## LITERARY CRITICISA IN ANCIENT INDIA

DR. RAMARANJAN MUKHERJI



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# LITERARY CRITICISM IN ANCIENT INDIA

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(c) by the author

FIRST EDITION, October 1966

SECOND EDITION, January 1990

Price: Rs. 300.00

#### First Edition:

Published by S. Bhattacharjee, Sanskrit Pustak Bhandar, 38 Bidhan Saranee, Calcutta-6, India. Printed by D. Dutta, Arunima Printing Works, 81 Simla Street, Calcutta-6.

#### Second Edition:

Published by S. Bhattacharjee, Sanskrit Pustak Bhandar, 38, Bidhan Sarani, Calcutta-6, and Text reprinted by Impressive Impression 10 Kartick Bose Street and *Title, Index* and *Chapter-7* printed at Arunima Printing Works, 81, Simla Street, Calcutta-700 006.

To
my father
Sri Amitaranjan Mukherji
in
affection and admiration

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#### Preface to the Second Edition

The first edition of 'Literary Criticism in Ancient India' had been out of print long back. My wife, Dr. (Mrs.) Arati Mukherji, had been insisting on publication of the second edition for a pretty long time. Sri Shyamapada Bhattacharyya, the Proprietor of the publishing concern also was pressing hard for revision of the work and making it up-to-date, so that the second edition could see light of the day in no time. Unfortunately, because of my administrative assignments, the work of making the book up-to-date could not be taken earlier, and the book had to remain out of market for several years. The inconvenience caused to the lovers of Sanskrit and students of Indian Aesthetics due to this is regretted.

In 'Literary Criticism in Ancient India', the plan followed by Mammața in his 'Kāvya Prakāśa' had generally been followed, and the approach of Sanskrit Poetics to the problems of Poetic Expression, the relation between Language and Meaning, the problem of Suggestions, the Theory of Aesthetic Experience and the controversy between Intellect and Emotion had been expounded in details. While giving a second thought to the contents, it was noted that the relevance of Sanskrit Literary Theories to Modern Literature should be discussed in order to show to the modern mind that these literary theories had not become things of past, and it was possible to evaluate specimens of Modern Poetry even by applying the yard-stick of adjudication, projected by Sanskrit Theoreticians. This explains the incorporation of the last chapter entitled 'Relevance of Sanskrit Literary Theories 'to Modern Poetry' in the second edition.

Now that my interest has shifted from Indian Aesthetics to Comparative Aesthetics, I have started analysing the works of Indian Literary Critics in the light of the principles formulated by Western Aesthetics and writings of Western Aesthets in the light of the doctrines propounded by Indian

Aesthetics. The result of this analysis has been fantastic, because the similarity between the thought-currents, projected by Indian Aesthetics and Western Aesthetics has appeared to be amazing. The last chapter incorporated in the second edition is likely to give an idea of this amazing similarity between two thought-currents.

I am extremely grateful to the lovers of Sanskrit and general readers, who did receive the first edition of the book with affection and appreciation. I am sure the second edition, which contains analysis of some of the Western Theories also will receive the same treatment from connoisseurs and general readers.

At this moment when the second edition of the book is going to see the light of the day I offer my respectful homage to the Divine Mother, whose unfailing blessings have enabled the second edition to see light, and put on record my appreciation of the encouragement received from my wife, Mrs. Arati Mukherji, my nephew, Sri Parthasarathi Mukherji and my grandson Sri Suryadip Sarkar. After all, the atmosphere which one has in home is responsible to a great extent for successful literary pursuits. This was maintained throughout by my wife, my nephew and our domestic assistants, Sri Rajendra Giri, Sri Tapan Naskar and Smt. Sailabala Halder. Thanks are due to all of them, as also to Sri Sourendranath Banerjee, who provided secretarial assistance in preparing type-script of the new chapter. The inspiration which I drew from my students, Dr. Sudhisankar Bhattacharya, Dr. Amarnath Bhattacharya and Dr. Samir Kumar Datta, is measureless. My profound gratitude is due to them.

The book is now being released for adjudication by lovers of Sanskrit.

Ramaranjan Mukherji

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#### ABBREVIATIONS

AP	Agnipurāṇa
ALS	Alaṃkārasarvasva
AK	Alamkārakaustubha
AB	Abhinavabhāratī
AS	Arthaśāstra
AV	Avaloka
AVC	Aucityavicāracarcā
BP	Bhāṣāpariccheda
BHS	Bhaktirasāmṛtasindhu
BS	Bhaktirasāyana
CL	Candrāloka
DR	Dasarūpaka
DL	Dhvanyāloka
EV	Ekāvali
KM	Kāvyamīmaṃsā
KL	Kāvyālaṃkāra
KD	Kāvyādarśa
KLS	Kāvyālaṃkārasūtra
KS	Kāvyānuśāsana
KK	Kavikanthābharana
SA	Kāvyaprakāśasaṃketa
KKK	Khandanakhandakhādya
KP	Kāvyaprakāśa
LC	Locana
MB	Mahābhāṣya
MD	Mānameyodaya
MP	Muktāphala
NS	Nāṭyaśāstra
NM	Nyāyamañjari

	(XII)	
NK	Nyāyakusumāñjali	
PR	Pradipa	CONTENTS
PLM	Paramalaghumañjūṣā	County I
PS	Prakāśa	CHAPTER I
PTS	Prītisandarbha	The Idea of Poetry:
RKL	Rudraṭakāvyālaṃkāra	Introduction—Benefits accruing
RG	Rasagangādhara	from Poetry—Poetry—What it is ?—Causal factors of Poetry—
SD	Sāhityadarpaṇa	Classification of Poetry.
SK	Sarasvatīkaņṭhābharaṇa	
SV	Ślokavārttika	CHAPTER II
SSP	Śabadaśaktiprakāśikā	Sound and Sense:
SM	Siddhāntamuktāvalī	Nature of Word and Meaning—
SP	Śṛṅgāraprakāśa	Abhidhā—the primary deno-
TC	Tattvacintāmani	tative Power—Lakṣaṇā—the
TV	Tantravārttika	secondary power of signification —Vyañjanā—the function of
TP	Tattvapradīpikā	paramount importance—Propo-
VP	Vākyapadīya	sition and its import.
VJ	Vakroktijīvita	
VL	Vāghbhaṭālaṃkāra	CHAPTER III
VB	Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇa	Sub-types of Poetry:
VSM	Vaiyākaraņasiddhānta-mañjūṣā	CHAPTER IV
VV	Vṛttivārttika	
VS	Vimarśinī	The Theory of Rasa:
VVV	Vyaktivivekavyākhyānam	Explanation of technical terms  —Theories on aesthetic expe-
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		other Defects.
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### LITERARY CRITICISM IN ANCIENT INDIA

#### CHAPTER I

#### THE IDEA OF POETRY

#### Introduction

In his famous work Kāvyamīmāmsā, the reputed critic Rājaśekhara incorporates an interesting story relating to the birth of Poetry and its marriage with Criticism. The story runs as follows:

The Goddess of learning was practising penance on the Himalayas with the desire of having a son. Pleased with her penance, Brahmā gave her a son, who was afterwards called Kavyapurusa. Immediately after his birth, this child addressed his mother in metrical speech and introduced his own self as the supreme speech—the Eternal Verbum, which is the material as well as the efficient cause of the universe, that has appearance only.1 At this Sarasvatī became greatly pleased and granted him this boon: may thou be the progenitor of metrical compositions: may sound and sense be your body, Sanskrit your face. Prākṛta your hands, Apabhramśa your thighs, Paiśāca your feet and a mixture of different Prakrtas your breast: may chiselled expressions be thy speech, Rasa thy soul, metres thy hair, riddles thy sport and figures thy instruments of decoration. Then as Sarasvatī placing the child on a slab of stone, situated2 close to a tree went to the heavenly Ganges to have a dip therein, the great sage Uśana approached the baby and thinking him to be helpless took him to his own hermitage. The baby addressed the sage in metrical expressions, whereupon he was greatly astonished and praised the Goddess of learning by poetical composition in his turn also. He referred to Sarasyatī as the milch cow of fine expression: though constantly milked by poets, her store of milk shows no sign of decline, whatsoever.3 As Uśana was the first to compose a verse, he was regarded as

Kavi. Another Kavi was Valmīki, who conducted Sarasvatī to the hermitage of Uśana and effected her reunion with the missing child; he, also, cursed in a verse4 the fowler, who pierced the she-bird into death of the pair of playing Krauncas, and thus attained fame as Adikavi. Once upon a time, while Sarasvatī was going to the celestial assembly as a judge, this child named Kavyapurus, persisted in following her; as he was desisted by mother, because as she pointed out, the gates of Brahmaloka are open only to one, who holds a permit to that effect from the supreme creator, he became angry and left the place in a hurry. This conduct of Kavyapurusa agitated his friend Kumara, who reported the whole thing to his mother Gauri, and she, also, in order to prevent him created Sahityavidyavadhu as his bride and asked her to follow him. The bride had to adopt various sorts of dress and dramatic devices to captivate the mind of her lover, who was completely won over by her at the end of the journey. The pair was then married in Vatsagulma by Gandharva from of marriage.

The Kavyapurus a described in this episode is Poetry and his bride Sahityavidya is the principle of literary criticism, which has for its another name Alamkāraśāstra. While Kautilya recognises four branches of learning, namely the different philosophical systems, the Vedas, the science of agriculture and Politics, Rajasekhara mentions this additional branch, namely Sahityavidya, which is claimed to be the foremost of all the branches. The word Sahitta seems to be derived from Sahita: when Poetry is defined as a combination of sound and sense, it is quite in the fitness of things that the science of criticism that propounds this definition is called Sahitya. Rajaśekhara himself says that, this branch deals with the different types of relation existing between śabda and artha. Bhoja in his Śrinjāraprakāśa clearly mentions these different types of relation, which are denotation, intention to convey a sense, purport, restriction of meaning, mutual connection effected by expectancy, compatability and proximity, ability, combination to convey a unified sense, association, rejection of defects, acceptance of Gunas, insertion of figures and presentation of emotional moods. This

observation of Bhoja gives us a glimpse of the different topics, dealt with in Alamkarasastra. The description of wedding as solemnized between Poetry and Criticism brings out their mutual interdependence and shows that neither the Art of Poetry goes without the Science of Poetry, nor does the latter thrive without the former. Criticism serves as a check to Poetry, which is unable to throw completely into winds the existing standards of criticism, and thereby helps Poetry to flourish. In fact, the value of a poetical composition is determined by its appeal to refined critics. The statement of Rajasekhara that Kavyapurusa, being completely captivated by Sāhityavidyāvadhū blindly follows her gives a succint hint to the idea that the productive activity of an artist is subordinated to the receptive activity of the person for whom he produces. Anandavardhana and Abhinavagupta maintain that, the pleasures of Poetry are not for the poet, but for those who enjoy it: they assume for this purpose a man of sound aesthetic instincts, who by dint of his trained intellectual power is able to identify himself easily with the events and characters described in Poetry or presented on stage—a man, to whom the final appeal of Poetry is supposed to be made. In a similar manner the science of criticism depends for its sustenance on the Art of Poetry, as there can be no principle of literary criticism without literature itself. For this reason, Dandin and Visvanatha begin their works with salutations to the Goddess of learning, who showers favours on Poets, and Mammata proceeds to sing hallelujahs to the Poet's speech straightway: this poet's speech, he says, unfolds a creation, which is unfettered by the rules of Providence, -is comprised of joy alone, -is not dependent on anything else, -and is charming on account of presentation of nine sentiments.8 These characteristic features of the creation of a poet's speech, Mammata points out, goes to establish its superiority over that of the supreme creator. First of all, Kavistsi is not governed by the laws of nature, that go to impose restrictions on Brahmasrsti; secondly, Kavisrsti is made up of unmixed bliss, inasmuch as, the appreciator of Poetry experiences nothing but joy irrespective of the nature of emotion, depicted by the Poet: Brahmasrsti, on the

other hand, is fashioned of three Gunas-Sattva, Rajas and Tamas, that lead respectively to pleasure, pain and infatuation, and consequently pure joy is not experienced in it. Thirdly, Kavi rsti is not dependent on any extraneous factor for its manifestation; it is said that, the poet is the supreme creator, according to whose sweet will the entire creation changes and takes up fresh shapes. Thus this creation does not stand in need of material, non-intimate or instrumental causes. It is not possible for Brahmasysti, however, to do away with these three types of causes: a jar is not produced without clay and potter, a piece of cloth without yarns and weaver, and so on. Fourthly, Kavisrsti is charming with nine Rasas or sentiments, namely the Erotic, the Comic, the Pathetic, the Furious, the Heroic, the Frightful, the Disgustful, the Quietistic and the Marvellous; in it the Rasas give nothing but delight; Brahmasysti, on the other hand, is comprised of six Rasas-madhura, amla, lavana, katu, kasaya and tikta, that are not uniformly pleasing. Thus it is clear that the productive activity of an artist and the receptive activity of an appreciator, -these two are mutually dependent on each other. This is corroborated by the observation of Abhinavagupta made in the introductory stanza of his Locana that, the essence of speech, which creates a novel world without taking the help of causal factors and makes dry and insipid universe soft and tasteful through delineation of sentiments, made by poetic faculty of the artist is identical with the combination of a poet and a critic.9

The concept of  $K\bar{a}vyapurusa$ , who is supposed to be an embodiment of whole literature is developed possibily on the analogy of the idea of Vedapurusa, who is described as being possessed of four horns in the shape of four forms of speech, namely  $Par\bar{a}$ ,  $Pa\dot{s}yant\bar{\imath}$ ,  $Madhyam\bar{a}$  and  $Vaikhar\bar{\imath}$ , three feet in the shape of past, present and future tenses, two heads in the form of transient and permanent sound-units, seven hands in the form of seven case-terminations; this supreme lord, it is said, fettered in breast, throat and head and fulfilling all objects of desire declares that his own self is the underlying principle of the entire universe. This proposition is rendered all the

more plausible by the statement of  $K \bar{a} vy apurus a$  that, he is nothing other than speech, of which the great creation is a Vivarta. The grammarian-philosopher Bhartrhari opens his Vakyapadīya with a reference to this subtlest from of speech, that is named Śabdabrahman; this supreme word, which is a highly subtle and metempirical principle, he says, is the supreme reality: it is without beginning and end and lies beyond time and space, and consequently, eludes all descriptions by means of positive and negative predicates. It is further pointed out that the supreme word is the efficient, as well as the material cause of phenomenal world, -efficient, when it manifests itself in the form of Kālaśakti, at whose dictates all other Kalās act and material, because it constitutes the changeless background to the stupendous panorama of the phenomenal world.10 The very fact that critics postulate the existence of Kavyapuruşa, who hears close similarity to Sabdabrahman or Vedapuruşa of the grammarian-philosophers goes to show the stupendous influence excercised by grammarians on critics, who develop their Alamkāraśāstra solely on the authority of Vyākarana.

The question whether Poetry has got any real utility or not is an interesting study. Mallinatha in his commentaries quotes an observation of ancients, in which an advice to eschew Poetry is tendered.11 It is pointed out that the stock-in-trade of a Poet is anything other than reality: he conducts men to dreamland of fancy, and thereby renders them incompetent to face the grim realities of ordinary world. As against this objection, the adherents of Poetry argue that, a poet seeks as much after truth as a Scientist or a Philosopher does: but whereas the scientist and the philosopher depend on such valid sources of knowledge as perception and inference, a poet relies only on his poetic intuition. The purpose of the poet, they say, is not to present truth of facts,-truth, that is found in the world of ordinary experience, but to delineate truth of probability,-truth, that is capable of leading one to the gateway of bliss. This highest truth is revealed to a poet, when his mind gets fully concentrated on depiction of a sentiment, or in other words, his poetic faculty starts functioning; and the highest Truth is nothing different

from the absolute reality, because Reality, Consciousness and Bliss are but the three aspects of the same Truth. In his Kavyanuśasana, Hemacandra maintains that, a poet is as much a seer as a painter, and the faculties of realisation of truth and description are blended harmoniously in him. 12 In support of his proposition, he quotes an observation of Bhattatota, according to which, though in Sastra, a simple seer is regarded as a Kavi, in ordinary world this term is used to signify one, who is able to describe in suitable language things revealed to his inward eye. Vision, he says, consists in an intuition, that is competent to find out hidden truth in things and moods: though from time immemorial, the Adikavi is endowed with this vision, yet poetry is said to originate from him only when he starts giving a graphic description of truths, realised by him, as a result of which Adikavya Ramayana is found. 18 Thus, as the composition of a poet, in whom the faculty of discovering truth combines with the power of describing moods, presents the highest truth in a charming manner, the charge that, a poet takes his stand on falsehood is untenable.

#### II

#### Benefits accruing from Poetry

The animadversion of the opponents that Poetry is to be put under taboo justifies fully the attempts of most of the  $\overline{Alam}$ ': $\overline{arikas}$  to enumerate the benefits that accrue from composition, as well as perusal of poetical works. The earliest writer to discuss on this topic is Bharata, according to whom the dramatic art brings relief and solace to minds, afflicted by sorrows and worries of this world, and as such is a pleasure-giving device. Bhāmaha thinks that, application to good poetry leads to proficiency in religion, riches, objects of enjoyment and salvation, as also in fine arts, and further to pleasure and fame. Following the footsteps of Bhāmaha, Viśvanātha maintains that, through Poetry even men of slow understanding attain easily the group of four—Dharma, Artha, Kāma and

Moksa. 15 Composition and recitation of verses, sung in praise of Lord Narayana and such other deities produce religious merits, and so Poetry in general is capable of being regarded as one leading to religious merit. Moreover, according to the Vedas, the objects of desire in their entirety are obtained in this world and the next through knewledge of one word only, and this happens, they say, because the subtlest form of word itself is the highest reality. Attainment of riches from composition as well as appreciation of Poetry is experienced in ordinary world, and wealth automatically leads to objects of enjoyment. Poetry is said to help attainment of salvation, as it renders men competent to grasp the real significance of the philosophical speculations of the Upanis ids. Visvanatha says that, the group of four is obtained with great difficulty by persons of mature intellect only through dull and insipid Sastras: but the same group is obtained with ease by dullards even through pleasing Kavya, and this goes to establish the superiority of the latter over the former. 16 Vamana is of opinion that, the purpose of Poetry is both seen and unseen, inasmuch as, it produces both pleasure and fame. 17. In his Sarasvatīkanthābharan i Bhoja makes an echo of the same observation. 18 Dhanañjaya thinks that Poetry does not lead to Dharma-Artha-Kama-Moksa nor to proficiency in fine arts as also to fame: what actually and mainly it produces is supreme bliss, consequential upon 19 aesthetic enjoyment. Abhinavagupta subscribes to the same view; the main purpose of Poetry, he says, is attainment of supreme bliss and this capacity differentiates it from scriptures and historical works: though Poetry leads to the group of four as also to proficiency, its chief purpose is delight. Establishing his opinion on this proposition of Abhinavagupta, Mammata proceeds to enumerate the benefits, that accrue from Poetry. These benefits, according to him are (a) fame, (b) acquisition of wealth, (c) knowledge of worldly ways, (d) destruction of inauspicious, (e) instantaneous and highest delight, and (f) attainment of advice in the charming manner of the beloved. Acquisition of same is found in case of Kal'dasa, who collected massive reputation by composing monumental works, and that

of riches in case of Dhavaka, who is supposed to have amassed a great fortune by dedicating the three dramas, that are ascribed to king Harsa to his royal patron. In a similar manner, an illustration of destruction of evil through Poetry is afforded by the case of poet Mayura, who is said to have been cured of leprosy by composing a collection of hundred stanzas in eulogy of the Sun-God. Poetry leads further, to knowledge of appropriate etiquettes of royal courts, that play an important part in maintaining the stream of culture. It is said that, one of the purposes of poetry is this that, it conveys advice in the manner of a beloved in the following form: 'One should act like Rama and never like Ravana'. Word, the critics say is of three kinds: (a) that resembling a master's command (Prabhusammita-vakya) (b) that resembling a friend's request (Sul rdscmmita-vakya), and (c) that resembling a lady-love's speech (Kantasammita-vakya). The words of the Vedas are like those of a master: they tender advice, no doubt, but their way is the way of a master, who issues summary commands: the words of the Puranas are like those of a friend: they tender counsel indirectly in the way of an well-wisher, who only points. out to the good and bad effects of different actions; the Vedas give prominence to enjoining words, which are incapable of being replaced by synonymns or of being arranged in a different order, while the historical and legendary works lay stress on meanings. The words of Poetry, however, are like those of the beloved; just as a lady attracts her husband first towards her by means of side-glance and deep embrace and then conveys the desired counsel in an ineffably sweet and indescribable manner and makes the husband accept it without his feeling that he is made to swallow something, similarly a Poetry draws, first of all, the minds of princes, averse to ethics towards it by depicting emotional moods, and then administers the medicine of instruction in such a way that the bitterness of the medicine is not experienced. Poetry does not directly command, but it makes the readers and spectators experience the goodness of virtuous path through identification with the focus of the poetic or dramatic situation. In it neither the sound-element is prominent

as in the Vedas, nor is the expressed sense-element so, as in the Puranas: here both these factors are subordinated to an unexpressed emotional mood of paramount importance, for the suggestion of which these two expend their energies. Mammata, following Abhinavagupta maintains that, these purposes are only of secondary importance, and the prime purpose of Poetry consists in attainment of instantaneous and supreme bliss, that springs from Rasasvala. Rasa, the critics say, is a blissful state of ego in which knowledge of all other knowables vanishes,-a transcendental state, produced from perception of Poetry. At the time of appreciation of Poetry, a connoisseur of poetic art experiences nothing but pleasure, and this, according to Mammata, constitutes the crestmark of all benefits, accruing from it. Mammata describes Kavya as the creation of a poet, expert in drawing extra-ordinary and striking descriptions: the descriptions, contained in it, he says, are not of ordinary world; they are charming and attractive. In reply to the question as to how this metamorphosis of ordinary description into an extraordinary one takes place, Mammata refers to the magic power of suggestion, that is said to work behind this transformation. In a Poetry, he maintains, the process of suggestion of sentiment is of supreme importance, and sound and sense play only a subsidiary role to that suggested sentiment20. These observations establish beyond doubt the contention that, Mammataregards the essentiality of Rasa in Kavya. Hemacandra considers that, the benefits that accrue from Poetry are only three in number: they are supreme bliss, springing from Rasāsvā la, acquisition of fame, and attainment of a counsel in the ineffably charming manner of a beloved. Of these three, instantaneous and supreme delight is of paramount importance, and it is obtained equally by a poet and a connoisseur of poetic art, while the second and the third are achieved respectively by a poet and a refined appreciator. Hemacandra says that, as acquisition of riches, knowledge of worldly ways and destruction of evil are capable of being obtained from Sastras and other factors, they are not benefits, accruing from Kavya alone, and so he does not include them in the list of Kavyaprayojanas<sup>21</sup>. In support to the contention of Mammata, that is shared by Hemacandra, that in a  $K\overline{a}vya$  sound and sense are subordinated to the function of suggestion, the latter quotes a statement of Bhatṭanāyaka, who in drawing the line of demarcation between the scopes of the Śāstras, the Purāṇas and the Kāvyas, clearly mentions that, while in the first prominence belongs to word, and in the second that to expressed meaning, in the third prominence belongs only to that function, that is competent to effect enjoyment of  $Rasa^{2}$ .

The observations of Mammata and Hemacandra that, Poetry produces supreme bliss and at the same time tenders counsel in the charming manner of the beloved bring out the supreme power of Poetry to establish harmony between the good (Śreyas) and the pleasant (Preyas), that are described as irreconcilable in the Upanisads. The conflict between the Good and the Pleasant, so emphasised by the seers of the Upanisads arise only in the empirical plane: in the trancendental plane however they are identical in essence, because the Good and the Pleasant are but two aspects of the same Absolute Reality. As Poetry removes the veil of ignorance of an appreciator and conducting him to a higher plane of consciousness induces him to realise the blissportion of his own self, that is nothing different from Good, the so-called conflict between Sreyas and Preyas is not experienced by him: on the other hand, what he experiences is identity between the two. The power by which Poetry lifts a connoisseur of poetic art to the transcendental plane, the Dhvaniva lin says, is nothing other than the function of Vyanjana: it eliminates the idea of unpleasant from the Good, and at the same time, introduces the idea of Good into the Pleasant.

#### III

#### Poetry-what it is?

The question of utility of Poetry leads us to a more important question of formulating a correct definition of  $K\bar{a}vya$ . From the very beginning of  $Alamk\bar{a}ras\bar{a}stra$ , attempts have been made

to propound this definition in clear-cut terms, but storm of controversy on this issue has never ceased to exist. The earliest critic to define Poetry from the standpoint of a spectator of dramatic performance is Bharata, according to whom, for a spectator of a dramatic performance, good poetry is that, which is composed of delicate and beautiful words and is easy to understand,-which is not bereft of logic and is capable of being combined with dance, and in which various emotional moods are depicted and different dramatic unities observed.23 This definition is not definition of Poetry in gener, I, but of a particular branch, namely Drśyakavya, and as such, does not merit consideration. The next critic Bhamaha makes the grammatical connection of sound and sense his starting point, and defines Poetry as word and meaning taken together.24 Later rhetoricians point out that this definition is competent enough to differentiate a piece of poetic creation from the Vedic texts and the historical works, because while in a work of poetic art sound and sense are of equal importance, in the Vedas and the Itihasas the sound and sense-elements are of greater importance respectively. Bhamaha himself introduces the view-point of those, who regard the sound-element as of more importance, and as such the figures belonging to sound as essential to the very existence of Kavya, as also of those, according to whom, the sense-element is of prime importance, and consequentially, the figures belonging to sense confer the status of Poetry upon a combination of sound and sense, and finally gives his own judgement that, as in a work of poetic art both the sound and sense-elements are of equal importance, figures belonging to both are covetable in it.25 The decision of Bhamaha not only shows equal prominence given to language and meaning in his system, but at the same time betrays his greatest regard for the principle of embellishment, to signify which he uses the term Vakrokti. Bhamaha's Alamkara denotes the assemblage of poetic figures, like anuprasa, upama and the like, and Vakrokti refers to a strikingness of expression, that underlies all figures of speech : he thinks that, in order to constitute a poetic expression, an ordinary expression has got to deviate from its normalcy, so that it may

acquire charm, and it is this deviating strikingness of expression that is connoted by the term Vakrokti. Thus, Vakrokti is an essential principle of an  $Alamk\bar{a}ra$ , and necessarily of  $K\bar{a}vya$  itself.

Dandin realises the difficulty of adumbrating an accurate definition of Poetry, because it depends as much on the psychological conditions of an appreciator as on the use of refined expressions and presentation of charming meanings. The same work of Poetic Art is relished in different ways by men of different dispositions, and consequently, the only answer to the question, what is Poetry is this that, one, which is relished or taken interest in as Poetry is Poetry. Considering from this point of view, the whole of a history or a biography is capable of being regarded as Poetry by a person, who relishes it as such. In his 'Defence of Poetry' P.B. Shelley correctly remarks: 'The parts of a composition may be poetical, without the composition as a whole being a poem. A single sentence may be considered as a whole, though it may be found in the midst of a series of unassimilated portions; a single word even may be a spark of inextinguishable thought'. The definitions of Poetry, as found in treatises on Alamkara impart to us only the views of their propounders as accurately as the medium of language permits, and this explains the plethora of criticisms, levelled against the definition of one by others holding different views on the subject. To obviate this difficulty, Dandin, instead of formulating a difinition gives us only a description of Kavyaśarīra, which, according to him, is comprised of well-arranged words, expressive of an intended idea.26 He uses the term ista to signify this desired sense, and in explaining this, his commentators say that, this is a charming idea. Although Dandin recognises the necessity of a beautifying principle in Kāvya, he does not, like Bhāmaha, regard the individual poetic figures as the sole means of beautifying a Kāvya. In this connection, he introduces a dissertation on the two modes or kinds of poetic diction, that are supposed to differ widely from each other. It is said that, on the essentials of a poetic creation, the up-holders of Vaidarbha-marga hold a view

that is completely different from that, followed by the champions of Gaudiya-marga: while the former prefer grace and lucidity in Kavya, the latter are much in favour of grandeur and verbosity. Dandin shows partiality towards Vaidarbha-marga, whose essence is said to consist in employment of ten Gunas. enumerated by him, and it is asserted that, a contrariety to these ten excellences is often traced in Gaudiya-marga.27 He defines an Alankara as a quality that imparts beauty to a poetic creation and maintains that, some of these Alamkaras are competent enough to differentiate these two types of poetic diction.28 This observation shows that, Dandin regards a Guna and an Alamkara as identical in nature, both being means of the same beautifying principle; the only difference between them lies in the fact that, while a Guna is an Alamkara peculiar to Vaidarbha-marga, a poetic figure is an Alamkara common to both the types of diction.

Vamana is of opinion that, a combination of sound and sense. beautified by Guna and Alamkara constitutes Poetry: the term Kavya, he says, is often used figuratively to signify the idea of a simple combination of language and meaning. He thinks that, each and every association of sound and sense is incapable of being regarded as Kavya, and what actually bestows the dignity of a poetic expression on an ordinary linguistic expression is the Alamkara. This Alamkara is not to be taken in its ordinary sense of poetic figures only: it conveys, as well, the idea of poetic beauty in general, and that constitutes the real connotation of the term<sup>29</sup>. A Poetry, he further maintains, is rendered beautiful by insertion of excellences and poetic figures and rejection of defects. In this Vamana agrees with Bhamaha and Dandin that, a beautifying principle is of prime importance in a work of poetic art. But while Bhamaha does not introduce the concept of Gunas, and Dandin does not make any difference between Guna and Alamkara, he attempts for the first time, to draw a clear-cut line of demarcation between these two elements. While Dandin keeps himself content with furnishing a description of Kavyaśarīra only, and does not probe into the factor, that constitutes the soul of a poetic creation, the question as to 16

what constitutes this soul is, for the first time, posed by Vamana, who in answer to it declares Riti, or diction as forming the essence of Poetry. Rīti, he says, is a particular arrangement of words, and the factors, that bring out this particularity in arrangement are the elements known as Gunas. Vamana speaks of three types of diction-Vaidarbhī, Gaudīyā and Pancali: of these three, the first one is said to be possessed of all the ten excellences, the second of only two-Ojas and Kanti and the third one of other two-Madhurya and Saukumarya. The importance of diction is pointed out by comparing it to the lines in a painting, and by saying that, just as a picture gets itself established on a few lines, similarly Poetry also takes its stand on Rīti. Vāmana is in favour of adoption of Vaidarbhī type of diction, as it is endowed with all Gunas: his advice is to eschew the other two types, as they are possessed of very few excellences. It is curious to note that, though Vamana regards Poetry as a combination of sound and sense, beautified by Guna and Alamkara, he does not recognise the essentiality of Alamkara in Kavya. He thinks that, Gunz produces beauty—the beauty that entitles a particular composition to be called Kavya, and Alumkara only heightens the beauty thus produced. Thus while Gunz is an essential means of embellishment in Poetry, an Alamkara is a non-essential means, going only to heighten the beauty thus created by the Gunas. The Guna, therefore, being essential for the very existence of Poetry is described as Nitya, implying that the Alamkara is Anitya 80.

Regarding his views on the definition of Poetry or on the factors, whose presence converts an ordinary expression into a poetic one, Udbhaṭa leaves us in complete darkness, because his only work that has been recovered explains merely the characteristic features of a few Alamkāras. In his treatment of poetic figures Udbhaṭa closely tollows the tradition of Bhāmaha, and puts much premium on a number of decorative devices, by which poetic expression is capable of being rendered attractive. Rudraṭa defines Poetry simply as an association of sound and sense, and influenced possibly by Daṇḍin and Vāmaṇa speaks of four types of diction: Pañcalī, Laṭīyā. Gaudīyā and Vaidarbhī.

Of these Pancali is characterised by short, Lativa by medium and Gaudīvā by long compound-words, while Vaidarbhī is marked by entire absence of compounds. The acceptance of compounds as the criterion of classifying Ritis betrays the viewpoint of Rudrata that diction belongs altogether to the province of words. His advice is to use such expression as is competent to bring out as much idea as is intended,—an expression, that becomes a complete unit through rejection of defects and insertion of decorative devices. He further maintains that, such words and such arrangements are to be preferred, as go to render a creation really charming. 81 These observations of Rudrata show his fondness for the principle of beauty of poetic expression, but it is a pity that instead of discussing this principle in detail, he proceeds to give an elaborate and exhaustive treatment of the poetic figures, adding a good number to the old ones, treated by Bhamaha, Dandin, Vamana and Udbhata. Although these writers do not realise the truth that, poetic expression being a manifestation of the personality of the poet is bound to differ in each case, and as such poetic figures or modes of expression are incapable of being grouped under a few fixed heads or categories, and proceed to add new Alamkaras to the list of already existing ones, they give a good start to Poetics by underlining the importance of beauty in a poetic expression, which, they think, is added to it by Gunas and Alamkaras, that belong only to its outward form.

Coming to Anandavardhana, we find the emphasis shifted from the external elements of Poetry to a much more intimate factor,—from Gunas and Alamkāras—to Dhvani. This learned critic, like Dandin, realises the difficulties involved in formulation of a definition of Poetry, and accordingly, avoids this question carefully. In reply to the question as to what constitutes the soul of a Poetic creation, Anandavardhana points out to the unexpressed content and opines that, manifestation of this content, alone, is sufficient enough to extend recognition as good poetry to a combination of souna and sense, although it is bereft of figures of speech and charming expressions. In explaining his doctrine, his commentator Abhinavagupta says that,

words and expressed meanings, being comprehended by all constitute the body of Poetry, and the very fact that an ordinary expression, though consisting in an association of word and expressed meaning is not regarded as a specimen of Kavya goes to show that, there is a factor, other than these two, that constitutes the true essence of Poetry, and this factor, he says, is nothing other than an implicit idea. According to Anandavardhana, a suggested sense manifests itself in any one of these three aspects: (a) in the aspect of a fact (Vastu), (b) in the aspect of an imaginative mood (Alamkara), and (c) in the aspect of an emotional mood (Rasa). Although from the point of theory, he considers each of these three aspects of suggested meaning as imparting life to Poetry, his real leaning is towards Rasadhvani, and it is not incorrect to draw such a conclusion from his observation that, practically he regards a suggested emotional mood as the correct secret of a Poetic Art. Reasons that enable one to draw such a conclusion are furnished, firstly, by the observation, which he makes, while giving a historical note on the creation of Kavya,—the observation that, history reveals Rasadhvani as forming the soul of a Poetic creation, inasmuch as, the Ramayana is only an outward manifestation of tragic emotion, aroused in the mind of the poet, on hearing the lamentations of Krauñca, separated from its consort, and secondly, by the explanation, furnished by him of Gunrs and Alamkaras,—the explanation that, these elements are related not to sound and sense, but to emotional mood alone. In sharp contrast to the views held by writers belonging to pre-dhvani school that, Gunas are dharmas of sabda and artha, Anandavardhana holds that, really, they are qualities, inhering Rasa—the soul of a Poetry, and when one describes them as qualities belonging to sound and sense, he only says so figuratively. In Anandavardhana, we find an attempt to hold a psychological analysis of an appreciator; as he says, the three qualities-Walhurya, Ojas and Prasala, postulated by him lies at the root of production of three types of mental states, produced from perception of Poetry, delineating different sentiments. Similarly, the poetic figures, he holds, though belonging to śabda and artha go really to augment the beauty of the emotional mood, that creates them in its urge to manifest itself. But although, Anandavardhana betrays his partiality for Rasadhvani, he takes care to maintain his original position that, Dhvani, in general, constitutes the soul of Poetry, and accordingly quotes copious illustrations of Vastudhvani and Alamkaradhvani, alike. The consideration, that prompts him to take this stand is possibly to grant recognition as good specimens of Poetry to descriptions of natural objects, drawn by hosts of poets, in which the revelation of Rasa is not so clear. 32 His commentator Abhinavagupta. however, does not like to hold this double stand: he declares Rasadhvani, alone, as forming the soul of Poetry and maintains that, the suggestion of Vastu and Alamkara ultimately terminates in that of Rasa. This assertion gives Vastudhvani and Alamkaradhvani practically the same status with that of expressive word and expressed meaning, -elements, that constitute only the means to the ultimate end-Rasadhvani, but the commentator tries to justify the statement that Vastudhvani and Alamka. radhvani also form the essence of a Poetic Art by saying that, when facts and figures are comprehended through the function of suggestion, they acquire inexplicable charm, and consequential superiority to varyartha, that renders them fit to secure the status of the soul of Poetry. 38 Thus, in the view of Abhinavagupta, although the terms Vastu-dhvani and Alamkara-dhvani are capable of being explained away as figurative expressions. Dhvanitva in the strictest sense of the term belongs to Rasa alone. Following the footsteps of this great commentator, all later writers show a decided partiality for Rasadhvani.

It is curious to note that though Abhinavagupta declares the essentiality of Rusa in Poetry, without which there could be no Kāvya, he criticises Bhaṭṭanāyaka, when the latter attempts to explain away the Prākṛta stanza: 'Bhama Dhammia' etc. as an example of manifestation of Rasa. Bhaṭṭanāyaka is of opinion that in the stanza under consideration, it is the realisation of Frightful sentiment that leads to cognition of the muchtalked-of negation, because the religious-minded person who is afraid of the lion naturally keeps away from the grove, infested

with the mighty lion. In reply to this Abhinavagupta points out that, the Frightful sentiment is not realised by the religiousminded person, who becomes a victim to its basic feeling fear only: this Frightful sentiment, if it is realised at all, is experienced by a man of poetic sensibility alone. He further points out that, a semblance of eratic emotion is really experienced in the stanza, and maintains that, by affording recognition to Rasa, Bhattanayaka practically accepts the position of the Dhvanivadin, the difference between the stands of the two lying in the fact that, while a Dhvanivadin recognises this that, the centre of gravity in a Poetic creation may lie in its material and its imagination, as much as in its emotional element, Bhattanayaka holds that it is an emotional element that is of prime importance in Poetry. Bhattanayaka is of opinion that, whereas in the Sastra, Sabda predominates and in the Akhyana Artha, in the Kavya both these elements are subordinated to the Vyāpāra. This he says, is three-fold in nature: Abhidhā, Bhāvakatva Vyāpāra, and Bhojakatva: Abhidhā presents the Vibhāvas, Anubhavas and Vyabhicaribhavas,-Bhavakatva accomplishes generalisation of these factors as also of others, -Bhojakatva brings Sattvaguna into prominence and ultimately leads to manifestation of one's pure consciousness. In explaining the observation of Ruyyaka that although Bhattanayaka affords recognition to Dhvani, he does not realise its essentiality in Kāvya, Jayaratha quotes a verse, ascribed to Bhattanāyaka, according to which even though Dhvani is an established entity, it is only an element and not an essence of Poetry, and maintains that, the learned critic belongs to that class of objectors, who do not deny the existence of Dhvani, but declare it as lying beyond the province of words.34 In commenting upon this verse, ascribed to Bhattanayaka, Abhinavagupta observes that, the statement of the learned critic that, Dhavani constitutes only an element and not an essence of Poetry relates only to fact and imaginative mood, because he himself by postulating the existence of a function known as Bhojakatva affords recognition to emotional mood or Rasa.35 These interpretations of the views of Bhattanāyaka made by ancient scholars distinctly show that according to this great critic Rasa is of essential importance in Poetry.

The importance of Rusa is recognised equally by Dhananjaya: he is of opinion that, everything in this world whether it is delightful or detestable,-high or low,-gross or elegant,occult or deformed, -entity or nonentity, when touched by the imagination of a poet and a man of cultivated taste becomes helpful towards realisation of Rasa. This Rasa, he thinks is brought into comprehension through Tatparya or Purport, consisting in the intention of the speaker, and consequently, the Vibhavas, Anubhavas and Vyabhicaribhavas stand in the same relation to Rasa as do the imports of individual terms to the import of the whole proposition. For this reason, the postulation of a separate function known as Vyanjanā in order to account for manifestation of Rasa is unnecessary. Dhanika maintains that the relation existing between a Rasa and a Kāvya is not that as exists between a suggestor and a suggested: it is one of Bhavya-Bhavakabhava, or in other words, Poetry makes the emotional moods sensed. The observations of Dhanañjaya and Dhanika are sufficient to show that both of them underline the importance of Rasa in Kavya. 36

Rājaś khara, influenced possibly by Vāmaṇa, describes Poetry as a sentence possessing literary excellences and embellished by Poetic figures, but at the same time, he does not fail to bring Rasa into prominence. He introduces a novel topic on maturity or  $P\overline{a}ka$  in Poetry and discusses different views on the nature of this  $P\overline{a}ka$ . Maṅgala is of opinion that, it is a literary finish, obtained through proper combination of nouns and verbs: other scholars fail to agree with Maṅgala on this issue; they define  $P\overline{a}ka$  as the competency of a Poet to select suitable words and to put them in appropriate places. Avantisundarī ridicules both these views and maintains that, maturity consists in use of Guna,  $Alamk\overline{a}ra$ ,  $R\overline{a}ti$ , Sabda, Artha and Bandha in consonance with the Rasa, intended to be depicted by the Poet. Rājaśekhara is fully in agreement with her so far as this doctrine is concerned,—a doctrine, that

reminds one of the observations of Ānandavardhana that, in a work of poetic art, words, meanings, literary excellences, poetic figures and styles have no distinct status of their own,—all of them being dependent absolutely on Rasa. The contradiction existing between Rājaśekhara's description of Poetry and his definition of maturity is not to be taken too seriously, because the work is more a convenient handbook on the discipline of Poets than a treatise dealing with general principles of Poetics.<sup>3 7</sup>

The important place assigned to Rasa in a poetic creation retains itself in the speculations of Bhoja, whose Sarasvatikanthabharana is probably a compilation based on the model of the earlier work Agnipurana. Although Bhoja does not give any indication of his awareness of the doctrine of Dhvani, adumbrated by Anandavardhana, he recognises the essentiality of Rasa in Kāvya, and puts a great deal of emphasis on it. This is evident from the fact that, he defines Poetry as a composition, free from blemishes, endowed with literary excellences, decorated with figures of speech and overflowing with emotion. This definition is merely an expansion of the definition, propouuded by the compiler of Agnipurana, formed by addition of the element of Rasa to the essential characteristics mentioned in the latter, according to which, Poetry is a sentence, shining with figures, possessed of excellences and bereft of blemishes.38 Bhoja, however, does not point out clearly the relation which the Gunas, Alamkaras and Dosas bear to Rasa, and Dr. S. K. De rightly observes that, 'his conception of Rasa bears resemblance to that of the utpatti-vadins'. By recognising the truth that, possession of literary excellences and poetic figures converts an ordinary expression into a poetic one, Bhoja stages a go-back to the old systems of Bhamaha, Dandin and Vamana, but at the same time by inclusion of Rasa in the list of differentia of Poetry he betrays unknowingly the influence exercised on him by the critics of Kashmira tradition, the main protagonists of which are Anandavardhana and Abhinavagupta. In Śrngara-Prakāśa Bhoja declares Śrigāra as the sole Rasa, but his concept of this Śrigara is completely different from its ordinary notion, which makes it identical with the Erotic. According to him, Śṛṅgāra is the specific inherent quality of the Ego, that forms the very basis of desire. As Rasa is a blissful state of the Ego, each of its types is based on this inherent quality that renders Rasāsvāda possible.

Ksemendra takes the essentiality of Rasa for granted and posits Propriety as constituting the very life of a poetic creation, that is known to depict emotions; the literary excellences and poetic figures, he says, beautify only the external form of a poetry, being acquired attributes, and the principle that enlivens all these elements is that of appropriateness.40 In elaborating this doctrine, he further states that, a poetic figure augments the beauty of a poetic expression only when it is inserted properly in an appropriate place: in this respect it is similar to an ordinary instrument of decoration, that renders a body charming only when worn in proper place. Thus a girdle placed on neck, a necklace worn in waist, an anklet displayed in arm, a bangle arranged in foot-all these make a frame all the more ludicrous; in a similar manner, valour shown to a refugee and compassion to an enemy subject a man to criticism, instead of acquiring praise for him. Ksemendra remarks that, the same thing happens in case of Gunas and Alamkaras belonging to Poetry: without Aucitya they fail to become instruments of embellishment.41 In reply to the question as to what constitutes Propriety, he says that, that which is suited to a certain thing is called proper and its abstract notion is called Propriety. This Propriety, he continues, has application with reference to various points, such as the word and the sentence, the import of the composition, the literary excellence and poetic figure, the sentiment, the verb, the case, the gender, the number, the adjective, the prefix, the particle, the surroundings, the family, the vow, the truth, the force, the purpose, the summarisation, the intuition, the stage, the thought, the nomenclature, the benediction and such other essentials of Poetry. Although Ksemendra mentions sentiment or Rasa as one of the numerous elements pervaded by propriety, a careful analysis of his work reveals his firm conviction that the test of Aucitya lies in

suggestion of Rasa. Thus the principle of Propriety, based as it is on the contention of Anandavardhana that, there is no other circumstance which leads to the violation of Rasa other than impropriety, and the supreme secret of Rasa consists in observing the established rules of Propriety42—is nothing original in itself, but the chief credit of the critic lies in the application of Aucitya to various points in a Poem in such a manner that, the aspiring poet realises the importance of Rasa and knows what is right and proper in Poetry. As Ksemendra is mainly a writer on Kavisikśā, he furnishes profuse illustrations of Aucitya concerning every point, and thereby brings home to a prospective poet his thesis that, in a Poetry, words, meanings, literary excellences, poetic figures and such other elements are to be so arranged as they go to help the manifestation of Rasa. In his Kavikanthābharana Ksemendra expresses his opinion that, Camatkara constitutes the very life of Poet and Poetry: a composition, bereft of this element, he says, is like gold without any priceless gem to illumine it, and is as unattractive as the youth of a lady, devoid of grace. Ksemendra speaks of ten kinds of Camatkara, which are enumerated as follows: charm, which one accrues without deliberation, that for which one has to delib rate, that which pervades a whole composition, that which resides in a part of a verse, that found in words, that traced in meanings, that noticed in sound and sense, that residing in figures of speech, that existing in sentiment and that found in the story of a famous personality.43 The concept of Camatkara is not a novel one, because the learned Dhvanikara and Abhinavagupta use this expression several times in their compositions. Dr. Raghavan thinks that originally the term Camatkara was an onomatopoeic word referring to the clicking sound we make with our tongue when we taste something snappy, and in course of its semantic enlargements, it came to mean a sudden fillip relating to any feeling of a pleasurable type .44 Thus it refers to delight, that arises in the mind of an appreciator on reading a poem, and as such, comprehends all the poetical elements-Guna, Alamkara, Rīti, Vrtti, Dhvani and Rasa, By recognising the essentiality of Camatkara or literary delight,

Ksemendra makes a new approach to the problem of Poetry: he thinks that in order to constitute poetic expression a composition has got to be relished or enjoyed, whether this enjoyment is due to sound-effect or to depth of meaning, or to insertion of poetic figures or to depiction of moods: he is of opinion that, it is this ability to cause artistic delight that differentiates a poetic expression from an ordinary linguistic one.

Coming to Kuntaka we find the emphasis shifted from external appendages and even from the unexpressed content to the imaginative faculty of the Pcet, that gives a new turn to an expression and enables it to bloom into the flower of Poetry: in the whole range of Sanskrit Alamkarikas he is the only critic to give the creative faculty of the Poet its due share by including it in the definition of Kavya, -others only mentioning it, as one of the causal factors of poetic creation. He makes Bhamaha's conception of Poetry his starting point and defines it as a combination of sound and sense, arranged in a composition, shining with strikingness of expression, effected by the skill of the poet,-a composition that causes delight to the connoisseurs of poetic art. 45 In explaining this definition he, first of all, sets at rest all controversies, concerning the problem whether word alone constitutes Poetry or meaning alone does it, and maintains that, as the ability to cause delight is present both in language and idea, as is oil in each seed, -both are of equal importance in it. He further asserts that, in Kavya sound and sense are arranged in perfect unison, -the language going to render the meaning charming and the meaning trying to make the language attractive. A piece of poetic creation in which the beauty of sound alone flatters the ear or the depth of import alone captivates the mind is not, for this reason, regarded as a specimen of good Poetry: a lofty idea, conveyed through an expression, not befitting it, Kuntaka says, is as good as dead, and in a similar manner, a beautiful expression, significant of an idea, not suiting the occasion is as hated as a disease. From this it follows that, of a number of synonymous words, the word used by the poet alone conveys the intended idea and the meaning presented by him alone causes delight by its own nature: it is difficult to alter a word or the position of a word, without making the poet say something worse, than he does say.46 In reply to the question as to what lies behind the harmonious blending of language and meaning, as is found in Poetry, Kuntaka points out to Vakrokti, which is explained as a mode of expression, to which charm is infused by the skill of the poet. Thus in the doctrine of Kuntaka, ultimate emphasis is laid on imaginative faculty of the Poet, that gives a new turn to expression and arranges language and meaning in unison. Taking this broad connotation of Vakrokti, Kuntaka maintains that, this Vakrokti constitutes the only possible embellishment or Alamkara of Poetry.47 As this Alamkara is a part and parcel of Poetry, it is incapable of being removed from that; embellished sound and sense constitute Kavya, and it is not proper to say that Alamkara belongs to Kavya, for this statement is likely to suggest that, it is possible for a Poetry to exist without it.48 Kuntaka speaks of six different types or Vakrata, created by Kavi-vyapara: these are varna-vinyasavakratā, pada-vūrvārdhavakratā, pada-parārdhavakratā, vākyavakrata, prakarana-vakrata and prabandha-vakrata. Of these six types, the first consists in peculiar use of letters, the second in peculiar use of synonyms, conventional words, words used in their secondary meanings, attributive words, covert expressions, compounds and suffixes, roots, gender and verb and the third in peculiar use of tense, case, number, voice, person, particle and indeclinable. The fourth type of vakrata namely vakyavakratā consists in charming presentation of Rasa, attractive description of Svabhava, and pleasing introduction of Alamkara: it comprehends, according to Kuntaka, the concept of individual poetic figures. The fifth and sixth types of Vakrata relate respectively to 'peculiarity of topic and strikingness of composition. The emphasis laid by him on Vakrata, of which Rasa is only one aspect leads the scholars to believe that Kuntaka developes an altogether new system, opposed to the doctrine of Dhvani: in fact, Ruyyaka categorically mentions that Kuntaka, comprehends the concept of Dhvani under such varieties of Vakratā as upacāravakratā and the like, and thereby, throws

open the suggestion that, he belongs to that group of scholars opposed to the theory of Dhyani, who like to equate Dhyani with Laksanā. A careful analysis of Kuntaka's work, however, reveals him to be an out and out Dhvanivadin, who not only recognises the supreme importance of Rasa and Svabhava, but at the same time realises the truth of Anandavardhana's doctrine that, propriety constitutes the secret of all composition. For this reason while defining varna-vinyasa-vakrata, he expresses his opinion that, letters appropriate to the context only are to be inserted and certain sounds, though unsuited to certain situations are capable of helping the idea and Rasa in other situations. This reminds one of the observations of the learned Dhvanikara that, such defects as unmelodiousness and the like are anityadosas, detrimental as they are to manifestation of the Erotic, but favourable to that of the Heroic, and testifies to his conviction that, such letters are to be used as are competent to bring Rasa into comprehension49. Then again his observation that such alliteration to create which a poet does not stand in need of taking recourse to a strenous effort and in which repeated letters are often changed creates a case of varna-vakrata echoes practically the doctrine of Anandavardhana that a figure for the improvisation of which special effort is necessary on the part of the poet is not organically related to Poetic Art and that the same sound-effect is not to be continued at great length<sup>50</sup>. In elaborating this principle of varna-vinyasa-vakrata, Kuntaka further states that, though the poetic figure Yamaka is recognised as a case of one such Vakrata, it lacks in beauty in other respect and as such, he refrains from discussing this element in detail: here, he continues, no life, other than a strikingness of expression is cognised. This observation, which is nothing but an expansion of Anandavardhana's thesis that, such obscure figures as Yamaka and the like are incapable of being related intimately to poetic art, because for their improvisation a good deal of effort is necessary on the part of the Poet, who has to search after suitable words-brings into light his idea that, other than strikingness of expression there is an entity that gives the

very life to a poetic creation 51. Then again while concluding his discussion on Viśesanz-vakrata, Kuntaka maintains that application of adjectives, suited to the situation render a Poetry charming, because it brings Rasa to a relishable state, or in other words, helps in the manifestation of emotional mood 52. By extending recognition to Samvri-vakrata, which consists in concealment of an idea and its expression through another mode with the help of pronouns and the like in order to create charmas one of the main types of Vakrata, Kuntaka accepts the principle of Anandavardhana and Abhinavagupta that, charm is associated with concealment, and consequently, while a touch of suggestion makes an idea charming, that of denotation makes it unattractive 5.3. Anandavardhana mentions suggestiveness of a suffix, and following him, Kuntaka, also, ennmerates Pratyayavakrata as one of the varieties of Vakrata: this vakrata, he says, consists in use of proper suffixes, as are competent to suggest the intended idea or emotion. Kuntaka thinks that of a number of synonymous words used in different gender, the one used in feminine is to be preferred, because the gender itself is charming and is able to bring Rasa into comprehension, even though other forms of strikingness are not there: he introduces, in this connection, the topic of Linja-vakrata, which consists in use of a gender, that suits the occasion by means of its effectiveness in suggesting the intended emotion 54. In a similar manner Kuntaka's Kalavakrata and Samkhya-vakrata consist respectively in propriety of tense and number or in other words, in their effectiveness in suggesting the idea or emotion. With reference to Pada-vakrata, he says that, it is indication of an emotional mood through prefixes and indeclinables in such a way that the mood manifested flashes forth as the sole life of the expression: this statement clearly shows that he considers Rusa as the main end of a poetic creation. 55 It is interesting to note that, a number of verses, quoted by Anandayardhana as examples of different types of Dhvani are cited by Kuntaka to illustrate different varieties of Vakratā: thus Anandavardhana's own verse: 'tāla jāanti guņā' etc. as well as the stanza: snigdhasyamala' etc. cited by Anandavardhana as instances

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of Arthantarascm's ramitavacya dhvani are given as examples of Rudhi-vakratā: the expression—'kusumasamayayugam' etc. quoted as an illustration of Sablasaktimula dhvani as an instance of Paryayavakrata; and the stanza: 'gaanam ca mattameham'. given as an example of Atyantatiraskrtavācya dhvani as an example of Upacaravakrata. This leads to the inevitable conclusion that Kuntaka proceeds to formulate the doctrine of Vakrokti after taking the existence of Dhvani for granted. In explaining vastuvakrata, he describes it as the presentation of a charming all-important natural attribute of a thing by a suitable language: another form of this vakrata, he says, consists in drawing a new form of an object, a form that surpasses all worldly limits and shines, as it receives a touch of poetic intui tion or that of the poet's culture and training. In support of his thesis that, a poet is competent to give a new shape to a thing, Kuntaka quotes the well-known verse: 'Apare Kavyasamsare' etc. found in the Agnipurana and cited by Anandavardhana. As regards vakya-vakrata, he maintains that, like the skill of a painter realised as something distinct from a board, colour and other ingredients, this type of vakrata also is something different from use of words, meanings, literary excellences and poetic figures, and is identical with the skill of the Poet. In explaining this proposition, he states that, although the skill of the Poet gives the very life to Rasa, Svabhava and Alamkara, yet it is essential in case of an Alamkara, because a figure not inserted skilfully in a proper place does not cause delight to connoisseurs of poetic art: in conclusion, he maintains, further, that, the entire assemblage of Rasa, Svabhava and Alamkara is rendered fresh and charming when introduced properly by a dexterous poet. 56 This classification of an element introduced in Poetry into three categories betrays unmistakably the influence exercised by the three-fold classification of Dhvani into Vastu, Alamkara and Rasa, as drawn by Anandavardhana. Kuntaka speaks of three different types of Svabhava pertaining to various beings and things, and tenders advice to adopt different ways for their presentation: thus when a rational conscious being is described. such of his natural attributes as are competent to bring permanent moods to a relishable state are to be painted; and when an animal is described, such qualities as suit its own class are to be delineated, so that they may please the refined readers by causing a suspension of disbelief. 57 An insentient being, he says, becomes a fit object of description in Poetry only when it causes charm by its capacity to awaken Rasa. 58 This observation reminds one of the proposition of Anandavardhana that, in every work of poetic art there must be some human element present, however predominantly descriptive it might be of unconscious phenomena of nature, in explaining which Abhinavagupta maintains that, every thing depicted in Poetry-whether it is conscious or unconscious—is intimately related with human feeling, inasmuch as, it either excites or ensues from that. The important place assigned to Rasa in the system of Kuntaka is evident from his attitude to the figure Rasavat: he does not regard this as an Alamkara, because the Rasa is awakened not for the purpose of embellishing expressed word and sense, but for its own sake, and so he maintains that, it is an Alamkarya. 59 But Rasa plays the greatest part in what Kuntaka calls Prab ndha vakrata and Prakarana-vakrata; it is said that such incidents as do not bring into light the greatness of the hero, and as such are not conducive to the sentiment, intended to be depicted are to be eschewed; and others that are not traced in the source, but are favourable to manifestation of sentiment are to be inserted: it is also asserted that, the creation of a Poet lives not by matter or plot, but by beauty imparted to it by continuous flow of Rasa 60 These observations based on similar propositions of Anandavardhana point out definitely to the idea of Kuntaka that in Poetry Rasa is of paramount importance. Although this learned critic evolves a new system of Vakrokti and gives the skill of a Poet, that works behind a poetic creation its due share, it is always emphasised that Rasa is the guiding principle, that prompts a Poet to insert suitable expressions and present pleasing meanings and that the test of Vakrata lies in Aucitya of the various elements with reference to Rasa, the depiction of which constitutes the main end of the Poet.

The problem as to whether Kuntaka accepts the essentiality

of Rasa in Kavya or not makes an interesting study. Although he draws a difference between Poetry, describing svabhavasaukumārua, that delineating Rasa and that abounding in Alamkāra and thus apparently maintains that, apart from Rasa, Svabhava and Alamkara are capable of being presented in Poctry 11, yet elsewhere he gives his opinion in favour of depiction of such Svabhava as is competent to bring Rasa into comprehension, and gives such illustrations of Poems, abounding in figures as are characterised by manifestation of Rasa. Thus the stanza: 'kim tarunyataroh' etc. cited as an example of Vakya-vakrata presents the Erotic, and so do the other two stanzas: 'Asyah sargavidhau' etc. and 'Uddeśo'yam sarasakadalīśrenīśobhātiśāyī' etc. These make the conclusion probable that, from the point of view of theory Kuntaka admits three elements introduced in Kavya-Svabhava, Alamkara and Rasa, but his leaning is definitely towards the last one. In this respect he is similar to Anandavardhana, who, though accepting in theory the existence of three types of suggested content betrays unmistakably his partiality towards the unexpressed emotional mood.

The close relation existing between Dhvani, Aucitya and Vakratā is noticed by Mahimabhatta whose comments throw a new light on Kuntaka's doctrine. Mahimabhatta accepts the essentiality of Rasa in Kavya: he says that, Rasa constitutes the soul of a Poetic creation and on this score he is quite in agreement with Anandavardhana. He differs from the learned Dhvanikara only in point of its process of comprehension : while the latter postulates a function of suggestion in order to explain its cognition, he thinks that, Anumana is competent enough to bring Rasa into comprehension. Mahimabhatta is of opinion that Aucitya of Rusa and Prakrti is the greatest Guna, -most essential for a Kavya: absence of this Aucitya, on the other hand, constitutes the greatest defect and forms the basis of all flaws, that flow from it. In criticising the theory of Kuntaka, he says that, the peculiar turn given to an expression by the skill of the Poet, to which so much publicity is given by Kuntaka is capable of being resolved either into Aucitya or into Dhvani. To state more clearly Kuntaka's doctrine might mean that Aucitya, which figures so largely in his treatment of Vakrokti constitutes the soul of Poetry or it might mean that Dhvani forms the essence of Poetry. No third alternative is possible, because a specimen of Poetic Art, that conforms to the principles of literary criticism cannot do without these two elements. Of these two alternatives-Aucitya and Dhvani, the special mention of the first one is unnecessary, because no opposition to Aucitya is everfound in real Poetry, ensouled by Rasa, whose secret lies in propriety. The second alternative renders the stand of Kuntaka identical with that of the Dhvanikara, and in fact, for this reason, the former quotes the same passages as are cited by the latter as illustrations of Dhvanikavya. This observation of Mahimabhatta is one of his great contributions to the speculations of Alamkaraśastra: by asserting that Vakrata is capable of being resolved into Aucitya or Dhvani, he shows that these three are but different aspects of Rasa, or to quote Dr. Raghavan, 'the more specific names for the Camatkara in a certain point'.

The definition of Kavya, propounded by Mammata is one of the most well-known definitions. Following his predecessors Bhamaha, Rudrața and Kuntaka, Mammața starts with word and meaning and defines Poetry as a combination of sound and sense, free from blemishes and possessed of excellences and sometimes devoid also of poetic figures. In this definition, word and meaning conjointly form the genus of Poetry, and treedom from blemishes and possession of Gunas and Alamkaras constitute its distinguishing features. The statement: 'sometimes devoid also of poetic figures' arouses the presumption that, in order to constitute Kavya, a combination of sound and sense has normally got to be endowed with Alamkaras. 64 In explaining this statement, the commentator Govinda in his Pradina says that, in those specimens of Poetry in which Rasa is not there, the presence of poetic figures is an imperative necessity, but in those cases, in which manifestation of Rasa is quite clear, the figures are capable of being dispensed with: thus, he maintains, one of the essentia characteristics of Poetry is not possession of poetic figures, but presence of either a distinct figure or a depicted emotion. 65 Mammata himself though not mentioning Rasa as a differentia of Kavya, proceeds to explain Gunss, Dosas and Alambaras not in relation to Poetry in general, but in relation to Rasa. Expanding the dictum of Anandavardhana, Mammata defines Gung as a property of Rasa, the essence of Kavya: it is said that a Guna directly resides in Rasa, invariably co-exists with it and causes its excellence without fail: thus, he says, a Guna is definable in terms of its having Rasadharmatva, Rasavyabhicaristhititva and Rasopakarakatva. In this respect, he continues, a Kāvyaguna is analogous to such qualities as bravery and the like, that belong to soul and not to the body of a human being. This view is in sharp contrast to that expressed by the writers, belonging to Pre-Dhvani school, who regard a Gunz as a varnadharma or an arthadharma, Mammata ridicules the idea of the ancients by pointing out that, through mistake they attribute a quality actually belonging to Rasa to Sabda and Artha: a Guna is a property of Rasa, and can never reside directly in Sabda and Artha. Pradipakara points out that those who regard a Guna as a property of a letter do not adduce any decisive reason to establish their proposition : on the other hand, they say that a Guna does not belong exclusively to a varna: it belongs also to a composition. Thus acceptance of their proposition entails a violation to the law of parsimony, strict adherence to which is displayed by the doctrine of Anandayardhana that a Guna actually belongs to Rasa and it is said to reside in sound, letter, sense and composition only in a secondary way. 66 In a similar manner, Mammata determines the place of Alamkara in relation to Rasa: it is said that, like a necklace adding to excellence of the soul through adornment of a part of the body, the poetic figures indirectly embellish the Rasa by augmenting the beauty of sound and sense, that manifest it. An Alamkara, he maintains, resides directly in word and meaning and by causing excellence to these component factors causes excellence to Rasa, where it exists: there are some cases, however, where an Alamhara does not cause any excellence to an existing Rasa, and vet

others, in which Rasa is conspicuous by its absence, and as such the Al miara does not embelish Rasa, but ends in mere strikingness of expression. 67 In drawing the line of demarcation between a Gun; and an Alemkara, Pradipakara says: a Guna is a property of Rasa and as such directly resides in it.-it invariably causes excellence to Rasa and invariably co-exists with it; an Alamkara, on the other hand, causes excellence to Rasa, but not being its property does not directly reside in it, -it does not cause its excellence without fail and does not co-exist with it invariably. Consistently with this view of Guns and Alamkara, Mammata explains Dosa in relation to Rasa and defines it as an attribute that detracts the principal meaning-Rasa of paramount importance. by standing in the way of its proper manifestation. In a specimen of Poetic art the main end of the poet lies in depiction of sentiment, which is realised properly by a real appreciator: anything that obstructs proper manifestation of Rasa and causes it to remain unrealised is regarded as a Dosa. Thus a Dosa primarily appertains to Rasa, but as words and meanings suggest this emotional mood it is possible to trace it in sabla and artha, also. The division of Dosus into three classes: Rasados 4. Arthadosa and Sabdados i is based on this consideration. 68

The very fact that Mammata explains Guns, Alemkāras and Desas not in relation to Poetry in general, but in relation to their capacity to awaken Rasa goes to show that he recognises the essentiality of Rasa in Kāvya. The statement that Alamkāras may exist even in those cases, where Rasa is absent, and there they end in mere uktivaicitrya is not to be taken too seriously, because it does not represent Mammata's real view. He firmly believes that Alamkāras are intimately related to Rasa: in some cases they cause excellence to it and in others stand neutral, neither embellishing nor tarnishing the depicted emotion. For this reason, he illustrates these two cases only, and does not quote any such stanza in which Rasa is not there and the poetic figures create sheer charm of expression. But still he feels the necessity of mentioning such a case, in which figures end in mere strikingness of expression, at least from the theore-

tic stand-point, because poets are seen composing such specimens. abounding in figures of sound and sense only in order to make a display of their craftsmanship, and critics also recognise these means of embellishment as sources of great charm. The assumption that Mammata considers Rasa as an essential element in Poetry is rendered all the more strong by the fact that, while enumerating the benefits that accrue from Poetry, he describes attainment of impersonal pleasure, springing from aesthetic realisation as the crest-mark of all benefits. It is curious to note that, although Mammata admits the essentiality of Rasa in Kavya, he does not mention it in his definition of Poetry and accepts Citrakavya, which is grudgingly recognised by Anandavardhana as a variety of Poetry. 69 Anandavardhana regards Citrakavya as the lowest type of Poetry: it is without any distinct suggested content, and as its charm lies in strikingness of sound and sense, it is merely pictorial in word or pictorial in sense. Anandavardhana makes it clear that, although Citrakavya is not fit to be recognised as Poetry, devoid as it is of the essence of a Poetic creation, yet it is admitted to the category of Poetry, because poets actually go on creating such specimens of Poetic Art in order to make a display of literary craftsmanship. As regards the first point, namely, non-mention of such a vital element as Rasa in the definition of Poetry, it is pointed out that Rasa is known through implication, inasmuch as, Gunas and Dosas and in most cases Alamkaras do not exist without it: it is also said that, all reference to Rasa is omitted, because it is an well-established fact in the poetical and critical world. As regards the second point, namely, recognition granted to pictorial Poetry as a type of Kavya, it is asserted that Mammata accepts it out of deference to the view of Anandavardhana, that he follows on many points. The inclusion of Gunas, Alamkaras and Dosas in the definition, as also non-mention of Rasa in it and recognition of Citra as a variety of Kavya-all these go to show the attempts made by Mammata to reconcile the views of the learned Dhvanikara with those of the writers belonging to pre-dhyani schools: but for these his stand has been subjected to severe criticism by later thinkers.

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This definition, however, is endorsed by Jaina writers, the foremost of whom is Hemacandra. Hemacandra defines a Poetry as a combination of word and meaning, devoid of defects, possessed of literary excellences and embellished with Poetic figures.70 Following Mammata's method, he also explains Gunas and Dosis in relation to Rasa and maintains that it is not possible for them to exist without their substratum Rasa, showing thereby that, this essential element, though not clearly mentioned in words, is obtained through implication. While tabooing the use of such obscure figures as Yamaka and the like, that are introduced by poets only in order to exhibit their skill in handling of expression, he remarks that, these completely defeat the very purpose of Poetry, in as much as, instead of attracting the tender minds of princes, averse to a study of Sastras towards Kavya, these distract them from it: obscure figures smother Rasa beneath them, and so do longdrawn descriptions of rivers, mountains and oceans, and as such these are to be eschewed. In this connection he cites a verse ascribed to Lollata: this verse decries attempts made by poets to describe in details rivers, hills, oceans, steeds and cities, because, as it says, such descriptions cause admiration and wonder, but does not give aesthetic delight: it also prohibits improvisation of obscure figures through sheer desire to display skill or out of deference to old tradition, because, as it puts, these figures stand in the way of realisation of Rasa. 71 These speculations show the important place assigned to Rasa in Kavya by Hemacandra.

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Instead of presenting Rasa through implication, Senior Vāgbhaṭa clearly mentions it in his definition of Kāvya, which according to him, consists in beautiful sound and sense, embellished with literary excellences and figures and possessed of distinct diction and emotional mood. This definition unmistakably betrays the influence exercised on senior Vāgbhaṭa by Daṇḍin, Bhāmaha. Vāmana and Ānandavardhana, on the doctrines of whom Vāgbhaṭa rests his thesis. Junior Vāgbhaṭa practically quotes the definition propounded by Hemacandra, which, in its turn, is a modification of the one advanced by

Mammata and says that. Poetry is comprised of a combination of sound and sense, free from faults, possessed of excellences, and often embellished with poetic figures. 78 Elsewhere he maintains that, word and meaning, bereft of blemishes and endowed with properties and figures constitute only the body of Poetry, and the element that gives the very life to it is Rasa of paramount importance. Thus, he accepts the essentiality of Rasa in Kavya, and unlike his predecessor, who recognises without question the ten Gun is of Vamana, limits them to three following Mammata, leaving the presumption that, Gunas are related to Rasa, and not to śabda and artha. Jayadeva, the author of Candraloka includes all the elements in his definition of Poetry and maintains that a Kavya is comprised of a sentence, devoid of desas and embellished with Rīti, Guna, Laksana, Alemitara, Rusa and Vriti. 74 As Laksanz is mentioned as a characteristic feature of Kāvya, a separate chapter is devoted to treatment of these which are not mentioned by later writers except in connection with dramaturgy. He casts a sarcastic fling at that writer (possibly Mammata) who regards that, a combination of sound and sense may constitute Poetry even without poetic figures by pointing out that, such combination is bound to be bereft of appeal, implying thereby that, a poetic figure is essential to the very existence of Kavya.

The essentiality of Rasa is admitted in unambiguous language by Viśvanātha and what remains unstated by writers belonging to the Dhvani school becomes stated in clear terms. Before stating his own definition Viśvanātha makes a trenchant attack on the standpoint of Mammaṭa, and challenges the mention of Doṣābhāva, Guṇī and Alaṃkāra as differentiae of Poetry. The mention of doṣābhāva, he says, to start with, renders the definition propounded by Mammaṭa vitiated by the fallacy of too narrow definition, because it is practically impossible to steer clear of all blemishes, and even many good specimens of Poetic Art are found to be possessed of minor defects here and there. The explanation that those stanzas represent specimens of good Poetry in those portions only that are free from defects, the other portions, stained by blemishes

being ordinary expressions does not lead us anywhere, because the very notion of a dost, marring the beauty of a portion of Poetry is a wrong one: the learned Dhvanikara, himself, maintains that, dos is stand in the way of realisation of Rasa, and thereby mar the charm of a whole poetic creation. Equally misleading is the statement that, the particle 'nañ' in the adjective 'adisau' indicates the idea of slightness, and what the clause actually means is that, in order to create a poetic expression, sound and sense have got to be endowed with slight defects, because such interpretation narrows down further the scope of Poetry, making specimens of Poetic Art, absolutely free from defects illustrations of ordinary linguistic expressions. The attempt to evade the question by pointing out that, the real intention of the critic lies in this that, an association of sound and sense, free from blemishes normally constitutes poetry, but in some cases, presence of minor defects does not take the said association out of the purview of Poetry is abortive, as Viśvanātha points out, the attributes that are grudgingly admitted are not be included in a true definition. which consists of essential characteristics only. The perforations made by insects on a gem render it one of inferior type, but do not take away its generic attribute, or in other words, do not convert it into a non-gem: in a similar manner, presence of such defects as unmelodiousness and the like impairs the relish of a poetic expression, but does not transform it into an ordinary linguistic one. 75 Secondly, Visvanatha maintains, the adjective 'Sagunau' mentioned in relation to 'Sabdarthau' is a defective one. The learned Dhyanikara, and following him, Mammata assert that, Gunas are properties belonging to Rasa and not to Sabda and Artha: consequently, the epithet 'sagunuu' meaning: 'possessed of literary excellences' is applicable only to Rasa, and not to sound and sense. The explanation, turnished to justify the use of the expression by showing that, Gunas, actually belonging to Rasa are capable of being attributed to Sabda and Artha through Upacara does not help us in the present case. The critic, who defines a Poetry as a combination of sound and sense, free from blemishes

and possessed of literary excellences and poetic figures really means that the said combination depicts emotion, as otherwise. he would not have described it as endowed with Gunas: and when this is the case, clear mention of Rasa is proper. The point that Rasa is obtained through implication is without any value: no body, indeed, Viśvanātha asserts, uses the expression-'land possessed of prayery' in order to convey the idea that the country is inhabited by living beings Equally useless is the observation that, the expression 'sagunau śabda thau' really refers to such sound and sense, as are competent to suggest literary excellences, because use of such word and meaning augments the beauty of a Poetic creation, but does not constitute its differentia. The arguments, advanced above, Viśvanatha continues, are sufficient to establish that similarly defective is the insertion of the epithet 'sālam'zārau': poetic figures enhance the charm of a poetic expression, but they do not infuse the very life into it. In support of his thesis, he cities an observation of the ancients, according to which, Sabda and Artha constitute the body of Poetry and Rasa forms its soul: Guna, Dosa, Rīti and Alamkāra have their parallels respectively in bravery, blindness, arrangement of limbs and such instruments of decoration, as bangles and the like, -all belonging to a human being. Viśvanātha criticises equally bitterly the view-points of Kuntaka and Anandavardhana. Vakrokti of Kuntaka, he says, is nothing but a figure of speech and as such, is unable, in the light of the above observation of the ancients to establish itself as the essence of Poetry. As regards the contention of Anandavardhana that, suggested sense in general constitutes the essence of a poetic creation, Visvanatha maintains that, it is wrong to consider suggested fact or suggested imaginative mood as the soul of a poetic creation, because such assumption reders the definition of Poetry vitiated by the fallacy of too wide definition, in as much as, riddles, even, are characterised by cognition of a suggested fact. The stanzas, cited by Anandavardhana, as instances of Vastu-dhvani, he maintains, are really illustrations of Rasa-dhvani, there being a touch of emotion or semblance of emotion in all of them: it is not that a vanjya-vastu or a vyanjya-alamkāra bestows on them the status of Poetry. The doctrine of Vāmana that, Rīti constitutes the soul of poetic art is equally inadmissible, because, as has been pointed out, Rīti is analogous to arrangement of limbs, which is definitely something different from soul.

Thus as the theories of earlier theorists on the nature of Poetry do not stand the test of criticism, Visvanatha proceeds to formulate his own definition of Poetry: this Poetic creation. he says, consists of a sentence, having Rasa for its essence. 76 In explaining this aphorism, he maintains that. Rasa is regarded as the soul of Poetry, because an expression that does not present Rasa is regarded as a specimen of ordinary linguistic expression, and not that of poetic expression. This Rasa, he continues, is comprehensive enough to include all such moods and feelings as are relished in the same way as Rasa is done, and consequently, an expression delineating a transient feeling or a semblance of emotion, also, constitutes Foetry. In consistency with his doctrine that, Rasa is essential to the existence of a Poetic expression, Visyanatha explains Gunas, Alamkaras and Dosas not in relation to sound and sense, but in relation to Rasa. Thus, according to him, the literary excellences go to heighten the beauty of the delineated mood; and so do the poetic figures: although they reside directly in sound and sense, they go to augment the beauty of the emotional mood and do not end in mere strikingness of expression. In a similar manner, the Dosas or defects go to mar the charm of Rasa by standing in the way of its proper manifestation, and thus are intimately related to Rasa. 77

Kavikarnapūra, belonging to-Gaudīya Vaisnava school, however fails to endorse the theory of Viśvanātha. The definition, propounded by Viśvanātha, he says, is vitiated by both the fallacies of too wide and too narrow definition. Thus, while it includes within the scope of Poetry, such ordinary expressions as: 'Lord Hari is enjoying the company of milkmaids', that are depictors of feelings, it denies the status of

Poetry to such poetic expressions as: 'This son of a barren woman with his body covered with the hair of a tortoise and head ornamented with a sky-flower is moving, holding a bow made of rabbit's horn', that are not regarded as sentences in the strictest sense of the term, because of the absence of compatability. Equally defective are the theories, adumbrated by Vamana and Mammata on the nature of a Poetry. The thesis that a Poet is one, who is expert in drawing descriptions, capable of generating impersonal pleasure, and Poetic expression is his speech, similarly competent to paint such descriptions as produce supreme bliss is not tenable, vitiated as it is by the fallacy of mutual interdependence. In reply to the question as to what then constitutes an accurate definition of Kavya, Kavikarnapura maintains that, this is Kavivanuirmitih, or in other words, Poetry is comprised of a creation made by a Poet's spech. In explaining the term 'Nirmitih', he observes that, this is a creation capable of generating asa tharana camatkara or super-normal pleasure, and thus connects the idea of Camatkara with that of Poetry-marking thereby, the resurrection of an old concept, already in disuse. This definition, he thinks, is comprehensive enough to include such elements as Rasa, Guna, Alamkara as well as Dosabhava, on which great emphasis has been put by earlier critics. 77 In his eagerness to show that his own definition is not vitiated by the fallacy of mutual interdependence, he explains the term 'Poet (Kavi)' as a technical one, and says that a Poet is possessed of a germ in the form of a mental impression, -is endowed with imaginative faculty and at the same time is well-versed in the different branches of learning. Like Visvanatha he explains Gunzs and Alamkaras in relation to Rasa, displaying, thereby, his leaning towards this essential element. Following Kavikarnapūra, Valadeva Vidyābhūsaņa of the Gaudiya Vaisnava school, also, defines a Poetic expression as a sentence created by a Poet and asserts that, Rasa constitutes the very soul of such an expression, revealing, at the same time, the great influence excercised on him by Viśvanatha.

The attempt to infuse the concept of Camatkara into Poetry

and to formulate its comprehensive definition on the basis of it is noticed more clearly in Panditaraja Jagannatha's Rasagangadhara. Jagannatha defines Poetry as an expression that presents a charming idea, and gives a beautiful analysis of the idea of charmingness, 78 That meaning, he says, is regarded as charming which forms the content of such a knowledge that generates unworldly pleasure. The generality of unworldliness is an attribute belonging to a particular species of pleasure, capable of being realised only by connoisseurs of poetic art: this unworldly or disinterested pleasure, he continues, is caused by concentration of the mind on the events and characters described in Poetry or presented on stage, At the time of perception of Poetry, the minds of appreciators become steady and free from distractions, and as a result of undivided application of their minds on the facts, presented in Poetry, they derive literary delight. Fleasure derived from knowledge of such ordinary expressions, as 'A son is born to you' or 'I shall bestow riches unto you' is not disinterested. because when such pleasure is derived, the sense of personality of the speaker is not lulled into sleep, and consequently, such expressions do not constitute poetic expressions. In his eagerness to formulate an accurate definition of Kavya in the style of a Naiyāyika, Jagannātha, first of all, defines a Poetry as a linguistic composition, which brings such an idea into expression, as produce disinterested pleasure, when contem plated. This definition, however, is not perfect, because it leaves room for application of the designation Poetry to ordinary expressions, also. This happens in those cases in which an idea, presented by an ordinary expression forms along with a sense conveyed by a poetic expression the content of a single contemplation, productive of disinterested pleasure. It is said that the focus and margin together make up the field of consciousness: when a specimen of Poetic Art is appreciated in a waiting room of a railway station, the ideas suggested by that specimen remain in the focus of consciousness and those, conveyed by sentences, uttered by persons, passing in and out and talking, as also other experiences remain in the margin. The

proposition that Poetry is a linguistic composition, bringing into expression an idea, which when thought out generates unworldly pleasure—is likely to bestow the status of Poetry on ordinary sentences, also, -the ideas, conveyed by which remain in the margin of consciousness and combine along with those. lying in the focus to form the content of a single thought, leading to unworldly pleasure. For this reason Jagannatha proceeds to give a more accurate definition of Kavya: this, he says, consists in such words, the generality, lying in continued contemplation of ideas, presented by which forms the determipant of a cause, productive of disinterested pleasure. The flaw pointed out in the first definition does not go to vitiate this one. because continued contemplation of meaning conveyed by ordinary linguistic expressions does not produce unworldly pleasure. and consequently, these expressions are left out of the purview of Poetry. This second definition is more specific and pointed. and as such, is a definite improvement on the first one. But a Naiyāyika like Jagannātha is not satisfied with it, because it involves quantitative complexity, -an accurate definition of Poetry being capable of enunciation with a fewer number of terms. The general principle states that, between two alternative hypotheses,—one involving complexity and the other simplicity. -the former is liable to condemnation and the latter is entitled to preference. For this reason, in conformity to the Law of Parsimony, Jagannatha adumbrates the shortest definition of Poetry; this, he says, consists in one, that is endowed with the attribute of unworldliness or disinterestedness. 79 Jagannatha anticipates the possible objection that, disinterestedness being a generality residing in disinterested pleasure, this pleasure, alone, is endowed with this generality, and a linguistic composition has nothing to do with it; as against this, he asserts that Camatkaratva or disinterestedness is an attribute belonging to a linguistic composition, as well, because the ideas, presented by this composition forms the determinant of a continued contemplation, that generates such pleasure, or in other words, an idea, presented by a poetic expression, when contemplated produces disinterested pleasure. Thus, the opinion of Jagannatha on this issue is this that, as a poetic expression is intimately associated with disinterested pleasure, the attribute of disinterestedness is capable of being asserted of this expression, as well. The third definition differs from the first two in this respect that, while in the latter, the relation existing between a linguistic composition and disinterested pleasure is clearly expressed in words, in the former this relation is comprehended automatically through natural power belonging to words,—a power, that remains unknown by itself Consequently, Jagannātha thinks that, the definition that, Poetry is one, endowed with the attribute of disinterestedness is the most accurate, short and simple definition of  $K\bar{a}vya$ .

Dr. Raghavan quotes a verse from Camatkara-candrika of Viśveśvara, protege of Simhabhūpāla (1330 A.D.): this work claims to be the first regular Poetics-treatise to make the Camatkara-approach; in this verse, the author defines Camatkara as a supermundane artistic delight, produced in the mind of a real appreciator on reading a poem, and maintains that, the factors that lead to this delight are seven in number, - Guna, Rīti, Rasa, Vrtti, Pāka, Sayyā and Alamkāra. 80 This observation makes it clear that, the concept of Camatkara is a comprehensive one, in as much as, it includes within its orbit all the elements of Poetry from Gunz and Alamkara to Dhvani and Rasa, and that, the writers, who make a Camatkara approach formulate a comprehensive definition instead of emphasising the one or other element. This is all the more true in case of Panditaraja Jagannatha: his definition not only gives a beautiful analysis of supermundane pleasure, produced from perception of Poetry. but includes in its comprehensiveness, all the elements recognised by earlier speculations. Thus the definition includes the idea of Rasa, because it is aesthetic realisation that generates this muchemphasised impersonal pleasure. Rasa, that exists in an appreciator's mind is peculiar in its nature : it is no doubt, a state of one's ego, but it is essentially universal and impersonal in character, being common to all persons of poetic sensibility and possess. ing no significance to their personal possessions and advantages. At the time of enjoyment of Rasa, the sense of individuality of

the reader or the spectator, as the case may be, is put into sleep and he is taken to an elevated plane of consciousness, reaching which he realises the innate identity existing between a man and a man, and consequently, he relishes Rasa, not in his personal capacity, but as a member of the assemblage of connoisseurs of Poetic Art. For this reason, a line of demarcation is drawn between a natural emotion and a poetic sentiment : the experience of the former produces pain or pleasure, as the case may be, because the man who experiences this remains fully conscious of his individual self, while that of the latter produces nothing but pleasure, being disinterested in nature. It is because of dormancy of the inviduality of an appreciator that, normal emotions, which are far from pleasant in actual experience bring about nothing but supernormal pleasure, when presented through Poetry. Thus it is clear that supermundane delight or Camatkara, so emphasised by Jagannatha is intimately related to Rasa, which is nothing but a mental condition, -its essence lying in pleasure, dissociated from all personal interest. The definition includes as well, the idea of Dhvani, because the comprehension of an unexpressed content, -irrespective of the fact whether it is a Vastu or an Alamkara or a Rasa—contributes towards enjoyment of literary relish. The importance of an implicit idea in the doctrine of Jagannatha is evident from the classification of Poetry, drawn by him, which is made on the basis of prominence and charm of this idea. It is said that, a Guna and an Alamkara keep the mind of an appreciator concentrated on events and characters described in Poetry, and thus while, on the one hand, help the appearance of the excitants, ensuents and accessories in their generalised characters, on the other hand, lull the individuality of a perceiver into sleep, leading him, thereby, to experience supernormal disinterested pleasure, and consequently, the definition that, Poetry is a linguistic composition, bringing into expression an idea, which when thought out causes unworldly pleasure fetches in through implication the concepts of Guna and Alamkara. Jagannatha, following the older theorists, speaks of ten sabdagunas and ten arthagunas of the same name, but he seems to be in agreement with the views of the Dhyani theorists on the issue of the number of Gun is, and he makes it abundantly clear that, these are three in number. He, however, regards these as constituting the essence of Rasa, and not as attributes, belonging to them, as they are supposed to be by critics, affiliated to the Dhvani school. He also, disagrees with Mammata in the latter's statement that, when mathurya is asserted of sound. sense or composition, it is done only in a secondary sense. because Guns are properties belonging to Rasa alone. Jagannatha maintains that, when the erotic or the tragic emotion is described as madhura, it is meant that, this emotion is endowed with an ability to convert the mind into a liquid form, and, this is so, because there is no existence of madhurya apart from that of Druti. Thus as the quality of madhurya consists in the ability to melt the mind, and, as this capacity is present equally in emotion, sound, sense and composition, so this quality is capable of being asserted of all these poetical elements, and consequently, the question of referring to śabda, artha, and bandha as madhura by an extended use of the term does not arise. And such is the case with other two Gunas: Ojas and Prasada. Jagannatha refers to Alemkaras as the sources of charm, belonging to the unexpressed content, that forms the essence of Poetry 81, showing, thereby the part played by them in rendering an idea charming, and as such, capable of producing disinterested pleasure, because, the charming in Poetry is that, which gives its appreciators impersonal pleasure. Although Jagannatha gives a comprehensive definition of Kavya, he puts great emphasis on Rasa: this is evident from his description of Rasadhvani as extremely beautiful-Paramaramanīya-a description, that betrays his practical stand that Rasa is an essential element in Poetry.

After adumbrating an accurate difinition of Kāvya, Jagannātha proceeds to launch an attack against the definitions, propounded by Mammata and Viśanātha Poetry, according to Mammata, consists of a combination of sound and sense, bereft of Dosas and endowed with Gunus and Alemkāras. In criticising this definition, Jagannātha points out that, sound and sense do not form the connotation of the term 'Poetry', as there is no

evidence that can lead us to that conclusion On the other hand. from such uses, as 'The Poetry' is being read aloud', 'the sense of the Poetry is being comprehended', 'The Poetry has been read, but the sense has not been grasped', and the like, it is clear that, expression alone forms the connotation of the term Poetry'. The question of trying to justify those uses by taking recourse to Laksanā does not arise, because there is no direct pointer to establish conclusively the proposition that, a combination of sound and sense forms'the conventional meaning of the term 'Poetry'. The observations of Bhamaha, Rudrata and such other critics are incapable of being regarded as such pointers, since those observations themselves form the subject of dispute. Thus the thesis of the ancients that, due to absence of any decisive proof to show whether Poetry consists of sound or of sense alone, it is proper to regard Poetry as comprised of a combination of sound and sense—is untenable. The argument that, the essence of Poetry lies in its ablity to produce aesthetic delight and as this ability is present both in word and meaning, both these elements are to be regarded as forming Poetry-lands us into fresh troubles, because this wide view is likely to bring musical tones and theatrical gestures, -all endowed with this capability of conducting a mood to a relishable state-within the purview of Kavya. Morever, the proposition that, a combination of sound and sense forms Poetry leads us to a position, leaving only a choice between two equal evils. Do sound and sense conjointly form the connotation of the term 'Poetry' or do they constitute it severally? Or in other words, is the generality Kavyatva-a characteristic residing in a group of śabda and artha or is it an attribute inhering in śabda and artha separately? The universal element of 'twoness' is a group-characteristic: two things conjointly form the number 'two', and it is not possible to single out one of those two objects and call it two. Thus in the case of 'twoness', we are free to use such expression as: 'This is one, and not two'. The thesis that, the universal element of Poetryness, also, is a group-characteristic allows us similar freedom to use such expressions as: 'This is a sentence of a verse, and not Poetry proper' and the like. In reality,

however, expressions of verses are identified with Poetry, and no line of demarcation is drawn between poetic expression and Poetry itself. This shows that the generality Poetryness does not meet on a common platform with the attribute 'twoness', and consequently, is not a characteristic inhering in a group. The contention that,  $\dot{s}abda$  and artha severally constitute  $K\bar{a}vya$  is equally untenable, because it allows us liberty to regard a single verse as a specimen of two poetic creations,—the sound-element forming one Poetry and the sense-element constituting another. These considerations impel Jagannātha to regard an expression alone as the genus of Poetry,—the sense going, only, to qualify it: and this procedure, he says, is to be followed in formulating definitions of the Vedas and the Purāṇas, also. 82.

Like Viśvanātha, Jagannātha, too, regards the mention of Gunzs and Alamkaras in the definition of Poetry improper, because, as he says, this mention renders the definition vitated by the fallacy of two narrow definition. Such expressions as: 'The orb of the moon is visible', 'The Sun has set' and the like, when uttered by messengers of heroices, pining in separation from their consorts convey a number of implicit ideas, and consequently, are regarded as specimens of best Poetry. The proposition that, possession of Guna and Alamkara is an essential characteristic of Poetry, however, makes these expressions samples of ordinary linguistic composition, and not those of poetic one, because there is neither any literary excellence nor any poetic figure in them. But to declare these as specimens of ordinary expression tantamounts to sheer denial of truth, since charmingness, that constitutes the essence of Poetry is conspicuously present in them. Secondly, neither Gunas nor Alem'taras are marked by respective common attributes,-there being divergence of opinion among Alamkarikas as to their nature and the exact part played by them in poetic creation, While Dandin regards Gunas as attributes belonging to letters. Vamana considers them as qualities residing in both sound and sense, and Anandavardhana recognises them as properties of Rasa: in a similar manner while the earlier theorists describe Alonokaras simply as elements going to beautify a Poetic creation the writers affiliated to the Dhvani school speak of their intimate relation with Rasa. The number of Gunas and Alamkaras, again, is not fixed: according to some, literary excellences are ten in number, while in the view of others, these are three; while some speaks of four poetic figures, another defines sixty of them. The elements, whose nature and number have yet to be ascertained are incapable of being regarded, Jagannatha thinks as the differentia of Poetry. Moreover, literary excellences, having their parallels in bravery and compassion are properties of soul, and in a similar manner, the poetic figures, bearing close resemblance to necklace and bangles are instruments of decoration: and as such, it is not proper to regard them as constituent parts of  $K\bar{a}vya$ .

The introduction of Dosabhava, Jagannatha continues, as one of the characteristic features of Poetry is another serious defect of Mammata's theory, in as much as, it renders absurd the use of the expression: defective Poetry (Dustam Kavyam), because if the combination of sound and sense, said to constitute Kavya is possessed of blemishes it is not Poetry, and if it is Poetry in the strictest sense of the term, it is certainly free from blemishes. The question of justifying the use of the expression by taking recourse to Laksanā does not arise, because the conditions, necessary for operation of this process, of which incompatibility of the primary meaning with the rest of the sentence is one,—are not fully satisfied. The attempt to justify the expression: 'defective Poetry' by saying that, a single specimen of Poetic Art is capable of being regarded as an illustration of real Poetry with reference to that portion, in which blemishes are completely absent, as also as an example of charmless Poetry with reference to that portion, in which defects are there-is misleading, because a desa mars the beauty of an entire Poetic creation and renders the whole of it defective. In this respect, a dosa offers a sharp contrast to the quality of samyoga: with reference to the latter, it is possible to have such expression as: 'The tree is united with a bird on the top, but it has no conjunction with that, so far as its branches are concerned', but with reference to the former no such assertion as: 'The

Poetry possesses defects in the first half, but is completely free from these in the second half is capable of being made. And this is so, because, while samyoga is an avyāpyavrtti dharma, doṣa is a vyāpyavrtti one: or in other words, the quality of conjunction resides only in a part of the qualified, but the attribute doṣa inheres in all the parts of Poetry: the former is a non-pervasive attribute,—the latter is a pervasive one. For this reason, we never experience a single linguistic composition as an illustration of ordinary expression in one portion and that of poetic one in another.

After criticising the definition of Poetry, as propounded by Mammata, Jagannatha takes up the definition, as put forward by Viśvanātha and rejects it also. Viśvanātha thinks that a Kāvya is comprised of a sentence, having for its essence Rasa. Jagannatha, however, is of opinion that this thesis is vitiated by the fallacy of too narrow definition, since it leaves aside those types of Poetry, in which the centre of gravity lies in facts or imaginative moods. The argument that this is what is intended is unassuring, since the proposition goes against the views of earlier theorists and the tradition, established by Poets, who describe waterfalls and the like and narrate travels and others, in which there is no Rasa, but which are purely descriptive and ornamental. An accurate definition of Kavya is to take note of cases of Vastu-dhvani and Alamkara-dhvani, as well: it should not remain confined within the limits of Rasa alone. As regards the explanation, furnished by Viśvanatha himself that stanzas marked by manifestation of a suggested fact or an imaginative mood are regarded as specimens of poetic creations, because there exists a touch of emotion or semblance of emotion in them and this touch reveals itself to a discerning mind, Jagannatha points out that, this is not, in the least, convincing: a touch of emotion or semblance of emotion is incapable of being considered as the differentiating factor of Poetry, since it is possible to trace such touches in the expressions: 'The cow moves' and 'The deer leapes' also. And this is so, because any and every content of Poetry can he resolved into a Vibhava or an Anubhava or a Vyabhicaribhava of Rasa. These observations betray the reluctance of Jagannātha to recognise Rasa as the only element of Poetry: although he admits its paramount importance, he finds it necessary to accept Vastudhvani and Alamkāradhvani from the point of theory, at least, showing thereby, his agreement with the learned Dhvanikāra in point of theoretic attitude.

The ancients who regard Poetry as a combination of sound and sense find a staunch supporter in Nagesa, who in his commentary on Rasagangadhara refutes the charges levelled against the definition of Mammata by Jagannatha and establishes their standpoint. He points out that, just as such expressions as: 'The Poetry has been heard', 'The Poetry is being read aloud' go to prove the contention that, Poetry consists of a linguistic composition, similarly such sentences as 'The Poetry has been grasped' go to establish another opposite proposition that. Poetry is comprised of a combination of meanings. For this reason, he says, it is proper to define Poetry as an association of language and meaning, and neither as sound nor as sense, alone. The objection of Jagannatha that, acceptance of this proposition presents a dilemma, because the generality 'Poetryness' is neither a group-characteristic, nor does it inhere in sound and sense separately has no legs to stand upon: Nagesa maintains that, this is a group-characteristic, and such expressions as: 'The Poetry has been heard', 'The Poetry has been grasped' are to be justified by taking the help of Laksanā based on usage,—this function conveying the idea of sound in the first sentence and that of sense in the second. This process, he continues, is to be followed in the case of definition of the Vedas, as well. The Vedas consist of a combination of sound and sense, which forms the actual connotation of the term: in some expressions, however, through Laks na it brings out the idea of sound alone, and in others that of sheer sense. That this assumption is fortunate to receive the approval of the great grammarian Panini is known from the aphorism: 'Tadadhīte tadveda', formulated by him. Moreover, Nāg śa points out, the capability to produce poetic relish is equally present in sabda and artha, and as such, a combination of both is to be regarded as  $K\overline{a}vya$ , showing thereby, that aesthetic relish or  $ras\overline{a}sv\overline{a}da$  is of prime importance in it. This analysis of the speculations of Alamkārīkas on the nature of Poetry reveals the important place assigned to Rasa in their theories by all writers, belonging to post-Dhvani school. Whether emphasis is placed on Dhvanr or on Aucitya or on Vakrokti, it is always asserted that Rasa is the main guiding principle of a Poet and that, no Poetic Art, worth the name can do without this essential element.

#### IV

#### Causal factors of Poetry

The first Alamkarika to probe into the cause of Poetry is Bhamaha. He thinks that, the most important equipment necessary for a Poet in order to compose Poetry is Pratibha or Poetic Intuition: the other factors that contribute to such composition are sound knowledge of language and meaning, guidance given by persons who know what is Poetry and how to compose it and thorough acquaintance with poetical works of great artists. The next Alamkarika to introduce this topic is Dandin, whose information, however, is as meagre as that, supplied by Bhamaha. Dandin is of opinion that, inborn genius, vast and clear learning and constant practice,these three conjointly constitute the cause of Poetic creation. At the same breath he remarks that, in some cases, absence of inborn genius is amply compensated by intense study and polishing.85 For this reason, his advice to an intending Poet is to cultivate speech with study and effort. Rudrata mentions šakti, vyutpatti and abhyāsa as the causes conjointly working behind the creation of a charming specimen of Poetic art. In explaining the nature of śakti, he says that, it is that power, whereby fresh idea and appropriate language are supplied in various ways to a concentrated mind: it is because of this faculty that, a poet does not feel any difficulty in presenting ideas through suitable expressions. This faculty, he continues, is two-fold in nature: one is natural and the other is created;

of these two, the first one is better, being congenita, and the second one is inferior, being acquired subsequently through scholarship. Vyatpatti, Rudrata thinks, is the capacity to discriminate between suitable and unsuitable, acquired through knowledge of metre, grammar, arts, ways of the world, word and meaning. As every word and every meaning are capable of being introduced in Poetry, so a Poet is to take great care in selecting such words, as are appropriate to the occasion and are most suitable to bring the intended idea into expression, and thus Vyutpatti is virtually but another name for all-round knowledge. In support of Rudiata's thesis that all words can be used and ideas presented in a Kavya, Namisadhu, his commentator cites a verse, which brings home the heaviness of burden, imposed on a Poet, because, at it says, there is no such expression, no thought, no logic, no art, as can not form an element of Poetry. 86 These observations unmistakably point out to the belief, prevalent at the time of these critics that no expression or thought is tabooed in Poetry: only a Poet is to use them carefully. Rudrata does not define Abhyasa, but underlines its importance by tendering advice to poets of posterity to practice as much possible under the guidance of good poets and able critics, after acquiring all-round knowledge. 87 Vamana handles the subject at greater length: he speaks of two types of Poets: the disapproving (arocakinah) and the all-approving (satrnabhyavaharinah); of these two, the poets belonging to the first type are endowed with the power of discrimination, and as such, are capable of being corrected, while the poets of second type are undiscriminating ones, and consequently, are incapable of being converted into real Poets. Vamana mentions three elements or constituents of  $K\overline{a}vya$ , which according to him, are the ways of the world, different branches of learning and miscellaneous. The different branches of learning, Vamana continues, include the science of language, lexicons, metrics, fine arts, erotics and politics. A knowledge of all these is a necessary equipment for a Poet; the science of language helps him to determine the chaste form of words, as also to discriminate chaste words from unchaste ones: the lexicons remove his doubts concerning the

exact meanings of terms-doubts, that constitute great hindrance to composition of Poetry, and thereby help him to derive correct knowledge of imports of terms. In a similar manner, the science of metres dispells doubts of an intending Poet concerning the nature of different metres. The science concerning such fine arts as music, dance, painting etc. leads to a knowledge of these and thereby renders a poet competent to incorporate these into his creations. The subject-matter of a Poetry abounds in descriptions of passions and emotions and a knowledge of these passions and feelings, so essential to composition of Poetry is derived from the science of Erotics.88 Similarly the plot of a Poetic Art is made knotty and attractive through application of the principles of Politics and Economies to it, and, accordingly, knowledge of these principles is an imperative necessity on the part of an intending Poet. Vamana's miscellaneous constitutes acquaintance with poetic creations of other artists, practice to compose Poetry, attendance upon seniors, insertion and rejection of terms, Poetic faculty and concentration Perception of poetic creations of others leads to proficiency, constant practice leads to its excellence and attendance upon scholars, well-versed in the art and science of Poetry leads to a thorough knowledge of this art of creation. In this connection, Vamana introduces the question of Paka or literary finish, and maintains that, it consists in an unshakable placing of words: so long as the mind vacillates, words are inserted or taken out; but when the Goddess of Learning actually showers favour, they become firmly placed. He defines Poetic faculty as an impression, inherited from previous births, -an impression, that serves as the very germ of Poetry: without this Poetry is either not produced at all or if produced per force becomes ridiculous. Concentration, he says, is complete cessation of thoughts relating to worldly objects: this mental faculty of exclusive attention is an essential equipment of a Poet, because the objects of description are revealed only to his contemplative mind. Concentration, Vamana continues, is secured by two factors—time and place: the place is solitude and the time is the fourth quarter of the night.89

Rajasekhara gives a fuller treatment of the subject. Before introducing his own view on the causal factor of Poetry, he quotes the opinions of Syamadeva and Mangala, two ancient authorities on the issue. Syamadeva considers that the equipment necessary for creation of Poetry is concentration, while Mangala thinks that this is uninterrupted practice. Rajasekhara, however, is of opinion that, Samādhi and Abhyāsa, which are outward and inward faculties respectively go to strengthen the literary power or śakti, which alone lies at the root of creation of Poetry. This literary power, he says, generates Pratibha and Vyutpatti, showing thereby that Pratibha is something different from śakti, inasmuchas, the former is effected by the latter. 90 A man, endowed with literary power becomes possessed of poetic intuition, and, at the same time learns to discriminate between proper and improper elements in Poetry. Rajasekhara defines Pratibha as a faculty, that manifests to the mind sound, sense, figure, expression and other elements, necessary for application to Poetry: through it things that are not even perceived by poets are easily conceived and expressed. 91 Pratibha, he continues, is of two kinds: Karayitri or creative and Bhavayitri or appreciative. The creative faculty benefits the poet, in as much as, it presents word, meaning, language, metre and figure, necessary for composition of Poetry to the Poet.

The creative faculty, in its turn, admits of classification into three sub-types: inborn, acquired and resulting from incantation or instruction. Accordingly, Poets, also, are of three kinds:  $S\bar{a}rasvata$ ,  $\bar{A}bhy\bar{a}sika$  and  $\bar{A}upade\acute{s}ika^{9}$ . A  $S\bar{a}rasvata$  Poet is a favourite of the Goddess of learning: he is free to compose at his sweet will; an  $\bar{A}bhy\bar{a}sika$  is a poet by practice and is limited in his ability and output; an  $\bar{A}upade\acute{s}ika$  is a poet by instruction and prattles some sweet nonsense. Different types of creative faculty are traced in different kinds of Poets, and so it is said that, the Poetry of one remains within his house only,—that of another moves upto the residence of his friends,—and that of a fortunate tramples upon the faces of the uncultured and cultured alike with its foot-steps in the shape of words, as if, eager to

traverse the whole universe 93. While others prefer a Sarasvata poet to others, Yavavariya maintains that, eminence is always preferable and that the combination of several qualities brings forth eminence. The appreciative faculty does good to the critic: it helps him to discern the effort and intention of the Poet. Thereby the cree of a Poet's creation bears fruit: otherwise, it would be barren. 94 Kalidasa is of opinion that, the creative and critical faculties are quite distinct, and are found rarely combined in one and the same person. In support of this thesis of Kalidasa, Rajasekhara quotes a verse, which states that, while one is capable of composing, another is capable of listening only: a combination of excellent qualities is very rare: one type of stone produces gold -another is competent to test it only. Mangla speaks of two types of critics: the disapproving and the all-approving To these Rajasekhara adds another two types: the jealous ones and the truth-seekers. The faculty to discriminate is natural to some; to others it is the outcome of profound knowledge. The quality of all-approvingness (satrnabhyavaharita) is common to all in the beginning, but it disappears when one begins to discriminate the best from the worst by virtue of deeper study. The jealous critics are silent over the merits of others. Scholarship without jealousy is a truism. In support of this principle, Rajasekhara cites a verse that records an imaginary conversation between a Poet and his friend, in which the Poet expresses his deep sense of disappointment for dearth of real appreciators: there is no critic, he says, who is not competent to distinguish merit and demerit, and at the same time time, is himself a good Poet. and luckily, if there is one such critic, he is not free from jealousy. 95 But a truth-seeker is very rare; he is found perhaps one in a thousand. It is said that through great fortune, a Poet comes across an appreciator competent to enjoy juxtaposition of words and expressions and experience emotional moods, presented in his creation: a specimen of Poetic art that remains confined in the mind of its creator is useless; in order to prove its worth, it has got to be proclaimed in ten quarter by the learned critics. There exist a good number of Poetic creations, but of them only

a few get an opportunity of receiving a firm footing in the minds of critics. 9 ?

After describing the different types of Pratibha, Rajasekhara preceeds to explain Vyutpatti. His predecessors define it as allembracing knowledge, and point out that, such knowledge is imperative on the part of a Poet, who makes an attempt at writing Poetry. Rajasekhara, however, is of opinion that, it consists in the capacity to discriminate between the proper and the mproper. In reply to the question as to which among the two factors-Pratibha and Vyutpatti is superior, Anandavadhana says that, Pratibha is more important to a Poet than Vyutpatti and proves his contention by citing an instance from the Kumarasambhayam, where Kalidasa describes the dalliance of Parvati and Siva. This description is improper and betrays lack of Vyutpatti on the part of Poet, but nevertheless, the propriety of this portion is maintained admirably by the Poet's Pratibha. Mangala, however, records a different view on this question: he maintains that, for a Poet Vyutpatti is more important than Pratibha, and it amply compensates the weakness of a Poetic creation, springing from the creator's lack of Pratibha. Raiasekhara attempts to effect a harmony between these two divergent doctrines and argues that, a combination of both these faculties is the best the one without the other is as undesirable and incomplete as grace without beauty or charm without leveliness. 97

It is interesting to note that, elsewhere in his work, Rāja-śekhara makes mention of eight factors, that are regarded as mothers or sources of Poetry: these are peace of mind, poetic intuition, practice, devotion participation in learned assembly, allembracing knowledge, strong memory and courage 98 The practical hints given by him to an aspiring Poet, as also his description of his house and daily routine reveal his partiality towards practice: he tenders advice to a poet-aspirant to compose stanzas daily in the second quarter of the day and examine those stanzas in the fourth quarter. It is said that a Poet's paraphernalia consist in a board with a piece of chalk, a casket, pen and ink, palm leaves on birch bark, leaves of palmyra, iron nails and clean mats; Rājaśekhara, however, thinks that, these are

mere accessories,—the real requisite for the composition of Poetry being  $Pratibh\overline{a}$  alone.

In his work Rajasekhara introduces an interesting discussion on different shades of borrowing or plagiarism. In this connection he cites a verse, which states that there is no Poet, who is not a thief, no merchant that does not steal, but he who knows how to conceal his theft flourishes without reproach. Great care, therefore, is to be taken to earn literary borrowing skilfully to one's advantage. Rajasekhara speaks of two kinds of plagiarism: one that is to be avoided and one that is to be adopted. In his opinion, a Poet is either a creator or an adopter or a coverer up or a collector. He thinks that, the greatness of a Poet depends on his capacity to discover something new in old expressions and ideas, as also in his ability to restate what is old 99. On the exact nature of literary borrowing, that is to be encouraged, Rajasekhara records the view-points of his ancients, and thereafter explains, with illustrations his own opinions.

Ksemendra bases his Kavikanthabharana on the model of Rājašekhara's Kāvyamīmāmsā, which is more a work on instruction of the aspiring Poet in the devices of the craft rather than a treatise on the principles of literary criticism. Ksemendra speakes of two factors, that are helpful to attainment of Poetic capacity; these are divine favour and human effort. 100 He advises an aspiring Poet to propitiate Sarasvatī, who showers nectar in the form of learning, as also to contemplate upon the unchanging and formless mystic power, which is higher than the highest. Co ning to the topic of human effort, he classifies scholars, intending to be initiated into the art of Poetry into three types: Pupils who can accomplish the work with little effort,-those who can be trained with difficulty,-and those who are incapable of being trained. 101 A pupil of the first type is advised to receive instruction from a man of literature, and not from a dry logician or an insipid grammarian, because it hampers the blossoming of good poetry: he is further advised to study the science of language, metrics and specimens of poetic art, pleasant to the ear as also to cultivate a taste for discovering new ideas in delightful compositions. Thus when his mind becomes fully absorbed in the emotional moods and captivated by literary excellences, it naturally gives rise to poetic capacity like a sprout. 102 A pupil of the second type is instructed to peruse the works of master artists keeping an eve on historical development: he is to wait upon a great Poet and is to fill in the gaps in a verse or in a foot or in a part thereof or is to compose in metre such sentences, as do not convey ideas or is to change the words of an already composed stanza maintaining the same meaning, and all these for the sake of practice. 103 An effort to induce poetic capacity into a pupil of the third type is fruitless; as he is like a stone by nature and at the same time, is spoiled by tedious grammar or dry logic, eloquence is unable to dawn upon him even through well-employed instructions: in this respect he is comparable to an ass, that does not sing though trained, as also to a blind, who does not see the Sun though shown. 104 This classification of trainees into three types reveals the attitude of Ksemendra that, a poet is not born. but is primarily made and consequently, practice is the most important causal factor of Poetry. This emphasis placed by him on practice is further corroborated by his observations or plagiarism and a Poet's code of conduct. It is said that a Poet thrives by imitating the general colour of a Poet's idea or by borrowing a word, a metrical line or even an entire composition or through his own faculty, acquired by effort: these means render a beginner ultimately into a feeder to the whole poetworld.105 To one who has acquired the gift of Poetry, Ksemendra delivers a number of good counsels. Such a person should possess discernment, be devoted to practice, be interested in searching new expressions and ideas and should never get tired of work. He should read the auxiliary sciences of Poetry and a number of great poems and historical works and should study paintings and leaf-cuttings. He should be persistent in the composition of Poems and should try to create something new. As regards the extent of knowledge, which a Poet is expected to possess. Ksemendra gives a long list of the arts and sciences, which include logic, grammar, dramaturgy, politics, ero-

tics, the Mahahharata, the Ramayana, means of emancipation. spiritual science, metallurgy, science of jewels, medicine, astronomy, archery, science concerning elephants, horses and men, art of gambling and magic and other miscellaneous arts106 The miscellaneous, he continues includes painting, geography, botany, zoology, familiarity with magnanimity, the usage of attributing consciousness to insentient beings, intimacy with asceticism, discernment, restraint, and the like. Ksemendra maintains that, proficiency of a Poet in these arts and sciences indicates his sovereignty over the kingdom of Poetry: one, who is not familiar with these branches of learning comes at his wit's end when questioned in an assembly of the wise, although he labours in the art of versification, and becomes comparable to a clown, entering a city for the first time 107. So what Ksemendra wants is wide reading and constant practice on the part of an aspiring Poet.

Unlike Ksemendra Mammata puts equal emphasis on poetic genius, superior type of proficiency, arising from a close study of the world, scriptures and poetical compositions and constant practice under the guidance of the knowers of Poetry, and maintains that, these three conjointly constitute the causal factor of Poetic creation 108. He uses the term Sakti to signify the idea of imagination, thus making it equivalent to Pratibha of other Alamkārikas and explains it as an inborn mental impression, that serves as the very germ of Poetic faculty: it is said that, without it Kavya is not produced at all, and if attempted to be produced per force becomes ridiculous. 109 Most of the Sanskrit Alamkārikas describe Prattbhā as a power, whereby a Poet sees the subjects of his poem as steeped in beauty and gives to his readers in apt language a vivid picture of the beauty he has seen: through it he presents ever new, wonderful and charming combinations and relations of things, never before experienced or thought of by ordinary men: it is further asserted that, Pratibia or imagination takes a Poet to the dreamland of fancy, full of eternal joy and peace and reveals to him the real nature of things, never known before by men of ordinary life. Mammata uses the terms Nipunata and Vyutpatti

to convey the concept of proficiency or culture, and observes that, this proficiency or culture, arising from a close study of the ways of the world, consisting of the immovable and the movable, of the treatises dealing with metres, grammar, lexicons, fine arts, four aims of human existence, elephants horses, swords and the like, of poetical compositions of mas r artists and of historical works and different sciences is as much necessary for creation of Poetry as is Imagination 110. It is believed that, a certain modicum of culture is necessary for a Poet if he is to infuse polish into his creation, and in order to be really great, Poetry not only requires spark, but also polish. As regards constant practice or Abhyāsa, Mammata opines that, repeated practice in composition and criticism of Poetry under the guidance of those, who know how to compose and appreciate it is as much necessary for the creation of Poetry as are the other two elements of Poetry-genius and culture : he further states that, an aspiring Poet is to take guidance not only from those who can compose Poetry, i.e., who know the art of Poetry, but also from those who can criticise  $K\bar{a}vya$ , i.e., who are wellversed in the science of Poetry 111. With all emphasis at his command, Mammata asserts that, these three conjointly, and not separately constitute the cause, and not the causes in the production and excellence of Kavya. It is interesting to note that, although Mammata regards Imagination as the first equipment necessary for a Poet, he declares that, erudition, arising from a close study of world and worldly life is another essential equipment, thereby revealing his conviction that, a Poet is not to be carried too far by Imagination, saying good-bye to Reason, because Imagination and Reason both are equally necessary for production of really great Poetry. Reason is to Imagination as the instrument to the agent,—as the body to the spirit,—as the shadow to the substance. Mammata's dissertations on Kavyahetu indicate that he belongs to that school of critics, who think that, a Poet is partly born and partly made: as Sakti is an inborn facutly, a Poet is a born genius: as Vyutpatti and Abhyasa are acquired through effort, so far as these are concerned, a Poet is made.

Hemacandra, however, thinks that, a Poet is born, and not made. He describes Pratibha as the only cause of Poetry and explains it as an intellect, competent to find out freshness in old things and thereafter to draw ever-new descriptions of familiar objects. This Pratibha, he continues, is two-fold in nature; natural and acquired. Natural faculty manifests itself as ignorance shrouding it vanishes, and in this respect is comparable to the splendour of the Sun, that expresses itself in its undimmed glory, as the row of clouds, covering it disappears; acquired faculty, on the other hand, is caused by factors as incantation and favour of Gods: although its manifestation like that of the natural one is consequential upon removal or waning of ignorance, yet it is differentiated from Sahajā-Pratibha, and is called Aupadhiki because its revelation depends on such seen factors as application of magical formulae, propitiation of Gods and others 112. Both these types of Pratibha. Hemacandra continues, are polished by Vyutpatti and Abhyāsa: these two go only to sharpen Poetic Intuition and are incapable of being regarded as causes of Poetic creations directly, inasmuch as, they do not bear any fruit whatsoever in case of persons, completely bereft of Pratibha 113. Following Mammata closely. Hemcandra explain Vyutpatti as proficiency in the ways of the world, consisting of the immovable and the movable, in the different branches of learning such as Grammar, Metrics, Lexicons, the Vedas Legendary and Historical works, Logic, Dramaturgy and Erotics, as also in the poetic creations of master artists; he says that, imagination, which is rendered elegant by this proficiency creates Poetry, incorporating such descriptions as do conform to the ways of the world and the principles, enumerated in different branches of Sciences, showing thereby that, as a poet is allowed to handle any and every subject in his Poetry, it is better for him to possess certain amount of proficiency in the ways of the world, as also in the different branches of learning 114. In explaining Abhyasa, he maintains that, it consists in repeated application to Poetry on the part of one, who is trained by writers as well as connoisseurs of Poetic art: imagination, rendered elegant by this repeated practice.

he says, provides like an wish-fulfilling cow an inexhaustible stock of emotional mood 115. As regards the training of a Poet, he observes that, it comprehends such practices as non-mention of even the actual, mention of even the non-actual, the process of shadow-borrowing, use of borrowed phraseology, filling up the gaps and similar other methods, revealing thereby clearly the influence exercised on him by Ksemendra 116

Vägbhata describes Imagination as the cause of Poetry: he thinks that culture ornaments, while practice polishes it. Like Kṣemendra he advices an aspiring Poet to undergo carefully a course of training, which includes among others composition of even unmeaning stanzas and verse-filling. Following Rāja-śekhara, he describes early hours, acquaintance with the different branches of learning and company of Poets as the sources of inspiration. Vāgbhaṭa, thus, in his conclusions on this point is indebted to Hemacandra, Kṣemendra and Rājaśekhara and there is hardly anything original in his own treatment.

The tendency to regard Imagination, Culture and Practice as conjointly constituting the causal factor of Poetry manifests itself after a brief interval in the speculations of Jayadeya, who believes that, Pratibha, attended with Sruta and Abhyasa gives rise to Poetry in the same way as a seed, coming in contact with earth and water gives rise to a creeper 117. Kavikarnapura expresses the same idea in a veiled way. He defines a Poet as one endowed with Vija and maintains that, this Vija consists in an impression implanted in previous births, an impression, without which it is possible neither to compose nor to appreciate Poetry: at the same breath he observes that, it is necessary for a Poet to possess Pratibha, responsiveness and proficiency in the different branches of learning, and following the ancients, explains Pratibha as an intellect, competent to present ever-fresh ideas. While Dandin and Mammata clearly mention Pratibha, Vyutpatti and Abhuasa as conjointly forming the cause of Poetry, Kavikarnapura points out that, the equipments necessary for a Poet are Pratibha and Sarvagamakovidatva, but at the same time he defines a Poet as one endowed with an impression, that leads to sprouting of  $K\overline{a}vya$ , and thereby, cleverly recognises the importance of repeated practice, that owes its existence to this impression<sup>118</sup>.

The Kāvya-kalpalatā-vṛtii of Arisimha and Amaracandra is a tre tise on Kaviśikṣā and naturally, it emphasises the importance of Practice in production of Poetry. It furnishes hints on construction of different metres, conversion of one metre into another, use of particles for filling up the verse, subjects for descriptive Poetry, the display of word-skill of various kinds, tricks of producing double-meaning verses and riddles, construction of similies and such other figures and uses of appropriate parallelisms. In this connection it gives a long list of conventions observed by the Poets and states what to describe and how to describe. The authors, whose main intention is to write a guide-book for a student-poet indulge in too much of spoon-feeding and by formulating a set of stereotyped rules narrow down the field of an aspiring poet's activity.

The doctrine that Pratibha constitutes the sole cause of Poetry finds a staunch supporter in Panditaraja Jagannatha, who refutes the contentions of earlier theorists on the subject and establishes his own proposition with irrefutable logic. Jagannatha mentions poetic genius or imagination as the sole causal factor in creation of Poetry, and explains it as an intellect of the Poet, absorbed in selecting sound and sense, appropriate to an emotional mood, intended to be depicted in a specimen of Poetic Art. The Dhvanivadin believes that, at the time of composition of Poetry, not only do ideas come out from the heart of the Poet: expressions, too, gush forth spontaneously in ceaseless succession from the fountain-head of his imagination, as he remains completely absorbed in contemplation of the emotion concerned. It is said that, a Poet, who has to search for suitable words and meanings cannot compose real Kavya of high merit, as in doing so his mind becomes distracted from the final aim, which is nothing other than depiction of sentiment. For this reason, while laying down the principles of using poetic figures, Anandavardhana remarks that, only that figure for the

improvisation of which no additional effort is necessary on the part of a Poet is regarded as intimately related to Poetic Art<sup>119</sup>.

Jagannatha thinks that the attribute Imaginationness, or Pratibhatva constitutes the determinant of the cause of Poetry and is capable of being explained either as a universal element or as an unanalysable ultimate concept. 120 The question of furnishing two different explanations arises, because there is divergence of opinion on the exact nature of Pratibha. The Mīmāmsaka regards Pratibhā as an unseen power, capable of being inferred only from its effects; this power, he says, is something different from substance, quality or action, and consequently, Pratibhatva is not a generality or jaii, because an attribute, that inheres in a species of substance or quality or action, and not in others is accepted as a jaii, provided it is not vitiated by the fallacy of cross division. The acceptance of the Mīmāmsaka doctrine renders Pratibhātva a specimen of non-jāti, but nevertheless, it is an attribute, incapable of being analysed into component parts, as also of being defined in clear-cut terms; and so. Jagannatha describes it as an ultimate concept (akhunda upadh). The view of Anandavardhana on the nature of Prativha, however, presents a completely different picture. Anandavardhana and following him, many others define Pratibha as a faculty of knowing, which the Vaisesikas describe as a quality, belonging to the soul; as Pratibuatva is an attribute inhering in a quality, these scholars think that, it is possible to grant the status of jati to it; this, they continue, is a species belonging to the genus Guna.

While earlier writ rs accept  $Pratibh\overline{a}$  as a natural (sahajā) faculty, being the outcome of impressions made on the soul in countless births, Jagannatha regards it as a cultivated (utpādyā) one: in some cases, this poetic faculty, he says, is produced by good fortune, caused through grace of God and great men, and in others is generated by a special type of proficiency and repeated practice in creation of Poetry.  $^{121}$   $Pratibh\overline{a}$ , that is caused through different sets of cause, thus, bears analogy to the fire, generated from grass, stick and stone, acting separately, and not

to the jar, produced by potter, his rod and wheel, working conjointly. It is wrong to assert that good fortune, special type of proficiency and repeated practice conjointly constitute the cause of poetic faculty, because this genius is noticed even in children. who have never before studied the ways of the world and poetical compositions or have never attempted to write specimens of Poetry. The argument that, in case of such children, culture and practice, acgired in previous births contribute towards the production of Pratibha is unacceptable, because, firstly, such presumption leads to complexity; secondly, there is no evidence to show that, these three factors conjointly constitute the cause of poetic intuition; and thirdly, there is no logical necessity of postulating such a theory, -the effect being accountable otherwise, 122 It is equally wrong to maintain that, religious merit is the sole cause of poetic faculty, because, men, who in earlier years could not compose Poems are found to do so in later years after attainment of superior culture and undertaking of constant practice. The argument that, in these cases, also, religious merit plays its ov a part in production of the desired effect is untenable, since it anders inexplicable non-manifestation of Pratibha in such person, in their earlier years before acquisition of proficiency and practice. The counter-argument that, another merit impedes dwaning of poetic faculty in those persons in their early life is equally unacceptable, because it entails a violation to the law of parsimony: presumption of two conflicting merits is a complex process,—the postulation of culture and practice as the cause of Poetic creation being a simpler one. 128 Thus Jagannatha refutes the contentions of rival theorists, and asserts, with all emphasis at his command that, firstly, Pratibha. Vuutpatti and Abhyasa do not conjointly constitute the cause of Kavya, which has Pratibha for its sole causal factor, and secondly, this Pratibha, also, is not caused by religious merit, culture and practice, acting conjointly, but in some cases by religious merit alone and in others by proficiency and practice acting independently. In his eagerness to show that, the causal connection postulated by him is not vitiated by the fallacy of Plurality of Causes, Jagannatha observes that, the effects

produced by the two sets of causes are different in their pature. or in other words, religious merit generates one type of poetic faculty, and culture and practice produce that of a different type : and thus, as corresponding to two sets of causes there are two sets of effects, the question of the fallacy of violation, vitiating the relation of causality does not arise. Now Poetic faculty being of two different types, one caused by merit, and the other by proficiency and practice—the same fallacy is likely to vitiate the causal connection between Kavya and Pratibha. How can two different causes lead to one and the same effect? Jagannatha puts forward two solutions to this problem. The first alternative, he says, is to point out that, Pratibha in general, - without any such qualification as caused by merit or culture-cum-practice is the cause of Poetry; the second one, he continues, is to state that, Pranbla, caused by merit leads to one type of Poetry, while that, created by culture and practice leads to Poetry of a different type: in short, either the cause of Kavya is to be posited as unitary in character or the effect of Pratibha is to be described as multiple in nature 124 In reply to the point of the opponents that, as dwaning of Pratibha is not found in all persons, acquiring proficiency in the different branches of learning and undertaking practice to compose Poetry under the guidance of writers and connoisseurs, so the relation of causality existing between Vyutpatti and Abhyasa on the one hand and Pratibha on the other is likly to be vitiated by the fallacy of violation, Jagannatha observes that, such cases of violation are capable of being explained away in two different ways. The first alternative is to say that, those persons did not acquire special type of proficiency, and the cause of Pratibha is is not each and every combination of Vyutpatti and Abhyasa, but that of a special type only: the second alternative, he answers, is to state that, in those cases expected dawning of Pratibha is obstructed by a great demerit. The conclusion of absence of impediment in the category of causes, he includes, is a necessary evil not only in his own doctrine, but also in that of Mammata and others, according to whom, Sakti, Vyutvatti and Abhyasa conjointly constitute the causal factor of Poetic

creation.<sup>125</sup> And this is necessary in order to account for non-composition of Poetry on the part of a Poet, who has to his credit a number of fine specimens of poetic art at a particular period, when emanation of his expressions and ideas is hampered through magical formula, applied by his opponent, as also to explain away similar other cases of violation.

### V

## Classification of Poetry.

Consistently with his doctrine that, *Dhvani* or suggested sense forms the soul or essence of Poetry, Anandavardhana classifies Poetry into three types, according to the place occupied by this implicit idea in a poetic creation. It is said that in a *Dhvani-kāvya* or a best type of Poetry, the expressed word and sense, subordinating themselves, manifest the suggested content of paramount importance. Mammaṭa, following Anandavardhana defines it as a type of Poetry in which the implicit idea is more charming and consequently of more importance than the explicit one. As an illustration of this suggestive specimen of Poetic Art, Mammaṭa cites the verse:

Niḥśeṣacyutacandanam stanataṭam nirmṛṣṭarāgo 'dharo Netre dūramanañjane pulakitā tanvī taveyam tanuḥ/ Mithyāvādini dūti bāndhavajanasyājñātapīḍāgame Vāpīm snātumito gatāsi na punastasyādhamasyāntikam//

which means this: 'The slopes of breasts have their sandal-paste completely washed off,—the lower lip has its red colour rubbed off,—the eyes have lost their collyrium at the corners,—and this slender form has put on horripilation. O ye messenger! liar! unaware of the agony suffered by your friend; You had gone indeed to the lake to have a dip, and not to the vicinity of that wretch'. It is pointed out that, here the idea of dalliance is conveyed through suggestion by the expressed sense, constituted of a number of changes, appearing in the limbs of the messenger, and the implicit idea is comprehended by a refined appreciator, who is thoroughly acquainted with the speciality of the speaker, person spoken to and context: it is further

asserted that, in the matter of suggestion of the implicit, the expression 'adhama', meaning 'wretched' plays a prominent role. Mammata is of opinion that, in the verse under consideration, the unexpressed is more attractive, and as such, is of more importance than the expressed, because the semblance of love-in-union, which is the dominant emotional mood here depends for its emergence more on the former than on the latter. Anandavardhana attempts to connect the concept of Dhvani with the somewhat mystical speculations of the Vaiyākarņas on Sphota and asserts that, the designation Dhvani, applied to this species of Poetry is based on an analogy of use of the same expression by the Vaiyākaranas. The Vaiyākaranas use the term 'Dhvani' to signify momentary and isolated sounds, pronounced by our speech-organs, -sounds, that go to suggest the eternal indivisible word-essence called 'Sphota', which alone is the real significant entity; taking cue from them the Alamkarikas also use the term Dhvani to signify a piece of poetic creation, that goes to bring into light an inexplicably charming unexpressed idea, which alone constitutes the secret of Poetry. 128

The second class of Poetry in which the suggested sense is not predominant but subordinate is called Gunībhūtavyangya Kavya or Poetry of subordinated suggestion: in it the suggested plays a subordinate part, in so far as it serves to emphasise or embellish the expressed 129. Anandavardhana cites a number of cases in which the unexpressed renders itself subordinate to the expressed: it does so (1) in such figures as Samasokti, Aparastutapraśamsā and the like, in which suggested matter goes to embellish the expressed, (2) in the poetic figure Dīpaka, in which suggested figure goes to emphasise the expressed Alamkara and (3) in the poetic figure Rasavat, in which the suggested emotional mood goes to heighten the beauty of another suggested mood or expressed sense. His Gunībhūtavyangya comprehends such cases also in which the implicit idea itself or the fact that, the expression conveys an implied meaning is expressed through the function of denotation and thereby, the unexpressed looses its charm, springing from concealment, -a charm that constitutes the essence of Dhvanikavya. The verse:

Samketakalamanasam vitam jñatva vidagdhaya /

Hasannetrarpitakutam lilapadmam nyamilayat //, meaning: Knowing that the profligate person is eager to have an idea of the time of union, the intelligent lady, revealing her desire by blooming eyes contracted her pleasure-lotus' serves as an illustration to the point: here the expressed meaning of the first half of the stanza itself shows that, the contraction of the pleasure-lotus is intended to give a hint180, Following Anandavardhana, Mammata, also, defines Gunibhutavyangya as a type of Poetry, in which the unexpressed does not excel the expressed in point of charm and asserts that this is Poetry of mediocre class131. His commentators says that, this subordination of the unexpressed consists in its being either of equal or inferior prominence. They are of opinion that, this variety occurs when the suggested sense in a Kavya does not acquire prominence by itself, but plays a second fiddle to the expressed, which is more striking on account of some peculiar mode of expression. As an example of this type of Poetry, Mammata cites the verse :

'Grāmataruņam taruņyā navavanjulamanjarīsanāthakaram /

Pasyanta bhavati muhurnitaram malina mukhacchaya //, which means this: 'the complexion of the young girl, as she repeatedly looks at the village-youth, holding a cluster of fresh Asoka blossoms in his hand is becoming extremely pale'. He points out that, in this verse, the explicit idea is the paleness of the complexion of the young girl and the implicit one is her failure to keep appointment with the village-youth in the bower of Asoka; of these two ideas the explicit one is more attractive, and as such, of more importance than the implicit one, because the manifestation of the emotional mood, which is a semblance of love-in-separation depends on the former,-the paleness of complexion being its effect (anubhava), and not on the latter. Anandavardhana maintains that, in the matter of determining whether the expressed or the unexpressed is principal or subordinate, the sole criterion is charm132: in Dhvani, the suggested is more attractive, in Gunībhūtavyangya, the expressed is more charming.

Anandavardhana is of opinion that Dhvani and Gunibhutavyangya types of Poetry are specimens of Poetic art in the strictest sense of the term, because both contain suggestive elements, and suggested idea constitutes the essence of Poetry. A type of Poetry that is completely devoid of suggested element and is merely 'pictorial in word' or 'pictorial in sense' is regarded as Citrakavya or the lowest class of Poetry: this. Anandavardhana says, is two fold in nature: śabdazitra and arthacitra. A Sabdacitra kāvya abounds in figures of sound and flatter the ear by sound-effect, while an Arthacitra-kavya abounds in figures of sense and consequently, evokes admiration through pictorial representation. 188 In this Poetry, the intention of the Poet does not lie in depiction of sentiment, and as such, it is not competent to bring an emotional mood into light: the beauty of this Kavya, that is devoid of a suggested element lies in mere strikingness of sound and sense. This Poetry, Anandavardhana continues, is not real Poetic creation, but an imitation thereof, as is evident from the very nomenclature given to it. Abhinavagupta endorses this view and observes that, Citrakavya does not contain a suggested element, that forms the essence of Poetry and is only a copy of a true Poetic creation.

The question as to how is it possible for a  $K\overline{a}vya$  to be devoid of a suggested sense arises in the mind of Anandavardhana and he himself discusses it threadbare. It is possible for a Poetry, he says, to be bereft of suggested fact and figure; but there is no such  $K\overline{a}vya$  that is devoid of suggested emotion. And this is so, because each and every subject-matter of Poetry is intimately related to Rasa, being either a  $Vibh\overline{a}va$  or an  $Anubh\overline{a}va$ : there is no such thing on earth that does not evoke one or other feeling. In reply to this question, Anandavardhana maintains that, though it is not possible for a  $K\overline{a}vya$  to be devoid of a suggested emotion, yet a  $Citra-k\overline{a}vya$  is regarded as such theoretically, because in it there is no intention of developing an emotion and it is taken up only with the object of bringing about a strikingness of sound and sense: this is called  $N\overline{v}rasa$ , as the apprehension of Rasa, that is smothered beneath poetic

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figures is weak in it. 184 This Citra, he continues, is admitted to the category of Poetry, because poets are seen producing this type of poetic creation, the end of which is not delineation of emotion, but an ostentations display of the creator's literary craftsmanship. Anandavardhana is of opinion that, a Poetry, in which the intention of the poet is to develop an emotion is bound to be a Dhvanikavya, because even insentient beings described by him become instrumental in depiction of emotion. Great poets do not want to make a parade of their skill in improvisation of poetic figures, nor do they handle such things as are not related to Rasa: and the result is that, their creations always turn out to be specimens of Dhvanikavya. In support of his contention that, the things incorporated by a poet, whose intention is to develop an emotion become helpful towards the suggestion of the desired emotion. Anandavardhana quotes a verse of the ancients, according to which, the universe, as described by a Poet whose object is to delineate an erotic emotion becomes full of flavour, while the same, as presented by one, averse to worldly affairs appears dry and insipid: it is further pointed out that, a master artist presents even inanimate beings as animate ones, attributing consciousness to them and even insentient beings as sentient ones, and consequently is comparable only to the supreme creator. Thus, Anandavardhana concludes, for a master artist there is only one type of Kavya, and that is Dhvani: Citra is for a beginner only. 185

Although Mammata recognises the essentiality of Rasa in Kāvya, he, in deference to Ānandavardhana, regards Citra as a variety of Poetry, and defines this lowest type of Poetry as one striking in word and sense and devoid of suggested idea (avyangya). In explaining the term 'avyangya', he, following his great master Ānandavardhana says that, this Poetry is not characterised by any distinct suggested element, or in other words, comprehension of implicit idea is not quite clear in it, and this is so because the poet takes it up only with the object of bringing about a strikingness of sound and sense. As an illustration of Śabdacitrakāvya, he cites the stanza:

Svacchandocchaladacchakacchakuharacchātetarāmbucchaţā

Murcchanmohamaharsiharşavihitasnanahnikahnaya vah / Bhidyadudyadudaradarduradari dirghadaridradruma-

Drohodrekamahormimeduramadā mandākinī mandatām // meaning: 'May the Ganges quickly remove your dullness,— wherein bath and daily rites are performed with delight by great sages, whose infatuation is destroyed by masses of swift and clear waters, surging up at will in the crevices of the banks,—the Ganges, which has valleys containing large jumping frogs and whose currents gain momentum due to long waves that rise high on account of falling in of tall and rich trees'. The commentators point out that, cognition of love of the poet for the Ganges is feeble here, because that feeling is completely suppressed by the huge mass of Anuprāsa, on the improvisation of which, the mind of the creator is completely absorbed: his purpose is to make a display of his literary craftsmanship,—and not to develop the feeling referred to. As an illustration of Arthacitrakavya, Mammata cites the verse:

Vinirgatam mānadamātmamandirāt
Bhavatyupaśrutya yadrcchayāpi yam /
Sasambhramendradrutapātitārgalā

Nimīlitākṣīva bhiyāmarāvatī //. meaning: 'King Hayagrīva destroyed the pride of his enemies and bestowed honour on his friends: hearing of this king as having gone out of his palace even casually, the City of Gods, with gates being quickly bolted by Indra in a flurry remained, as if, closing her eyes through fear'. In explaining this verse, his commentators observe that, though it contains a suggested element in the shape of Heroic Sentiment, with heroism of Hayagrīva as its basic mood, yet as that implicit idea is completely suppressed by the poetic figure Utprekṣā, on the improvisation of which the whole effort of the poet is concentrated, the stanza is, as if, devoid of suggested element. 168

Although Mammata, in deference to Anandavardhana speaks of Citra as the lowest variety of  $K\overline{a}vya$ , Viśvanātha rejects its claim as Poetry altogether; and this he does in consistency with his own definition that, a sentence, capable of giving Rasa into expression is Poetry. He is of opinion that, there are

two divisions of Poetry only: Dhvani and Gunībhūtavvangya; in the first, the Rasa involved is primarily suggested, in the second it is collateral. Criticising the definition of Citra-Kavya, as furnished by Mammata, he observes that, the very term 'avyangyam' used in the definition rejects the claim of this type of composition to be regarded as Poetry, because in order to constitute a specimen of poetic expression, a sentence is to present Rasa either essentially or collaterally. The argument that, by 'avyangyam', complete absence of suggested element is not meant, but what actually is meant is presence of slight or feeble implicit idea does not solve the difficulty. The so-called indistinct implicit meaning is either capable of being relished or incapable of being so experienced: in case Rasa, presented in the linguistic expression is relished, the composition is either Dhvani or Gunībhūtavyangya; in case it is not relished, the composition does not constitute Poetry at all. 187 In order to establish his own proposition, Viśvanatha seeks the protection of an observation of Anandavardhana, according to which, the criterion of Poetry is revelation of suggested elementwhether circumstantial or essential—and an expression, that is devoid of this element is not real Poetry, but only a copy thereof.

Kavikarnapūra, to start with, classifies Poetry into three types: Uttama, Madhyamī and Avara. In Uttamakāvya, the suggested meaning is prominent, in Madhyamakāvya it is of secondary importance and in Avarakāvya, it is totally bereft of charm and as such, is lifeless, so to say. In continuation, Kavikarnapūra points out, the capacity of the implicit idea to suggest another subtle sense as also strikingness of sound and sense infuse additional beauty into Uttamakāvya and converts it into one of Uttamottama type. He thinks it improper to group a Poetry, containing a single suggested element with this under the same head. In a similar manner, Kavikarnapūra observes, a Madhyamakāvya, characterised by strikingness of sound and sense is converted into Uttamakāvya and an Avarakāvya, ornamented by charm of language and meaning is transformed into Poetry of Madhyama type. The speculations of

Kavikarnapura reveal a more rational approach to the problem of classification of Poetry, in as much as, he arranges it in different categories according to the difference in charm, inherent in the composition, as a whole, and not in any one of its elements, or in other words, according to difference in appeal of respective  $K\bar{a}vyas$ . Although by recognising the importance of strikingness of sound and sense he takes a retrograde step, his observations are of great consequence, at least, from the historical point of view, because they serve the foundation of Panditarāja Jagannātha's theory on the issue.

Jagannatha classifies Poetry into four types and names them as Uttamottama, Uttama, Madhyama and Adhama. In his first type of Poetry, it is said, the expressive word and the expressed meaning, rendering themselves subservient, go to suggest an inexplicably charming unexpressed idea. 189 The manifestation of a sense that remains concealed in such a manner, that even men of refined taste fail to catch it does not render a specimen of Poetic Art a Poetry of Uttamottama type: and such is the case with revelation of an implicit idea, that is clearly cognised even by persons, devoid of poetic sensibility. It is admitted by the Dhyani Theorists that, in order to constitute a true Dhvanikavya, the word and expressed meaning must make themselves subordinate to the prominent suggested idea; this peculiar feature of the best type of poetic creation is referred to by Anandavardhana through the expression 'Upasarjani'rtasvarthau' and by Jagannatha through 'Gunībhavitatmanau'. Thus it is clear, Jagannatha's Uttamottamakavya corresponds exactly to Dhvanikavya of Anandavardhana and Mammata. As in Aparanga and Vacyasiddhyanga varieties of Karya, Jagannatha continues, the implicit idea is of secondary importance, they are incapable of being regarded as specimens of the best type of Poetic creation. As an example of this type of Poetry Jagannatha cites the verse:

Śayitā savidhe' pyanīśvarā saphalīkartumaho manorathān/

Dayitā dayitānanā ubujam daramīlannayanā ninkṣate//
meaning; 'the girl, though lying by the side of her beloved,
yet unable to fulfill her desires is looking at his face with her

eyes slightly closed' Jagannatha is of opinion that, the suggestion of erotic emotion extends to this stanza the status of Uttamottama Kāvya; here the lover being the person, with reference to whom love is generated is the alambanavibhava, lying in seclusion being the excitant cause is the uddīpanavibhava, gazing at the face of the beloved being an ensuent of love is the anubhava and bashfulness and anxiety of the girl being accessories to love are vyabhicaribhavas: these, it is said, go to suggest the feeling of love of the heroine for the man, which being developed turns into Srigararasa and is relished by the appreciators at the time of perception of Poetry. Thus according to Jagannatha, the stanza furnishes an illustration of Rasadhvani, and not of Bhavadhvani, an example of which is afforded by the verse:

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Gurumadhyagatā mayā natāngī nihatā nīrajakorakena

mandam/

Darakundalatandavam natabhrulatikam mamayalokya

ghūrnitāsīt//.

meaning: 'as the slim-figured lady sitting in the midst of her superiors was struck by me with a lotus-bud, she stared at me and then turned her face away in such a manner that, her earrings went slightly upwards and eye-brows moved downwards'; it is the indignation of the lady, that is principally experienced by refined readers, and so prominence belongs to it and not to its cause—the feeling of love. In this connection, Jagannatha quotes a verse, which is said to constitute an example of Rasadhvani of Samlaksyakramavyangya type; it runs as:

Talpagatāpi ca sutanuh śvāsāsangam na vā sehe/

Samprati sa hrdayagatam priyapanim mandamaksipati//. and means: 'the fine-figured girl, who could not bear the touch of her husband's breath even when reclining on bed is now (on the night prior to the departure of the husband) mildly repelling his hand placed on her breasts'. In pointing out the difference between this stanza and the first one, Jagannatha observes that, whereas in the first verse, the sequence between cognition of the expressed and that of the unexpressed is imperceptible, in this one, this sequence is perceptible, or in other words, the

first one is a case of Asamlaksyakramavyangyadhvani, while this one is a case of Samlaksyakramavyannuadhvani.

The question as to whether the expressed meaning bears any definite relation to the unexpressed one or not forms the subject-matter of a hot controversy, as is evident from Jagannatha's animadversion of the explanation of the stock illustration of Dhvani: Nihsesacyutacandanam stanatatam' etc., as furnished by Appayadīksita. Appayadīksita thinks that, the expressed meanings, presented in the verse, namely the changes appearing in the limbs of the messenger are capable of being caused only through dalliance, and consequently, this idea of dalliance is brought into light through the function of suggestion; he is of opinion that, the primary meanings of the different expressions, used in the verse preclude all doubts, concerning the cause of such changes, as complete disappearance of saudal-paste from the slopes of the breasts and the like: they point out clearly and unhesitatingly to embraces and kisses, -all of which are subservient to enjoyment, and thereby, help the revelation of the principal suggested content, namely, dalliance.

In criticising the doctrine of Appayadīksita, Jagannātha observes that, first of all, the explanation of the verse in question, as presented by his opponent is not in agreement with that furnished by Mammata, and other ancient critics of repute. According to Mammata, neither the wiping away of sandal-paste applied to the slopes of the breasts nor the complete disappearance of redness from the lower lip bears the relation of universal concomitance to dalliance, and as these are capable of being produced both by bath and enjoyment, the sense of dalliance is not comprehended through Anumana: the changes. appearing in the limbs of the messenger being inconclusive reasons do not, he says, lead to a valid inference of the idea of enjoyment. Secondly, Jagannatha continues, the proposition of Appaya is opposed to all logic, in as much as, nothing is gained by establishing the fact that, the disappearance of sandal-paste and redness is not caused by bath: this fading away is capable of being produced by a number of factors, of which bath and enjoyment are some. Moreover, the attempt of Appayadīksita

to show that, the changes described in the limbs of the lady are definite and conclusive pointers to enjoyment lands Vyanjana itself in jeopardy. The Dhvani Theorists maintain that. uncommonness of the suggestive expressed meaning instead of being helpful to operation of Vyanjana is detrimental to it, as in that case Anumana steps in to replace it, or in other words. uncommonness, which is but another name of universal concomitance is harmful to suggestion being favourable to inference. 140 Thirdly, in the body of the unexpressed sense. Jagannatha points out, there are two portions, of which the first one is the idea of approaching the lover and the second one is the motive of coming up to him, which is enjoyment. The acceptance of the explanation of the verse, as furnished by Appaya renders the first part of the suggested sense an indicated one, because, as he says, it is not possible to establish logical connection of disappearance of sandal-paste from slopes of the brea-ts and fading away of redness from the lower iip with a dip in the lake, and consequently, Laksanā is bound in this case to come to our rescue by presenting such meanings as are competent to remove this incompatibility: and these meanings here are quite contrary to the primary ones, or in other words. through Vivarītalaksanā the expressions 'Gata' and 'Na Gata' convey respectively the idea of 'not-approaching' and 'approaching'. Thus as the sense of approaching the lover on the part of the messenger is conveyed through Laksana, it can not be regarded as the suggested content; no sense can be brought into light through the functions of Indication and Suggestion at the same time. The argument that, the second portion of the unexpressed content, namely the idea of enjoyment is quite competent to bestow the status of Uttamottamakavya on this stanza does not hold good, because Appaya himself regards that idea as being comprehended through logical postulation. and a sense that is arrived at through arthapatti does not constitute a sabdartha, since such presumption entails a violation to the maxim: 'ananyalabhyah śabdarthah'. Moreover. Jagannatha continues, the explanation offered by his opponent renders the stanza a specimen of Vacyasiddhyanga variety of

Gunībhūtavyangya, in which the expressed meaning depends for its establishment on the unexpressed, instead of making it an instance of Dhvanikāvya, as it actually is. As the explanation of the stanza, offered by Appaya is vitiated by all these defects. Jagannatha rejects it outright and maintains that, the primary meanings of the expressions, used by the intelligent lady are. and as should be, equally applicable to both the explicit ideaa dip in the lake and the implicit one-enjoyment: and the suggested content, that does not naturally follow from the expressed one is cognised by a connoisseur of Poetic Art. thoroughly conversant with the speciality of the speaker, the person spoken to, context and such other factors. Thus while in the view of Appaya the suggestive expressed sense bears some definite relation to the unexpressed idea and is an unfailing pointer to it, in the view of Jagannatha, the explicit meaning bears no relation whatsoever to the implicit one: it is, he says, the transcendental function of suggestion, that brings into comprehension a suggested content not related in any way to the expressed one.

Jagannātha regards a specimen of Poetic creation, in which the suggested content, though always subordinate in relation to all meanings becomes the source of charm as a  $K\bar{a}vya$  of Uttama type. He thinks that, a specimen of Poetry, in which a suggested sense is prominent in relation to the expressed meaning, but subservient in relation to another implicit idea constitutes  $Uttamottama~K\bar{a}vya$ , and not Uttama one, because in order to form  $K\bar{a}vya$  of this variety, it is necessary for the unexpressed content to remain subordinate under all circumstances. An example of this type of Poetry is furnished by the stanza:

Rāghavavirahajvālāsantāpitasahyaśailaśikharesu /

Śiśire sukham Śayānāh kapayah kupyanti pavanatanayāya//, meaning: 'the monkeys sleeping snugly in winter on the peaks of the Sahya mountain, heated by Rāma's anguish of separation are showing anger towards Hanumān'. It is pointed out that, here the expressed meaning is the sudden indignation of the monkeys, and the suggested sense is the idea that, Rāma has

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been comforted by him through delivery of the message of Sītā; this suggested matter is the cause of establishment of the expressed idea and as such justifies it, in as much as, the cognition and acceptance without question of the explicit idea depends on a knowledge of the implicit one. For this reason, the suggested sense renders itself subordinate to the expressed one, but nevertheless, in the verse under consideration, it becomes a source of inexplicable charm. It is interesting to note that, while Anandavardhana is of opinion that, the sole criterion of determing prominence of a meaning is charm and consequently, identifies Prādhānya with Cārutva, Jagannātha makes a difference between the two and observes that, Pradhanya does not necessarily co-exist with Carutva, and consequently, it is possible for a suggested sense to render itself subordinate to another idea and still retain its beauty. Another interesting study is the point whether the verse:

Ayam sa rasanotkarsī pīnastanavimardanah /

Nābhyūrujghanasparsī nīvīvisramsanah karah //, meaning: 'this is the hand, that pulled our girdles, handled our breasts, touched our naval and thighs and untied the knots of our garments' constitutes a specimen of Uttamottama or Uttama Kāvya. Some critics point out that, though the erotic emotion is subordinated to the tragic one, whose beauty it heightens, yet it is prominent in relation to the expressed meaning; and so the verse is an illustration of Uttamottamakāvya. Nāgeśa challenges this observation and maintains that, the erotic emotion, whose apprehension is momentary is not more prominent than the expressed meaning: and this is so, because the hero being dead, the Erotic is unable to manifest itself in its full splendour due to absence of its Vibhava: consequently, Nageśa observes, the stanza furnishes an illustration of Uttama or Gunībhūtavyangya variety of Poetry, as maintained by Mammata and Viśvanātha, 141

Jagannātha's Madhyama or mediocre variety of Poetry is that Poetry in which the charm of the expressed meaning excels that of the unexpressed: here the beauty of the unexpressed is, as if, swallowed up by that of the expressed. The expression:

'Tanayamainakaga vesanalambikrtajalad hijathara pravista-himagiribhujayamanaya bhagavatya bhagarathyah sakhi', meaning: 'A friend of the Ganges, which is, as if, an arm of the mount Himalaya sent to the fathoms of the Ocean in search of his son Mainaka' furnishes an illustration of this variety of Poetry. This Poetry, Jagannatha points out, is, no doubt, characterised by revelation of a suggested content in the form of whiteness and depth of the river, because no such expressed, as is untouched by an unexpressed is competent to generate impersonal pleasure: but the charm of this content is swallowed up by that of the expressed imaginative mood Utpreksa in the same way as the complexion of a village-girl is engulfed by cosmetics and paints. The above discussion makes it clear that. in both Uttama and Madhyama types of Poetry, the suggested sense is subordinate, but whereas in the first variety, this is a source of great charm, in the second, this is not so. Jagannatha observes that, all poetic creations, abounding in figures of sense are capable of being comprehended under either of these two types. Thus in the poetic figure Samāsokti, the unexpressed goes to embellish the expressed and as such, is subordinated to it, but nevertheless appears as a source of great charm, and consequently a Poetry, possessed of this alamkara belongs to Kavya of Uttama variety: in the poetic figure Dīpaka, on the other hand, the expressed imaginative mood excels the subordinate suggested Upamā in charm, and hence a Poetry, endowed with this alamkara belongs to Kavya of madhyama variety.

Jagannatha's fourth or the lowest variety of Poetry is that in which the charm of sound, embellished by that of sense is of more importance: in it the beauty of sound completely swallows up that of meaning. An example of this type of Poetry is afforded by the verse:

Mitrātriputranetrāya trayīśātravaśatrave /

Gotrārigotrajatrāya gotrātre te namo namah //, meaning: 'Our obeisance is to Lord Viṣṇu,—a protector of the Gods, springing in the family of Indra,—a foe of the demons, inimical to the Vedas,—Viṣṇu, who has the Sun and the Moon for his eyes'. Here, Jagannātha points out, the beauty of sense is

totally engulfed by that of sound, on the improvisation of figures, belonging to which the whole energy of the poet is expended. He further maintains that, though it is possible to count a fifth type of Poetry, which abounds in strikingness of sound and is totally devoid of charm of sense, as are such obscure figures and conundrums as Yamaka, Padmabandha and the like, that are accepted as Poetry by established practice of the Poets, yet it is ignored here, because it does not conform to the definition of Poetry, adumbrated before: riddles and obscure figures do not bring a charming idea into expression, and, accordingly, do not constitute specimens of  $K\bar{a}vya$ , at all. 143

The scheme of classification of Poetry, followed by Jagannatha differs in many respects from that, adopted by Anandavardhana and Mammata. Jagannatha's Uttamottama type of Poetry corresponds exactly to Dhvanikavya of Anandavardhana, -the essential trait of this Poetry being prominence and exquisite charm of the unexpressed. In his treatment the Gunībhūtavyangya and Citra types of Poetry of the ancients are split up into three cases: (1) Poetry, in which the suggested content, though rendered subordinate is the cause of charm, (2) Poetry, in which the beauty of the subordinate unexpressed is excelled by that of the expressed, and (3) Poetry, in which the charm of sound, attended with the beauty of sense is of more importance, being the chief object of relish. It is pointed out that, Poetry, abounding in figures of sense falls under either first or second of these cases, or in other words, under Poetry of Uttama or of Madhyama type, and that, abounding in figures of sound comes under the third case, or in other words, Poetry of Adhama type. Jagannatha asserts that, it is improper to group Poetry, abounding in figures of sense and sound under the same head, because appreciable difference in charm, and appeal, consequential upon it is traceable in them. 144 The attempt to place them under one head inspite of this difference in charm, as is experienced by connoisseurs of Poetic Art cuts at the very root of the problem of classification of Poetry, and sounds ridiculous. The observations of the ancients, who place śabdacitra and arthacitra on the same

footing, Jagannatha says, bespeak lack of critical acumen and sense of originality on their part. Secondly, the divisions of Anandavarahana and Mammata are not mutually exclusive, in as much as, such poetic figures as Samāsokti, Aprastutaprašamsā and the like are capable of being comprehended under both Gunībhūtavyan ya and Citra types of Poetry—under mediocre Poetry, because the unexpressed is of lesser attraction and importance than the expressed, and under Poetry of the lowest variety, because its illustrations abound in figures of sense And this happens, because, according to the learned Dhvanikara, the criterion of judging whether a Kavya belongs to the second or third category is to see whether the intention of the Poet is to develop an emotional mood or not: if the poet aims at developing a suggested sentiment, the  $K\bar{a}vya$  is of second variety and if he aims at making a display of his skill in improvisation of figures of speech, the Kavya is of third variety. This intention of the Poet, that forms the cardinal point in discussion does not admit of easy ascertainment, and consequently, much room for confusion is left. For this reason, Jagannatha sets forth a new scheme of classification, in which no consideration is given to the intention of the Poet: he splits up Gunībhūtavyangya and Citrakāvya of the ancients into three cases, and observes that whereas figures, characterised by revelation of a charming subservient suggested content belong to the first case (Uttamakavya), those marked by manifestation of an unexpressed of lesser charm belong to the second case (Madhyama), and those, in which the beauty of sound is of more importance come under the third category (Adhama). This splitting up is advantageous in another respect also: it dispenses with the necessity of subdividing Gunībhūtavyangya type of Poetry into eight sub-types, as is done by Mammata and Viśvanātha. Thus Jagannātha's scheme of classification is an improvement on that adopted by his learned predecessors: it places sabdacitra and arthacitra varieties of Kavya under different heads, -removes the possibility of the division being an over-lapping one, and dispenses with the necessity of subdividing Gunībhūtavyangya class of Poetry.

#### CHAPTER II

# SOUND AND SENSE

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## Nature of word and meaning

The problem of an accurate definition of Poetry leads us to a more intricate problem of determining the exact nature of word and meaning. The question that confronts us is whether a significant word is not different from the letters that constitute it or is it something different from the sounds that go only to reveal it. The Naiyayika believes in the transitoriness of words and consequently, holds that, these words do admit of production and annihilation : he thinks that, they are not different from the letters that go to constitute them. The objectors argue that, letters individually are not significant. entities, in as much as, such presumption renders letters other than the first one unnecessary; nor does a group of letters fare. better, because no such group is possible since the previous. letter ceases to exist when the succeeding letter is heard, and an assemblage is possible only between entities that co-exist. And a letter, they point out, ceases to exist the next moment it is pronounced. In reply to this, the Naiyayika says that, although it is not possible to have an assemblage of letters, that are transitory units and last only for a moment, yet a word as comprised of them is capable of being perceived in these three ways: (1) each succeeding letter is regarded as being united with each preceding letter through the impression left behind by it and this process continues till the cognition of the last latter, (2) sounds produced by the preceding letters give rise to new sounds, which in their turn give rise to fresh sounds and this process continues till the cognition of the last letter and thus nothing stands in the way of comprehension of the whole word-unit by the auditory organ, (3) letters apprehended. in succession leave behind abiding impressions, which togetherwith the comprehension of the last letter go to deliver the meaning, or in other words, the cognition of the last letter being reinforced by simultaneous re-collections of the preceding ones goes to convey the particular concept. Consequently, he argues, a significant word is nothing different from the letters constituting it, and the unitary conception of a word in spite of multiplicity of letters is only illusory in character.

The Vaiyākaranā, however, fails to see eye to eye with the Naiyāyika on this issue. Nāgeša records the observations of the Naiyayika and maintains that, none of the explanations furnished by him, concerning the comprehension of the whole word-unit as also verbal cognition of the concept signified by it is acceptable. The first explanation does not help us, because an existent letter is not competent to unite with a letter that has ceased to exist, in as much as, an assemblage is possible only between entities that co-exist and secondly, of letters that last only for the moment they are pronounced, the question of sequence does not arise. Equally unhelpful is the second explanation, that takes recourse to śabdajaśabda-nyāya and thus attempts to account for comprehension of the whole word-unit : no doubt, it explains cognition of a word, but does not go to establish the existence of a significant word as comprised of constituent letters. The argument that, even a non-existent word is endowed with expressiveness lands us into further troubles, because by applying the same logic it is possible to state that a destroyed jar contains water, which, however, sounds absurd. The third alternative also, that seeks to explain verbal knowledge as ensuing from cognition of the last letter, along with the impressions left by the preceding ones is not free from incongruencies. As there is no hard and fast rule about the existence of impressions of letters in the same order in which they are realised. the word nadiois likely to convey the idea signified by the word dīna, both being constituted of the same component letters. 1 As against the theory of the Naiyayika that a word is nothing but a multitude of letters, the Grammarian points out that, this doctrine renders difference in meanings of such Sanskrit words as Saro and Raso, Nadī and Dīna, Jarā and Rāja unaccountable,

—pairs, in which the constituent letters are the same. The difference in order does not make any difference to the multitude: a forest is seen as such, whether it is viewed from this side or that,—a textile is cognised as such, whether it is seen from this end or that; and this rule is likely to apply in case of a word also, which, according to the Naiyāyika, is nothing but multitude of letters. Our experience, however, reveals that such pairs as  $Nad\bar{\imath}$  and  $D\bar{\imath}na$  present different ideas and in a word, not only the constituent letters, but also the order of arrangement is of importance. This leads the Vaiyākaraṇa to reject the Naiyāyika doctrine and postulate the existence of an eternal word-unit as something different from the multitude of letters forming it.

The grammarian contends that meanings are not signified by momentary sounds, pronounced by our speech-organs, but by an indivisible and eternal word-unit known as Sphota, that is revealed by such transient sounds; scrupulously he makes a distinction between momentary and isolated sounds on the one hand and eternal word-essence on the other,-between unmeanning and significant sounds. Bhartrhari speaks of these two types of words-Nala and Sphota: the first, he says, reveals the latter and the second alone signifies the concept; this doctrine, he continues, proves the unity of word in spite of multiplicity of letters, -a fact, which is directly perceived and consequently, is incapable of being repudiated.2 The Sphota, Bhartrhari continues, is permanent and indivisible and is devoid of any idea of sequence: the different forms of this Sphota, which is unitary in character are asserted in relation to the momentary sounds, only, that go to bring it into light. Like the same crystal appearing as red or yellow, when present by the side of a red or an yellow object and like the same face appearing as long or round, when reflected in a sword or a mirror, the same wordessence appears as varna-sphota, pada-sphota or vākya-sphota, as the case may be, when revealed by sounds, taking the shape of letters, words and sentences. Although Sphota is devoid of physical structure and sequence, the structure and sequence, belonging to the Nada that manifests it are attributed to it and accordingly it appears as one endowed with form and sequence. In order to explain this characteristic feature of Sphota, Bhartrhari introduces the parallelism of the orb of the moon, which though fixed appears as quivering when seen through the ripples of a river: just as the motion of the waves, he says, is attributed to the moon itself, similarly, the peculiar traits of Nāda are attributed to Sphota.

The grammarian thinks that. the difference between the physical structures of two sounds—ka and kha is unreal, being the result of an illusion and the ultimate germ giving rise to both the sounds is one and the same. He believes in the existence of a reservoir of air in some part of our body and asserts that, in the evolution of sound, air plays a great part. The subtlest form of speech, which is nothing other than Sabdabrahman, he maintains, remains in the Mūlādhāra or the seat of eternal consciousness from which all active impulses come out. The next gross manifestation of this Para Vak is Pasyanti, which is brought into light by air, reaching up to the navel region : this Paśyanti is grasped only by our mental apparatus, and not by the auditory organ. It is said that these two subtle forms of speech form the content of indeterminate and determinate types of knowledge respectively of a Yogin, who gets a glimpse of the Eternal Verbum in moments of deep meditation. The next gross manifestation of Paśyantī is Madhyamā, which is brought into light by the same air, as it reaches, the region of our heart : it is mental in constitution and is apprehended only by our internal sense-organ—the mind, and not by an external sense-organ. The grammarian says that this less gross manifestation of speech is cognised when one shuts up his ears or goes on contemplating on mantras. The grossest manifestation of speech, he continues, is Vaikharī, which is brought into light by the same air, as it reaches the cavity of our mouth, strikes the palate, and then, turning back touches the different places of articulation : this speech is endowed with a physical form and is apprehended by the external auditory organ.3 He thinks that, the Vaikhari form of speech is incompetent to signify concepts; the momentary sounds o. Nadas comprehended by our auditory

organs signify meanings, because they possess both the elements of Madhyamā and Vaikharī, and it is the former alone that brings ideas into light, the latter being as nonsensical as a sounce emanating from a drum and other instruments. The grammaran regards the Madhyamā form of speech as identical with Sphoṭa. which, as the name suggests, is the only significant entity, and, in its turn, is capable of being equated with Śabdabrahman or the Eternal Verbum.

The concept of Sabdabrahman is the greatest contribution of Bhartrhari to the field of the philosophy of Sanskrit Grammar. He declares that, the word-essence or the subtlest form of speech is the only transcendental reality, which lies beyond time and space and eludes all descriptions by means of positive and negative predicates: this ultimate principle of being, bliss and consciousness manifests itself in the line of word, as also that of meaning as the cosmic process starts, and consequently, though in the empirical plane, words and meanings are distinct from each other, in the transcendental plane, they are identical in essence. Bhartrhari is of opinion that, the universe is a vivarta of this Sabdabrahman, which is without beginning and end. The term vivarta, which Bhartrhari uses does not convey the technical sense to connote which it is used in later Vedanta works. So while some of his commentators explain the universe as an unreal representation of this supreme principle, others point out that, this is nothing but material transformation of the Absolute Reality. Milk changing into curd illustrates the doctrine of material transformation (Parinama): here the curd is as much real as the milk; a string appearing as a snake or a mother-o'-pearl appearing as a piece of silver, on the other hand, illustrates the doctrine of formal appearance (Vivarta): here the string is not actually transformed into snake, there being only a case of error of ordinary perception.4 Bhartrhari describes the Eternal Verbum as the underlying principle of the universe and thereby attempts to bring out the supreme importance of the word-element. This importance, he continues, is realised from our ordinary experience also. A reality, to denote which there is no term does not form the content of our knowledge:

a fiction, on the other hand, such as a rabbit's horn or a skyflower, when conjured up by a verbal expression appears to have existence and becomes amenable to logical predication.5 For this reason, the Eternal Verbum is described as the supreme light, that illuminates all objects-realities and fictions alike. It is interesting to note that, while Bhartrhari himself regards Posyanti as the Eternal Verbum itself and not as its first nanifestation in the direction of word, his commentator Punyaraja, influenced possibly by Saiva philosophers describes Parā as the Eternal Verbum and Pasyantī as its first manifestation in the line of word, the other two subsequent manifestations being Madhyamā and Vaikharī.6 Bhartrhari maintains that a consummate study of the science of grammar leads the devotee, first of all, to draw a line of demarcation between Sadhusabda and Apasabda and through religious merit, accrued from constant use of Sadhuśabda prompts him to leave the plane, of articulate speech and reach step by step to the plane of Pasyanti or Para, coming to which he becomes blessed with the vision of Sablabrahman. This is the highest spiritual plane - the summum bonum of all dovotees. And so Bhartrhari describes the science of language as the doorway to emancipation, - the straight King's Highway leading to salvation.7

The doctrine of the Vaiyākaraṇi is this that, a word is not an assemblage of letters: it is a separate indivisible unit revealed by momentary sounds, pronounced by our speechorgans. As regards the process of comprehension of this significant unit called Sphoṭa, that does not admit of division into component parts, Bhartṛhari maintains that, each sound of a simple word reveals the same Sphoṭa, and not different ones, because Sphoṭa is unitary in character. Thus in the case of the simple word 'Gauḥ', which is comprised of three sounds—ga, au and ḥ, he points out, each of the three sounds manifests the same sphoṭa. In reply to the objection that, in case of manifestation of the same word-unit by each and every sound, the succeeding sounds become superfluous units, Bhartṛhari says that, although each sound reveals the whole word, there is a qualitative difference in each act of revelation. The first

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revelation is indistinct and so subsequent revelations by succeeding sounds are necessary in order to make the comprehension of Sphota distinct and clear. As each revelation leaves behind an impression of Sphota on the mind, it gradually acquires greater and greater aptitude for comprehending the word-essence, and when the last sound is heard and manifestation of Sphota consequential upon it is made, the word-essence is apprehended in its undimmed glory.8 A close parallel to this process of comprehension, Bhartrhari points out, is to be seer in the case of understanding the import of a section of the Vedas or a verse. Each time a particular section or a particular verse is read, we do not have the idea that we are reading new sections or verses, presenting different meanings; rather with each reading the same sense is comprehended, and consequentially, the notion of distinction disappears yielding place to that of identity. Although each reading presents the same idea, the first cognition is not so clear as the second one,the second one is not so distinct as the third one, and so on. Each subsequent recitation presents clearer and clearer idea, because the preceding readings leave behind their impressions on the mind, and reinforced by these impressions, the mind acquires greater and greater aptitude for comprehending the sense distinctly. Our mind, Bhartrhari usserts, is such an apparatus that, it requires successive rubbings and polishings in order to have a glimpse of Sphota.9

LITERARY CRITICISM

The above discussion makes it clear that, while in the view of the Naiyayika, a word is an assemblage of momentary sounds, in the view of the Vaiyakarana, it is an indivisible eternal and significant word-essence, that is brought into light by the momentary sounds, pronounced by our speech-organs. Although the Mīmamsaka believes in the eternality of sounds, he does not favour the Sphota-theory of the Vaiyakarana. He does not regard a sound as a momentary phenomenon, a the Naiyayika thinks, but Lonsiders it to be an eternal and omnipresent entity. Thus as it is not impossible for eternal and omnipresent sounds to torm into an assemblage, the Mimamsaka does not feel the necessity of falling in line with

the Vaiyakarana and of postulating the entity of Sphota. In reply to the possible objection that all the sound-units, conveyed by individual letters being equally permanent and omnipresent, it is difficult to determine which of them would form a group to convey a particular concept, and in case of such non-determination, verbal cognition would become an absurd proposition, he points out that, in order to form into a word and convey a definite idea, the eternal and omnipresent sounds stand in need of manifestation by our speech-organs: it is not possible for unuttered and unmanifested sounds to form inte a group called 'word' and thus to signify a particular concept. This assertion of the Mīmāmsaka refutes, at the same time, the contention of the opponents that, sounds being permanent and present everywhere the idea of sequence does not arise with reference to them, because the Mimamsaka doctrine clearly states that, words are formed not by unuttered sounds, but by manifested ones only, and it is quite possible to attribute sequence to manifestation of sounds. For this reason, the Mimamsaka maintains, the sequence of sounds is of great importance in a word and a change in this sequence results—as is evident from the words Sarah (Lake) and Rasah (flavour)-in a change of ideas, as well. He argues that, although manifestations of sounds are momentary actions, and consequently, it is not possible for the manifested sounds to form into a group, yet recollection of all the sound-units simultaneously in the same order in which they were manifested takes place, as the last sound of a word manifests itself, and this happens, because the last manifestation is aided by impressions left on the mind by earlier manifestations, and as recollection of all the sound-units occurs at a time, the particular idea is comprehended. He contends that, the sounds, conveyed by letters apprehended in succession leave behind abiding impressions, which together with the comprehension of the final sound delivers the meaning, and thereby, attributes to memory-impressions an unbelievable capacity, namely, that of delivering the meaning. In reply to the charge that, the Mimamsaka Theory fails to explain the unity of a word, in as much as, it renders it a combination of sounds, conveyed by letters and thereby invests it with the attribute of multiplicity and thus postulates something opposed to our experience. he states that, in reality, word is nothing but a group having for component parts sounds, conveyed by letters, that form the content of a single cognition, and when one explains a word as a unity, he only transfers the unity of cognition to the content of that cognition, or in other words, the sense of unity of a word is nothing but an illusion. It is interesting to note that though the Mīmāmsaka standpoint on the nature of a word finds expression in the writings of Kumārilabhaṭṭa, his disciple Manḍanamiśra upholds enthusiastically the reality of the Sphoṭa as a metaphysical entity and, thus, lends his full support to the doctrine of the Vaiyākaraṇa.

The Alamkarika, as is evident from his express statement that, the theory of Dhvani is based on the doctrine of Sphota follows the viewpoint of the Vaiyakarana on the nature of a word. He classifies a word-unit into three types: vacaka, laksaka and vyanjaka and maintains that, this classification relates merely to designations and not to the things designated: to state more clearly, there is no separate list of vacaka, laksaka and vyanjaka words, -the same word being used as each of these three units under different circumstances. 10 A word that conveys a sense through the function of denotation is called vacaka, one that signifies a meaning through the function of Indication is called Laksaka, and one that brings an implicit idea into expression through the function of suggestion is named vyanjaka. Corresponding to these three types of words, there are, he asserts, three types of meaning: vacya, laksya and vyanyya, that are brought into light respectively through the functions of Abhidha, Laksana and Vyanjana. And this he does, because the relation between a word and its corresponding meaning is by no means such as one can deny. Bhartrhari maintains that, the existence of this relation is sufficiently borne out by the very nature of a word and its meaning : the simple fact that a word is called vacaka (one that denotes the sense) and the thing is termed vacya (the thing that is denoted) is in itself a strong evidence as to their mutual connection. When it is said that, 'this thing is denoted by this word' and 'this word denotes this thing', it is necessarily understood that, there is some kind of connection between  $v\bar{a}caka$  and  $v\bar{a}cya.^{11}$  The ascertainment of exact nature of relation existing between a word and its corresponding idea forms an interesting study, because the different schools of Indian thought seek to explain it in different ways.

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## Abhidha-the primary denotative Power

The Vaisesika does not regard verbal cognition as a separate valid source of knowledge, which, in his opinion, is two-fold in nature: perception and inference. 12 He thinks that, inference comprehends the case of verbal knowledge, or in other words, conceptual cognitions are cases of inference: the word stands in the same relation to its corresponding idea as does a Probans to a Probandum 12(a). The opponents may here retort that, in order to have a genuine case of Inference, he continues, it is necessary for the Probans and the Probandum to have a fixed and invariable relation between each other, such as conjunction, inherence, causality, identity etc. Sabda, however, does not possess conjunction with artha, because it is a quality of ether, and a quality does not possess another quality. Secondly, things that are formless and inactive by nature are incapable of making themselves mutually related to one another without the intervention of any external force. Thirdly, the term 'cow' in such expression as: 'the cow does not exist' does not convey the idea of conjunction between the term itself and the thing signified by it, of which nothing but negation is predicated. The same line of argument, the opponent continues, is competent enough to set aside the question of relation of inherence existing between a term and its import. 18 Nor is the relation of identity capable of being established between a word and its meaning.

In reply to the question as to what then is the relation

existing between a word and its corresponding idea, the Vaisesika points out that, this is a conventional relation and consequently owes its existence to the convention of a particular community: accordingly, this, he says, is artificial and not natural. Thus in the view of the Vaisesika, a word, which is a Probans in inference leads to knowledge of an object. that does not form the content of perception and as such is regarded as a Probandum in the same way, as smoke leads to knowledge of fire, that does not form the object of perception.14 The Vaisesika points out that, in the case of inference, first of all, the person, who has already known the invariable relation between the probans and the probandum perceives the probans (in the subject); next he remembers the universal concomitance subsisting between the probans and the probandum. Then arises the synthetic judgement (paramarsa) in the form of 'the subject-as-determined-by the-probans-as-pervaded by the probandum.' Thereafter, the probandum is inferred in the subject. Likewise in the case of verbal knowledge, the Vaisesika asserts, one must beforehand cognise the denotation of particular words. Thereafter he hears those words and at once remembers the denotation, i.e. the conventional relation subsisting between the words and their corresponding meanings. Then and then only, he understands the meaning of the entire sentence, i.e. to say, his knowledge is verbal in character. The inference may be presented thus: These words possess conventional relation with their respective denotations, which have already been remembered, for the simple reason that, they form a group of words, possessing mutual expectancy, compatibility and proximity.

The Philosophers belonging to the Mīmāmsā and Nyāya schools, however, do not accept this Vaiśeṣika stand-point as the correct one. They point out that, verbal knowledge does not fit in with the scheme of syllogistic reasoning, as it is said to be by the Vaiśeṣika. The word, no doubt, represents the Probans and the meaning the Probandum, but the subject, which is represented by the hill in the syllogism: Parvato vahnimān dhumāt is conspicuous by its absence. The meaning is incapable of being regarded as the subject, because it does not form the

object of perception, while the subject in all cases is a known and perceived entity. The argument that, the word itself represents the Probans and the subject both involves the fallacy of Petitio principii. Secondly, in case of a genuine inference. the Probans and the Probandum remain spatio-temporally associated, but it is not possible to assert this association of śabda and artha, because while the former resides in the ear-drum, the latter remains in the outside world and the two do not go hand in hand. Thirdly, they point out that, in case of a genuine inference, the Probans invariably and unfailingly leads to the knowledge of the particular Probandum under all circumstances; for example, smoke always leads to cognition of fire and never to that of water. This characteristic feature of inference. however, is absent in case of our conceptual cognition, in which different ideas are signified by the same word in different countries. Verbal knowledge, therefore, the Naiyayikas conclude, is something different from inferential cognition, and consequently, the Vaisesika doctrine has no legs to stand upon. The Naiyayikas further contend that, Inference presupposes an unconditional relation (svabhavikah sambandhah) between the Probans and the Probandum, i.e. to say, the knowledge of the Probans unconditionally without the interference of any external factor leads to the knowledge of the Probandum. But the situation appears totally different in case of verbal knowledge, where the knowledge of denotation (Samketagraha) is invariably a determinant factor. Unless and until it is already known, the cognition of word does in no way lead us to the understanding of its meaning.

Although the Mīmāṃsaka joins hand with the Naiyāyika in controverting the Vaiśeṣika doctrine, he differs from the logician on a vital point, in as much as, while the latter regards the relation existing between word and meaning as the product of divine volition, he declares it to be eternal and natural. The words and their corresponding ideas, he says, are not first produced and then get themselves connected with one another: their reciprocal association, he affirms, is fixed by nature. And this he does in his eagerness to maintain the unquestion-

able trustworthiness of the Vedas. According to the Mīmāmsaka the property of expressiveness inheres eternally in words in the same way as the property of burning inheres in fire. In reply to the question as to why the meanings of words are not grasped by all, he points out that, the power of expressiveness of a particular word with reference to the particular object signified by it, though eternal and natural, stands in need of the knowledge of the conventional relation, prevalent in a particular community in order to generate conceptual cognition. A parallel is to be found in case of sense-organs: though endowed with eternal power of comprehending respective objects, they stand in need of establishing contact with those. if they are to reveal them. 16 As regards the charge that, the use of the same word to convey different meanings in different regions goes to refute the Mīmāmsaka thesis of inherent eternal power of expressiveness with regard to words, he points out that, though the property of expressiveness is natural and unchangeable, yet conventional relation, knowledge of which goes to make it operative is changeable, and this variation of meaning is due to variation of conventional relation in differnt countries and communities. Thus the Mimamsaka maintains with all emphasis at his command the thesis of eternal inherent power of expressiveness with regard to words and asserts that, the entity of conventional relation is necessary in order to make this inherent power effective and operative, thereby showing that, the power of expressiveness or Śakti or Abhidhā is to be distinguished from conventional relation or Samaya or Samketa.

The Naiyāyika fails to see eye to eye with the Mīmāṃsaka in ascribing the eternal potency of expressiveness to words. This power, he argues, does not stand on a same footing with that of burning inherent in fire, because while the power of burning does not stand in need of its knowledge in order to make it operative, the power of expressiveness depends for its operation on a knowledge of conventional relation, existing between a term and its idea. Thus when it is an imperative necessity to posit conventional relation as an auxiliary factor

in generating verbal cognition in addition to the inherent potency of expressiveness, the Mīmāṃsaka doctrine, the Naiyāyika says, entails a violation to the law of simplicity, and as such is to be controverted. The Naiyāyika contention that, the Will of God represents the relation between word and meaning, and there is no such thing as the power of expressiveness, as separate from it, on the other hand, he maintains, is in conformity to the law of parsimony.

The Naiyayika like the Vaisesika takes care to show the hollowness of the stand-point which explains the relation between a word and its meaning as an eternal one. He denies the existence of any natural relation linking the two, because, as he says, no evidence-either perception or inference-is available in support of this contention. 17 This relation, he continues, is incapable of being explained as conjunction or inherence, because language and meaning does not remain in the same locality: the former originates in the vocal apparatus of the speaker, while the latter lies on earth. But at the same time, it is not possible to assert that, there is no relation, whatsoever, between a term and its corresponding idea. What than is the relation existing between the two? In reply to this query, the Naiyayika maintains that, the cognition of meaning is not due to any natural connection, but it issues forth from the Will of God, which expresses itself in the following form: 'Let this meaning be comprehended from this word' or 'Let this word signify this meaning'. This Will of God, he says, is the connection that exists between a word and an object symbolised by it, and is identical with the real denotative power of word or Sakti 18 Although the Will of God expresses itself with reference to three factors-śabda, artha and bodha, yet the sound alone is regarded as vacaka, because it produces cognition of meaning, and in a similar manner the sense, alone, is regarded as vacya, because it forms the content of such cognition, and consequently, there is no possibility of the cognition itself being designated vācaka or vācya. The Naiyāyika regards a sentence as the only significant unit of speech and points out that, verbal testimony or śabdabodha is produced by words

only when they are related to one another in such a way as to constitute a logically significant sentence. 19 Of this verbal testimony, he says, the primary cause is constituted by knowledge concerning words and the function by recollection of meanings, caused by such words: the knowledge concerning Sakti, he adds, is auxiliary to conceptual cognition, in as much as, a man, bereft of this knowledge fails to recollect objects. even when words are comprehended by him. 20 The Naivavika contends that, hearing of a particular term leads to recollection of its corresponding idea, with which it is linked on the basis of conventional relation, superimposed by Divine Volition. And this it does, because knowledge of one of the two related things invariably brings in through association of ideas the recollection of the second related entity. Thus the Naivavika identifies Sakti or Abhidha with Samketa or conventional relation which, he says, is wholly artificial, improvised as it is by Divine Will, and his doctrine differs from that of the Mīmamsaka in this respect that, while the Mīmāmsaka differentiates Sakti or power of expressiveness, pertaining to words from Samketa or convential usage, he equates Samketa with Sakti and remarks that conventional relation, superimposed by the Will of God alone constitutes the sole cause of conceptual cognition. As to the exact denotation of the term 'samketa', the Najvavikas differ among themselves: while ancient logicians refer to the Will of God as the true interpretation of samketa, the neologicians maintain that the term refers to convention of human origin, as well; thus, according to the neo-logicians, any will -be it human or divine—that expresses itself in the following form: 'Let this meaning be comprehended from this word' constitutes samketa.21

LITERARY CRITICISM

The Vaiyakarana challenges the doctrine of the Naivavika and asserts that, the Will of God is incompetent to link subda with artha. A relation, he maintains, is different from the related things and at the same time is responsible for such qualified cognition as the relata are endowed with the particular relation. Thus in case of conjunction of jar with the earth, the relation of conjunction itself, which is different from both the

jar and the earth leads to such knowledge as the earth is possessed of conjunction with the jar. In case of Divine Will, however, which, is said to constitute the relation between word and meaning, we do not have such idea, as this particular word is possessed of Divine Volition or this particular idea is endowed with it. Consequently, the Vaiyakarana concludes, the volition on the part of God does not represent the relation, existing between a word and an object, symbolised by it. 22 And this he says, because, according to him, relations always lead to qualified cognition, or in other words, to cognition of the related entities, as possessed of those particular relations, and in his scheme there is no place for such relations, as do not lead to this qualified cognition. The first type of relation is technically known as Vrttiniyāmaka and the second type as Vrttyaniyāmaka. The Naiyāyika, however, grants recognition to both these types of relation, and this difference in their epistemological schemes accounts for difference of opinion, concerning the role of Divine Volition between the Naiyayika and the Vaivākarana.

Following the footsteps of the Mimamsaka, the Vaiyakarana, also, describes the relation between word and meaning as natural and eternal. This relation, he says, bears analogy to the relation, existing between the sense-organs and the objective world: both are without beginning and end. 28 If words were, he argues, naturally unconnected with their meanings, nobody could have associated the one with the other in any possible way. For this reason, Patanjali, with all emphasis at his command, declares a word, its corresponding idea and the relation existing between the two as eternal entities. 24 The Vaiyakarana agrees with the Mīmāmsaka in another point also. Like the latter, he, too, differentiates Sukti or denotative power from Sambandha or the relation existing between the two and maintains that, this Sambandha is auxiliary to comprehension of the eternal denotative power, pertaining to words. Following the Mīmāmsaka's line of argument, he says that, the eternal denotative power of a word stands in need of ascertainment of relation, existing between that particular word and the meaning signified by it in order to make itself effective and operative. A close parallel is to be found in the illuminative power of a lamp: though this power is inherent in a lamp, yet it operates and illuminates objects, only when connection of lamp with the objects concerned is established. In a similar manner, he says, Śakti becomes operative and produces conceptual cognitions, only when the relation of a word with the object symbolised by it is ascertained. Śakti, he continues, is to be scrupulously distinguished from Sambandha or Samketa, and in support of his contention refers to such expressions as: 'This idea constitutes the conventional meaning of this word', 'This meaning is signified by the denotative power of this word' and the like, showing, thereby, the distinction of denotative power from conventional usage or relation.

As regards the nature of actual relation linking Sabda and Artha, reference is to be made to the Sabdadhyasavada of the Vaiyākaraņa. The Vaiyākaraņa maintains that, although in the empirical plane sound and sense are totally dissimilar and discrete, in popular usage they are completely identified, as is evident from such expressions: 'Om stands for Brahman', 'The two-syllabled word Rama vanguishes the pride of archers' and the like. To state more clearly, in popular usage the term 'Rāma' not only stands for an assemblage of four sounds, namely -R,  $\bar{A}$ , M and A, but also for the man designated by the term. This identity between two distinct entities—śabda and artha, the Vaiyākarana asserts, is not real: but is caused by an illusory superimposition of the former on the latter. Thus the Vaiyakarana doctrine states that, our popular usage presupposes the complete identity of śabda and artha, which, however, is unreal being caused by illusory superimposition of one on the other. Now as superimposition takes for granted the real differencebetween the thing superimposed and the object of superimposition, it is clear that, the Vaiyakarana accepts the thesis that, śabda and artha are entirely different from each other, but at the same time he affirms that in popular usage identity of śabda is superimposed on artha through illusion, or in other words, according to him, the relation existing between sound and senseis difference-cum-identity.25 This explanation of the Vaivakarana is competent enough to controvert the counter-argument of the Naivayika and the Mīmamsaka that, if word and concept were identical, then the utterance of the sound agni (fire) would have been accompanied by burning sensation, because, according to him, the difference between word and concept is real and their identity is unreal, being a product of illusory superimposition (adhyasa). But there are other defects in the Vaiyakarana thesis that stand in the way of its acceptance without question. Kumarila points these out and asserts that Sabdadhyasavada has no legs to stand upon. It is said that, the peculiar doctrine is likely to render all objects signified by homonymous words identical, since things that are equal to the same thing are equal to one another: conversly again, it is likely to convert synonymous words into those expressive of different ideas, because such words differ in respect of their constituent letters. 26 It is further pointed out that, the basis of superimposition of śabda on artha is absolutely absent in the present case; neither the two are similar to each other, nor are they spatio-temporally associated in such a way that, the quality of one is capable of being transferred to the other.27

These objections seem to emanate from an insufficient or distorted understanding of the logical character of the meaningrelation. The logic of language demands that meaning as an epistemic relation should primarily belong to the conceptual plane. A very illuminating passage of Helaraja's commentary on the second verse of Sambandha-samuddesa in the third book of Vakyapadīya leaves no doubt about what the Vaiyakarana really means to say. Even the opponents should admit that, for the sake of the logical possibility, the apprehension of meaning must move hand in hand with the universalisation of both the word and its meaning. The word as a purely physical existence is not 'a word', but differs from man to man and from utterance to utterance. If we would take the word as a physical sound-series, obviously the speaker and the hearer could not have participated in the apprehension of the same word nor could have a man understood the same thing by the same word for the second time. Yet the very possibility of communication. between man and man depends on the incontestable fact that different individuals must understand the same thing by the same word; otherwise the society would have lost its social character and the individual man would have been exiled into a non-communicative insularity of impervious existence. Hence a word to be the same must transcend its particularity as a physical instance of articulation, and be sublimated to a universal in the realm of conceptual understanding. The meaning too must pass through the same process of purification When we seem to understand the same 'thing' dog by the word 'dog', we are not supposed to have had perceived the same instance of the canine quadruped barking, hopping and running. Our retained impressions of the past percepts are individually peculiar to each individual. Different impressions of the different individuals are isolated psychic factors carrying an insular existence in the individual minds. Yet we understand each other well enough in linguistic communication to be able to say that we mean the same thing by the same word. Moreover, words are not meant for reference to a thing in its physical presence. They are used for reference to a common meaning when the things are absent. Thus we can communicate with one another only in so far as we can participate in a common fund of meaning. That shows that the thing dog must be universalised into a conceptual understanding before meaning becomes possible.

In the realm of Concepts, the word and its meaning pass into each other and coalesce into a single and monolithic existence. This coalescence is so complete that one can only try to separate the two by violating the very character of the word as the meaningful expression and that of the meaning as the meant referent. Hence Helārāja carefully explains that in the word as the carrier of meaning there is no place for the acoustic sequence of an articulated series. The terms Vācya and Vācaka are categories of logical analysis. As real categories of conceptual existence they are not two, but one inseparable whole. The meaning is so much fully interpenetrated by the

word that the referential function is also an act of self-reference at the same time. This is the famous doctrine of Svarūpavācyatā or Grāhya śakti of a word, as it has been propounded by Bhartrhari and interpreted by Puṇyarāja and Helārāja. If the meaning-relation is a conceptual relation and if the meaning cannot stand in consciousness without being sustained by the word that means, it logically follows that the referential function of a word is impossible without its self-reference. In other words, the word turning on its meaning is the word turning on itself, that is, we cannot take the meaning in consciousness without taking in the word that means, since the two bear a monolithically inseparable existence.

Now it we accept the fundamental position of the Sabdadvaita Philosophy, it is only meet to say that, the word passing into its meaning (arthapaksaniksipta) is the same as the word appearing as its meaning. The meaning then is a superimposition on the word as its sustaining substratum, just as in the rope-snake illusion, the snake is a superimposition on the rope. In the realm of conceptual consciousness, the word appearing as the meaning is the reflection of the metaphysical process in which the one Sabda-Brahman appears as the phenomenal world. The word passes into the meaning-consciousness and the meaning-consciousness passes into the objective world. Thus the word is the final substratum sustaining consciousness and the object. These three are at last united in One. Nagesa, while showing the meaning-relation as the universal mode of conceptual relation gives a succint summary of Bhartrhari and Helaraja on this point. 27(a)

In order to fortify the thesis of the Vaiyākarana, Nāgeśa advances a number of arguments, of which the most important is the reference made to the use of such expressions as: 'The Jar exists (Ghaṭo'sti)' and 'The Jar does not exist (Ghaṭo nāsti)'. 28 In the first expression, in which existence is predicated of the jar, the term 'asti', denotative of existence is used in addition to the term 'Ghaṭa', which is not sufficient to signify existence of the jar in outside world: in the second expression, in which negation is predicated of the jar, the term

'nasti'. denotative of non-existence is used side by side with the term 'Ghata', which does not refer to a jar, that has existence in the objective world. The argument that words signify things as they reside in outside world renders use of the term 'asti' in the first sentence superfluous and that of the term 'nasti' in the second one absurd, because in that case the term 'Ghota' alone becomes sufficient to denote an existent jar in the first expression; and in the second one it becomes impossible to predicate the negation of an existent entity. Nagesa's doctrine, however, explains away these difficulties, in as much as, it maintains that the word 'Ghata' denotes a jar, residing in the realm of our intellect and consequently, the use of the terms 'asti' or 'nāsti' is necessary in order to refer to its existence or nonexistence in the outside world. In support of his own doctrine, Nagesa quotes the observations of his predecessors, though in some cases he gives them a little twist in order to suit his purpose. Thus, he refers to the detection of reciprocality of casual connection between word and meaning by Bhartrhari, and maintains that, this is a definite pointer to his own doctrine of identity between Sphota and Bauddhartha. Word, Bhartrhari holds, is an immediate antecedent from which the intended meaning is generally understood and a word, again, is comprehended through the instrumentality of meaning, that is previously ascertained by intellect. 29 This observation presupposes the fact that, spatio-temporal association exists between śabda and artha, because the relation of cause and effect does not exist between entities residing in different times and regions, and as spatial association is incapable of being asserted of word and object, symbolised by it, as residing in the external world, what a word signifies is an object, remaining in the realm of our intellect. In course of explaining the rule 'upadeśe' janunāsikah', Patanjali raises a question as to the identity of Devadatta, and himself answers saying that, the one wearing bangles and earrings and having broad chest and round arms, such is Devadatta. The proposition that, words signify objects as they exist in the outside world renders the use of the expression 'such is' superfluous, in as much as, all the terms used in the sentence refer to the same object. The contention that, Banddhartha is signified by a word, however, saves the situation, because the expression—'such is' seeks to establish identity between Devadatta, residing in the outside world and the wearer of bangles and the like, residing in the realm of our intellect. In a similar manner, in course of explaining the rule 'Hetumatica', he cites such illustrations as, causes to slay Kamsa, causes to bind down Bali, and himself raises the question of propriety of use of verbs in present tense in the sentences quoted: to our common sense it seems that, such use of verbs is improper, because the slaying of Kamsa or binding down of Bali is not an incident of present times, but nevertheless to our discerning mind it seems perfectly proper, in as much as, Kamsa and his death are capable of remaining present in the realm of one's intellect. 81 Kaiyata, also, expresses the same opinion in his exposition on the observations of Patanjali under Matupsutra. With the help of a number of illustrations, he makes it perfectly clear that, words signify objects, as they reside in our understanding and not in the outside world of our experience: when existence in the outside world is sought to be predicated, such terms as 'asti', 'jayate' etc. are used in addition to those, denotative of objects themselves. Nagesa claims that, his doctrine enjoys the support of the speculations of thinkers, affiliated to different philosophical schools. Thus he quotes the observation of Gautama, according to which, as something cannot grow out of nothing and nothing out of something, an effect, though non-existent in the world of our experience prior to its production and after its destruction resides in the realm of understanding; similarly, he cites the theory of Vacaspati, which states that, the conscious, first of all, gives a stamp of name and form to each and every object of thought and thereafter creates the tangible object in the outside world by bestowing upon it the said name and form : this theory justifies the use of the second case-ending, which is usually added to Karmakaraka after Ghata in the expression-Ghatam karoti', since though the jar is in the process of creation in the world outside, in the realm of our understanding it is an accom-

plished entity. Reference is also made to the Smrti texts, which assert that, all objects from the universe down to the smallest atom reside in the domain of our intellect and not in outside world: as an evidence for this conclusion, they point out to realisation of objects in dreams, errors and states of infatuation, in which the sense-organs do not establish connections with their respective objects of enjoyment. 32 Nagesa claims further that his doctrine is in conformity to the thesis of Patañiali, according to which Vikalpajñana consists in the cognition of an object, which though an unreal entity appears as real, being conjured up by a mere verbal expression : such an object, though a fiction, it is said, appears in the domain of our understanding following solely the comprehension of a word, significant of it. Bhartrhari takes note of this magical power of a sound-unit, and maintains that, existential status is conferred by a small verbal form on an object, whose existence is denied by perceptive or inferential knowledge. The doctrine that words signify such objects as are purely intellectual in character, Nagesa concludes, justifies the use of such sentences as 'This barren woman's son is going, holding on his head a chaplet of sky-flowers: he has bathed himself in tortoise-milk and is holding a bow of hare's horn'. If the meanings of words were objects residing in the outside world, then such terms as 'Bandhyāsuta' and the like would not have been used with inflections added therein, in as much as, the case-terminations are added only to Pratipadikas and an unmeaning assemblage of letters is not treated as a Pratipadika. As, however, meanings of words are objects residing in the realm of our intellect, such terms become significant entities and consequently, capable of being treated as Prātipadikas, even though the objects signified by them have nothing to correspond to in the outside world of reality. Thus with irrefutable logic Nageśa establishes his own thesis that, \$ab.la and artha remain identical in our intellect prior to outward manifes'ation. 33 This indicates him to be an out and out monist, in as much as, it is from the standpoint of all-devouring non-dualism, wherein all distinctions fade away, that the word and its corresponding idea are viewed as identical-as two Undifferentiated aspects of one and the same thing i.e., Supreme Consciousness. This is an extension of Bhartrhari's doctrine that, the Eternal Verbum is the only Absolute Reality, which manifests itself in the line of name as also of form, as the process of creation goes on. Consequently, in the transcendental plane they are one and the same, though in the empirical plane their manifestations appear to be distinct from one another. Bhartrhari himself declares sound and sense to be essentially the same, and commenting on this observation. Punyarāja maintains that, there is no fundamental difference between word and concept, and they appear to be distinct from each other only in popular usage.

It is interesting to note that, though the Vaiyakarana differs from the Naiyayika on many vital points, he agrees with him at least once, in as much as, he too, regards a sentence as the only significant unit of speech. But while the Naiyayika recognises the reality of words and concepts signified by them, even though they be isolated from a sentence, the Vaiyakarana defends with a marvellous tenacity the indivisibility of a sentence and repudiates completely the reality of word-units. Gifted with a true Vedantic insight as he is, Bhartrhari voices the opinion of the ancient seers that, it is the indivisible alone, which is real and it is the divisible, which is unreal. He asserts that, just as letters do not admit of division into component parts, similarly words do not admit of division into component units, and words, again, have no existence of their own apart from the sentence. Punyaraja describes in unequivocal language the unreality of word-units and maintains that, this is quite in keeping with the views of both Panini and Patanjali. Both of them take note of the analytical method adopted in the science of language in breaking up a sentence and its component words into units and sub-units and opine that, this artificial method is useful for the understanding of unintelligent people: this, they assert, is a necessary evil, because it helps one to arrive at the supreme truth. In consistency to his doctrine of indivisibility of a sentence, the Vaivakarana attempts to maintain the indivisibility of the meaning, also, signified by it. 34 He says

that, just as in the expression—Brahmanakambulam, meaning a blanket for a Brahmin, the meaning of the word 'Brahmana' has no separate existence of its own apart from the idea conveyed by the whole expression, similarly, the meaning of each individual word looses its separate existence and merges itself absolutely in the complete unit of thought—the meaning of the whole sentence. 35 Thus, according to the Vaivakarana. the idea of each individual word looses itself entirely in the concept, expressed by the proposition in its harmonious unity, or in other words, words isolated from a sentence do not actually convey separate meanings. The Naivavika challenges this doctrine of the Vaivakarana, and says that the very fact that change of words in a sentence is followed by a resultant change in the import of the whole sentence goes to establish the capacity of individual words to signify meanings of their own, 36

The Naiyayika describes knowledge of words as the cause of verbal testimony and comprehension of denotative power or śakti as auxiliary to it: the Vaiyakarana, however, opines that, knowledge of words, as endowed with the power of signification constitutes the cause of verbal cognition. Thus while the Naiyavika mentions the cognition of word and that of its denotative power separately as the causes of verbal cognition,—the first being the primary one and the second being secondary—the Vaiyākaraņa asserts that, the comprehension of words, as possessed of its power of signification alone constitutes the primary cause of verbal cognition. In order to ensure that, his statement does not lead to complexity, he says that, verbal cognition concerning a particular object is caused by a knowledge, qualified by the power of signification, ascertained with reference to that particular object, and commenting on it asserts that, the concept of word is understood automatically through Samsarga. Thus, this knowledge qualified by the power of signification, that is put forward as the cause of verbal testimony, he continues, co-inheres in the same substratum with the excited impression of the power of signification and embraces for its content the word, that forms the resort of this power. For this

reason, verbal cognition, it is said, does not accrue to one, who has not ascertained the denotative power of a word or to one, who has lost the memory of such power or to one, who is not conversant with the particular word itself. It is interesting to note that, though the Naiyayika mentions the knowledge of the primary function of denotation (śakti) as a secondary cause of verbal cognition, the Vaiyakarana regards knowledge, qualified by function in general (Vrtti) as its cause, and in continuation of his assertion states that, power of signification in general or Vrtti appears either in the aspect of denotation (Śakti) or in that of Indication (Laksana) or in that of Suggestion (Vyanjana). Although the Vaiyakarana primarily deals with the formation of words and analysis of sentences, and as such does not stand in need of granting recognition to Vyanjana as a separate Vrtti, yet he does so in conformity to his doctrine of Sphota in order to account for revelation of the eternal wordessence. Thus in the scheme of the Vaiyakarana, Vyanjana exists in mere name, and as regards Laksanā, he maintains that, this is nothing but an unfamiliar Sakti, whose operation, is marked by mature intellects only. Consequently, the Vaiyakarana's use of the term 'Vrtti', denotative of the function of signification in general in place of the Naiyayika's 'sakti'. denotative of the primary function of denotation does not change the position much, though in other vital points the views of the two are wide apart from each other. 37

On major points the  $\overline{A}$ lamk $\overline{a}$ rika follows the Vaiy $\overline{a}$ karana: as the latter posits the existence of the function of denotation ( $\hat{s}akti$ ) as something distinct from conventional relation, existing between word and its corresponding concept, so the former, too, scrupulously makes a distinction between denotation and conventional relation, and asserts that, the function of denotation is something different from this relation. Thus both Mammata and Visvan $\overline{a}$ that formulate the definition of  $\overline{Abhidha}$  as the primary function capable of bringing the conventional idea ( $\overline{saiketito'rtha}$ ) into expression,—a definition, that presupposes the absolute distinction of  $\overline{Abhidha}$  from  $\overline{Saiketa}$ .

As the writers, affiliated to different philosophical schools

differ among themselves on the nature of relation existing between word and meaning, as also on the justifiability of recognising the power of denotation as something distinct from this relation, so, they differ, also, on the exact nature of conventional meaning, signified through  $Abhidh\bar{a}$ . What does a word actually connote? Does it connote the class-element or the individual or the quality and action associated with it? Does the word 'Cow' refer to the generality 'Cowness' or to an individual cow or to qualities and actions, belonging to it? This is a most pertinent question, in furnishing replies to which most of the philosophical sects have expended their substantial energies.

At the first sight it seems plausible that, words connote individuals only and neither generalities nor qualities inherent in them: thus, for instance, the word 'Cow' refers to cowindividual, and neither to the universal element of cowness nor to such qualities as whiteness or blackness, belonging to the cow-individual. This theory is more adoptable to our experience, as it is the individual alone that is capable of being engaged into an action or of being dissuaded from it on account of its capacity of performing purposive action. A close examination of the doctrine, however, reveals that it is vitiated by a number of fallacies, and as such, is unacceptable. The contention that, words refer to individuals only places before us two alternatives, acceptance of neither of which seems sound. Thus the proposition that, the term 'Cow' refers to all cow-individuals leads to the fallacy of endlessness, because it is not possible to know all the cow-individuals of past, present and future times simultaneously. Equally fallacious is the argument that, the term 'Cow' refers to a particular cow-individual, because in that case it is not proper to use the term 'Cow' to signify other cow-individuals, in as much as, such use entails a violation to the maxim that, words connote only those meanings with reference to which their respective conventions are accepted. In ordinary use, however, the term 'Cow' does not refer to a particular cow-individual, but to all individuals belonging to the class, and consequently, the fallacy of violation creeps in. The argument that although a particular cow-individual is

present before our visual organ, yet all the cow-individuals form the content of extra-ordinary perception through sāmānyalakṣanā-pratyāsatti, in which the universal element itself serves as the link between the sense-organ and its object of perception, and consequently it is not impossible to ascertain convention of the term 'Cow' with reference to all cow-individuals, -argument, introduced in order to avoid the two fallacies, referred to above does not help us in any way, because, first of all, the existence of Samanyalaksana-pratyasatti itself is open to great controversy and secondly, the contention that the term 'Cow' connotes all cow-individuals, which is based on the correctness of this argument leads to complexity. 39 Moreover, the theory that, individuals alone are connoted by words prompts us to treat all the terms in the expression: 'A white moving cow Dittha' (Gouh śuklaścalo ditthah) as synonymous units, in as much as, all of them refer to the same cow-individual and thus renders all attempt to draw the line of demarcation amongst the scopes of different words unreasonable and ridiculous. 40

As this theory, concerning the connotation of words is untenable, the Vaiyakarana adumbrates a new doctrine, according to which, words connote attributes, belonging to the individual and not the individual itself. In the first instance, he classifies an attribute  $(up\overline{a}dhi)$  into two types: an attribute inherent in a thing (vastudharma) and an attribute, superimposed according to the sweet will of the speaker (vaktryadrcchasannivesita). An attribute inherent in a thing is grouped under two heads: that which is an accomplished entity (siddha) and that which is in the process of accomplishment (sadhya). An accomplished attribute is further classified into two sub-types: the classelement (jati) and quality (guna). A jati is an eternal attribute, which inheres in all individuals, belonging to a particular class. The Vaiyākaraņa refers to this attribute as that, which gives the very life to an entity: he says that, by means of its connection with a thing, it renders the thing a proper content of thought and object of expression. Mammata quotes an observation, ascribed to Bhartrhari, according to which, a cowindividual by itself is neither affirmable as a cow nor is distinguishable from non-cows: its positive character of being a cow, as also the negative character of being different from other entities is not intrinsic, but is derived from the inherence of the universal element of cowness in it.41 In explaining this observation, Jagannatha points out that, the very fact that a cow is neither recognised as a cow nor is differentiated from non-cows so long as the universal element of cowness remains uncognised and is so recognised and differentiated as soon as the universal element is comprehended goes to show that jati alone forms the basis of all affirmative, as well as negative cognitions.42 The Vaiyakarana thinks that, such class-names as cow, horse and the like connote the universal elements of cowness, horse-ness etc. as the case may be, and not the cow-individuals, horse-individuals and the like, as they are supposed to be. Illustrations of words signifying qualities are afforded by such terms as 'red' and 'white', that connote the qualities of redness and whiteness respectively. Patañjali explains a quality as something different from generality, action and substance, and describes it as an eternal or transitory attribute, distinct from a substance and appearing in and disappearing from it and found to inhere in individuals, belonging to different species. Thus mahattva, belonging to space is eternal: redness belonging to jar is transitory, being capable of production and destruction: both are regarded as qualities. This description of guna, as drawn by Patañjali enables us to draw the line of demarcation between a jati and a guna: while a jati is never found dissociated from the individual in which it resides and distinguishes one class from another, a guna is capable of being dissociated from an individual and distinguishes a thing from others belonging to the same class or to a different one. 43 In drawing the distinction between jati and guna, Mammata succinctly states that, the universal imparts life to an individual and as such forms its very essence, but a quality is not of the same nature: it is merely a differentiating factor, serving only to mark an individual off from others belonging to the same genus or to a different one. Illustrations of words, signifying actions

are afforded by such terms as 'Gacchati' and 'Pacati', that connote the actions of going and cooking respectively. Although an action, also, serves to mark off an individual from others and consequently, becomes a differentiating factor, yet the distinction between Guna and Kriyā is so palpable that it does not stand in need of categorical assertion, in as much as, while Jati and Guna are accomplished entities,  $Kriy\bar{a}$  is in the process of accomplishment: possibly for this reason, Mammata does not proceed to draw the line of demarcation amongst these. An action, it is said, is comprised of a number of sub-actions, amongst which there is a definite sequence : thus, for example, the action-unit of cooking does not refer to a single act, but to a series of movements, -each of which occupy a successive portion of time, -beginning from the lighting of the stove to putting it off. The word 'Pacati', the Vaiyākaraņa says, connotes all these events taken together, showing, thereby, that an action has temporal and sequential significance. 44

A word, significant of a Samjñā, the Vaiyākaraņa says, is different from other categories of words, in this respect that, while others connote attributes inherent in things, this word connotes an attribute, that owes its origin to the caprice of the speaker. As regards the exact nature of this attribute, superimposed on such entities as 'Dittha', 'Davittha' and the like according to the sweet will of the speaker, he asserts that, it consists not in the assemblage of sounds, perceived by our auditory organ, but in the eternal word-essence or Sphota, which is divested of all idea of sequence and is revealed by the transitory sounds, pronounced by our places of articulation. Thus, according to the Vaiyakarana, the eternal pada-sphota, as reveled by a particular proper name is connoted by that name, and not the individual on which it is superimposed. 45 Jagannatha points out that, though sphota, in reality, constitutes an attribute of space, yet it is attributed to the individual according to the whim of the speaker and as such rests on the individual indirectly. Mammata faithfully represents the stand-point of the Vaiyakarana, but other scholars differ among themselves in their interpretation of the Vaiyakarana thesis. Jagannatha

records a few of these observations: while some scholars, he says, assert that the connotation of a proper name consists in the assemblage of sounds, conveyed by letters and endowed with a definite sequence, others maintain that, it is comprised of a substance, as devoid of all objective attributes like the universal, the quality or the action. The second group of scholars, of which Viśvanātha is one, refers to a Samjīā-śabda as a dravya-śabda, because, in their opinion such a śabda refers to the substance itself,—shorn of all attributes that remain unexpressed. Writers who regard the eternal pada-sphota or the transitory assemblage of sounds as the connotation of a proper name are of opinion that, the knowledge of the individual follows from the knowledge of the attribute, while those, who regard a substance, that constitutes the substratum of all unexpressed attributes as the connotation of a proper name think that, the cognition of the individual, as divested of all qualities appears straightway: thus while according to the former, the individual forms the content of a determinate cognition, according to the latter, it constitutes the content of an indeterminate one.46

The Vaiyakarana thus, speaks of four-fold connotation of terms, which, as he points out, are illustrated by the words, used in the expression: 'A white moving cow Dittha', wherein the words 'cow', 'white', 'moving' and 'Dittha' connote respectively the universal, the quality, the action and the eternal word-essence. The thesis that, words, signifying qualities and actions connote qualities and actions respectively is exposed to the fallacies of endlessness and violation, that go to vitiate the vyakti-vada, in as much as, qualities and actions differ from individual to individual: thus the whiteness of snow is different from that of conch-shell, which again is different from that of milk,—the process of cooking molasses is different from that of preparing rice, and this being the case, it is possible to accept the convention of the word 'whiteness' neither with reference to all patches of whiteness, inhering in all white-individuals nor to some patches of whiteness, residing in some white individuals. In reply to this animadversion, the Vaiyākarana argues that, the data on which the opponent bases his conclusion are wrong, and as such his criticism of his own doctrine is unsound. The quality of whiteness, he continues, is always one and the same: it presents an appearance of difference on account of difference in substrata only: and such is the case with the act of cooking. A parallel to these is to be found in the face, which though one and the same, appears to be of differing types, when reflected in sword, mirror or oil: it looks long, when reflected in a sword,—round, when reproduced in a mirror and graceful, when caught in oil. Thus, the Vaiyākaraņa concludes, the unity of the quality and the action is real, their diversity being apparent only, and consequently, the question of vitiation of his theory by the fallacies of vyab'icāra and ānantya does not arise at all.<sup>47</sup>

The question whether the word 'Paramanu', meaning an atom signifies the universal element of atomness or the quality of a particular measurement forms an interesting study. The Vaiśesika regards measure as a quality, of which atomness, shortness or length are but different types and so he is of opinion that, the word Paramanu signifies a quality. He does not find it possible for him to regard this word as connotative of the universal atomness, because, in his scheme atomness is not a universal element at all. Following a section of the Naiyāyika, the Vaiśesika recognises cross-division as an impediment, standing in the way of an attribute receiving the status of a universal. It is said that in those cases, where more than one universal elements co-inhere in the same substratum, a close examination reveals the universals to be associated through the relation of comprehensive and comprehended; if this relation does not exist between them and yet they are found to co-inhere in the same substratum, they are not capable of being regarded as universals in the strictest sense of the term. Thus the attribute of substanceness (Dravyatva), which comprehends within its scope that of earthness ( Pythivītva), which, again, includes within its domain that of jarness. (Ghatatva) is found to inhere in the same jar along with the attributes comprehended under it, and accordingly, all these attributes are competent to receive recognition as universals.

Of Bhutatva and Murtatva, however, the case is a different one: though both these attributes co-inhere in earth, water, fire and air, yet the relation of comprehensive and comprehended does not exist between them, in as much as, while Bhūtatva alone resides in space, Mūrtatva alone exists in mind; and for this reason the Vaisesika denies the status of universal element to both these attributes. The attribute atomness ( Paramanutva ), the Vaisesika thinks, stands on the same footing with Bhutatva and Murtatva, because while in an atom of earth it co-inheres with earthness, the relation of comprehensive and comprehended does not exist between the two: this is evident from the fact that, while in an earthen jar, the attribute of earthness, alone, of the two is present, in an atom of water, the attribute of atomness alone resides. This consideration leads the Vaisesika to deny the status of Jati to Paramanutva, which he regards as a Guna and consequently, he maintains that the term 'Paramanu' is significant of a quality. The Alamkarika differs from the Vaisesika in the justifiability of regarding cross-division as a jāti-vādhaka: following the Vedantin and a section of the Naiyayikas, he challenges the propriety of doing so, because, as he argues, a strict application of this principle is likely to deny the status of universal element to all attributes of wider scope, such as Prīthivītva and the like, in as much as, though such attributes are found to reside in the same substrata in some cases along with the attributes of lesser scope, in other cases, they inhere in substances alone. He thinks that, absolute sameness of cognition itself is competent to extend the status of Jāti to an attribute: as with reference to atoms, we have identical cognitions, nothing stands in the way of 'Paramanutva' being reckoned as a universal. For this reason, he regards the term 'Paramānu' as one significant of universal element: its Gunavācakatva, he continues, is purely technical.

In consistency to his own thesis that, objects are eternally related to eternal words, the Mimamsaka holds that, meanings, also, are eternal entities and accordingly, all terms are connotative of universals. He challenges the propriety of regarding individual qualities, actions and substances as the connotation of

terms, as the Vaiyakarana thinks, because, as he points out. these are susceptible to change and destruction, and as such, incapable of being brought into permanent relation with eternal words. The Mīmāmsaka holds that, all words, without fail connote the universal or class-element. Thus the term 'cow' signifies the universal cowness, the term 'white' the universal whiteness and the term 'cooking' the universal cookingness. In contradiction to the position advocated by the Vaiyakarana that, the unity of qualities, actions and substances is real and their diversity is only apparent, the Mīmāmsaka asserts that, these are actually of diverse types and the identical recognition of all of them is a definite pointer to the inherence of universals in them. Thus, he argues, though the quality of whiteness differs from individual to individual, yet due to the presence of the universal element of whiteness in the different patches of the same colour, the term 'white' is used to denote all of them, and consequently, what constitutes the connotation of the term 'white' is the universal whiteness: and the same is the case with the term 'cooking'.48 The Mīmamsaka goes so far as to declare that even proper names connote universals and he establishes his position in this way. The substance, signified by the proper name 'Dittha' constantly changes its form and colour, yet the same term 'Dittha' is used to denote all these different substances because the objective universal Ditthatva is present in all of them: this universal, the Mīmāmsaka points out, constitutes the connotation of proper names. He further points out that, even if the substance, denoted by the term 'Dittha' be taken as always remaining one and the same, a śabdagata-jāti is capable of being put forward as the connotation of the term. Thus, though the sound Dittha, as pronounced by an octogenerian is different from that uttered by a child, which again is distinct from that chattered by a parrot, yet we recognise these three sound-groups as being essentially identical: and this recognition points out to the existence of a universal element 'Ditthatva'. common to all utterances of the sound-group. The Mimamsaka asserts that, the proper name 'Dittha' connotes either the universal element, common to all forms of the substance or the

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generality, common to all utterances of the sound group. Thus, with strongest arguments, he establishes his own thesis that all words primarily signify the universal. In order to account for comprehension of the individual, which is certainly understood in such expressions as, a cow is to be slaughtered, the Mīmāṃsaka relies on  $Lakṣan\bar{a}$ : thus, according to him, the individual, that forms the substratum of the universal is brought into light through  $Lakṣan\bar{a}$ , while the latter is denoted through  $Abhidh\bar{a}$ .

The Naiyayika does not agree with the Mīmamsaka on this issue also. The Mīmāmsaka doctrine, first of all, he points out, does not enable us to relate the sense of the case-endings with that of the stem, to which they are added. 51 A Vibhakti, according to the Vaiyakarana signifies three ideas taken jointlyvocable, number and gender, and these ideas, are incapable of being asserted of a universal, which is essentially shapeless and unitary in character. The attempt to save the situation by taking recourse to the argument that, the individual, which is comprehended through Laksanā is capable of being construed with Kāraka, linga and samkhyā and as such the difficulty referred to above does not arise proves futile. This argument states that, the universal is first cognised through Abhidha, then the individual is apprehended through Lakṣaṇā and subsequently gender and number are construed with the individual. This type of conceptual cognition, however, does not conform to our experience, in as much as, gender and number are always construed with the conventional meaning, signified through Abhidha, and the intervention of Lakṣaṇā seems absurd. Moreover, Lakṣaṇā presupposes temporal sequence, which, however, is not traced between comprehension of the universal and that of the individual: our experience reveals that the individual is cognised simultaneously with the universal, which does not remain without a substratum. 52 Secondly, the Naiyayika argues, the Mīmamsaka doctrine renders the words 'Go' and 'Gotva' synonymous units—both signifying the sense of the universal element of cowness, and thus converts the suffix 'tva' into a non-entity, having no special significance of its own. Thirdly,

he points out, it is not in conformity to the thesis that, the contents of perceptual and conceptual cognitions are identical. When a cow is seen, not only the universal cowness is perceived but the qualities and actions, as also the physical arrangement of the cow is known through perception: similarly, when the word 'cow' is heard, not only the universal cowness is comprehended, but the universal, the quality, the action, the substance, -all these taken together are cognised. 53 The Mīmāṃsaka doctrine, he argues, does not take notice of our ordinary experience and thus is not rational from the empirical point of view. As the Mīmāmsaka thesis does not stand the test of criticism, the Naiyayika, the most rational of all the philosophers puts forward his own thesis, according to which, the connotation a term consists in the universal, the individual and the configuration taken together, or in other words, a word connotes the individual, as characterised by the universal and possessed of a physical arrangement. 54 The Naiyāyika maintains that, though the connotation of terms is cumulative in character and as such, all the three constituents of it, namely, the universal, the individual and the physical arrangement are equally present in all cases, yet the emphasis placed on one of these elements, varies from place to place: in some instances, the universal is in the forefront, - in others. the individual is principally connoted, and in yet others, the configuration or physical arrangement is the main content; thus, in the proposition: 'A cow is not to be touched by feet', the emphasis is on the universal, -in the proposition: 'Tether the cow' it is on the individual, -and in the sentence: 'Draw the picture of a cow' it is on the configuration. 55 The Naiyayika takes care to show that though his doctrine includes the individual within the connotation of terms, yet it is not exposed to the fallacies of Anantya and Vyabhicara, because, as he says, a particular individual, possessing a particular colour or a particular action is not connoted by a term, -but what actually is connoted is the individual that forms the substratum of the universal: thus, as the universal constitutes one of the constituents of connotation, the possibility of vitiation of the theory by the fallacies,

referred to above does not exist. As the individual is comprehended through Abhidhā in his theory, the Naiyāyika does not feel the necessity of taking the help of Laks mā in order to account for its cognition; his theory, he says, explains the simultaneous comprehension of the universal and the individual, and thereby shows that, no temporal sequence exists between the cognition of jati and that of vyakti. It enjoys another advantage over the doctrine of the Mīmāmsaka, in as much as, it renders construction of gender and number with the connotation of a term possible, because though the universal is amorphous, the individual is not so. The Naiyayika advances another purely scholastic argument in order to show that his doctrine is more in conformity to the law of parsimony than that of the Mīmāmsaka. Thus the proposition that the term connotes the individual, as the substratum of the universal renders the universal itself a determinant of connotation: the theory that the term connotes the universal, alone, however, renders the attribute universalhood a determinant of connotation. Of the two concepts: the universal and the universalhood,-to put it more clearly, of Gotva and Gotvatva, -the latter is much more complex than the former, because while Gotvais an attribute common to all cows, Gotvatva is an attribute that inheres in the universal, residing in all cow-individuals and serves to differentiate cows from non-cows. Thus as the body of the determinant of connotation (śakyatanacchedaka) is much more long in the second instance, than in the first one, the Naiyayika asserts, the first is to be preferred to the second. 56

In conformity to his metaphysical doctrine, the Buddhist fails to accept any one of the views, adumbrated by orthodox philosophers on the issue of connotation of terms. Nothing is, he contends, constant and lasting in the continuous flux of changes, and accordingly, the individual entity is a momentary one. As regards the universal, he points out that, its existence as a positive entity itself is open to great controversy: neither does it subsist eternally nor is it shared by all individuals, who are really discrete and as such, unable to share it in common. But, nevertheless, we comprehend all cow-individuals

as cows and use the same term 'cow' to signify all of them. In reply to the question as to what leads to this identity of cognition and verbal usage, the Buddhist points out to the property of being different from non-cows, and asserts that this property is shared equally by all cow-individuals. Thus though the Buddhist denies the existence of the universal as a synthesising principle, he recognises the power of the negative concept of negation of the contrary to synthesise things in the same way as is done by the positive concept of the universal. The universal, it is said, presents itself in two aspects: positive and negative; in its positive aspect it creates similar or identical cognitions, and in negative aspect differentiates a thing from others, belonging to other class: to quote an illustration, differentiates a cow from not-cows. The Buddhist takes note of this negative aspect only and asserts that the term cow connotes the negative concept of being not not-cow, or to put it in a more general way, the connotation of a term consists in 'negation of the contrary'. The doctrine that a word signifies negative concept, having no objective reality helps the Buddhist to establish the falseness of verbal cognition. 57

Mammata records these conflicting doctrines, but true to the tradition of an Alamkarika, who follows the Vaiyakarana on vital points endorses the Vaiyākarana stand-point on this issue. Thus in his Śabdavyāpāravicāra he makes express mention of four-fold connotation of terms and in his treatment of Virodhalam's ara speaks of ten possible cases of this figure, resulting from conflict between any two of the four ontological categories-the universal, the quality, the action and the substance. Viśvanātha follows the footsteps of Mammata, and Jagannatha, too, asserts that the causes of application of words to signify particular objects to the exclusion of other words are four, showing, thereby, that the whole cognisable universe is capable of being grouped under any one of the four abovementioned categories. 58 It is interesting to note that, though Mammata and Jagannatha are in agreement with the doctrine of the Vaiyakarana, they lend their support to Jatisaktivada, as well, as is evident from fuller treatment given to this doctrine in their respective works. And this they do, because this theory enjoys the support of the great grammarian-philosopher Bhartrhari. In his speculations on the exact nature of Padārtha, he introduces the concept of the great universal, that permeates the entire universe and manifests itself in different forms and individuals. A word whether connotative of the universal or the individual, Bhartrhari points out, ultimately connotes this great universal, that gives the loftiest notion of a class one can conceive of: and this, he asserts, is true of stems, verbal roots and suffixes. This makes it clear that Mammata and Jagannātha extend recognition to Jātiśaktivāda, not so much out of respect for the Mīmāṃsaka as in deference to the peculiar doctrine of Bhartrhari.

According to the Vaiyakarana and the Alamkarika, Abhidha or the power of expressiveness is of three different types: Rudhi, Yoga and Yogarudhi. The first type of expressiveness is determined simply by convention, the second type merely by derivation and the third both by convention and derivation. Corresponding to these three types of the power of expressiveness, there are three distinct groups of words: Rudha, Yaugika and Yogarudha. The first group is comprised of such words as 'Gauh' and the like, whose derivative or analytical meaning does not correspond with their innate signification; thus the analytical meaning of the term 'Go' is a moving being, but its popular signification, to convey which it is used, is the cowindividual, not affected in any way by the derivative meaning, referred to above. The second group is comprised of such words as 'Pācaka', 'Pāthaka' and the like, which denote the same meanings as are conveyed by component parts into which such words are capable of being grammatically analysed. Thus while a Rudha word denotes its innate idea alone, a Yauaika simply signifies its derivative meaning. The third group of Yogarudha words is comprised of such words as 'Pankaja' and the like, which combine in themselves twofold significationconventional as well as derivative : of these words, the derivative meaning, qualifies the conventional one, and thus, the word 'Pankaja' denotes neither a lotus alone, nor anything grown in

mud, but it refers to a lotus, that grows in mud. Quoting the authority of Patanjali, Nageśa states that, in some cases Yogarudha words denote simply the idea assigned to them by convention and in others convey merely the derivative meaning; in such cases, he continues, either the Yoga-śakti or the Samudaya-śakti is restricted by intention of the speaker. Others, however, fail to agree with Nagesa on this point. They maintain that such words are to be recognised as belonging to a different group, known as Yaugikarudha words. Illustration of this group, it is said, is afforded by the word 'mandapa', which conveys two distinct meanings-'house' and 'one who takes gruel'-one following from the word as a whole, and other from its etymological interpretation. The Yaugika-rudha is incapable of being equated with the Yogarudha, because there is considerable difference between the two. 60 Thus while of a Yoga-rudha sabda the conventional and derivative meanings emanate at the same time, of a Yougrka-rudha śabda the conventional alone is comprehended in one case, and the derivative alone in another: secondly, while the two meanings, denoted by the former mutually correspond with each other, the ideas denoted by the lattter are quite distinct, that is to say, the meaning conveyed by samudaya-śakti seems to be altogether different from that conveyed by avayava-śakti.

Another problem that deserves mention is the question whether an apaŝabda is endowed with expressiveness or not. Patañjali uses the two terms apabhramŝa and apaŝabda as synonyms, and says that, a single Sanskrit word 'go' gives rise to a number of apaŝabdas as Gāvī, Gonī etc. Apaŝabda, he says, represents any corrupt form of speech, that has lost its pristine sanctity. Thus, while, on one hand, it comprehends words that do not conform to the rules of Sanskrit Grammar, on the other hand, it includes all forms of  $Pr\bar{a}l_Tta$ , because they are nothing but corruption in relation to Sanskrit. Bhartrhari mentions two divergent views as regards the expressiveness of an apaŝabda: according to one view, an apaŝabda is not significant by itself, but its apparent expressiveness depends upon inference of the correct word, which alone is the significant unit: according to

another view, an apaśabda is equally endowed with the power of denotation, the only difference between a correct and corrupt form of speech lying in the fact that, while use of the former leads to religious merits, the use of the latter produces demerits. 61 The first view, recorded by Bhartrhari represents the Naiyayika thesis and the second the Vaiyakarana one. The Naiyāyika denies expressiveness to an apaśabda: he says that. when a corrupt word is comprehended, its corresponding correct word is recalled and the sense is conveyed through the power of denotation belonging to this correct word. This proposition, however, seems unacceptable, because the meaning of a corrupt word is cognised even without recalling its corresponding correct form: moreover, sense is comprehended even by uneducated people who are blissfully ignorant of Sanskrit. 62 To obviate this difficulty, Gangesa suggests another process; he maintains that, the power of denotation of an apaśabda is the result of false attribution, or in other words, sense is comprehended from such a word, because it is erroneously regarded to be endowed with expressiveness. 68 Thus in a most ludicrous manner the Naiyāyika attempts to explain away the cognition of a meaning from a corrupt word, because his peculiar doctrine that, words owe their expressiveness to Divine volition compels him to deny denotative power to such words. The process suggested by Gangesa, however, does not take us out of the woods, because conceptual cognition resulting from comprehension of a corrupt word is experienced as a right notion, and is not sublated by other notions, gathered later. The very fact that when an uneducated man fails to grasp the exact meaning of a Sanskrit term, to signify which precisely, its corresponding corrupt form is used goes to show that, an apaśabła is as much endowed with the power of denotation as is a śabła. 64 So the Vaiyakarana does not deny expressiveness to an apaśabda: he thinks that the meaning is as regularly denoted by it as by the so-called correct word. But, nevertheless, he asserts, a line of demarcation is capable of being drawn between them: while use of a correct word leads to religious merit, that of a corrupt word leads to demerit, and consequently, the first is to be preferred to the

second. This theory, he further maintains, justifies the attempt on the part of the Mīmāmsaka and the Vaiyākarana to distinguish between two meanings of the same word-one used among the Arvans and the other among the Mlecchas. Thus the word Yava is used among the Arvans to denote barley-corn : among the Mlecchas, however, it is used to denote long-pepper. In reply to the question as to which of these two meanings is more authoritative and acceptable, the Mīmāmsaka answers that, the sense to signify which the word is used in the Vedas is to be regarded as more authoritative than that in which it is used among the Mleechas: and following him, the Vaiyakarana also says that, the meaning supported by the sistas is to be preferred to that, backed by the Miecchas. 65 He further asserts that, constant use of correct words leads to religious merit as well as an intellectual training, and thereby helps us to have a vision of the Absolute Reality. For this reason, he tenders advice to study reverentially the science of language, which, as he says, is the treatment, capable of curing the impurities of speech, -the open gateway to liberation. These linguistic speculations and assertions point out to eagerness of ancient teachers to preserve the pristine sanctity of Sanskrit, by checking the infiltration of loan-words into its vocabulary.

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## Laksana-the secondary power of signification

Just as a great controversy rages over the role of Abhidhā and exact connotation of terms, similarly the nature of Lahsanā also forms the subject-matter of an animated discussion. The Alamkārika defines it as a function that brings into comprehension a meaning, connected with the primary one: this function, he says, starts to operate relying either on usage or on some motive when the primary meaning, signified through the function of denotation becomes incompatible with the rest of the sentence. This definition gives us an idea of the three things needed for operation of Lahsanā, which are (1) inappli-

cability of the primary meaning in the given context, (2) existence of some definite relation between the primary and secon. dary ideas, and (3) usage or purpose. Of these three requisites, the first supplies the reason for operation of Laksana, in as much as, it says that, the help of this function is sought, when it becomes impossible to establish logical connection of the primary meaning of a particular word with concepts of other words, used in a sentence; the second gives us a clue to the acceptance of a particular meaning, other than the conventional one to the exclusion of other ideas: it says that, Laksana conveys only that sense, which is related in some form or other to the explicit one; the third presents the justification for taking recourse to this round-about process, by showing that it serves a definite purpose: it asserts that, in those cases where Laksanā is not based on usage it brings home a motive and thus bears fruit. Thus according to the Alamkarika, Laksana is a function capable of bringing a secondary sense into light : just as he does not equate Abhidha with Samketa or the conventional relation, existing between word and its corresponding concept and says that, the power of expressiveness is something different from this conventional relation, similarly he does not define Laksanā in terms of a relation existing between the primary and secondary ideas, but, on the other hand, mentions this relation as a factor necessary for operation of this function, and thereby shows that the function itself is something different from relation.

TITERARY CRITICISM

As an illustration of Lakṣaṇā based on usage, Mammaṭa quotes the expression: 'Karmaṇi kuśalaḥ', in explaining which he says that, as the primary meaning of the term 'Kuśala', which 'a cutter of kuśa grass' is inapplicable in the present context, what actually is comprehended through Lakṣaṇā is the idea of an expert, who is similar to the cutter of Kuśa grass in point of discrimination: this Lakṣaṇā, he points out, is based on usage, because the term 'Kuśala' itself has gained currency to convey the idea of the expert. Viśvanātha criticises this observation of Mammaṭa and maintains that, the idea of the expert itself constitutes the conventional meaning of the term 'Kuśala', and

consequently, it does not stand in need of taking the help of Indication for its expression. As redards the sense of the cutter of Kuśa grass, he is of opinion that, it merely forms the etymological meaning of the term, which is not identical, in all cases, with its conventional meaning; and this happens, because, while etymology is regulated by the convenience of grammarians. convention is regulated by usage and practice. The expression: 'Gangayam ghosah', meaning 'a herd-station on the Ganges'. Mammata adds, furnishes an example of Laksanā based on motive. In explaining it, he says that, as logical connection of a flowing mass of water, which constitutes the primary meaning of the term 'Ganga' is incapable of being established with a herd-station, Laksanā brings the idea of the bank of the Ganges into light: this function, he continues, leads us to think of the excess of coolness and purity,—an idea, which is not likely to be comprehended from such simple expression: 'A herd-station on the bank of the Ganges'. Viśvanātha, also, cites it as an illustration of Indication based on purpose: in fact, this stockexample is quoted by all later writers on the subject. As regards an accurate example of Indication based on usage, Viśvanātha puts forward the expression: 'Kalinjah sāhasikah', meaning 'the Kalinga is brave', in which, the term 'Kalinga' is said to signify through Laksina the idea of an inhabitant of the land named Kalinga. Here the relation linking the primary meaning with the secondary one is that of container and the thing contained, and the particular term is used in the secondary sense because it is the usual practice of men to use that particular term to convey that particular idea. Indication based on usage is similar to the function of denotation, in as much as, both bring such ideas into light as are handed over by tradition. For this reason, Mahimabhatta denies the status of a separate Vrtti to Indication based on usage: he says that Nirudhi-Laksanā is identical with Abhidhā.

According to the  $\overline{A}$ lamkarika, Abhidha is a power belonging to words, while Laksina is a function belonging actually to the primary meaning, and not to the word unit. He says that, when the explicit idea of a term becomes incompatible with the

concepts of other terms used in the proposition, the explicit idea itself conveys the secondary sense through the function of Indication, belonging to it: this function, however, is attributed to the word, significant of that explicit idea and the word-unit, also, is said to be possessed of it through transference of epithet. Thus Mammata describes Laksanā as 'Santararthanisthah śabdavyājārah', which clearly indicates his view that, though Indication is commonly regarded as belonging to a word-unit, it actually belongs to the primary meaning, whose comprehension intervenes cognition of word and that of the secondary sense: and Viśvanatha more clearly expresses his opinion that, though Laksanā does not belong naturally to a word, it is attributed to it, showing, thereby, that a word-unit is said to be possessed of Indication only through courtesy. 67 The Alamkarika thinks that, this function pertains not only to the explicit meaning of a term, but to the import of a whole proposition, as well. Thus he cites the sentence: 'O friend, by doing great good to me you have shown your goodness; behaving in this fashion may thou live for hundred autumns'! as an illustration of Dhvani based on Indication and says that, in the sentence under consideration, the import of the whole proposition conveys through Laksana the idea that, great harm has been done to the speaker by the person spoken to.68

Like the Alamkārika the Mīmāmsaka also considers Lakṣaṇā as a function belonging to the primary meaning, conveyed through the function of denotation. He is of opinion that, in all cases, Abhidhā connotes the universal, and thereafter ceases to function: it is Lakṣaṇā that brings the idea of the individual into comprehension, and subsequently signifies the import of the proposition. Kumārilabhatṭa makes it abundantly clear and following him Mukulabhaṭṭa cites the expression: 'Gouranubandhyah', meaning: 'a cow is to be immolated' as an example of Lakṣaṇā. In explaining this, he says that, as establishment of logical connection between immolation and the universal cow-hood is an absurd proposition, the universal being an eternal entity, what actually is understood is that the cow-individual is to be sacrificed, and this idea of the individual

is signified through Indication. Mammata challenges this observation of the Mīmāmsaka, and asserts that, Lakṣanā is incompetent to signify the idea of the individual, because all the factors necessary for its operation are not present,-the so-called Indication being based neither on usage nor on purpose. In reply to the question as to what then brings the idea of the individual into light, he points out to Presumption or Arthapatti, which though recognised as a separate source of knowledge by the Mīmāmsaka is comprehended under Anumāna by the Naiyayika. This Presumption, it is said, consists in postulation of a cause, competent to explain the known effect which is to be accounted for: in its stock-example: 'Pino Devadatto divā na bhunkte', meaning: 'Fat Devadatta does not eat during day-time', the taking of nocturnal meal by Devadatta is posited in order to account for the fatness of Devadatta. Mamata thinks that, in the expression: 'a cow is to be sacrified', the sense of the individual is capable of being cognised through Arthapatti, because, the universal does not reside without its substratum—the individual, and consequently, the existence of the universal necessarily implies that of the individual. 70 This theory of the Alamkarika, however, is open to serious objection, in as much as, it entails a violation to the maxim that an object, known through conceptual cognition alone is capable of being brought into harmonious relation with other such objects, forming the content of verbal knowledge or in other words, an expectancy, raised by a sabdurtha is to be fulfilled by a śabdartha alone. And a śabdartha is an object, that is cognised from a word through any one of the functions of Abhidha and Laksana merely: a meaning that is known through implication or inference is not regarded as a śabdartha. The proposition that, a meaning known through implication or inference, also, constitutes a śabdartha gives it a wide scope, so as to include the concepts of an able-bodied sacrificer and a sharp weapon within the import of the proposition: 'A cow is to be sacrificed', which, however, seems absurd. Thus, it is possible to point out that, if the Alamkarika doctrine concerning the comprehension of the individual were accepted, it would not have been proper to enter it into verbal concordance with others, since such action would have thrown to winds the principle: ' $\S \bar{a}bd\bar{\imath}$  hi  $\bar{a}k\bar{a}nk\bar{\imath}\bar{a}$  sabdenaiva  $p\bar{\imath}ryate$ '. For this reason, the Naiyāyika, whose approach to most of the problems is very rational from the empirical point of view, instead of depending either on  $Arth\bar{a}patti$  or on  $Lak\bar{\imath}an\bar{\imath}\bar{a}$  for the cognition of the individual, simply states that, the universal, the individual and the configuration conjointly constitute the connotation of terms.

While most of the  $\overline{A}$ lamkarikas posit the existence of two types of  $Laksan\overline{a}$ —one based on usage and the other on purpose, the  $\overline{M}$ nmamsaka, though granting recognition to the first type, namely, Indication based on usage asserts that, this is as good as  $Abhidh\overline{a}$ , because like the latter conveying an idea fixed by convention, this, too signifies a sense, assigned to the word by tradition. This observation, possibly, supplies a clue to Mahimabhaṭṭa to declare the absolute identity of  $Nir\overline{u}dhi-Laksan\overline{a}$  with  $Abhidh\overline{a}$ .

In his eagerness to establish the correctness of an Arthavada, which merely extols the Vidhi and, thereby, indicates in a round-about manner the advisability of following the injunction, the Mīmāmsaka feels the necessity of describing Laksanā as a function pertaining, as well, to the import of a proposition. and accordingly explains it as a power, competent to bring into comprehension an idea, related in some form or other to a complete thought-unit, presented by a significant entity,72 This explanation renders an Arthavala a proper field of its operation, in as much as, such a sentence merely praises a Vedic rite and the idea that, performance of such a rite is beneficial is brought into light through Indication alone. The Mīmāmsaka takes every care to establish his proposition and shows that in the expression: 'Gabhīrāyām Nadyām Ghosah'. meaning 'a herd-station on the deep river', the concept of the bank of the fathomless river is signified through Indication neither by the term, 'Gabhīrā' alone, nor by the word 'Nadi' singly nor by both the words severally: this concept, he asserts, is conveyed through Indication by both the terms

conjointly. Thus, the word 'Gabhīrā' does not convey the idea of the bank, because such an eventuality renders its connection with the sense of the word 'Nadz' hopelessly difficult, in as much as, the bank is not identical with the river itself: nor does the word 'Nadi' signify the sense of the bank, since it is equally difficult to establish connection of bank with depth, in as much as, the bank itself is not fathomless. Nor do both the words convey their respective secondary meanings separately, -- the one signifying 'deep bank' and the other 'the bank of the river', -because what is actually cognised is the idea of the bank of the fathomless river and a total of these two concepts-'deep bank' and 'the bank of the river' does not make up the sense of the bank of the fathomless river. The argument that either the word 'Gabhīrā' alone signifies the sense of the bank of the fathomless river and the word 'Nadi' helps us to ascertain the intention of the speaker and fix up the exact secondary meaning or the term 'Nadi' alone conveys the aforesaid idea and the term 'Gabhīrā' helps us in the same manner to determine the desire of the speaker proves futile, because for want of decisive evidence it is very difficult to choose between the two alternatives; the point that the term 'Nada' is denotative of a tangible object, whose connection with the bank is more intimate and real and consequently, the second of these two alternatives is acceptable leads us nowhere, because equally forceful is the point that the word 'Gabhīrā' is connotative of a quality, whose connection with the bank is more intimate, in as much as, a quality does not reside without a substratum and hence the first alternative is the better of the two. Thus as none of these alternatives stand the test of reason, the Mīmamsaka concludes, the intended idea of the bank of the fathomless river is conveyed through Indication by a collection of two mutually related words-'Gablira' and 'Nadr' conjointly.

The Naiyāyika doctrīne, however, presents a completely different picture of Lakṣ iṇā. In consistency with his doctrine that, Śakti is identical with the relation, existing between a word and its corresponding concept, as is fixed by Divine

Volition, the Naiyavika defines Laksana also in terms of a relation and asserts that it consists in the relation linking a secondary sense with the primary one. Here also he relies upon the principle that, of two related things, cognition of one leads. to recollection of the other, and asserts that just as in case of comprehension through śakti, the knowledge of the word-unit causes remembrance of its conventional meaning, similarly in case of apprehension through Laksana also, the knowledge of that conventional meaning causes recollection of the secondary sense and from such recollection ensues conceptual cognition.75 As regards the exact nature of relation existing between an object primarily denoted by a term and that, secondarily signified by it, he maintains that, it presents itself in any of the following five forms: (a) in the form of a connection existing between a container and the thing contained, (b) in the form of that lying between imitator and imitated, (c) in the form of proximity, (d) in the form of association, and (e) in the form of relation existing between benefactor and beneficiary. Of these different types of connection, illustrations are furnished respectively by the expressions: 'The cradles are laughing', 'The boy is a lion', 'The hamlet on the Ganges', "Admit the sticks' and 'The stakes are Indra'.74 The Naiyayika does not accept the proposition that, incompatibility of the primary meaning with the concepts of other terms used in the sentence paves the path for operation of Indication; this proposition, he points out, leaves out of the 'scope of Laksana such expressions as 'Admit the sticks' or 'Protect the curd from crows', because there is no. inapplicability of the concept signified primarily by any one of the terms used in these. Moreover, as the in empatibility under consideration is capable of being removed in other ways. also, the same sentence is likely to give rise to a number of meanings,-different terms presenting different ideas through Indication. Thus parallel to the argument that, as logical connection of a herd-station can be established with the bank, so the term 'the Ganges' conveys through Indication the sense of the bank in the expression: 'A herd-station on the Ganges' runs the counter-reasoning that as logical connection of a row of

fish can be established with the flowing mass of water, so the term 'herd-station' conveys through Indication the idea of fish. These arguments and counter-arguments result in a deadlock and render it extremely difficult to ascertain the exact meaning of the proposition. And this is true of all sentences, that constitute the fields for operation of Laksanā. In order to obviate these difficulties, the Naiyayika says, the reason that paves the path for operation of this function is not inconsistency of the conventional meaning, but rather its inability to bring out the intention of the speaker. 75 This view, he points out, justifies the work. ing of Laksana in such expressions as: 'Admit the sticks' and 'Protect the curd from crows'; the intention of the speaker of the first sentence is to allow the holders of sticks to enter and that of the speaker of the second is to protect the curd from all destroyers: as these two ideas are incapable of being expressed through the primary meanings of the terms 'sticks' and 'crows' respectively, what these two words bring into light through Indication are the concepts of the holders of sticks and the destroyers of curds. Moreover, it explains comprehension of a definite meaning from a single expression, in as much as, the intention of the speaker is always the same in a particular sentence and it is asserted that a meaning, which brings out this intention,—the primary meaning failing to do so-constitutes the indicated meaning. The argument that the cause which gives rise to operation of Laksanā is furnished in some cases by inconsistency of primary meaning and in others by inability of this sense to bring out the intention of the speaker leads to complexity and consequently is unacceptable. Thus the Naiyayika suggests a modification in one of the three requisites necessary for working of Indication : in place of Anvayanupapatti as described by others, he incorporates Tatparyanupapatti, and asserts that this paves the path for operation of this function. As regards the third necessary factor, namely usage or motive, he rejects the first alternative, namely traditional usage and maintains that Indication based on it is nothing but another name of śakti.

In conformity to his thesis that Laksanā is comprised of a

relation which the secondary idea bears to the primary one and that the recollection of the conventional meaning is caused by comprehension of the word, with which alone its relation is fixed by the Will of God, the Naiyayika maintains that, a sentence or a collection of words mutually related to one another does not constitute the field of its operation. And this is so because no idea is assigned to a sentence as a whole by Divine Volition and consequently, the question of existence of a type of connexion of the secondary concept with this idea does not arise. In reply to the question as to how then the sense of a herd-station on the bank of the fathomless river is cognised from the sentence: 'Gabhīrāyām Nadyām Ghosah', the Naiyayika answers that, the term 'Nadi' conveys through Indication the idea of the bank of the river and the concept signified by the term 'Gabhīrā' becomes connected with the river through the relation of identity. The objection that an idea cannot establish its connection with only a portion of a complete sense-unit, he points out, does not hold good, because such connection is traced in such expressions as: 'Saraih śātitapatrah', 'Caitrasya Gurukulam' and the like. In view of the possibility of this objection being carried too far, the Naiyayika suggests another solution to the problem, as well: he says, the term 'Nadī' alone brings out through Lakṣanā the sense of the bank of a deep river, and the term 'Gabhīrā' helps us merely to ascertain the intention of the speaker, and, thereby, determine the exact form of the indicated meaning.76 This line of argument, he further maintains, explains comprehension of idea from a compound-word, which as a whole is possessed neither of Sakti nor of Laksana, because no conventional meaning is assigned to it as a whole by the Will of God: nevertheless, a sense is cognised from it and this cognition, he says, is effected either through Sakti or through Laksanā of its members. Thus in the compound Rajapuruşah, which forms an illustration of Sasthitatpurusa, the first member conveys through Indication the idea of one belonging to the king, and subsequently, this idea gets connected with the sense of the second member through the relation existing between qualification and the thing

qualified. In the compound Citragu, which is an example of Bahuvrīhi, either the second member conveys through Indication the sense of owner of the cows and the idea of the first member qualifies merely that of the cows, which constitutes only a portion of the complete indicated meaning or the second member alone indicates the sense of owner of variegated cows, the first member helping us merely to ascertain the intention of the speaker. Similarly in the compound Upakumbham, which is an example of Avyayībhāva, the second member signifies through Indication the idea of one, related to a jar and the meaning of the first member goes subsequently to identify itself with that idea in such a manner that its prominence is retained, or in other words, the resultant conceptual cognition embraces for its content the idea of proximity, identical with one, related to the jar. In Itaretaradvandva and Karmadharaya, Laksana does not operate, -Sakti of component members being competent to bring their respective ideas into light. In Samaharadvandva, however, which refers to the aggregate of two members, the second member alone conveys through Indication the idea of the whole compound,—the first member serving merely as a pointer to the exact intention of the speaker: in Ekasesa, in a similar manner, the only word left brings out through Indication the meanings of other words, as well, and hence from Pitarau the idea of parents is cognised. Thus unlike the Mīmāmsaka, the Naivāvika denies both Śakti and Laksanā to a collection of words. mutually related to one another: and this he does in conformity to his metaphysical scheme, which is essentially theistic. 77

It is interesting to note that, though himself an Ālaṃkārika Paṇḍitarāja Jagannātha follows the Naiyāyika stand closely and explains both Abhidhā and Lakṣaṇā in terms of relation in the manner of a true Naiyāyika. Thus his Abhidhā consists in a relation which śabda bears to artha and artha bears to śabda; and Lakṣaṇā is comprised of a relation which the secondary idea bears to the primary one. These descriptions are not in consistency with the tradition of an Ālaṃkārika and point out to the great influence exercised by Navyanyāya on scholarly world at the time of Jagannātha. 78

The Vaiyākarana does not regard Laksanā as a power absolutely distinct from Sakti: he thinks that when Sakti or the function of denotation brings into comprehension as the primary meaning of a word to which it belongs an unfamiliar object, with the nature of the familiar object superimposed on it, it is designated Laksanā. Thus, according to the Vaiyakarana in the stock-example: 'A herd-station on the Ganges', the function of Indication presents the idea of bank with the state of flowing stream attributed to it. While the Naiyayika thinks that the bank is cognised as bank, the Vaiyakarana is of opinion that the bank is comprehended as the flowing stream itself, or in other words while the Naiyayika makes a difference between the determinants of primary and indicated meanings, the Vaiyakarana maintains that, these two are identical. Thus in the expression: 'Protect the curd from the Crows', the term 'Crow' signifies any animal that destroys curd, which is taken as identical with the crow itself and to this power of signification, the Vaiyākaraņa gives the name Laksınā. Here the Naiyāyika points out, the term 'Crow' conveys through Indication any destroyer of curd, which bears similitude to a crow in respect of eating the curd up. This difference in explanation shows that whereas according to the Naivavika, a line of demarcation is drawn between a śakyārtha and a laksyārtha in the realm of our intellect, according to the Vaiyakarana, as the identity of the former is superimposed on the latter, no difference, whatsoever, is cognised between the two. 79

The Vaiyākaraṇa explains that in the expression: 'A hamlet on the Ganges', the bank is comprehended as the flowing stream itself. This knowledge of one thing as another, however, constitutes an erroneous notion as is exemplified by knowledge of a mother-o'-pearl as a piece of silver. For this reason, the opponents point out, the comprehension of bank as identical with the flowing stream itself which is a wrong notion is not likely to lead to cognition of coolness and purity, that are attributes belonging to the stream alone. In reply to this criticism, the Vaiyākaraṇa maintains, the sense of identity of the bank with the flowing mass of water is comprehended

through Vyanjanā and the validity of a knowledge, caused through Vyanjanā is incapable of being challenged or rejected by an idea of incompatibility; thus though the cognition of the bank as identical with the flowing stream is the result of an illusory superimposition, yet as the idea of identity between the two is brought into light through the function of suggestion, that does not follow the path of reason, the soundness of the cognition is unshakable.

The Vaiyakarana doctrine that Laksana leads to cognition of an object, with the identity of the object, primarily signified by the term, to which it pertains superimposed on it claims to enjoy the support of some of the great thinkers, affiliated to different Philosophical schools. Thus, Patanjali, it is said, in course of furnishing an explanation of the sutra: Pumyogadakhyayam', points out that, the superimposition of identity of one on the other is caused by any one of the relations existing between the two: (a) that of container and the thing contained, (b) that of imitator and the imitated, (c) that of proximity and (d) that of association: in illustrating these four types of superimposition, caused by four different kinds of relation, he cites the expressions: 'The cradles laugh', 'The boy is a lion', 'A herd-station on the Ganges', and 'Admit the sticks'. In commenting on these observations, Kaiyata remarks, the use of the term 'laugh' in the expression 'The cradles laugh' shows that the identity of cradles is superimposed on children, reclining on them and this superimposition furnishes a clue to the use of the word 'cradles' in order to signify children resting on them. Gautama, the Nyayasutrakara, also, takes note of this factor of superimposition, which consists in attribution of the state of one thing to another and is caused by numerous types of relation existing between the thing superimposed and the substratum of superimposition: stickness, he says, is attributed to a Brahmin who is associated with the stick and consequently such expression as: 'Admit the sticks' is used: in a similar manner, the state of the God of death is superimposed on the king, who imitates him, the state of life is attributed to rice, which sustains it, the universal scaleness

to sandal-wood, which is weighed by the balance and so on. In commenting on this, the Varttikakara remarks, the universal stickness, which constitutes the cause of application of the term 'stick' to denote it to the exclusion of other words resides primarily in the stick: this universal, which inheres in the stick associated with the Brahmin is subsequently transferred to the Brahmin himself and as a result of this attribution, the Brahmin is called stick. 81 The Vaiyakarana doctrine claims another advantage over the Naiyayika thesis, in as much as, it justifies the expression: 'To the Ganges belong both fish and hamlet' ( Gangāyām Mīnaghosau stah'), which is much in vogue in popular use. The use of the Dvandva compound in Minaghosau, which demands existence of fish and hamlet in the same substratum puts the Naiyayika in a difficulty, because, according to him, Indication presents the bank as the bank, on which exists the hamlet but not fish, residing in the flowing stream alone. The Vaiyakarana however, does not face this difficulty: he is of opinion that, Laksana presents the bank as the flowing stream itself, or in other words, simultaneous comprehension of water and land as identical with the flowing stream arises; of these two objects that constitute the content of simultaneous cognition-water and land,-the first forms the resort of fish and the second that of hamlet; and thus, as fish and hamlet reside in a substratum, determined by the same attribute, nothing stands in the way of formation of the Dvandva compound.82

The Vaiyākaraṇa doctrine finds a more clear expression in the Paramalaghumañjūṣa of Nāgeśa: basing his theory on the speculations of earlier thinkers, affiliated to his own school, here, he denies in unambiguous language the status of a separate Vṛtti to Lakṣaṇā. The Naiyāyika thesis, which grants recognition to Indication as a separate function states that, this relation leads to recollection of an object, connected in some form or other with the thing, primarily signified by a term and thus posits the existence of two different attributes, one determining the object primarily signified by a term and the other determining the object indicated by it. The Vaiyākaraṇa thesis, how-

ever, maintains that the so-called Laksana leads to cognition of an unfamiliar object, as determined by the attribute of the object primarily signified by a term and thus recognises the existence of only one determinant. Consequently, Nagesa points out, the Vaiyakarana stand is more in conformity to the law of parsimony than the Naiyayika one, and this is all the more simple, because while the Naiyayika feels the necessity of postulating two separate Vrttis in order to account for comprehension of the secondary sense, the Vaiyakarana explains this cognition away with the help of one Vrtti only. Moreover, it is not proper, he continues, to extend recognition to Laksanā as a separate Vrtti in the manner of the Naiyayika and the Alamkarika, who think that it operates only after the operation of Abhidha and consequently, as the name 'jaghanya' given to it suggests, treat it with contempt; they opine that help of this function is to be sought only when Sakti or Abhidha fails to bring out the intention of the speaker and that much help is to be taken as is competent to bring this intention out by removing all incompatibilities. A function, that is despised and yet accepted should rather, he affirms, be rejected, particularly when an unfamiliar power of denotation is competent to remove all inconsistencies and, thereafter, bring the intention of the speaker into light. Accordingly, Nagesa speaks of two types of the power of expressiveness, pertaining to words: one common or familiar and the other uncommon or unfamiliar. The first is ascertained by dullards and intelligents alike, while the second is determined only by men of mature intellect. Thus, the term 'the Ganges', Nagesa points out, signifies through its usual Sakti the idea of the flowing stream and that of the bank through its unusual Śakti, showing, thereby that Laksanā of others is capable of being equated with uncommon denotation or aprisddha-śakti. This theory, he claims, is based on the principle enunciated, by Patanjali himself,—the principle, that each and every word is competent to signify any and every sense, if the intention of the user to convey that particular idea by that particular word is there.83 In reply to the question as to why then the idea of a jar is not conveyed by the term 'Kata', he answers that the

wanted intention is not there : as regards this intention, he says, that it pertains actually to God and is handed over to us through tradition. In support of his theory, Nagesa cites the observations of Bhartrhari, according to whom, although a word signifies both a primary and a secondary meaning, yet both the ideas are not apprehended simultaneously, because such factors as context and the like, that are auxiliary to comprehension of ideas differ in each case: when a factor, conducive to cognition of the primary meaning is there, this meaning is comprehended: when a factor, conducive to cognition of the secondary one is there, that idea is apprehended. Bhartrhari himself applies this principle to the term 'Go' and shows that it is competent to convey the ideas of both a cow and a carrier: of these two concepts, the idea of cow, as signified by the usual power of denotation of the term constitutes the primary meaning and the idea of carrier, as signified by the uncommon power of denotation forms the secondary meaning. Thus Bhartrhari ascribes unrestricted power to words and asserts that all possible meaning is capable of being signified by the same term; and this he does in conformity to his metaphysical scheme, according to which, as the cosmic process starts, the same Sablabrahman manifests itself in the line of word as also of concept : when all words and meanings are nothing but evolutions of the same Eternal Verbum, and in the transcendental plane they remain one with that eternal entity, the power to signify any and every concept is inherent in a word, and consequently, it is but natural for it to denote anything under the Sun. Against this assumption that, words are endowed with a capacity to denote any and every object, Bhartrhari himself anticipates an objection that, the proposition is likely to nullify the doctrine of eternality of relation, linking the word with its corresponding idea. If the term 'cow' denotes both the cow-individual and the dull carrier, how can it be described, he asks, as bearing natural and eternal relation to its corresponding concept. In reply to this, he points out that, the term 'cow' actually connotes the universal cowhood: as this universal resides primarily in the cow-individual and secondarily through superimposition in the carrier, the term

'cow' is used to denote both the objects and consequently, the question of negation of eternality of relation existing between word and meaning does not arise. 84 The problem can be solved in another way, as well. Some thinkers maintain that, the form of the word itself constitutes its connotation; this they say, because every knowledge is associated with a verbal expression and no object, that has no corresponding significant unit to denote it forms the content of our cognition. Thus the self of the word 'cow' which constitutes the true connotation of the term, these thinkers observe, is associated primarily with the cowindividual and secondarily with the carrier and hence, the use of the same term to denote two objects does not make invalid the theory of eternality of śabdartha-sambandha. In this manner, with irrefutable logic and astounding polemics, Nageśa establishes his proposition that Laksanā is but an unfamiliar power of denotation and consequently does not deserve recognition as a separate Vrtti.

Contrary to the Naiyayika thesis that, the power of denotation does not belong to a compound-word as a whole, and it is Sakti or Laksana, pertaining to component members, that brings idea from such word into expression, the Vaiyakarana thesis asserts that, the power of expressiveness belongs to a compoundword as a whole and Sakti of component members is unable to bring the unified idea of a compound into light. The Naiyayika doctrine, Nagesa points out, fails to explain addition of caseendings to a compound-word, in as much as, these suffixes are attached only to a Pratipadika, the status of which is extended only to an expressive word-unit. The argument that, as the component members are significant units, the whole compound also is bound to be a highly expressive entity is misleading, because a collection of two or more significant words does not make up an expressive unit : this is made abundantly clear by Patañjali in his exposition on the rule, formulating the definition of a Pratipadika. 85 Nageśa challenges the contention of the Naiyayika that, in the compound-word 'Rajapurusa', the first member conveys through Indication the idea of one related to the king: this explanation, he says, is improper, since it does

not tally with the meaning of Vigrahavakya, in which the sixth case-ending is added to the first member (Rajnah purusah), showing thereby, that the first word signifies the idea of relation with the king and not that of the related. The contention that. the first member of the compound signifies through Indication the sense of mere relation is equally unacceptable, because the identity of an employee, who is conveyed by the second member is incapable of being established with the relation itself. Hence, Nagesa concludes, a compound-word is as much endowed with the power of expressiveness as any other word, and through this power it conveys a unified sense, which is different from the individual meanings of component members, as also from a collection of them. 86 Thinkers who deny expressiveness to a compound-word as a whole feel the necessity of formulating a number of rules in order to put under taboo the use of such adjectives as qualify only a component member, as also the use of gender and number in accordance with that of an object, conveyed by one of the component members. The Vaiyakarana, who recognises the function of denotation as pertaining to a compound-word as a whole, in the same manner as it belongs to a Youarudha sabla, however, does not stand in need of formulating such rules, because, according to him, a compound-word signifies a unified meaning, in which the ideas of component members completely merge their separate existence, and consequently, the qualification of any one of such members by adjectives or determination of number and gender of the compound according to those of any one of the members does not arise. Thus, the Vaiyakarana thesis, Nageśa points out, is more in conformity to the law of simplicity than the Naiyayika one and as such is to be perferred to the latter. All this, he says, in accordance with the observations of Bhartrhari, who ascribes. with irrefutable logic, expressiveness to a compound-word as a whole, which he asserts, signifies a unified idea. 87

Broadly speaking Lakṣaṇā admits of classification into two types: Śuddhā and Gauṇī,—the principle of classification being the nature of relation, linking the primary and the secondary concepts. Through Gauṇī-Lakṣuṇā is comprehended an object,

which is similar to that conveyed primarily by the term, while through Suddhā-Laksınā is apprehended an object, which is connected with that, denoted primarily by the term through a relation other than that of similarity: thus while Gauni-laksanā brings into comprehension an object similar to that signified by Abhidha, Suddha-lakṣana brings into light a thing connected to that denoted by Abhidha through any relation other than that of similitude. The expression: 'A hamlet on the Ganges (Gangayam ghosah)' furnishes an example of Suddha type of Indication, because here the function leads to cognition of the bank of the Ganges, which is connected with the flowing stream through the relation of proximity : of Gauni type, the stockillustration is afforded by the expression: 'The carrier is a bull' (Gourvāhīkah), in which the function of Indication leads to comprehension of the idea of the man, who is similar to the bull in point of laziness and dullness. 88

On the proper explanation of the expression: 'Gourvahikah' and the exact nature of the indicated meaning in it, scholars differ among themselves. Both Mammata and Visvanatha record three theories on the issue, all of which seek in their own way to explain the exact nature of conceptual cognition, resulting from comprehension of the proposition. The first theory regards the qualities of dullness and laziness, associated with the universal cow-hood, that is conveyed through denotation as the indicated meaning of the term 'cow' in the expression : 'The carrier is a cow': subsequently, these attributes, belonging to the cow individual leads the function of denotation to operate for a second time and cause comprehension of the idea of the man, or in other words, presence of similar indicated attributes in the man prompts one to use the term 'cow' to denote him to the exclusion of other words. Thus, according to this view, the term 'cow' first of all, signifies the idea of cowness through Abhidha: then it conveys the idea of sluggishness and stupidity, belonging to the cow-individual through Laksanā and subsequently brings out the idea of the individual carrier through Abhidha again. In criticising this theory, Viśvanātha points out that, it envisages the signification

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of the sense of the individual carrier through the function of denotation from the term 'cow' and therein lies its weakness. Abhidha or Sakti of the term 'cow' is unable to bring the idea of individual carrier into light, because with reference to this, its power is not ascertained through convention. Nor is it possible for Abhidha, that looses its potency after connoting the universal cow-hood to revive for a second time and convey the idea of the man, because, as the theorists say, Denotation knows no resurrection. This inherent weakness of the theory makes it unacceptable and allows an opportunity to the second theory to offer its own explanation. The second theory maintains that, the qualities of sluggishness and stupidity, pertaining to the individual carrier, which are taken as identical with similar attributes, belonging to the cow-individual are conveyed through the function of Indication. As regards the comprehension of the sense of the individual carrier, this theory does not depend, as the previous one does, on the efficacy of Abhidha, which is said to be revive and operate for a second time; but explains it as being cognised through logical postulation or inference. The apprehension of attributes, belonging to the individual carrier, it states, necessarily leads to knowledge of the man, since qualities are inseparably associated with him, and the existence of attributes necessarily presupposes that of its substratum. Thus, while the first theory describes the idea of attributes belonging to the cow-individual as the laksyartha, the second theory states that the idea of such attributes, belonging to the individual carrier,-now taken as identical, on account of excess of similitude with those, pertaining to the cow-individual-constitutes the indicated meaning: then again, while the first theory depends for the cognition of the sense of individual carrier on Abhidha, the second theory puts forward logical postulation or inference as the means of such understanding. As the second theory does not ascribe a capacity to revive to Abhidha, it is an improvement on the first one, but nevertheless, it has its own weakness, which renders it, also, untenable. Visvanatha points out this defect and says that, it is not possible for the sense of the individual carrier, implied

by invariable association to determine the concordance of words, because such attempt leads to violation of the well-known maxim that, an expectancy, raised by a word is to be fulfilled only by a word and not by a sense, cognised from contemplation of inseparable association. This defect prompts both Mammata and Viśvanātha to reject it and formulate a new theory on conceptual cognition of the expression under discussion. According to this theory, neither the idea of attributes, belonging to the cow-individual, nor the sense of qualities, belonging to the individual labourer is presented through Indication: what actually is conveyed through Laksanā is the sense of the individual carrier, who bears similarity to the individual cow, in as much as, both of them share in common the attributes of sluggishness and stupidity. The motive of taking recourse to Laksanā in the present case is to bring home an idea of excessive laziness and stupendous stupidity of the man concerned. This theory seeks to explain the relation existing between the primary and secondary meanings by pointing out that, the attributes belonging to the cow-individual are invariably associated with the universal cow-hood, that constitutes the conventional meaning of the term 'cow': these attribute resemble similar attributes, pertaining to the individual labourer: these attributes, in their turn, are related to the man through the relation of container and the thing contained. Thus it shows the existence of a connection, however, remote it may be, between the universal cow-hood and the individual labourer, which represent the primary and the secondary ideas respectively, revealing, thereby, the intention of its adherents that, existence of such a remote connection does not stand in the way of operation of Laksanā. On this point the Naiyāyika meets on a common platform with the Alamkarika, in as much as, he too, believes that the function of Indication is competent to bring into light even an object, that bears remote connection with the thing, signified by denotation: this is evident from the explanation of the term 'dvirepha', furnished by him: this term, it is said, primarily refers to the word 'bhramara' which denotes a bee, and consequently, the term

'dvirepha' is said to convey through Indication the sense of the bee.

· It is interesting to note that though the Alamkarika and the Naiyayika accept Gauni as only a type of Laksana, the Mīmāmsaka extends recognition to it as a separate Vrtti. And this he does, because, he thinks that, Indication is competent to bring only that object into light, which bears an intimate connection with the thing, signified through denotation. Thus Kumārilabhatta says, when the acceptance of a primary meaning becomes impossible being opposed to our ordinary sources of knowledge, such as perception and the like, then that function, which brings into comprehension an idea, associated with the expressed one is regarded as Laksana, and the other function, which conveys the sense of an object, associated with the attributes, signified through Laks in a is regarded as Gauni-Vrtti. 89 In explaining Gaunī-Vrtti, he quotes the expression 'The boy is fire' (Bahnirman wakah) and points out that the term 'fire' connotes the universal fire-hood through Abhidha: and conveys the idea of individual fire through Laksanā; subsequently Gauni-vritti brings out the sense of the boy, who resembles the individual-fire in points of colour and splendour. Thus Kumarila draws a line of demarcation between Laksana and Gauni, and maintains that the latter conveys an object that is similar to a thing, signified by the former, revealing, thereby, that the meanings presented by these two functions differ in point of time of their congnition. Nagesa gives his tacit consent to this difference, as is evident from his assertion that, Gauni is more inferior to Suddhā; he maintains that, in the expression: 'A hamlet on the Ganges' the state of a flowing stream is falsely superimposed on the bank, which is close to the stream, while in the proposition 'This man is a bull', the universal cow-hood is superimposed on the man, who possesses attributes similar to those, possessed by the cow-individual, and consequently, the apprehension of the exact secondary sense is more delayed in the latter than in the former. This leads Nagesa to arrive at the conclusion that Gauni, coming in the trail of Suddha Laksana is much more inferior to it, or in

other words, is atijaghanyā in comparison to Śuddhā, which is jaghanyā 90 The Mīmāmsaka thinks that, when recognition as a separate Vrtti is extended to Laksana on the ground of its operation being preceded by that of Abhidha and consequential inferiority to the latter, recognition as a separate Vrtti is also to be extended to Gauni, which works even after the working of Laksana and as such is inferior to that also. The Alamkarika, however, thinks that, Gauni is only a type of Laksana, and is called qualitative, because, in it is traceable connection through qualities,—the thing indicated being understood to possess qualities of that by which it is indicated. This, he says, is mixed up with upacara, which consists in concealment of apprehension of difference between two things, which are altogether distinct on the strength of extreme likeness of the two, as that of fire and a boy, who is so fiery-tempered that we call him a perfect fire. Thus, while the Naiyayika and the Alamkārika declare Gaunī as merely a type of Laksanā, the Mīmāmsaka maintains that it is to be posited as something separate from Indication, -as a tertium quid.

According to another principle of classification, the Alamkārika classifies Laksanā into two types: Upādāna-laks inā and Laksana-laksana. In the first type, the primary meaning implies another meaning in order to establish itself: in it, the object signified through Abhidha hints at something else, which is required in addition for establishment of its logical connection with other concepts, presented in the sentence; in the second type, on the other hand, the primary meaning surrenders itself completely for the sake of the secondary sense: in it, the object, denoted through Abhidha completely gives it up in order to faciliate establishment of logical connection amongst the indicated thing and other objects, conveyed by other terms used in the sentence. Of Upadana-laksana the stock-example is 'The lances are entering' (Kuntāh pravišanti): here indication brings out the idea of lancers, which comprehends within it the concept of lances, in as much as, it is not possible to know the lancers without cognising the lances; of Laksana-laksana, the stock-illustration is 'A hamlet on the Ganges' (Gangayam Ghesah); here Indication brings out the sense of the bank, which does not comprehend within its scope the concept of the flowing water. Thus while in Uvadana-laksana the primary meaning finds a place in the body of the indicated idea, in Lakṣaṇa-lakṣaṇā it does not find such a place, or in other words, it is left completely out of the purview of the indicated meaning. For this reason, the Najyāyika designates these two types as Ajahatsvārthā and Jahatsvārthā respectively. In explaining the characteristic feature of Jahatsvārthā-lakṣaṇā, some of the Naiyāyikas point out that, in it, the primary meaning does not enter into connection with those, with which the secondary idea effects its connection. This principle makes the expression: 'Feed the lances' (Kuntān bhojaya) an illustration of Jahatsvārthā, since the lances themselves, that constitute the primary meaning do not enter into connection with the act of eating, with which the holders of lances effect their connection. This view, however, is opposed to tradition; in as much as, the Naiyayikas themselves quote the expression as an illustration of Ajahatsvārthā, and not of Jahatsvartha. In his Bhasapariccheda, Viśvanatha introduces an interesting discussion on the exact type of Lakṣaṇā, exemplified by the expression: 'A hamlet on the Ganges': he remarks that, if the relation of flowing stream is ascertained with sheer bank, then this idea of bank alone is sure to be conveyed through Indication; if on the other hand, the relation of the stream is ascertained with the bank of the Ganges, then the concept of bank of the river is sure to be indicated. Commenting on this, Dinakarabhatta observes that, the acceptance of the first alternative makes the sentence a specimen of Jahatsvārthā, while that of the second one renders it an example of Ajahatsvārthā. 92 The Alamkārika, however, cites the expression as an illustration of Laksana-laksanā: he thinks that, the relation which the bank bears to the flowing stream is capable of being known through implication, in as much as, Indication brings only that idea into light, which bears a relation to the primary one, and consequently, the entry of this relation into the body of the indicated meaning as its determinant is superfluous and at the same time, opposed to

all logic, since it entails a violation to the maxim, which states that an idea, not known through any other source of knowledge alone constitutes the content of conceptual cognition.

Mammata thinks that the classification of Laksana into Upādāna and Lakṣana varieties relates only to Śuddhā type of Indication, and is incapable of being asserted of Gauni type. The reason is quite clear. In Gauni-laksana the thing, secondarily signified bears similitude to that primarily signified, or in other words, the two meanings are mutually related through the relation of salriya. This salriya, writers point out, consists in possession of a number of attributes, pertaining to one by another, which is absolutely distinct from the former. Thus Gauni-laks ina presupposes the existence of sadrsya between the primary and indicated meanings and sadrsya, in its turn, presupposes absolute distinction of one idea from other: consequently, the primary meaning never finds a place in the body of the indicated sense in such type of Indication. Viśvanātha, however, takes note of Gauni-upalana-laksana, an illustration of which is furnished by the expression: 'These oils, extracted from sesame-seeds are pleasant in the winter (Etani tailani hemante sukhāni). In explaining this expression, he points out that, the term 'taila' primarily refers to tila-oil, but secondarily conveys the idea of any oil, that resembles tila-oil, -both being liquids pressed from kinds of vegetables. Viśvanatha says, the concept of any oil includes within its scope the idea of tila-oil, and hence the sentence constitutes an illustration of upadanalaksana. This view of Viśvanatha does not stand the test of reason, because the indicated meaning in the present case, which is any liquid pressed from anything, that resembles tilaoil does not comprehend the idea of tila-oil itself, since the assertion that, one resembles the other presupposes absolute distinction between the two and thus rules out the possibility of such comprehension. For this reason, Jagannatha does no classify Gauni into Jahatsvartha and Ajahatsvartha sub-types: Gauni-laksanā is necesarily one of Jahatsvārthā or Laksanalaksanā type. The opponents might contend that, in ordinary expressions the term 'taila' is used to signify the idea of any oil,

that resembles tila-oil, including that oil itself and hence, recognition is to be given to Gauni-upadana-laksana in deference to such expressions. In reply to this, it may be pointed out that, in such cases the term 'taila' conveys the idea of tila-oil through Abhidha and that of any liquid, pressed from anything, that resembles tila-oil through Gauni-laksanā The objection that two functions, pertaining to a single word cannot operate simultaneously does not cut much ice, because such operation of two functions is seen in such expression as: 'Fish and hamlet relating to the Ganges (Gangayam ghosah matsyaśca stah)' also: here the idea of the flowing stream, as also that of the bank is cognised, denotation and indication bringing respectively the two ideas into light. The argument that, the term 'taila' conveys through indication the sense of oil, associated with tila-oil, and as such, the  $Laksan\overline{a}$  is of  $Up\overline{a}d\overline{a}na$  variety renders the  $Laksan\overline{a}$ one of Suddha type, in which the relation existing between the primary and secondary meanings is anything other than the relation of similarity and thus instead of saving the situation, lands Gauni-laksanā into jeopardy.

Mukulabhatta draws the line of distinction between Śuddhā and Gauni types of Indication in a novel way. He says that, in Qualitative Indication, the identity of expressed and indic ted meanings is apprehended, while in Pure one, the difference between these two ideas is realised: thus the former is characterised by a sense of identity between the primary and secondary meanings, while in the latter, the second stands aloof from the first without being tinged by it in any way. Mammata challenges this observation and asserts that, neither Gauni nor Suddha is characterised by aloofness amounting to distinction, i.e. to say in none of these varieties there is a clear cognition of distinction between the objects, primarily denoted and secondarily signified. Thus in the expression: 'A hamlet on the Ganges', he points out, the bank is cognised as identical with the stream itself and this apprehension is caused by Vyanjana. As the bank is taken as identical with the flowing mass of water, the idea of excess of coolness and purity, which are attributes pertaining to the stream alone, he continues, is comprehended through Vyanjanā as pervading the hamlet. The point of Mukulabhatta that the bank is cognised as absolutely distinct from the flowing stream places the indicative expression, under consideration on a same footing with the expressive unit: 'A hamlet on the bank of the Ganges', in which, also, the bank is understood as something different from the river and, thus, fails to explain the comprehension of the idea of excess of coolness and purity.

According to another principle of classification, Laksanā is arranged into two classes: Saropa and Sadhyavasana. In the first of these two classes, the object of superimposition, as also its substratum, both are mentioned in words, in such a way that their peculiar traits are revealed: in it, the thing superimposed and the object whereon it is placed are expressed in words, having the same case-ending, that is to say, are stated in grammatical co-ordination with their distinction nonconcealed. In the second class, on the other hand, only the thing superimposed is mentioned in words and this swallows up completely the substratum of superimposition, which is left unmentioned.98 The expression: 'The carrier is a bull' (Gourvāhīkah) furnishes an illustration of Sāropā, while the proposition: 'The bull prattles (Gourjalpati) affords an example of Sadhyavasana. As both the bull and the carrier are clearly stated in words in the first expression, the cognition of identity between the two is preceded by an apprehension of difference between them, in as much as, the peculiar trait of the man remains non-concealed: in the second expression, however, this trait is concealed and so what is cognised is sheer identity between the man and the bull. Thus while in Sāropā, the comprehension of identity between the thing superimposed and the substratum of superimposition is preceded by a cognition of distinction between the two, in Sadhyavasana, the apprehension of identity between these two is not preceded by any such knowledge of difference between them. Jagannatha records a number of views, which attempt to explain the exact nature of conceptual cognition in cases of Saropa and Sadhyavasānā Laksanā, and, thereby, draw a line of demarcation between the two. As an illustration of Sadhyavasana type of

Indication, he cites the expression: 'On the palace-tops of this city there shine rows of moons' (Pure'smin saudhasikhare Candraraji virajate), in which Laksana makes one think of the identity with moon of the face, which is completely swallowed up by the former. According to one theory, the term 'moon' conveys through Indication the idea of face, as endowed with its peculiar attribute the universal faceness, but at the time of conceptual cognition, the idea of moon, as endowed with its special characteristic appears and its identity with the face is comprehended. This theory believes in the capacity of Laksanā to present two different meanings: one at the initial stage and the other at the time of deriving verbal knowledge, and thus asserts that, the attributes of faceness and moonhood both are comprehended as belonging to the same entity at the time when conceptual cognition occurs. Another theory does not believe in this great power of Laksana: it states that Indication presents the idea of face, as possessed of the universal faceness, and the resultant conceptual cognition occurs in the corresponding way; it is only at a late stage that, Vyaniana brings out the idea that the face is identical with the moon. Like the first theory, this theory, also, maintains that, the attributes of faceness and moonhood both are cognised as belonging to the same entity, but this knowledge does not occur when conceptual cognition takes place: the sense that the attribute moonhood qualifies the face is effected by Vyanjana, which operates later. These two theories try to draw the line of demarcation between Saropa and Sadhyavasana by pointing out that, while in the latter the attributes of moonhood and faceness are cognised straightway as residing in the same substratum, in the former such comprehension of both the attributes, as pertaining to the same thing does not arise. A third theory approaches the problem in a different way. It states that, in Sadhyavasana the face is cognised as the moon itself and not as the face, and explains that, it is this non-comprehension of the idea of faceness that differentiates this type of Indication from that of Saropa type. As an illustration to the point, the adherents of this theory

cite the parallelism of cognition of a piece of silver on a mother-o'-pearl: when the mother-o'-pearl is known as a piece of silver, its comprehension as a nacre does not arise, because the two knowledges are mutually opposed to each other. In a similar way, they point out, the knowledge of face as the face and that of it as the moon are mutually opposed to each other, and consequently, when the face is known as the moon, apprehension of its real nature does not arise. 94 Commenting on this theory Jagannatha remarks that, if experience of connoisseurs of poetic art reveals that the peculiar trait of the substratum of superimposition is cognised in Sadhyavasana Laksana, then the statement that the knowledge of Visaya and that of Visayī stand in the relation of cognition concerning nacre and that concerning silver is unnecessary; if, on the other hand, his experience indicates that, the peculiar trait of the Vişaya is not comprehended in such cases, then conception of such a relation becomes an imperative necessity. Thus Jagannatha leaves the correctness of the third theory entirely to the experience of refined readers, revealing thereby, his agreement with the first and second views.

The exact form of conceptual cognition, as derived from cases of Saropa-laks and poses a more difficult problem, because on a correct determination of this rests the existence of the poetic figure Rūpaka as something distinct from Upamā. The Alamkarika maintains that, Saropa-laksana forms the basis of Rupaka, as is exemplified by the expresssion: 'The face is the moon' (mukham candrah); here, he points out, the term 'moon' conveys through Indication the idea of one, which is similar to the moon and the resultant verbal cognition takes the form that, the face is identical with one, which resembles the moon itself. Against this Jagannatha raises a possible objection. If in the expression: 'The face is the moon', the term 'moon' is explained as signifying the sense of one similar to the moon, then, wherein does lie its difference with the proposition: 'The face is similar to the moon'? And what then is the necessity of recognising the poetic figure Rupaka as something distinct from Upama? The argument that in the expression: 'The face is the moon', the conceptual cognition takes the form that, the face is identical with one which resembles the moon (Candrasadrśābhinnam mukham), whereas in the sentence: 'The face resembles the moon', this knowledge takes the shape that, the face is identical with one, which constitutes the substratum of similitude determined by the moon (Candranirūpitasādrśyāśrayābhinnam mukham)—the difference being caused by use of one word 'Candra' in the first expression and that of two different words 'Candra' and 'sadrsa' in the second one—and consequently, there is considerable difference between the scopes of Rupaka and Upama does not take us out of the woods, because such slight difference in the form of verbal knowledge, as is caused by cognition of association in diverse ways does not lead to postulation of separate figures. This is evident from the fact that recognition as a separate figure is not extended to the expression: 'The face is like the moon' (Mukham Candra iva), which differs from the proposition: 'The face resembles the moon' (Candrasadrsam mukham) in point of form of conceptual cognition, in as much as, in the first expression, no such idea as this that, the moon determines the similitude, as is gathered from the second one is comprehended. What then differentiates a case of  $R\overline{u}$  paka from that of U pam $\overline{a}$ ? In reply to this, Jagannatha records four theories which offer different solutions to the problem.

The first theory states that though the form of conceptual cognition is the same in both cases, yet a difference is capable of being drawn between them on the basis of cognition and non-cognition of identity between the thing superimposed and the substratum of superimposition. Thus, although knowledge derived from both the expressions: 'Mukham Candrah' and 'Candrasadr'sam mukham' appears in the same form, namely the shape that, the face is identical with one, which resembles the moon, yet while in the first one the sense of identity of face with the moon itself, as conveyed through the function of suggestion is comprehended, no such cognition occurs in the second proposition. And this happens, because while the first expression is marked by operation of Laksanā, the motive of taking the help of which is

to bring home this idea of complete identity of moon and face, the second one is not characterised by working of Indication, and resultant operation of suggestion, as well. The objection that, suggestion brings into light the sense of identity of moon and one that resembles the moon, (which constitutes the indicated meaning of the term 'moon'), but not that of absolute sameness of the moon and the face does not stand, because this idea is cognised automatically. First of all, Laksanā presents the concept of one, which resembles the moon and the conceptual cognition, consequential upon it is that, the face is identical with one which resembles the moon: subsequently, Vyanjana conveys the idea of absolute sameness of a thing that resembles the moon and the moon itself and as a natural corollary to it the sense that the face is identical with the moon is comprehended, because two things that are identical with the same thing are identical with one another.95

The second theory asserts that, Rupaka differs from Upama not only in point of comprehension of identity between the thing superimposed and the substratum of superimposition, which constitutes the motive of taking recourse to Indication, but in point of form of conceptual cognition, as well. It states that though the term Candra' initially conveys through Laksanā the idea of one which resembles the moon, yet when verbal cognition occurs, the sense of identity of the face with the moon itself is apprehended, or in other words, the resultant conceptual cognition takes the form that, the face is identical with the moon, which, in its turn is absolutely the same as the thing resembling it (Candrasadrśābhinnacandrābhinnam mukham). The rule that verbal knowledge corresponds exactly to the presence of concepts through functions does not hold good in case of cognition caused by Laksanā: for this reason, though Indication conveys the idea of bank as endowed with its universal bankhood from the term 'Ganges', used in the expression: 'A hamlet on the Ganges', yet when verbal knowledge is derived, the bank is taken as the flowing stream itself, as a result of which the excess of coolness and purity pervading the hamlet is understood, In addition to this difference in point of form of conceptual cognition,  $R\overline{u}paka$ , based on  $S\overline{a}rop\overline{a}$ -lakṣaṇā differs from Upama in point of cognition of the purpose, for the signification of which Indication is resorted to, as well, in as much as, while in  $R\overline{u}paka$  the peculiar traits, pertaining to the moon are cognised as belonging to the face, in  $Upam\overline{a}$  no such comprehension arises. <sup>96</sup>

The third theory seeks to differentiate, the scopes of two poetic figures under consideration by pointing out to the difference in the nature of similarity, that forms the very foundation of them. The similarity, that forms the basis of Upama, it says, is an analysable concept, comprehending within its scope the idea of difference, as well: while the similarity that forms the basis of Rūpaka is an unanalysable attribute, which does not presuppose the existence of absolute distinction between things in which it inheres. Thus the idea that the face, though different from the moon is endowed with attributes belonging to it—is cognised from the expression: 'The face is similar to the moon'. whereas, the idea that the face is possessed of qualities, pertaining to the moon-is known from the sentence: 'The face is the moon'. This theory claims to enjoy another advantage over the first two theories, because, as it says, it does not stand in need of advancing arguments in order to remove the apparent contradiction between initial cognition of difference between the moon and the face and the ultimate comprehension of identity between them.97

The neo-ālamkārikas adumbrate an altogether new theory on the issue; they seek to explain conceptual cognition ensuing from such propositions as: 'The moon is the face', 'The carrier is a bull' and the like without resorting to Indication. They think that, in such cases identity is established between primary concepts, i.e., to say, between the face and the moon in the first expression and between the carrier and the bull in the second one. The point that the sense of incompatibility stands in the way of production of such knowledge, in as much as, no identity can be established between the face and the moon in the world of experience is without any value, because this sense of incongruity does not obstruct verbal cognition in the

same way as it does not an artificial knowledge. A passionate lover regards the face of his fiancee as the moon, even though his knowledge of it as the face persists, and this happens because his strong desire serves as an excitant. An impediment is one which hampers the production of an effect in spite of the presence of its causal factors and an excitant or a stimulant is one which takes away the obstructing power of the impeding factor and allows the causes to produce the desired effect. An impediment is illustrated by a moon-stone which does not allow the fire to consume, while a stimulant is exemplified by a sun-stone, which takes away the power from the moon-stone and allows the fire to produce its desired result. The adherents of this theory assert that, although no conceptual cognition ensues from the expression: 'Sprinkles with fire', yet it follows from the proposition: 'The moon is the face', because, while in the first case there is no stimulant, competent to take away the power of the impeding factor, in the second case an excitant in the shape of strong desire of the speaker exists and this does not allow the impeding factor to hamper the production of verbal knowledge. They claim that their doctrine is in conformity to the principle enunciated by the ancients, which states that, a verbal expression is competent to produce knowledge, concerning those objects even, that do not exist in the outside world. 98 In support of their contention that in Rupaka actual identity is established between two vacyarthas and as such, Laksana plays no part whatsoever there. these theorists cite a number of expressions and show that in each of them absolute sameness is established not between Visaya and Visayisadr'sa, but between Visaya and Visaya themselves. Thus in the expression: 'The Goddess of fortune is embracing you—a Rajanarayana', what is cognised is not the idea that the king resembles Lord Narayana, but the sense that he is identical with the Lord himself. In criticising the view-point of the ancients that in the expression: 'The face is the moon', the term 'moon' conveys through Indication the sense of one, which resembles the moon, the Neo-alamkarikas maintain that, such a stand renders the scopes of Upamā and


Rūpaka identical. Moreover, such a theory considers similarity as the determinant of the indicated sense, which is the idea of one, which is similar to the moon in the present case. This similarity, which consists in sameness of attributes refers neither to resemblance in point of certain specific qualities nor to that in point of attributes in general. And this is so, because the acceptance of the first alternative vitiates such expressions as: 'The beautiful face is the moon' and the like by the defect of tautology and the acceptance of the second one renders such a proposition as 'The face is the moon' an instance of Uvama, in as much as, the idea of possession of same attributes in general is conveyed through Indication. Hence, these theorists conclude, in Rupaka identity is established between two primary concepts and Laksana plays no part there; in Upama, on the other hand, no such identity is established and this differentiates a case of the poetic figure Rupaka from that of Upamā.

Jagannatha challenges this contention of the neo-alamkarikas: the strikingness of a Rupaka, he points out, depends not merely on cognition of sheer identity between two objects, but on comprehension of such identity, as is caused by possession of similar attributes and consequently, the proposition of the Navva that, in Rupaka sheer identity is established and cognised takes away from this figure charm, which constitutes the very essence of an Alamkara. The point that, the strikingness of a Rūvaka lies in cognition of identity, caused through possession of similar attributes is established by the fact that, the expression: 'The Mahabharata is veritable Heaven' is not regarded as an instance of this figure, although in it identity of the Heaven is established on the Great Epic; it is recognised as an instance of Rupaka only when the sense of the expressions, denotative of similar attributes such as 'suparvalamkrtam' (The Heaven is embellished by Court of the Gods and the Mahabharata by chapters ) and the like is apprehended. The same thing, Jagannatha continues, happens in the case of the expression: 'The face is Moon', which furnishes a stockillustration of this poetic figure; there, also, the absolute same-

ness of the moon and the face, as caused through possession of such similar attributes as the capacity to please and the like is understood: the difference between the two expressions lies in the fact that, whereas in the stock-illustration, the common attribute being very familiar does not stand in need of expression through words, in the unfamiliar instance, it stands in need of being categorically stated in terms. The argument that, identity presupposes possession of common attributes and as such, though in an expression absolute sameness of two objects is merely established, the fact that they are endowed with common attributes is understood automatically does not help the Navya much, in as much as, the wrongness of the proposition is established by the sentence: Rama may deviate from the path of truth only when fire looses its heat and water its cold touch, in which mere sense of identity of fire and heatless, as also that of water and coldless is cognised, and no comprehension of common attributes, whatsoever, occurs. 99 Equally unhelpful is the argument that, the expression 'The King does not resemble a lion, but is lion himself' proves the contention of the Navya that, the poetic figure Rupaka consists in sheer superimposition of identity of one on another, without any reference to the existence of similarity between them, -an argument, advanced in order to substantiate the position that, comprehension of identity in Rupaka is not preceded by that of similarity and as such, in illustrations of this figure Laksana does not step in to convey the idea of Visayi-sadria. Those thinkers, who maintain that Rūpaka is based on Lakṣaṇā, also, assert that, in it, the sense of identity between two objects is comprehended through Vyanjana and this explains the necessity of taking recourse to Indication: these thinkers further maintain that in this figure an idea of identity, as caused through similarity is apprehended. In reply to the objection as to how, then, can the similarity of the King and the lion be negated and absolute sameness between them be established in the same expression, it is possible for these thinkers to point out that, what is intended in the expression is to deny the difference between the King and the lion and,


thereafter, to establish their absolute identity. And this is so, because while the similarity, that constitutes the essence of Upama comprehends the concept of difference, that which forms the basis of Rupaka is an unanalysable concept, having no association with any idea of distinction. With these arguments Jagannatha rejects the theory of the Navya, which denies the operation of Laksanā in the expression: 'The face is the moon', which constitutes an instance of the poetic figure Rupaka. He agrees with the ancients on this issue and maintains that in the expression under consideration, the term 'moon' conveys through Indication the idea of one, which resembles the moon, but, nevertheless, it is differentiated from the sentence 'The face resembles the moon', which constitutes an illustration of Unama, in as much as, while the idea of identity between the two objects is cognised in the former, no comprehension of such sense occurs in the latter: and this is so, because while Laksanā operates in the first, it does not in the second. Moreover, Jagannatha points out, the theory that Lakşanā operates in instances of Rūpaka is in agreement with the views expressed by such great thinkers as Patanjali and Kaiyata, who extend recognition to this secondary power of signification and as such, is to be accepted in preference to that, adumbrated by the Navya, which is not backed by any authority.100

Mammata classifies  $Laksan\bar{a}$  into six varieties, which, he arranges in the following order:



This classification is not scientific, in as much as, it is vitiated by the fallacy of overlapping division; thus the expression: 'The carrier is a bull' not only illustrates  $S\bar{a}rop\bar{a}$ , but  $Laksana\ laksan\bar{a}$ , as well, because the primary meaning of the

term 'bull' completely gives it up in favour of another meaning: in a similar manner, the sentence: 'A hamlet on the Ganges' exemplifies not merely Lakṣaṇa-lakṣaṇā, but Sādhyavasānā, as well. For this reason, the commentators of Mammaṭa propose another scheme of classification, which is capable of being tabled in the following form:



Jagannātha, first of all, classifies Lakṣanā into two broad types: Nirūdhi and Prayojanavatī. The second of these two types is further split up into two sub-types: Gauni and Śuddhā. Of these two sub-types, Gaunī is again classified into two sub-classes: Saropa and Sadhyavasana and Suddha, in its turn, into four varieties: Jahatsvārthā, Ajahatsvārthā, Sāropā and Sadhyavasana. Thus Jagannatha accepts the scheme of classification, drawn by Mammata and so his classification also is not scientific. Viśvanātha gives a scientific division of Lakṣaṇā, which, according to him, has eighty varieties. First of all, Lakṣaṇā, he says, is of two types: Rūdhimūlā and Prayojanamīlā. Each of these types has two sub-types: Upadana and Laksana. Each of these varieties, again, admits of classification into two sub-varieties: Saropa and Sadhyavasānā. Each of these eight types of Lakṣaṇā, Viśvanātha continues, may either be of Suddha or of Gauni variety, the total sub-divisions of Lakṣaṇā being sixteen, of which eight are based on usage and the other eight on motive. This Prayojanamīila-lakṣaṇā is two-fold on account of the abstruseness or obviousness of the suggested sense and consequently, may be said to possess sixteen varieties. Then again, this type of Laksana admits of a further division through the fact

that, the fruit pertains either to the thing indicated or to one of its qualities. Thus there are thirty-two varieties of  $Prayojanam\overline{u}l\overline{u}-lakṣan\overline{a}$ , and these, along with eight varieties of  $R\overline{u}dhi-m\overline{u}l\overline{u}-lakṣan\overline{a}$  bring the total number of sub-types of  $Lakṣan\overline{a}$  to forty. In view of Viśvanātha, each of these types admits of a further division according as the power of Indication is exercised by the import of a proposition or by that of a term, and so the total number of varieties of  $Lakṣan\overline{a}$  come up to eighty.

## IV

## Vyanjana-the function of paramount importance

Although the Mīmāmsaka and the Naiyayika differ f om each other on such vital issues as the nature of relation existing between sound and sense, the exact connotation of terms and the like, both of them agree in denying the status of a separate Vrtti to Vyanjanā. The Mīmāmsaka makes no mention of it and the Naiyayika equates it with Laksana, the secondary power of signification. Jagadīśa cities the expression: The face displays smiles in full blossom' ( mukham vikaśitasmitam ), in which the term 'vikasita' is said to convey through suggestion the idea of fragrance and attractiveness of the face according to the Alamkarika. The Alamkarika thinks that, Abhidha or Śakti of the term is unable to bring the sense of fragrance into light, because that does not constitute the conventional meaning cf the word: nor is  $Laksin\overline{a}$  competent to bring this sense into comprehension, because, inability to establish connection, that forms one of the three factors necessary for operation of this function is absent. In criticising this view Jagadīśa points out, inability to establish connection amongst the primary concepts does not produce Laksanā, which is defined in term of a relation, which a secondary concept bears to the primary one: nor does it indicate its operation, since the fact that, the term Ganges' conveys through Indication the idea of the bank s comprehended through inference: nor does it to lead to

cognition of association among concepts signified through Lakṣaṇā, and consequently; constitute a causal factor of such cognition, since from the expression: 'Admit the sticks'-the sense of allowing the holders of sticks to enter is understood, even though the so-called cause, namely inability to establish connection among the primary concepts is conspicuous by its absence. Thus, Jagadīśa asserts, inability to establish logical connection among the concepts signified through Abhidha is not a necessary requisite of Laksanā, and when this is so, the view of the Alamkarika that, due to the absence of this necessary factor Laksanā is unable to operate and bring out the idea of fragrance and attractiveness of the face falls through. With all emphasis at his command, he maintains that, the sense, under discussion is comprehended through Indication and as such, the postulation of a separate function of suggestion in order to account for its cognition is unnecessary. As an additional proof of existence of Vyanjanā the Alamkārika cites such expressions as: 'Ayam gauravito mahan', in which the contextual sense, namely the idea that, this great man is venerable, indeed, is signified through  $Abhidh\overline{a}$  and the noncontextual sense, namely the idea that this cow is better than this sheep is conveyed through Vyanjana. The Alamkarika thinks that, as the function of denotation is restricted to the contextual meaning, it is not possible for it to bring the noncontextual idea into comprehension, as well, and so postulation of the function of suggestion, competent to bring out this idea becomes an imperative necessity. Jagadiśa challenges the proposition of the Alamkarıka and asserts that in such cases cognition of the non-contextual idea does not occur at all, since the knowledge that there is no intention of the speaker to signify this non-contextual stands in the way of its production. If cognition of the non-contextual occurs at all, he continues, such cognition is not verbal, but mental, effected somehow. The argument that, verbal cognition, effected through Vyanjana alone produces transcendental bliss carries no weight, since a knowledge that occurs in mind automatically without the help of other factors and cognitions, also, produces supreme

delight. Thus as comprehension of Rasa as well, which leads to supreme bliss is capable of being explained as one effected in mind automatically without the help of vişayendriyasannikarşa, parāmarśa or śaktijnāna, the postulation of Vyānjanā to account for cognition of this element is unnecessary.

With irrefutable logic and astounding polemics, the Alamkārika meets this challenge of the Naiyayika. The idea of fragrance and attractiveness of the face, as is gathered from the expression 'The face bears smiles in blossom' is not comprehended, he asserts, through Laksanā: and this is so, because all the factors necessary for operation of this function are absent. The argument that cognition of the non-contextual does not occur in those cases, where multi-meaninged words are used, since in such instances the idea that, the non-contextual is not intended to be conveyed hampers such cognition is not sound. The mere use of multi-meaninged words to the exclusion of others by the poet goes to show that his intention is to convey both the contextual and the non-contextual. Equally unsound is the argument that, the cognition of the noncontextual is not verbal, but mental, being effected automatically in the mind. A verbal expression, the Alamkarika points out, does not cease to function after signifying the primary meaning alone: the Naiyayika himself maintains that, it conveys through Laksanā the secondary idea, as well, in soms cases. Thus when the status of a verbal cognition is granted to the comprehension of the indicated meaning, brought into light through the function of Indication, there is no reason to deny this status to apprehension of the suggested content, which ensues in the manner of the indicated idea from cognition of word. The point that although this cognition follows from comprehension of word, yet it is regarded as mental in character, because mind thinks out the idea under consideration is dangerous, because its application is likely to withdraw the status of separate sources of knowledge to perception and inference, in as much as, these being types of cognition are caused by common cause—the mind. Thus the Alamkarika controverts the Naiyayıka thesis that, the understanding of the implied meaning being  $m\bar{a}nas\bar{i}prat\bar{i}ti$  does not fall within the purview of conceptual cognition: he firmly maintains that, comprehension of this sense is caused by a new  $\dot{s}abdavy\bar{a}para$ , which he names  $Vya\tilde{n}jan\bar{a}$ .

In extending recognition to the function of Vyanjana, the Alamkarika claims to enjoy the support of the Vaiyakarana. whom he follows closely on many vital problems concerning sound and sense. The Vaiyākarana defines Vyanjanā as an impression, which when called into play by such factors as knowledge of speciality of the speaker, the person spoken to and the like, as also, by an appreciative genius brings into light an idea, other than the conventional one: in order to differentiate it from Laksana, he points out that, Vyanjana does not depend on incompatibility of the primary meaning for its operation: nor does it convey a meaning, that is related in some well-known form with the primary one; Vyanjana, he asserts, is competent to signify a sense, which bears direct or remote or even no connection with the primary one. For the Vaiyākarana, the acceptance of Vyanjanā should follow as a corollary from the fundamental philosophical position according to which the Śabdabrahman reveals itself as the phenomenal world. This inverted revelation is the play of Avidyaśakti which leads the common man to accept the revealed empirical world as a reality over and above the consciousness. The common man labours under this illusion due to eternal Vasana or Samskara. Thus Vyanjana or appearance of the phenomenal world is the concrete expression of the force of an eternally inverted pre-disposition, which is instilled in man by Maya or Avidya. Thus when the Vaiyakarana takes Vyanjana as a form of Samskara or pre-disposition, it has a logical link with the metaphysical position. On the conceptual plane of meaningrelation, too, we have seen how the word as the substratum and sustainer reveals itself as the meaning. In this fundamental sense, it should have been said that, every meaning is vyangua or revealed, being superimposed on the word that means. But on the purely empirical plane, as a mark of concession to logico-epistemic analysis, the Vaiyākaraņa, too, has distinguished among different dimensions of meaning and accepted Vyanjana as the tertiary dimension. Yet here, too, he has not forgotten to emphasise the importance of Vasana or Samskara as the force, the resurgence of which, he has equated with Vyanjana. When the grammarian for the sake of empirical logic, has restricted the term Vyanjana to its technical sense, he has noted the importance of pre-disposition and the law of association in resurrecting the suggested meaning. When a burglar hears the statement 'the Sun has set' uttered by someone in some other context and remembers that it is time to go for burglary, he does not remember any previously cognised meaning-relation between the statement and the sense suggested to him. His habit of life has formed an association between the necturnal darkness and the act of burglary. The act formed into a habit lies silent as a disposition in his mind. The statement directly asserting the fact of the Sun going down stimulates his pre-disposition into the remembrance of his task at hand. The suggestion of the task as the sense of the statement is nothing but the stimulated resurgence of his slumbering pre-disposition. Hence Vyanjanā is called samskārodbodhaka by Nagesa. Though in the direct meaning-relation or Abhidha-śakti, too, Samskara plays a part, yet here conscious knowledge of the relation between the word and the meaning (Saktigraha) is necessary for apprehending the meaning directly by the corresponding word, i.e. Saktijnana is necessary in that case. But in Vyanjanā, Vyanjanājnāna is not necessary, since the pre-requisite of suggestion is not the fact that the burglar should have previously grasped in consciousness a meaningrelation between the statement 'the Sun has set' and the act of burglary ahead. The very existence of the pre-disposition is enough, the statement acting only as a stimulus in response to which the samskara emerges as the suggested sense. Hence it is said-Vyanjana svarupasati hetuh.

Moreover, according to the doctrine of Spheta, the one monolithic werd is gradually manifested by the succession of sound-series. The gradual manifestation is nothing but resurgence of the previously formed flowing impressions printed on

the mind by evanescent auditory perceptions. By describing Vyaniana as an impression, the Vaivakarana makes it clear that, while śakti ascertained with reference to a particular meaning in this birth conveys an idea, this function, ognised in previous birth, as well, signifies the implied aning and consequently, one is different from the other. He feels the necessity of postulating this function, because as Nagesa points out, this is necessary in order to explain revelation of the eternal sound-unit Sphota, which according to him, is the only significant entity. The Vaiyakarana thinks that, the momentary sounds pronounced by our speech-organs do not signify an idea: what they do is that, they reveal the eternal sound-unit, which because of its expressive character is regarded as Sphota: the revelation of this Sphota, he believes, is effected through the function of suggestion. Moreover, Nagesa continues, the Vaiyākaraņa thesis that Vyanjanā exists is in conformity to the doctrine of Bhartrhari, which regards a nipata as a dyotaka, drawing, thereby, a line of demarcation between vacaka and dyotaka units. Thus in the term 'Prajapati', meaning: performs an excellent penance, the prefix 'Pra' conveys no meaning of its own: it only indicates that the verb 'japati' itself conveys the idea of performance of an excellent penance. When the prefix 'Pra' conveys no primary meaning of its own, it is unable to signify any sense through Laksanā as well, because Laksanā brings out only such a meaning, as is connected with the primary one, and as such is regarded as an extended power of denotation or aprasiddhā-śakti: it only suggests the capacity of the verb lying near it to convey the particular sense. 102 This observation is competent to distinguish Vyanjana from Laksanā, also, because while the latter is only an extended power of denotation, the former is not so. As regards the substratum of this function, the Vaiyakarana says that, it resides in word, sentence, meaning, portion of a word, letter, style, movements and such other numerous entities, thus making it clear that, word, letter, meaning and even unmeaning sound and movement-all these are able to bring out an implicit idea through the function of suggestion. The Alamkarika endorses this view of the Vaiyākaraṇa, as is evident from the observation of Mammaṭa that, the function of Vyanjanā pertains to all types of meanings, as well and that the conveying agents of a Vyangyārtha are words, their fragments, meanings, letters, compositions and even such units as gestures and sideglances, that do not come under the purview of śabda. The Vaiyākaraṇa thinks that, the knowledge of speciality of the speaker, person spoken to and such other things is only auxiliary to comprehension of a particular implicit idea and as such, is not indispensable in all cases.

Visvanatha defines Vyanjana as a function that brings the implicit idea into comprehension when the three well-known functions of Abhidha, Laksana and Tatparya cease to operate after conveying their respective ideas. It is not possible for any one of these functions to signify its special meaning and in addition to it bring out the implicit sense, because the function pertaining to a word operates only once. In support of this contention, Viśvanātha quotes an observation of the Mīmāmsaka, which states that a function, pertaining to a word, a valid source of knowledge, such as perception and the like and a sacrificial act intended to fulfil a particular aim operate only once and know no resurrection: thus the term 'Ghata' once pronounced causes cognition of the jar only once, - perception of smoke in hill once derived leads to inference of fire only once, and performance of Aśvamedha for one time only leads to Heaven only once. This function of suggestion, he continues, belongs to śabda, artha, prakrti, pratyaya and other elements and is referred to by such terms as vyanjana, dhvanana, gamana and pratyayana. 104

The Alamkārika classifies  $Vya\tilde{n}jan\bar{a}$  into two types:  $S\bar{a}bd\bar{\imath}$  and  $\bar{A}rth\bar{\imath}$ , according to the part played by the sound or sense-element in the suggestion of the implicit sense. The Alamkarika thinks that both  $\dot{s}abda$  and artha play their part in bringing the suggested content into light: this, he points out, is evident from the fact that, no implicit idea, whatsoever, is comprehended from an expression, whose explicit sense is not understood, as also from the fact that, an idea, not expressed through

words, does not bring a relishable suggested sense into light, 105 Thus, though in all cases, the sound and the sense-elements go to convey through Vyanjana the implied meaning, yet in some cases, the sound-element plays a prominent role, - the sense-element being auxiliary to it and in others, the case is just the opposite. The Alamkarika says that those cases of suggestion where sabda plays a greater part are regarded as instances of Sabdi-Vyanjana and those, where artha plays a greater part are regarded as instances of Arthi-Vyanjana. As regards the criterion of determining whether the sound plays a prominent or subordinate part, he says that, prominence belongs to śabda in those instances where the words actually used do not admit of replacement,—the manifestation of the implicit idea being hampered in case of such substitution and prominence belongs to artha in those instances, where the words admit of replacement,—the revelation of the unexpressed not being impeded in any way by snch substitution, or in other words, in Sabaī-Vuanianā, the sound-element is parivrttuasaha while in Ārthī-Vyanjanā, this is parivrtti-saha. Against the view of the Alamkarika that, both sabda and artha go to suggest the implicit in all cases, an objection that, the cognition of sound and that of expressed sense being not simultaneous, it is not possible for both these elements to combine and perform the same function is likely to be raised. It is quite natural to point out that, at the time of comprehension of sound, that of sense does not occur and at the time of apprehension of the explicit, that of sound disappears, and as such, simultaneous existence of the sound and sense-elements is a myth. In reply to this objection, it is possible for the Alamkarika to assert that, this is not so, because the connotation of a word comprehends the form of the word itself and consequently, at the time of apprehension of primary meaning, the sound-element, which, also, is included within it is understood. Hence when the simultaneous cognition of the sound and the sense-elements arises, the objection that, it is not possible for both these units to combine and bring out the implicit does not stand. The stand of the Alamkarika that the form of the word itself constitutes the primary meaning of a word is based on the doctrine of Bhartrhari that, every possible cognition is determinate, the determining factor being an articulate form, as also on the observation of the grammarian that, a difference in sound-element leads to a corresponding difference in sense-element. For this reason, Jagannatha points out, in the expression: 'The Sun rises red and sets red: the great remain the same in prosperity and adversity', the term 'red' does not admit of substitution by any synonym, since such replacement makes a difference in meaning, as well, and endangers the very existence of the poetic figure Arthantaranyāsa, which consists in corroborating a particular statement by a general one or the vice versa. 107

The Alamkārika classifies a Śābdī-Vyanjanā into two types, according to the function that constitutes its basis: of these, Lakṣanāmūlā-Vyanjanā, as the name suggests, is based on Indication and Abhidhamula-Vyanjana is based on denotation. 108 In contradiction to the Naiyayika thesis that, a simple mental cognition of the unexpressed occurs, the Alamkarika maintains that, verbal knowledge of the motive, for the signification of which Laksanā is taken recourse to appears, as is evident from the fact that, comprehension of the idea of excess of coolness and purity from the expression: 'A hamlet on the Ganges' ensues from cognition of word: he, further maintains that, the word brings this idea into light through the function of suggestion. Abhidha is unable to convey the idea of excess of coolness and purity, because that does not constitute the conventional meaning of the term 'Ganges'. Nor is Laksanā competent to do so, because help of this inferior function-this necessary evil-is sought only to remove the obstacle standing in the way of establishment of logical connection among the concepts; and this is done only when Abkidha fails to bring out such concepts among which logical connection is capable of being effected. Thus Laksanā conveys only that meaning, as is absolutely necessary in order to remove the inconsistency, and does nothing more. In the stock-illustration, accordingly, it signifies merely the idea of the bank of the Ganges,-a concept, that is indispensable in order to establish its logical connection with development of a diary-form and does not proceed further to convey the idea of excess of coolness and purity, as well. To an obstinate opponent the Alamkarika points out, Laksana is unable to bring the idea of excess of coolness and purity into comprehension, because the factors necessary for its operation are absent. First of all, the sense of the bank neither forms the primary meaning of the term 'Ganges', nor is it incongruous in the present context, that is to say, logical connection can very well be established of the bank with the herd-station. Thus the first condition—the inapplicability of the primary meaning remains unsatisfied. Secondly, the bank bears no direct connection with the properties of coolness and purity, which are associated only with the flowing stream of water and naturally, the second condition, also, is not satisfied. Thirdly, if the motive also is said to be conveyed through Indication, then the necessity for positing another motive arises: in reality however, no such second purpose is traced. So none of the conditions necessary for operation of Laksana is satisfied. The argument that the motive is not understood at all—is without any value, since it is opposed to the experience of all appreciators. For this reason, Anandavardhana, and following him, Mammata assert that, the capacity of a word to bring out the purpose for the signification of which Laksanā is resorted to is not impeded by such hindrances as incompatibility of the primary meaning and the like and consequently, it conveys the said purpose straightway, showing, thereby, that the motive is not brought into light through the function of Lakṣaṇā itself.109

Mammata says that, if for arguments' sake, it is contended that, the motive is nothing but an indicated meaning and in order to explain the operation of this Indication, a second motive is posited, then a serious fallacy vitiating the whole system is expected to crop in: if the prayojana of the first Lakṣaṇā is supposed to be conveyed through another Lakṣaṇā, and the prayojana of that subsequent one is said to be communicated through a third Lakṣaṇā by positing another prayojana, then the

fallacy of Regressus-ad-infinitum is likely to arise and land even the basic Laksanā in jeopardy; to state clearly, as in such case, the minds of readers are likely to remain absorbed in search for a series of motives, it is not possible for them to apprehend even the first indicated meaning.

LITERARY CRITICISM

Indian thinkers speak of different varieties of reasoning, which include self-dependence (ātmāśraya), mutual dependence (anyonyāśraya) vicious circle (cakraka) and the vicious infinite (anavastha). The reasoning of self-dependence consists in the situation when a thing directly and immediately presupposes its ownself in respect of genesis, subsistence and cognition. . If it were contended that A was the cause of A, that is, its ownself, then A would be split up into two entities which are not identical and as such the reasoning would be defective: in a similar manner if it were contended that a man existed in his ownself, or in other words, were his own container and contained, then the man would be split up into two entities which are never identical and the reasoning would be invalid. These cases of selfdependence are defective, because they stand in the way of production, subsistence or cognition of the thing concerned. The reasoning of mutual dependence arises when between two terms the first term presupposes the second term and vice versa immediately and directly for its genesis, subsistence or cognition. The argument that a seed produces a sprout and a sprout a seed, or that the man is sustained by earth and the earth by man, or that the cognition of the jar requires that of the picture and the knowledge of the picture requires that of the jar furnishes an illustration of this type of reasoning. The resoning of vicious circle arises when between two terms the first requires the second, and the second requires the first through the intervention of third or the fourth. The argument that a seed produces a sprout, a sprout a flower and a flower a seed or that the cup exists in the earth, the earth in space and the space in the cup or that the cognition of the jar presupposes that of the picture, which, again, presupposes that of the monastery, which, in its turn, presupposes that of the jar furnishes an illustration of this type of reasoning. In each of these three types of reasoning the same term is required to serve as the condition and the result, and their difference lies only in the number of steps involved in between: thus when A requires A immediately and directly, it becomes a case of self-dependence, -when A requires B immediately and directly and B requires A immediately and directly, it becomes a case of mutual dependence.when A requires B, B requires C and C requires A, then the argument becomes a case of vicious circle. The reasoning of the vicious infinite consists in continuity of the chain of probans and probandum, of ground and consequent without limit. The argument that, the seed produces the sprout, the sprout another seed, this second seed a second sprout and so on infinitely or that the man is sustained by the earth, the earth by the quarterelephants, the quarter-elephants by the tortoise, the tortoise by the space and so on of that the cognition of the jar requires that of the picture, whose knowledge requires that of the monastery, which, in its turn, requires that of the mat and so on affords an example of this type of reasoning. Of these three specimens of arguments, the first one, however, differs from the other two in this respect that, whereas in the last two, the infinite series is vicious in the first one, it is legitimate or valid, because the continuity, herein, is endorsed by recognised canons of proof. The seed is the cause of the sprout and the sprout again is the cause of the seed; this is established by legitimate organ of knowledge. and for this reason, causal relation between seed and sprout is capable of being established, even though this chain is bound to be pursued infinitely in the past and to have an infinite future career, as well. The raison d'etre of infinite series acting as a reductio ad absurdum lies in the fact that, it stands in the way of genesis, subsistence or cognition of a particular thing. In the present case, however, there is no mutual dependence between the seed and the sprout in respect of genesis, subsistence or cognition: the individual seed which is the cause of the individual sprout is not the effect of that sprout, but of a different individual sprout that occurred in the past, or in other words, the pairs of cause and effect are numerically different, and hence, there is no mutual dependence. It would

have been a vicious series had the self-same individual seed and the self-same individual sprout been required to serve as cause and effect alternately. The fact that series is an infinite one is due only to the fact that no arbitrary limit can be set to the history of the physical world, which is an uninterrupted one. The second and third specimens of arguments, on the other hand, fail to explain a datum, the necessity of which impels its advocate to postulate a series, of which there is no last term, which could justify the original datum. Hence infinite series in these is vicious: it militates against ths original datum, which is the starting point of the series. Jayantabhatta draws scrupulously a line of demarcation between the infinite series, which is vicious, lands as it does, the original datum in jeopardy and that which is legitimate, and maintains that the first one only is regarded as fallacious. The critic who is of opinion that, the motive for the signification of which Laksanā is resorted to is conveyed through Laksanā renders the original Laksanā dependent on a subsequent Indication, since the motive constitutes one of the essential factors necessary for its operation: this second Laksana again depends on another for its subsistence and the third on a fourth, and in this way an unending series of Laksanā goes on. This unending series obstructs the genesis of original Laksanā and at the same time stands in the way of cognition of the purpose for the signification of which this first Laksanā is resorted to and as such militates against the original datum which constitutes the starting point. This infinite series, to quote Mammata, is Mūlakṣatikārinī; and is to be avoided. 110

In the view of some critics, opposed to the theory of Dhyani, the motive of Indication has no existence separate from that of the indicated meaning, and what actually is comprehended is not the secondary sense only, but the sense endowed with a particular motive. Thus, according to these scholars, the secondary meaning of the term 'Ganges', used in the expression: 'A hamlet on the Ganges' is the bank endowed with the qualities of coolness and purity and the purpose is the apprehension of an idea, that can be gathered in excess to that derived

from the simple expression: 'A hamlet on the bank of the Ganges'. Thus as Laksanā convevs a meaning, qualified by a motive, the postulation of a separate function for signification of this purpose is not necessary. In reply to this view of the opponents, Mammata emphatically asserts that, the indicated meaning can in no case be one endowed with a motive, or in other words, the proposition of Viśista-laksanā is untenable. And this is so, because it leads to violation of the well-known axiom: Jnanasya visayo hyanyah phalamanyadudahrtam. Commentators differ widely among themselves on the correct interpretation of this dictum, in which the use of the ambiguous term 'phalam' poses a serious problem. The explanation that by phala a produced fruit is meant and the axiom conveys the idea that, the content of knowledge is something different from the fruit of such knowledge which is a produced entity is unacceptable, since it fails to bring out any inconsistency in the proposition of Viśista-lakṣaṇā. The fruit of Lakṣaṇā, here, is cognition of the idea of coolness and purity and this is certainly different from its content, which is the bank, endowed with the said attributes. The qualities of coolness and purity themselves are incapable of being regarded as the fruit of knowledge, because Laksinā does not go to generate them. The explanation that by the term phala an indicated fruit is referred to and what the axiom means is this that, the fruit of a knowledge, which is not a produced entity but an indicated one is different from the content of the knowledge concernedrenders the qualities of purity and coolness themselves fruits of such knowledge and at the same time brings out an inconsistency in the proposition of qualified indication, which makes the attributes of coolness and purity the content as well as the fruit of knowledge caused by Laksana, and is thus an improvement on the first one, but, nevertheless, this also is untenable, since it is based on a wrong datum and is not in conformity to the explanation offered by Mammata himself in his Vrtti thereon. This explanation takes it for granted that the fruit of knowledge consists of the attributes of coolness and purity themselves. which, however, is not a fact, in as much as Laksanā leads to comprehension of the said qualities and not to the qualities themselves: and this comprehension is certainly different from the idea of the bank, endowed with the attributes of coolness and purity and consequently, the maxim does not stand violated. Moreover, in his Vrtti on this maxim, Mammata describes Prakatata or Samvitti as the fruit of knowledge, both of which are produced entities, showing, thereby, that what is understood by phala in the dictum is a produced fruit, and not an indicated one. In order to avoid these difficulties clever commentators take recourse to an ingenious subterfuge: they point out that what actually the maxim states is that, just as the content of a knowledge is different from the knowledge itself, similarly, the fruit, accruing from it, also, is different from it, or in other words, knowledge, object of knowledge and its fruit-all these are mutually exclusive. In the case of perception of a blue thing, the content of cognition is the blue thing itself and the fruit is either Prakatata belonging to the object or subjective cognition Samvitti, pertaining to the perceiver. In the view of the Mīmāmsaka, when a thing becomes known either through perception or through inference or through any other source of knowledge, an attribute, regarded as 'knownness' is produced in the thing: this, he says, is the fruit of knowledge. The Naiyayika, on the other hand, holds that, when a thing is comprehended, knowledge concerning cognition arises in the mind of the knower, and this serves as the fruit of knowledge. The advocate of the doctrine of qualified indication states that, in the expression: 'A hamlet on the Ganges', the content of cognition, caused through  $Laksan\overline{a}$  is the bank of the river, endowed with the attributes of coolness and purity and its fruit is comprehension of an additional meaning, which is nothing other than an excess of the said qualities: thus he identifies fruit of knowledge with knowledge itself throwing the well-established maxim into winds and consequently, his doctrine becomes untenable.

In his magnum opus 'Kāvyatattvasamīkṣā', Dr. N. N. Choudhuri offers an altogether new explanation of the dictum which seems very reasonable, in as much as, it does not want

to evade the problem. Dr. Choudhuri says that, the term 'phala' refers to a produced fruit : in the stock-illustration the fruit of knowledge caused by Laksanā is cognition of the attributes of coolness and purity, which, however, are regarded as fruits themselves through transference of epithet. He points out, further, that the term 'anya' in the dictum conveys not merely the idea of a different thing, but that of a thing, which appears in a different time, and thus the dictum asserts that the content of knowledge is entirely different from the fruit of such knowledge, there being temporal sequence between them, -the content being cognised first and the fruit next. The advocate of the doctrine of Qualified Indication does not take note of this and explains that Laksanā conveys the idea of the bank, endowed with the attributes of coolness and purity, which, however, is an absurd proposition, in as much as, the sense of the bank is comprehended first and that of the attributes next. To state more clearly, as there is difference in point of time of cognition of the unqualified secondary sense and that of the motive, which is said to qualify it, the same function cannot bring into light both the ideas simultaneously.

There are other grounds that go to establish the untenability of the proposition of Viśiṣṭa-lakṣaṇā. The inferior function of Indication is taken recourse to in order to establish logical connection among the concepts conveyed by terms used in a proposition and it brings out only that idea as is absolutely necessary for establishment of this logical connection. As in the expression under consideration, the sense of sheer bank is competent to solve the difficulty which faces us, in as much as, association of hamlet with the bank is capable of being effected. it is neither possible nor proper for Laksanā to bring out the idea of the attributes of coolness and purity, as well, -an idea, that does not contribute in any way towards establishment of this connection. The parallelism of sandal-paste, which, though applied in order to allay heat generates coolness, as well, introduced in order to explain the double function of Laksana does not cut much ice, because sandal-paste is an unconscious being, while Laksanā is in the form of a knowledge and consequently, the two do not meet in a common platform. Secondly, in order to have knowledge of a qualified object, the qualifications are to be known first; to put it more precisely, in order to derive knowledge of the bank, endowed with the attributes of coolness and purity, the attributes are to be known first. No source of valid knowledge, however, can bring these attributes of bank into consciousness, because these qualities pertain to the stream alone, and not to the strip of land. Of course, in case of erroneous knowledge, attributes belonging to one thing are superimposed on another, but the knowledge of coolness and purity, as pertaining to the bank cannot be described here as an erroneous knowledge, because such description completely defeats the prupose of postulation of Indication. When the function of Adhidha goes to the point of generating an error, the primary meaning being incompatible with the rest of the sentence, then Laksanā comes to our rescue: it brings the secondary sense into light and thereby creates a right notion. If Laksana, also, a supposed to generate a false idea, then the very purpose of dopting this round-about process as an expedient after reject, g Abhidha becomes defeated. Thus it is not possible for Lakṣaṇā to convey the idea of the bank, as endowed with the attributes of coolness and purity,-attributes, that do not pertain actually to it. The Dhvanivadin says that, although Laksanā fails here, Vyanjanā succeeds: it brings the idea of the bank, endowed with the said attributes into light even though the existence of those attributes in the bank is opposed to legitimate sources of knowledge. For this reason, Jayantabhatta, the noted logician pronounces a note of warning to the effect that, the function of suggestion, which owes its genesis to the poetic intuition of a poet is never to be challenged by arguments, since it does not follow the path of reason and logic: it is difficult even for great scholars, he asserts, to pursue steadily its line of action, which is most unpredictable. 111 These points go to establish the untenability of the proposition of Visista-lkṣaaṇā. And so the Alamkārika concludes, in no case can there be an Indication with reference to a qualified object, i.e. to say Indication can never convey a meaning accompanied by a motive: what actually is understood through  $Lak an \overline{a}$  is an unqualified object, the qualities belonging to which are conveyed through  $Vya \widetilde{n}jan \overline{a}$ ; and, hence, postulation of this function, which is designated by the terms 'reverberation' and 'illumination' as well, is an imperative necessity. 112

While Lakṣanāmūlā-vyañjanā conveys the motive for the sake of which Indication is resorted to Abhidhamula-vyanjana brings into comprehension that sense, which does not form the primary meaning of a multi-meaninged word. Both Mammata and Viśvanātha define it as a process, which causes cognition of an idea other than the conventional one, when the expressive power of a word having more possible meanings than one is restricted to one meaning by such restrictive factors as conjunction, disjunction and the like. 118 In support of their contention, both cite a couplet of Bhartrhari, which states that, in case of non-determination of actual meanings of homonymn, the elements that go to point out the exact idea are conjunction, disjunction, association, antagonism, purpose, context, special characteristic, proximity to another word, ability, propriety, place, time, gender, accent and such other factors. 114 As an example of this type of Vyanjana Mammata quotes the verse :

Bhadrātmano duradhirohatanorviśālavaṃśonnateḥ kṛtaśilīmukhasaṃgrahasya Yasyānupaplutagateḥ paravāraṇasya dānāmbusekasubhagaḥ satataṃ karo'bhūt

Here, he points out, multi-meaninged words are used, the denotation of which is restricted to the contextual sense of the king and the non-contextual idea of the tusker is brought into light through the function of suggestion. The contextual idea in the verse is this: 'The hand of the king, who possesses a magnanimous soul, whose form is unassailable,—who is eminent in a great family,—who has made a store of arrows,—who is of unimpeded march and a repeller of enemies always becomes lovely by the sprinkling of waters used at the time of making gifts'. A true connoisseur of Poetic Art, however, understands that the verse has a second application, which

is as follows: The trunk of lordly elephant, who belongs to the Bhadra species, whose body is difficult to mount upon,who is as tall as a lofty bamboo, who has attracted a collection of bees and whose gait is majestic is beautiful as it emits ichor. Mammața is of opinion that, this non-contextual meaning of tusker is incapable of being comprehended through Ab'ridha, because it is restricted to the contextual idea of the king. Nor is Lakṣanā competent to bring this idea into light, since the factors necessary for its operation are absent. Hence, he remarks, the postulation of the function of Vyanjana becomes necessary. Elsewhere, following the footsteps of Anandavardhana, he maintains that, Vyanjana not only conveys the non-contextual, but brings out the relation, subsisting between the contextual and the non-contextual, as well. Thus in the verse cited above, the function of suggestion conveys the idea of the mighty tusker, as also, the relation of similarity, linking the two apparently discrete ideas: and so the Dhyanivadin quotes it as an illustration of Upamadhvani.

The fact whether the non-contextual is actually conveyed through the function of suggestion or not forms the subjectmatter of an animated discussion as is evident from the four different theories on the issue recorded by Abhinavagupta. One theory states that, the second sense is comprehended only by such person, who has seen the use of that particular word in that particular sense, and as in such case, the function of denotation is restricted to the contextual, cognised first, the second is conveyed through the function of suggestion. Another theory states that, the non-contextual is signified through the function of Abhidha, but this is different from the function of denotation, which brings the contextual into light in this respect that, while the latter conveys an idea with the help of sheer conventional relation, the former does it with the help of such additional accessories as capacity of the primary meaning to suggest the implicit and so on, and as such is transformed into  $V_{t}a\widetilde{n}jan\overline{a}$ . A third theory points out to the principle, according to which, difference in concepts leads to difference in words and asserts that, in case of homonyms, also, words actually differ, because

no one word can convey two ideas; only in such cases the words are of same appearance. Thus in those instances where multimeaninged words are used, the cognition of the second sense is always preceded by an understanding of its corresponding significant word. In such poetic figures as Sles t and the like, the mind of the appreciator thinks out this second word-unit being aided by the function of denotation, while in case of Sabdaśaktimūla-dhvani, it apprehends the second word-unit through the function of suggestion. This theory recognises the noncontextual as a suggested unit and as such bears affinity to the first one, the only difference between the two lying in the fact that, while the former assumes difference in words corresponding to difference in meanings, the latter does not take this distinction for granted. A fourth theory holds that, though Abhidha is restricted to the contextual, it comes back to activity being aided by arthasamarthya and conveys the non-contextual, as well. Subsequently, Vyanjana brings out the idea of such relation as similarity or identity, linking the contextual and the non-contextual. Comprehension of this relation, it continues, is an imperative necessity, because, otherwise, the sentence becomes significant of discrete ideas like the raving of a mad man and consequently, a specimen of invalid proposition. Thus, according to this theory, the non-contextual is brought into light not through Vyanjana but through Abhidha: Vyanjana only goes to convey the relation linking the two apparently discrete ideas in such cases. 115

Taking cue from these theories mentioned by Abhinava-gupta, Jagannātha introduces an interesting discussion on the comprehension of the non-contextual. Scholars, he says, differ widely among themselves on the question of the actual part played by such factors as conjunction, disjunction and the like, that are said to restrict the power of denotation. Some are of opinion that, as the convention of a homonym is accepted equally with respect to all meanings, all of them are cognised as soon as the word is heard; then a doubt arises as to the intention of the speaker to solve which the hearer takes note of conjunction, disjunction and other factors, that are definite

pointers to the said intention; subsequently, a second recollection, having for its content the contextual only, which is intended to be conveyed by the speaker occurs and accordingly, the contextual alone enters into association with other ideas. The theory propounded by these scholars asserts that, a homonymous word leads to recollection of two ideas in the first instance and to that of the contextual alone in the second after the determination of the intention of the speaker: in conformity to its accepted principle that, a word leads to recollection of its corresponding concept through association of ideas, it points out that, though the second recollection is intervened from cognition of the word-unit by a knowledge concerning the intention of the speaker, yet remembrance of the contextual alone ensues for the second time, since the knowledge of the said intention comprehends that of the homonym itself, in as much as, the hearer understands that this word is used to signify this particular idea. In reply to the point as to why the contextual alone forms the content of this second recollection, it maintains, the knowledge of conjunction, disjunction and such other factors or that of the speaker's intention, which is consequential upon it obstructs the remembrance of the non-contextual: this assumption, it affirms, is an imperative necessity in order to explain logically conceptual cognition, resulting from a homonym, -cognition, which does not embrace for its content a number of ideas. In support of this observation, the adherents of this theory cite the couplet of Bhartrhari quoted above and explain it as conveying this idea that, conjunction, disjunction and such other factors impede the remembrance of the non-contextual and thereby cause recollection of the contextual alone in those cases where homonyms are used and as such, comprehension of the real intention of the speaker becomes highly doubtful. They further maintain that, in such cases apprehension of the non-contextual, as well, occurs and in order to explain this comprehension postulation of the function of suggestion becomes absolutely necessary. The argument of the opponent that in the first instance, Abhidha brings the contextual alone into light, since the recollection of the non-contextual is obstructed by such restrictive factors as conjunction and disjunction, but in the second instance the self-same function brings out the non-contextual, as well, and consequently, postulation of Vyanjana is unnecessary is without any weight, because the knowledge of the restrictive factors that go to impede the remembrance of the non-contextual persists at that stage even and accordingly it is not possible for Abhidha to convey that idea. Equally weightless is the counterargument that the knowledge of restrictive factors hampers the persentation of the non-contextual through Vyanjana also, because comprehension of this sense is experienced by all appreciators and Abhidhamula-vyanjana is posited in order to account for this comprehension. In conformity to all this it is said that, the knowledge of the restrictive factors obstruct such recollection of the non-contextual, as is not effected through Vyaniana: as an alternative to this, it is pointed out that, the knowledge of Vyanjana itself serves as an excitant; it takes away the power of the impeding factors and thereby allows the recollection of the non-contextual to occur freely. For this reason, Mammata speaks of Niyantrana of Abhidha: what he means by Niyantrana is this that, the factors conjunction, disjunction etc. obstruct the remembrance of the non-contextual, and, thereby, allow the contextual only to present itself through the function of denotation: in such cases, the non-contextual, he points out, is cognised through Abhidhamula-Vyanjana. 116

On the exact role of the so-called restrictive factors another section of scholars holds a completely different view. They are of opinion that, knowledge of real intention of the speaker is an indispensable requisite for conceptual cognition, resulting from use of multi-meaninged words: thus, when it is understood that, the intention of the speaker is to convey the idea of Lord Viṣṇ then that sense is cognised from the term 'Hari'; when on the other hand, it is noticed that, his intention is to signify the sense of a lion, then that meaning is apprehended from the same term. These scholars point out that, in the first instance, cognition of a multi-meaninged word leads to recollection of the contextual and the non-contextual alike: then the purpose of

the speaker is ascertained by conjunction, disjunction, context etc., and after that the idea that constitutes the content of the intention of the speaker alone enters into concord with other concepts. In such cases, they continue, the comprehension of the non-contextual, which occurs later is effected through Vyanjana: Abhidha is incompetent to cause this comprehension, since ascertainment of the purpose of the speaker is a causal factor indispensable for a cognition effected through Abhidha and the intention of the speaker in such cases is not to convey the idea of the non-contextual. The factor which prevents Ablidha from conveying this idea does not prevent Vyanjana, as well, from signifying this sense, since knowledge of the speaker's purpose is not regarded as an essential requisite for a cognition, effected through Vyanjana in all cases. These thinkers claim that their theory is an improvement on that adumbrated by others in this respect that, it neither feels the necessity of asserting that recollection of a meaning ensues for the second time nor that of postulating a capacity pertaining to conjunction, disjunction etc. to obstruct remembrance of the non-contextual: hence, they point out, this is more in conformity to the law of parsimony than the one, cited before. In reply to the querry that, if recollection concerning the contextual alone is not regarded as an essential requisite for conceptual cognition resulting from a homonym, then how can the term 'Viśeṣ 1smrtihetavah' used in the couplet of Bhartrhari be justified and that, if the fact that remembrance of the non-contextual is obstructed be denied, then what does Mammata mean by Niyantrana of Vacakatva, these thinkers explain that, these two terms really convey different ideas: by describing conjunction, context etc. as Viścs asmrtihetu, Bhartrhari means that, these factors help one to ascertain the actual intention of the speaker, which is to convey the contextual only: in a similar manner, by Niyantrana of Vacakatva Mammata makes it clear that, these factors lead to ascertainment of the speaker's purpose and thereby makes Abhidha competent to cause conceptual cognition concerning the contextual alone. In such cases, they continue the comprehension of the non-contextual, which does not constitute the content of the speaker's intention is caused through  $Vya\tilde{n}jan\bar{a}$ . Thus, while the upholders of the first theory assert that, the restrictive factors obstruct the very recollection of the non-contextual, the followers of the second maintain that, this remembrance is not impeded, but the non-contextual does not get itself associated with other concepts and this happens, because knowledge concerning intention of the speaker, which embraces for its content the contextual only is admitted as indispensable for conceptual cognition, ensuing from a multimeaninged word.<sup>117</sup>

Jagannatha, however, does not accept either of these theories The observation that, the so-called restrictive factors lead to recollection of the contextual alone, which gets itself connected with other concepts, in as much as, remembrance of the noncontextual is obstructed, he points out, seems absurd, since, it is opposed, firstly, to our experience. Moreover, as the cognition of the contextual alone is capable of being explained otherwise by positing the knowledge concerning the intention of the speaker as an indispensable factor for conceptual cognition, resulting from a homonym, the assertion that recollection of the noncontextual is obstructed seems unnecssary. Thirdly, this recollection is bound to occur, since the knowledge of the word is there and this word is related with the non-contextual in the same way as it is with the contextual: in case of verbal cognition, knowledge of the word leads to recollection of its corresponding concept in accordance with the principle that of two related, the knowledge of one leads necessarily to that of the other and when the non-contextual, as well, is linked with the word nothing stands in the way of its comprehension. The argument that, knowledge concerning conjunction, disjunction, context etc. or that concerning intention of the speaker, which is consequential upon the former obstructs recollection of the non-contextual is unsound, since recollection of a particular thing is caused by revival of an impression left by it in the mind and when in the present case the impression deposited by the non-contextual is excited by cognition of its significant word-unit, nothing is competent to prevent its recollection. The point

that the knowledge of the so-called restrictive factors obstructs the recollection of the non-contextual in those cases where multi-meaninged words are used, even though the conditions of such remembrance are present is without any weight, since such assumption is opposed to our experience. The cognition of such homonym as 'Payas' leads to comprehension of all meanings-whether contextual or not-in the minds of those persons even, who are thoroughly acquainted with context, place, time and such other factors. This is evident from the fact that, when doubt appears in the mind of an unintelligent person about the exact meaning of the term 'Payas' in the expression: 'Payo ramanīyam', a man thoroughly acquainted with context and such other factors clears away his doubt by pointing out that, the intention of the speaker is to convey the idea of milk and not that of water. Had the recollection of the non-contextual been obstructed by conjunction, disjunction, context etc. then it would not have been possible for this intelligent person to cognise the non-contextual, as well, and to assert that the speaker does not want to convey this sense. Hence, Jagannatha concludes, the assumption that, the knowledge of context etc. or that of the intention of the speaker, which follows from it obstructs the very recollection of the non-contextual is unsound and unwarranted.

Equally unaceptable is the second theory, which states that, when it is ascertained through the help of the so-called restrictive factors that, the intention of the speaker is to convey a particular sense, then that idea alone forms the content of conceptual cognition effected through  $Abhidh\bar{a}$  and an idea other than that is conveyed through  $Vya\bar{n}jan\bar{a}$ . To the adherents of this theory, who regard knowledge of the speaker's purpose as a causal factor of comprehension of meaning, ensuing from cognition of a multi-meaninged term, Jagannātha puts this question: does in all such cases  $Vya\bar{n}jan\bar{a}$  leads to cognition of the noncontextual or does it lead to this apprehension in some cases? The acceptance of the first alternative or in other words, the assumption that  $Vya\bar{n}jan\bar{a}$  causes cognition of the non-contextual in all cases renders the proposition that knowledge of the

speaker's purpose is indispensable for conceptual cognition useless, in as much as, the contextual and the non-contextual equally form the content of verbal knowledge. The argument that the said proposition relates only to conceptual cognition, effected through Abhidha and is to be accepted in order to show that cognition of the contextual alone occurs through Saktithe non-contextual being comprehended through Vyanjana is unsound, since when both the meanings are cognised in all cases, there is no point in describing one as being conveyed through Abhidha and the other as being signified through Vyanjana, particularly when the former is competent to bring out both the ideas: and when this is so, postulation of Vyaniana in order to explain cognition of the non-contextual leads to complexity and as such is to be avoided. Equally unsound is the argument that the proposition is necessary in order to explain the fact that cognition of the contextual occurs first and that of the noncontextual happens next,—the former being effected through Abhidhā and the latter through Vyanianā.—because Abhidhā is quite competent to bring both the contextual and the noncontextual into light in the same manner in which it brings out a number of ideas in illustrations of the poetic figure Slega. The point that a case of the poetic figure Slesa is completety different from that of Abhidhamula-vyanjana, in as much as, while in the former both the meanings form the content of speaker's intention, in the latter the purpose af the speaker is to convey only one idea and as such, while both the ideas are conveyed through Abhidha in the first, in the second only one idea is comprehended through it—is without any meaning, since the very assumption that the knowledge of the intention of the speaker is a causal factor indispensable for conceptual cognition effected through Sakti is without any foundation. But this does not go to make such knowledge absolutely redundant, because, as Jagannatha points out, in some cases, it removes the doubts of the man who cognises and thereby prompts him to do a particular job: thus when the sentence 'Saindhavamanaya' is uttered, he, in some cases, brings salt and in others a steed. Thus as knowledge of the intention of the

speaker does not constitute a cause of conceptual cognition effected through Abhidha even in those cases where multimeaninged words are used, both the contextual and noncontextual are capable of being conveyed through the function of denotation and consequently, the postulation of a separate function of suggestion in order to account for cognition of the non-contextual is unnecessary. The acceptance of the second alternative or in other words, the assumption that, Vyanjana causes cognition of the non-contextual in some cases renders the situation still more difficult, because their is no criterion to determine definitely where Vyanjana steps in to bring out the aprakaranika and where it does not. The argument that knowledge of intention of the poet to signify the implicit furnishes this criterion, and in those cases where the poet desires to bring out the non-contextual content, Vyanjana appears to convey it and in others, where the poet does not intend to bring home an idea other than the contextual one, Vyanjana does not step in -is misleading, since it goes against the accepted principle of these theorists themselves,-the principle that, the knowledge of the speaker's intention is not necessary for understanding the implicit. Moreover in some cases an indecorous sense is apprehended through suggestion,a sense, which is incapable of being explained as forming the content of the poet's intention. The expression: Jaiminīyamalum dhatte rasanayamayam dvijah' furnishes an illustration to the point: here the idea that this Brahmin is well-versed in the doctrines of Jaimini is conveyed through Abhidha and the sense that he bears in his tongue the stool of Jaimini is signified through suggestion; the post does not certainly intend to bring out this highly indecorous content, but, nevertheless, it is apprehended by a refined appreciator. The very fact that suggestion brings out an idea, that is not intended to be conveyed by the post goes to prove the falseness of the proposition that the knowledge of the poet's intention to signify the unexpressed leads to its comprehension through suggestion. The reasoning that the appreciative genius of the appreciator furnishes this criterion and it invites Vyanjana to operate and

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bring out an idea, which is charming only-is, in no way, an improvement on the former, because it fails to explain understanding of the unexpressed, which is not in the least charming in the expression cited above. The sclution that no indecorous implicit is cognised from the expression is meaningless, in as much as, the very experience of a true connoisseur goes against it. Moreover, the simpler process is to assert that the appreciative genius of the appreciator brings back the restricted power of denotation to life and allows it to convey the non-contextual. as well. The untenability of the proposition that the appreciative genius of the connoisseur of Poetic Art invites Vyanjana to bring the charming unexpressed into light is capable of being proved in other ways also. The acceptance of this proposition renders cognition of the unexpressed compulsory in those cases where the non-contextual is charming: in reality, however, the knowledge of the attractive non-contextual does not occur without fail, in as much as, it is comprehended only by such a person, who knows that the non-contextual constitutes the conventional meaning of the term and remembers it. The reasoning that cognition of a particular sense through Vyanjana is caused by a knowledge that, that particular sense constitutes the conventional meaning of the term or in other words. Saktijnana is indispensable for understanding the implicit, introduced in order to avoid the difficulty pointed out abovelands one into further troubles. This Saktijnana is not a necessary factor in all cases: this is evident from the fact that the stanza: 'nihścsacyutacandanam stanatetam' cited as an illustration of Dhvani conveys through suggestion the idea that, the messenger had been to the wretched hero for dalliance, even though none of the terms used in it is denotative of this sense of enjoyment. Had the idea of dalliance formed the conventional meaning of some of the terms, then that sense would have been conveyed through Abhidha, and the postulation of Vyanjana in order to account for its revelation would have been needless. Nor is Saktijnana a necessary factor in some cases. where multi-meaninged words are used and the function of denotation is restricted to the contextual sense: and this is so,

because the restriction of the function of denotation itself is open to serious controversy. Moreover, when the assumption that Saktijnana is a causal factor of comprehension of the non-contextual through Vyanjana is felt necessary, the simpler process is to state that, cognition of this idea is caused by Śakti or Abhidha straightway. In his eagerness to protect his conclusion that the cognition of the non-contextual is caused through Vyañjanā from the attack of opponents, the Dhvanivadin takes recourse to a clumsy subterfuge: he points out that, in those cases, where the non-contextual is compatible with the concepts conveyed by the rest of the sentence, Abhidha brings the noncontextual into comprehension; but in those cases, where it is incompatible with the concepts, conveyed by other terms, it is incapable of being signified through Abhidha, and consequently, is brought into light through Vyanjana. As an illustration to this point, he cites the expression: 'Jaiminīyamalam dhatte', etc. referred to above and explains that the indecorous sense sounds absurd and as such is not capable of being conveyed through Abhidha and consequently, of being associated with other concepts: hence, he asserts, the necessity of positing Vyanjana in order to explain cognition of the indecorous idea arises. Although Abhidha is unable to bring an unreasonable idea into light, Vyanjana is quite competent to do so, since, as the Dhyanivadin maintains, it does not follow the path of reason and logic. In reply to this Jagannatha points out, the idea of incompatibility or absurdity of a sense does not stand in the way of conceptual cognition concerning it: and this is all the more true in Poetry, which abounds is such poetic figures as Atiśayokti, Rūpaka and the like. Comprehension of an idea, he continues, certainly ensues from cognition of such expressions as: 'The Goddess of learning has come down to Earth in the guise of Patanjali' or 'The Palace-tops of this city meet the Sun', though the imports presented by them seem absurd in their very appearance. The argument that in these expressions, also, Vyanjana appears to bring the unreasonable idea into light is untenable, because it gives Vyanjana a wider scope, making each and every specimen of poetic figure the proper field of its

operation. Thus with strongest reasoning, Jagannātha refutes the contention of the ancients that, in those cases, where homonyms are used, the function of suggestion steps in to bring the non-contextual into comprehension, and asserts that, cognition of this idea is caused by the function of denotation: what suggestion brings out is the relation between the contextual and the non-contextual, and not the non-contextual itself.<sup>118</sup>

It is interesting to note that though Mammata and Jagannatha draw profusely from the same source book—the Dhvanyaloka of Anandavardhana, vet both differ widely among each other on the process of comprehension of the non-contextual idea in those cases where homonyms are used. Thus while Mammata thinks that the aprākaranika is conveyed through suggestion, which brings out the relation, as well, which it bears to the prakaranika, Jagannatha is of opinion that the aprakaranika is signified through denotation and suggestion goes only to convey the relation linking the two ideas : or in other words, while Mammata holds the first of the four theories, recorded by Abhinavagupta, Jagannatha subscribes to the last one. And the germ, which gives rise to these different doctrines is traceable in the speculations of Anandavardhana himself. In his dissertation on Sabdaśaktimula-dhvani, the learned Dhvanikara simply states that the cognition of the non-contextual is effected through Śabdaśakti, without making it clear whether this function is Abhidha or Vyanjana, and, thereby, leaving much room for doubt. 119 Elsewhere, he maintains that, the function of suggestion brings out a charming idea, which loses much of its charm when conveyed through the function of denotation, showing, thereby, that the test of ascertaining whether a sense is signified through Vyanjana or Abhidha is to see whether it is charming or not. 120 Mammata thinks that the non-coutextual is more charming than the contextual and so he describes it as a suggested content: Jagannatha, however, regards the contextual and the non-contextual as equally unattractive and so he refers to both as expressed ideas; what is most attractive is the relation linking the two apparently discrete ideas, which, he says, is comprehended through sugges192

tion. In the absence of any decisive evidence, it is difficult to maintain with any amount of precision whether the  $apr\overline{a}k\overline{a}ranika$  is brought into light through denotation or suggestion, particularly, in view of the point raised by Jagannatha that Śaktijūana is indispensable for understanding of the unexpressed.

With astounding arguments Jagannatha shows that Abhidhamūlā-vyanjanā operates in other cases also, where homonyms are conspicuous by their absence. In some expressions, abounding in Yogarudha words, cognition of purely derivative meaning occurs after the comprehension of the meaning signified by the word as a whole: in such cases Abhidha conveys merely the idea signified by the word as a whole, the derivative meaning going only to qualify it, and consequently, the cognition of the idea, conveyed merely by its component parts is effected through Vyanjana. Abhidha, Jagannatha points out, is unable to bring out the unqualified derivative meaning, since such an assumption goes against the principle which states that, Sakti pertaining to a word as a whole is more powerful than that belonging to its component parts and as such prevails over the latter. Nor is Lakşanā competent to bring this sense into light, because the conditions necessary for its operation are absent. So, Jagannatha concludes, the postulation of Vyanjana in order to explain cognition of this unqualified charming derivative meaning is an imperative necessity: this Vyanjana, he names, Abhidhamu'avyanjana. As an illustration to this he cites the verse:

Abalānāṃ śriyaṃ hṛtvā vārivāhaiḥ sahāniśam/ Tiṣṭhanti capalā yatra sa kālaḥ samupasthitaḥ//,

which signifies through  $Abhidh\bar{a}$  the idea that, the rainy-season has approached, in which flashes of lightning vanquish the beauty of ladies and get themselves constantly associated with clouds. Jagannātha roints out that, after the cognition of the idea mentioned before, comprehension of another meaning, namely the idea that, courtesans have squeezed money from incapacitated persons, but are enjoying the company of drawers of water—occurs: this comprehension, he continues, is caused through  $Vyanjan\bar{a}$ , and neither through  $Abhidh\bar{a}$  nor through  $Laksan\bar{a}$ .  $Abhidh\bar{a}$  fails to bring this sense into light, since it

constitutes simply the derivative meaning of some of the terms used in the verse: Lakṣaṇā equally fails to bring it out, since the conditions indispensable for its operation are not present. The same thing happens in those instances also, where Yaugi-karūdha words are used. Thus in the verse:

Cāncalyayogi nayanam tava jalajānām śriyam haratu /

Vipine' tvacancalanamapi ca mrganam katham harati //, Abhidha conveys the idea that, there is no wonder that, the quivering eyes of the girl steal away the charm of the lotus: the fact that it takes away the grace of more unsteady deer is most astonishing; it is pointed out that, after cognition of this sense, another idea that it is easy for thieves to steal away the riches of fools, but it is very difficult to rob an intelligent of his fortune is comprehended through Vyanjana. Jagannatha thinks that, positing of Vyanjanā is an imperative necessity in order to explain understanding of this idea. As Sakti belonging to the word as a whole takes away the power of Sakti, pertaining to its component parts, the idea is not conveyed through Abhidha: nor is it conveyed through Laksana, since the first idea does not, in any way, seem incompatible. The argument that, according to a Naiyayika, the first condition necessary for operation of Laksanā is not incompatibility of the primary meaning, but its inability to convey the intention of the speaker, and as in the verse under consideration, the speaker intends to convey the second, and not the first idea, so the said idea is signified through Laksanā-is ludicrous, since it puts the cart before the horse. The idea that the intention of the speaker is to convey the second sense is understood only after the cognition of the second sense itself, for the signification of which Vyanjana is resorted to, and consequently, the question of Laksanā replacing it does not arise. Jagannatha calls this Vyanjana Abhidhamulavyanjana and remarks that it is called into play by the appreciative genius of the appreciator: he describes it as a function, which brings a derivative meaning, as well, into comprehension, when Śakti, belonging to component parts of a Yogarūdha-śabda is regulated by that belonging to the word as a whole. Thus Jagannātha's Abhidhāmūlā-vyanjanā brings into light unqualified derivative meaning in those cases where  $Yogar\overline{u}\phi ha$  words are used and the relation linking the contextual and the non-contextual in those cases where homonyms are used. Although Jagannātha differs from Mammaṭa and other ancients on the process of cognition of the non-contextual itself, in conclusion, he maintains that as postulation of  $Vya\widetilde{n}jan\overline{a}$  is necessary in order to account for understanding of the relation linking the contextual and the non-contextual, the less clumsy process is to explain the cognition of the non-contextual itself as being effected through  $Vya\widetilde{n}jan\overline{a}$ , and so the view-point of the ancients is not totally wrong. 121

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The factors that lead to comprehension of one idea of a number of ideas, presented by a homonym and consequently, restrict the function of denotation of such terms to one meaning are, according to Bhartrhari, Samyoga, Viprayoga, Sahacarya, Virodhitā, Artha, Prakarans, Linga, Anyaśabdasya sannidhi, Samarthya, Aucitī, Deśa, Kāla, Vyakti, Svara and such other things. While Mammata and Viśvanatha simply quote illustrations of these, Jagannatha furnishes their definitions, as well, which help us to draw the line of demarcation amongst the scopes of these restrictive factors. Thus he defines Samyoga or conjunction as a type of relation, having for a relatum only one thing, conveyed by a multi-meaninged word: while this relation is not known to link a particular object with the ideas whose recollection is obstructed, it is commonly known to link it with only one idea whose remembrance occurs unimpeded. The expression: 'Hari with conchshell and discus' furnishes an illustration to this; here the denotation of the term 'Hari' is restricted to the idea of Lord Visnu by the relation which it bears to conch and discus; no object other than Lord Visnu is commonly known to hold these two weapons. Semyoga or conjunction is to be differentiated from Lin /a or characteristic, because while the latter is never found in any thing, other than that characterised by it in past, present and future, the possibility of the former differentiating other objects, as well, is not altogether ruled out: thus while wrath is a peculiar feature of cupid and is not traced in ocean, which constitutes another meaning of the term 'makara lhvoja', conjunction of conch and discus is not absolutely incapable of being traced in Lord Indra, which forms another meaning of the word 'Hari', in as much as, it is possible for Lord Indra to hold conch and discus in certain occasion. 122

Viprayoga or disjunction is defined as separation of a particular thing from one object to the exclusion of others, -all of which are conveyed by a single homonym. The expression: 'Hari without conch and discus' affords an example of this factor restricting the function of denotation of the term 'Hari'; Jagannatha points out that, though in the expression referred to above, conjunction is competent to restrict denotation, in as much as, disjunction presupposes the idea of conjunction, or in other words, separation that of union, yet it is put forward as an example of Viprayoga, because here the idea of disjunction is prominent and that of conjunction is subservient. And this explains separate enumeration of disjunction as a restrictive factor. Those cases where conjunction being the principal element leads to recollection of one particular meaning to the exclusion of others are instances of Samyoga and those cases where separation is prominent and union goes only to play a second fiddle to it are examples of Viprayoga. 128

Sāhacarya or association is commonly defined as mutual dependence of each other for the performance of actions. 124 The ancients cite the expression: 'Rāma and Lakṣmaṇa' as an example of this and point out that, the meaning of the term Lakṣmaṇa restricts the denotation of the word Rāma to the sense of son of Daśaratha, because Rāma and Lakṣmaṇa, the two sons of Daśaratha are seen to work conjointly. Jagannātha challenges this proposition and asserts that, Sāhacarya refers neither to reliance upon another for the performance of all conceivable actions nor to that for the accomplishment of a few actions: and this is so, because the acceptance of the first alternative renders the example: 'Rāma and Lakṣmaṇa' a defective one, since Rāma does not depend on his brother for the performance of all actions; the acceptance of the second alternative, on the other hand, invests the term 'Ghaṭa' with

the capacity to restrict the denotation of the term 'Rama'. since Rama may depend on a jar for the accomplishment of a particular action. Moreover, Jagannatha continues, this definition of Sahacarya fails to explain logically the expression: 'Rama and Ayodhya'. 'Raghu and Rama' as fields of operation of this factor, because it is possible neither for Rama and Ayodhya nor for Rama and Raghu to combine and perform an action conjointly. To avoid this difficulty some scholars explain Sahacarya as a celebrated relation which an idea conveyed by a term used near a homonym bears to one of the concepts. signified by the homonym itself: in the expression: 'Rama and Laksmana', it is that which exists between brothers; in 'Rāma and Sītā', that as exist between husband and wife; in 'Rama and Ayodhya', that as present between possessor and the possessed and so on. But this view, also, is unacceptable. because by describing both Samyoga and Sahacarya as wellknown relations, it fails to draw the proper line of demarcation between the fields of operation of these two factors. The reasoning that where this relation is conjunction, the denotation is to be understood as being restricted by Samyoga and where the relation is anything other than conjunction, it is to be accepted as being regulated by Sahacarya is untenable, since it does not assign any reason to separation of conjunction from the whole body of relations and decides the whole thing arbitrarily. The argument that in the field of operation of Samyoga the relation of conjunction is clearly stated in terms, while in that of Sahacarya only the related, and not the relation itself is clearly mentioned in words-is equally misleading, because violation to this is traced in the expression: 'Salaksmano Ramah', where though the relation between the two is clearly stated in terms, yet Sahacarya goes to regulate recollection of meanings. In the midst of these confusing arguments and counter-arguments Jagannatha gives his considered opinion on the issue. Samyoga, he says, is relation in general: in those cases, where this relation is a celebrated one and is clearly stated in terms, this factor is to be taken as the restrictive one: in those cases, on the other hand, where two related

entities enter into a Dvandva compound,  $S\overline{a}hacarya$  is to be taken as the restrictive factor. This, he asserts, is the real intention of the ancients: thus, while the expression:  $Sag\overline{a}nd\overline{i}vo'rjunah$  illustrates the capacity of Samyoga to regulate recollection of ideas, the compound-word ' $G\overline{a}nd\overline{i}v\overline{a}rjunau$ ' exemplifies that of  $S\overline{a}hacarya$  to do so. 125 Nageśa holds a different view on the issue. He is of opinion that only two similar things are competent to get themselves associated, and consequently, what is meant by  $S\overline{a}hacarya$  is similarity. Rāma and Lakṣmaṇa are similar to each other and so the concept conveyed by each of these terms restricts the denotation of the other: as restriction of Śakti, pertaining to both the terms occurs simultaneously, the fallacy of mutual interdependence does not step in to vitiate the proposition. 126

Virodhita, is defined as well-established antagonism; nonexistence of two things in the same place and in the same time is also regarded as Virodhitā. As an illustration of the first variety of this factor, the ancients cite the expression: Rāmārjunagatistayoh, in which antagonism between Paraśurāma and Kārtavīrjārjuna is said to restrict the denotation of the terms-Rama and Arjuna. Appyadīksita finds fault with this illustration and asserts that antagonism is unable to regulate recollection of ideas in the present case, because both the terms Rāma and Arjuna are multi-meaninged units and so Śakti, pertaining to each depends for its restriction on that, belonging to the other, or in other words, the determination of the exact sense of the team Rama depends on ascertainment of the real import of the word Arjuna and vice versa and thus, the entire proposition is vitiated by the fallacy of mutual interdependence. In reply to the question as to where does this Virodhita restrict denotation, Appaya says that it does so in such cases, where the concept conveyed by an one-meaninged word is antagonistic to one idea only of a number of ideas ensuing from a multimeaninged word: he thinks that the expression: Ramaravanau constitutes the proper field of operation of this factor. Jagannatha criticises this view of Appaya, and points out that in the compound-word Ramaravanau denotation is restricted by Sahacarya, which consists of any celebrated relation, comprehending within its scope that of enmity even. Secondly, the proposition that, this factor regulates recollection of ideas in those cases only where an one-meaninged word is used along with a multi-meaninged one is wrong, since this is found to restrict denotation of the component words of the compound harinagasya, both of which are homonyms. The question of the fallacy of mutual dependence going to vitiate the explanation of the comound harinagasya does not arise, because Śakti, pertaining to both the terms is restricted simultaneously by antagonism, brought into light by a third element, - the singular number used after the compound: this singular number brings out the idea that, hostility exists between the lion and the elephant, without pointing out specifically whether the former quarrels with the latter or the latter does so with the former. In a similar manner, Jagannatha asserts, in the expression: Ramarjunagatistayoh, meaning: their relation is like that between Rama and Arjuna, put forward by the ancients as an example of Virodhita, the idea of antagonism, brought into light by context, made known through the use of the word 'tayoh' restricts denotation of both the words simultaneously and consequently, the charge of Appaya that the whole thing is vitiated by the fallacy of mutual dependence does not stand. As an instance of Virodhita of second type, namely that, which consists in non-existence of two entities in the same substratum at the same time, Jagannatha cites the compound 'Chayatapan', where hostility between sun-light and its absence regulates the recollection of ideas ensuing from cognition of the term 'Chāvā'. 127

Artha is purpose and is conveyed by words ending in the fourth and other usual case-endings: it consists in the fruit of an action for the attainment of which that particular action is performed. This Artha restricts denotation of the term Sthānu in the expression: 'Sthānum bhaja bhavacchide', meaning: 'Propitiate Sthānu for the destruction of worldly existence' to the idea of Lord Śiva, in as much as, propitiation of Śiva alone leads to liberation from worldly bondage. At the first sight it seems that, Linga or

characteristic regulates the recollection of idea, ensuing from cognition of the term Sthanu in the present case, because the capacity to form the object of worship having for its end salvation belongs to Lord Siva and not to any other thing, conveyed by the homonym Sthanu. Jagannatha, however, is of opinion, that this expression does not exemplify the field of operation of Linga, since the characteristic feature itself does not form the content of conceptual cognition resulting from comprehension of the expression: the characteristic he points out, is conceived mentally and this mental conception follows verbal knowledge. Some scholars try to draw the line of demarcation, between the scopes of Artha and Linga in a different way: they say that a characteristic is conveyed by a single word: without being associated with any other concept it goes to restrict denotation of a homonym to one idea; an Artha, however, as is evident from the present illustration, is conveyed by a number of words, the concepts, signified by which get associated with one another and, thereafter, go to regulate recollection of ideas. 128

Prakarana or context is existence in the intellect of the speaker and the person spoken to: this is time, place, character etc. as they flash in the mind of the speaker and the hearer. This is also regarded, as a restrictive factor. Thus when the sentence 'Deva knows all' is addressed by an employee to the king, Prakarana restricts the denotation of the 'Deva' to the idea of the monarch. 129

Linga is a special attribute, clearly expressed through words and residing only in one thing to the exclusion of others, all of which are conveyed by a multi-meaninged word. In the expression: 'Kupito makaradhvajah', this factor restricts the denotation of the term 'makaradhvaja' to the idea of Cupid, in as much as indignation is a characteristic feature of Cupid and not of any other entity, signified by the homonym. 180

Jagannātha describes Śabdasyānyasya sannidhi as proximity to a multi-meaninged word, only one idea conveyed by which is able to get itself associated with only one sense, signified by the homonym near which it is placed. In those cases where two homonyms are used and logical connection is capable of

being established between one concept conveyed by each to the exclusion of other ideas, this factor is supposed to restrict denotation of both the terms to the contextual. The expression: 'Karena rajate nagah' meaning: the elephant shines with its trunk-affords an example of the field of operation of this restrictive factor, which regulates recollection of ideas ensuing from the cognition of the terms: 'kara' and 'naga', both of which are homonyms. The fallacy of mutual dependence does not come in to vitiate the proposition, since the denotation of both the terms is restricted simultaneously and this happens, because no other concepts conveyed by the terms are capable of being associated with each other. As an illustration of this restrictive factor, Mammata cites the expression: 'Devasya purārāteh', meaning: Of Lord Siva, the enemy of the Asura, -where the denotation of the term Deva is supposed to be restricted to the idea of Siva. Jagannatha criticises this and points out that though both the terms used in the expression are multi-meaninged ones, in as much as, the first conveys the ideas of king and Lord Siva and the second those of enemy of the cities and hostile to Asura, vet Sakti, pertaining to neither of these is restricted and this is evident from the fact that the idea of king is as much compatible with that of enemy of the cities as is the concept of Lord Siva with that of one inmical to the demon. In order to avoid this difficulty Govinda in his Pradīpa slightly modifies the example and reads it as 'Devasya tripurarateh', thereby, converting the second term into a single-meaninged one, but by suggesting this modification he lands himself into further troubles, because the illustration becomes a field of operation of Linga, hostility to the three cities being a special characteristic of Lord Siva. In conformity to this illustratration, Govinda defines Sabdasyānyasya sannidhi as agreement in gender, number and person of a homonym with an one-meaninged term,—the two standing in the relation of noun and adjective. This definition, Jagannatha points out, fails to explain the operation of this restrictive factor in the illustration Karena rajate nagah, cited above and at the same time allows its scope to coincide partly with that Linga, and hence is untenable. 131

Samarthya consists in the fact of being a cause of a particular effect: in the expression: madhuna muttah pikah, denotation of the term 'madhu' is restricted to spring-time, because that alone leads to intoxication of the cuckoo. The scope of this factor seems to coincide with that of Linga, in as much as, the capacity to intoxicate the cuckoo is a special characteristic of spring and it is perfectly reasonable to point out that this peculiar feature regulates recollection of ideas. The argument that the capacity to madden this particular bird only is not a characteristic of spring, in as much as, it intoxicates the entire animalworld-is dangerous, since it rejects the claim of Samarthya itself to be regarded as a restrictive factor. Jagannatha, in this connection, opines that, it is possible to draw a line of demarcation between the scopes of these two restrictive factors, by pointing out that in those cases where Linga regulates recollection of ideas, the special characteristic itself forms the content of conceptual cognition and is clearly expressed by one term while in those cases, where Samarthya regulates this, the special characteristic is conceived mentally, as it constitutes the unified form of concepts, conveyed by a number of words. 132

Auciti is competency: in the expression: 'Pātu vo dayitāmukham' the denotation of the term 'mukha' is restricted to the sense of favourableness, since this alone is competent to protect the love-stricken from love-sickness. 183

Sometimes place also restricts Śakti of homonyms: thus, in the expression: 'Bhātyatra Parameśvarah', the place in the form of capital, as conveyed by the term 'ātra' goes to show that by Parameśvara the king is meant, and not the divine lord. And this is so, because the assumption that the homonym conveys the idea of God renders the very term 'atra' redundant, in as much as, God pervades the entire universe and consequently, His existence in a particular place does not stand in need of specific mention. Another illustration of place regulating recollection of ideas is afforded by the proposition: Vaikunthe Harirvasati where the mention of the place Vaikuntha shows that the term Hari refers to Lord Viṣṇu and not to any other thing, conveyed by the term. 184

After place comes time: in the expression: there shines Citrabhanu, -the sense of the term Citrabhanu is restricted to Sun by day and to fire by night: in a similar manner, time restricts the denotation of the term Hari to the idea of Lord Visnu in the proposition: Hari sleeps for four months and so on. Vyakti is gender, which appears in the aspect of masculine or feminine or neuter: in 'Mitram shines' the sense of the term 'Mitra' is restricted to the idea of a friend through neuter gender, while in 'Mitra shines' this is restricted to the sense of the Sun through masculine gerder. Svara refers to accent: in the compound 'Indrasatru' this accent leads to apprehension of a particular meaning; when the accent is on the last vowel then the idea of one who slays Indra is conveyed: when on the other hand, this is on the first vowel, the idea of one, who has Indra for his killer is signified. 185 Mammata maintains, accent leads to comprehension of a particular meaning in the Vedas only, and not in Poetry of classical period and consequently, he does not furnish any illustration of Svara regulating recollection of ideas in ordinary Poetry. Depending on this observation of his learned predecessor Viśvanātha ridicules the proposition of the ancients that, Svara in the form of modulation of voice or accent leads to comprehension of one idea of a homonym: this Svara, he continues, brings the suggested content into light only, and does not go to regulate recollection of ideas in any way. Moreaver, the proposition that, Svara restricts denotation of a multi-meaninged word to one particular idea, he points out, cuts at the very root of Ślesālamkāra where comprehension of a number of meanings ensues from cognition of a homonym, whose denotation is not restricted by such usual factors as conjunction, disjunction, context etc. Apart from these factors, there are others, also, that go to restrict denotation of homonyms: thus, in the verse. 'the girl possesses breasts of this much size, and petal like eyes of this much measure', it is gesture, which leads to cognition of the exact meaning'. 186

Jagannatha hesitates to recognise Artha, Samarthya and Aucitī as three distinct restrictive factors: in the field of

operation of each of these three factors, he points out, it is the relation of cause and effect, which goes to regulate recollection of ideas: thus, in 'Propitiate Shanu for liberation from worldly bondage', this relation is traced between propitiation and salvation, in 'The cuckoo is intoxicated by spring' between spring and intoxication of cuckoo and in may the favourableness of the beloved protect thee' between favourableness and removal of love-sickness, and consequently, the more simple process is to regard the relation of cause and effect itself as the restrictive factor in these cases. The ancients describe a Linga as a special characteristic feature, which implies that, other restrictive factors are attributes common to both contextual and non-contextual. This theory is wrong, because an attribute that is common to both the ideas of a homonym is unable to regulate recollection of ideas and effect remembrance of the contextual only. The argument that though such elements as conjunction, disjunction etc. are common to both, yet they are regarded as uncommon or special to the contextual only through tradition-renders the other factors practically identical with Linga. Hence, Jagannatha asserts, the only restrictive factor is linga, which comprehends within its scope the other elements, such as conjunction, disjunction and the like. 187

Whereas Śābīī-vyañjanā, a function belonging to words brings into light the non-contextual meaning of multi-meaninged terms, according to the ancients and the derivative meaning of a Yogarūḍha-śabda, according to Jagannātha, Ārthī-vayañjanā, a function belonging to meanings conveys an implicit idea being aided by the speciality of the speaker, person spoken to, time place, context and such other things. The simple expression: 'The Sun has set' signifies only one explicit sense, but it conveys a number of implicit ideas, according to difference in the nature of the speaker and the person addressed. But sheer knowledge of these elements is not able to produce comprehension of the suggested content, for the understanding of which presence of appreciative genius is necassary in the minds of refined readers. As Rājaśekhara says, creative genius (Kārayitrī-pratibhā)

induces a post to discover new ideas in old things: it produces an efflux of emotions at the sight of ordinary things even in his mind: appreciative genius (Bhāvayitrī-vratibhā), on the other hand, enables a connoisseur of poetic art to share the feelings of a Poet and derive impersonal pleasure from perception of his creation. Dull grammarians and insipid logicians fail to catch subtle ideas presented in Poetry and are not able to appreciate even best specimens of Poetic Art, because they lack in this Bhavavitri-Pratibha. As Yaska remarks, it is not the fault of the post that, the blind man does not see it: it is the fault of the man concerned. The existence of this type of appreciative genius is a necessary condition for comprehension of an implicit idea, and as such, the Dhyanivadin points out, Anumana does not comprehend the concept of Dhvani. 188

LITERARY CRITICISM

# V

# Proposition and its Import

A Proposition is usually defined as a collection of terms, which satisfy the triple requirements of expectancy (Akanksa). competency (Yogyata) and proximity (Asatti). Though the Alamkāraika differs from the Naiyāyika on many vital issues. yet as regards the nature of a proposition both of them hold the same opinion, in as much as, both maintain that a proposition does not consist in grouping together isolated words, irrespective of any syntactical consideration. Thus Jagadiśa defines it as an accumulation of terms, endowed with mutual expectancy and in his Vrtti on it remarks that, a collection of words which are mutually expectant in the sense that, the concept conveyed by one term is favourable to comprehension of association, which the concepts, conveyed by other terms bear to it is regarded as a valid proposition. The view-point of Amarasimha that, a group of words, ending in case or/and root-terminations goes to constitute a sentence, Jagadīśa points out, is unacceptable, because it is vitiated by the fallacies of too wide and too narrow definition. The theory that, a sentence consists of a number of

words ending in case-terminations or root-terminations, extends, the status of a valid proposition to a group of such isolated terms as 'Ghatah Patah' or 'Pacati Gacchati', which do not, in reality, constitute specimens of sentence; the doctrine that, sentence consists of a number of words ending in case and root-terminations, on the other hand, denies the status of a proposition to such individual terms as 'Ghatah' or 'Pacati', which in reality, constitutes specimen of sentence. This assertion of Jagadīśa goes to show that, he does not insist on the presence of a verb as an indispensable condition of a sentence, although he is of opinion that, in some cases, a verbal form alone is sufficient to constitute a sentence. He maintains that, a sentence is a combination of mutually expectant and consistent words, but does not lay so much stress, as the ancients do, on the inclusion of the verb. As in most cases, an action is easily understood from the very nature of the context, Jagadiśa does not find any logic in the dictum of the ancients that, there can be no sentence without the verb. 189 Viśvanātha, following the footsteps of the Naiyāyika defines a sentence as a group of words, possessed of expectancy, compatibility and proximity, showing, thereby, that each of these is an essential causal factor towards, cognition of the import of a proposition: thus, the group of words-'sprinkles with fire', he remarks, does not constitute a sentence, since, instrumentality of fire is incompatible with the act of sprinkling: the group of isolated terms 'cow, horse, man, elephant' does not make up a proposition, since the words are not mutually expectant,-the term 'Devadatta' does not go to form a sentence being related with the term 'goes', pronounced twenty-four hours after the first term, since there is no immediacy of the concepts intended to be related. 140

The first requirement of a proposition is expectancy (Ākānkṣā). Nāgeśa describes it as a factor that leads one to ascertain the expressiveness of a sentence: it is the desire to know a thing, competent to get itself associated with another thing, conveyed by a word, already cognised: without the knowledge of the former the sense remains incomplete and the collection of terms fails to present a complete idea. This non-completion of idea intended to be conveyed in the absence of any one of the concepts signified by the constituent terms, Nagesa points out is  $\bar{A}k\bar{a}nks\bar{a}$ .  $\bar{A}k\bar{a}nks\bar{a}$  or expectancy primarily resides in the mind of the hearer, who expects to comprehend a related concept on understanding a concept, expressed by a term already known, and as such, does not belong to the concepts themselves which are insentient beings: but, nevertheless, this is attributed to the concepts, that form the content of expectancy or inquisitiveness of the hearer, and accordingly, concepts are described as being possessed of expectancy only secondarily. The usage that words are endowed with mutual expectancy seems incorrect, since the desire to know neither pertains to the words primarily nor are capable of being transmitted to them, in as much as, they do not form the content of such inquisitiveness, which is produced after comprehension of concepts resulting from their cognition: but it is secondarily justifiable by pointing out that, the usage conveys the idea that, the concepts expressed by constituent terms are mutually expectant. Thus the statement that, the term 'Bring' expects the words 'the jar' is equivalent to the statement that, the concepts conveyed by the term 'Bring' expects the concepts, expressed by the words 'the jar' for the completion of the sense intended to be conveyed. 140 In support of his observation that a word is incapable of expecting another word, Nageśa cites the explanation of Patanjali on the rule 'Samarthah Padavidhih', which clearly states that, the proposition that terms are mutually expectant tantamounts to the statement that concepts signified by them are expectant: thus the usage that the term 'rajan' expects the word 'purusa' and vice versa is equivalent to the statement that, the king expects the employee thinking him to be his own and the employee expects the king thinking his own self as belonging to him. The explanation that  $\bar{A}k\bar{a}nk\bar{s}\bar{a}$  consists in expectancy or inquisitiveness is likely to extend the recognition of a valid proposition to the group of words-'Ghatah karmatvam anayanam krtih' which does not in reality, constitute a specimen of sentence. In order to avoid this difficulty, Nagesa suggests a modification in his own definition of this foremost requirement of a proposi-

tion: he maintains that, it consists in the expectancy which a concept bears to another concept, which either gives rise to a desire to know the former or forms its object or gives rise to the said desire and at the same time forms its object. In the group of words 'Ghatah karmatvom anayanam krtih' the desire to comprehend the concept expressed by the term Karmatvam is neither caused by the concept, conveyed by the word Ghatah nor does the latter form in any way the vising of the former. In the group of terms 'Devadatta cooks rice' (Pacati tandulam Devadattah), on the other hand, the concept conveyed by the term Pacati gives rise to an inquisitiveness to know the concept signified by the term 'tandulam' which at the same time, forms the object of the act of cooking and the concept expressed by the term 'tandulam' gives rise to desire to cognise the concept denoted by the term 'Pacati', which embraces the former for its object : in a similar manner, in the collection of terms 'Paśya mrjo dhavati' the concept conveyed by the term Pasya gives rise to a desire to understand the idea signified by the other two terms, -an idea which forms the object of the act of seeing. Hence, Nageśa argues, while these two groups of terms constitute specimens of a sentence, the first group does not.142

The Naiyayika fails to accept the proposition of the Vaiyakarana that Akan'ssa, the first requirement of a valid proposition consists in inquisitiveness. Udayana asserts that, the untenability of the doctrine is proved by the fact that, judgmental cognition arises even in case of an indifferent person, who is not in the least eager to gather any knowledge. In reply to the question as to what then constitutes  $\bar{A}k\bar{a}iks\bar{a}$ , he points out that, it is an element competent to give rise to the inquisitiveness of the hearer: in explaining this, he further says that, it is equivalent to pre-non-existence of the relational thought, in the mind of the hearer-thought, concerning interdependent constituent concepts, which are necessarily related to one another or are related to the ideas, implied by these concepts. As the pre-non-existence of the relational thought is absent in case of an uninflected stem there is no  $\bar{A}k\bar{a}nk\bar{s}\bar{a}$  amongst the concepts expressed by these and consequently, a group of pure stems,

divested of inflexional endings does not constitute a valid proposition. 148 Vardhamana, the commentator on the Kusumanjali, however, refutes this contention of Udayana. The view of Udayana that, propositional expectancy is equivalent to the pre-non-existence of the relational thought, he maintains, is likely to extend the status of a sentence to an isolated word, as well, in as much as, there being no comprehension of relational thought, ensuing from such isolated term, the pre-non-existence of such thought is there. Thus as the definition of Udayana is unacceptable, Vardhamana formulates a new definition of Akan's a. which, he says, consists in nothing but the non-completion of the relational sense intended to be communicated by the speaker. Thus a substantive is said to have propositional expectancy with reference to a declensional suffix and the vice versa, because non-cognition of either of these leads to non-comprehension of the relational judgment: and such is the case with a radical stem and a conjugational suffix also. Hence, to communicate an idea, Vardhamana remarks, the constituent concepts are to be expressed by their verbal counterparts in such a succession of the stem, the nominal inflexion, the root and the radical suffix, as the understanding of the particular relational thoughtunit becomes psychologically possible, revealing thereby that, Ākānkṣā consists practically in a particular sequence (Ānupūrvī) of stems, roots, suffixes and words, -sequence, which is favourable to comprehension of the idea concerned. 144 For this reason, though in his Bhāṣāpariccheda, Viśvanātha at the outset remarks that, a particular term bears propositional expectancy with reference to another term, if the absence of the latter is responsible for non-cognition of the idea of relation, of which the former is one of the relata, in conclusion, he maintains that, as the concept of proximity (Asatti) comprehends that of expectancy  $(\bar{A}k\bar{a}nk\bar{s}\bar{a})$ , as it exists between a verb and a vocable and similar other words, expressive of the interdependent concepts, what actually exemplifies  $\bar{A}k\bar{a}nk\bar{s}\bar{a}$  is the sequence between a stem and a nominal suffix and a root and a verbal suffix,—an arrangement, without which cognition of the intended idea becomes impossible. Thus in order to communicate the idea 'Bring the jar' it is necessary to express the concepts by their verbal counterparts arranging them in such an order as the stem, the declensional suffix, the root and the conjugational suffix, or in other words, it is necessary to follow the particular sequence: Ghaṭa, am, ā-ni, hi. Knowledge of this sequence, he asserts, is a causal factor towards judgmental cognition, which does not, consequently, ensue from the string of terms: Ghaṭaḥ karmatvam ānayanam kṛtiḥ, in which the constituent concepts are not expressed by their verbal counterparts arranged in regular succession. 145 Jagadīśa also makes this clear in his magnum opus Sabdaśaktiprakāśikā.

SOUND AND SENSE

The next requirement of a valid proposition is Yogyata or competency, whose knowledge, the Naiyayika contends, is a causal factor of verbal cognition. Though in the group of words: 'sprinkles with fire', the syntactical expectancy is there, yet it is not recognised as a valid proposition, because there is no syntactical possibility between the constituent concepts, the instrumentality of fire being incompatible with the act of sprinkling. Viśvanātha defines Yogyatā as the relation which one concept bears to another concept: as the knowledge of this relation or rather possibility of this relation is not there in case of the string of words: 'sprinkles with fire', relational thought, he says, is not comprehended from the said group, which does not necessarily constitute a valid proposition. 146 In reply to the point that, as this Yogyata, which consists in the relation which one concept bears to another is incapable of being known before deriving verbal knowledge, it is not proper to regard Yogyata-jñana as a causal factor of conceptual cognition, Viśvanātha says, when recollection of different concepts ensues from cognition of their corresponding denotative words, it is possible to have knowledge of the relation existing between these concepts, as well: in some cases this knowledge, being confirmed by perceptual experience takes the form of a right notion and in others, having no experience to confirm it assumes the form of a doubtful cognition. Vardhamana, the commentator on Udayana's Kusumānjali furnishes a more accurate definition of Yogyatā: this, he says, consists in the

absence of any such cognitive instrument, which is capable of controverting the relational idea sought to be expressed by a particular collection of terms 147 The expression: 'sprinkles with fire' lacks in this Yogyata, in as much as, the act of sprinkling with a non-liquid substance as fire is contradicted by the cognitive instrument of Perception. Hence, the expresion neither constitutes a valid proposition nor leads to cognition of any relational idea. Nagesa defines Yogyata as possession of such attributes by two or more things as renders their mutual association possible: the sentence 'sprinkles with water' is characterised by presence of this Yogyata, because water is endowed with an attribute, pertaining to a liquid, whose connection is capable of being effected with the act of sprinkling and the act, in its turn, possesses a universal element inhering all actions of rendering wet, -a universal element which makes its association with the instrumentality of water possible. The group of words: 'sprinkles with fire', on the other hand, lacks Yogyata, because fire being a non-liquid substance is not endowed with an attribute inhering all liquids and consequently is not competent to effect its connection with the act of sprinkling. No relational thought, the Naiyāyika contends, is comprehended from such group of words, which are not instances of valid proposition; but, nevertheless, cognition of discrete and isolated concepts only, occurs in such cases from individual terms. 148

Nagesa himself, however, does not acquiesce in such a view; he does not believe in the proposition that knowledge of syntactical possibility is indispensable for conceptual cognition, and necessarily he thinks that, comprehension of contradictory ideas does not prevent the cognition of the relational thought-unit, intended to be conveyed by the expression: 'sprinkles with fire'. The particular relational thought is certainly understood, he points out, from this expression, because though in the external world it is not possible to sprinkle anything with a non-liquid fiery substance, in the realm of our intellect it is quite possible to establish connection of the act of sprinkling with the instrumentality of fire,

and words, in reality, denote things, as they reside not in the external world, but in the realm of our intellect. The very fact that from such a sentence as, 'There goes the barren woman's son with a garland of sky-flowers on his head' the relational thought is cognised goes to show, Nageśa asserts, the absurdity of the proposition that, the knowledge of the absence of any possible contradiction i.e. to say of Yogyata is the cause of comprehension of relational thought. The Naiyayika thesis regards the group of words: 'sprinkles with fire' as totally insignificant, because, as it says, the relation of the act of sprinkling with the instrumentality of fire is contradicted by perception. The untenability of this doctrine is proved, Nagesa continues, by the simple fact that, whenever one hears somebody speaking the words: 'sprinkles with fire', he immediately ridicules the speaker thereof, saying that, it is not possible to sprinkle anything with a non-liquid fiery substance. Had these words been completely non-sensical, then it would not have been possible for the hearer to accost the speaker with the sarcastic remark, which is consequential upon comprehension of the idea by him, and instead of making such comment he would have remained silent. Moreover, the adoption of the Naiyayika doctrine is likely to render all philosophical querries and replies thereto ipso facto absurd and impracticable. In all serious discussions, philosophers anticipate the objection of the opponents and demolish the points raised by them: and all these they do in order to place their own theories on sound footing. In these cases, the view-point of the disputant is contradicted by the theory of the philosopher, who is out to establish his own doctrine, and consequently, the arguments, introduced by the opponent are sheer non-sensical and unintelligible utterances to him, in view of the syntactical impossibility of the concepts, expressed by words, used by the former from the view-point of the latter. Thus the acceptance of the Naiyāyika thesis is likely to lead to an insoluble deadlock. 149 Then again when a false curse is uttered against us or somebody calls us by name, we feel angered, because we become fully aware of the relational thought, intended to be conveyed by the words used,

even though the knowledge of absurdity of such relation immediately dawns on our mind. And, such is the case with such metaphorical expressions as 'moon-face' and the like also, comprehension of relational thought ensuing from which leads to experience of joy in the mind of a connoisseur of Poetic Art. These and similar other numerous instances go to controvert the Naiyāyika position and establish the Vaiyākaraņa stand that, syntactical possibility or its knowledge is not necessary as a causal element of judgmental cognition, or in other words, the knowledge of contradiction does not impede or arrest the comprehension of relational thought in case of verbal cognitions. And what is true of verbal cognition, Nagesa continues, is also true of perception and inference, where, too, the emergence of determinate relational cognition is not hampered by the idea of contradiction. In support of the contention he quotes an observation of Bhartrhari, which states that, words refer to such ideas, as do not possess the least objectivity and as such reside in the realm of our intellect only. The Naiyāyika attempts to thwart the Vaiyakarana stand by pointing out that, while cognition of relational thought, ensuing from the proposition: 'sprinkles with water' is followed by a positive activity, in as much as, the hearer starts, throwing water, that of association, ensuing from the group of words: 'sprinkles with fire' is not followed by any such activity: this, he argues, shows that, while comprehension of the idea of association among the concepts, conveyed by the terms used in the first proposition occurs, no knowledge of such idea is derived from the second collection of terms. The Vaiyakarana however, is clever enough to meet this objection: he points out that, the cognition of thought unit is not followed by any pragmatic activity in the second case, because the proposition lacks in objective validity. It is wrong, he continues, to say, as the Naiyayika does that, no comprehension of relational thought occurs from the proposition: 'sprinkles with fire'; knowledge of this thought, he asserts, occurs certainly: the expected pragmatic activity, however, is checked afterwards, as the knowledge of objective validity of the relational cognition is contradicted by stronger instruments as perception and inference. This difference of interpretation as regards the absence of positive activity following from understanding of the idea, presented by the sentence: 'sprinkles with fire' between the Naiyāyika and the Vaiyākaraṇa happens, because while the former identifies completely the formal validity of a proposition with its objective validity, the latter draws a line of demarcation between the two, and asserts that, in order to be formally valid, a proposition does not stand in need of possessing Yogyatā or syntactical possibility.

The Naiyāyika says that, in order to constitute a regular sentence a group of words is to possess another requirement, which is Asatti or proximity. In his Bhasapariccheda Viśvanatha defines Asatti as immediacy of two words, which are related to each other, and maintains that knowledge of this immediacy is a causal factor towards comprehension of relational thought, intended to be conveyed by a sentence. In his explanation, however, he modifies his own view and says that, what is necessary for cognition of the idea of association is immediacy of two concepts, that are intended to be related, and not the knowledge of immediacy of two words. For this reason, he points out, from the group of words: 'The mountain has eaten is fiery Devadatta' no relational thought is cognised and a wrong idea is comprehended from the string 'The blue jar is a thing picture'. This definition of Asatti fails to explain cognition of relational thought between more than two concepts in those cases where a number of adjectives go to qualify the same noun, as in the proposition: 'The holder of umbrella,-the bearer of ear-ring and the wearer of cloth Devadatta', where the first adjective is intervened from the noun, which it qualifies by the second one, the second by the third one and so on. The opponent says that, in such cases, recollection of each preceding word is put to an end by that of each succeeding one and consequently, the knowlegde that all the adjectives are contiguous to the noun, qualified by each of them does not occur. Viśvanātha solves this difficulty in this way . He says that, impressions left by cognitions of the preceding words, being reinforced by realisation of the last letter go to usher in a single recollection concerning all words used in the sentence: when this happens, all the corresponding concepts are remembered at a time,concepts, which become related with one another simultaneously through the relation of verb and vocable, -substantive and attribute. In support of his solution, he cites a principle, enunciated by the ancients, which states that, just as all pigeons, young and old rush at the same time towards the same granary, similarly, all the concepts become simultaneously related to one another. 151 So in the ultimate analysis, Asatti of the Naiyāyika is reduced to immediacy of two or more concepts that are intended to be related. This is also described as absence of intervention of words, expressive of these concepts by such word or group of words, as does not contribute in any way towards comprehension of relational thought, not being connected with the words so intervened. Such intervention necessarily breaks immediacy of concepts intended to be related and consequently, absence of such interference constitutes  $\bar{A}satti$ . This immediacy is broken, as well, by utterance of words, expressive of concepts intended to be related at different times and so that also constitutes Asatti. It is for this reason that, Viśvanātha in his Sāhityadarpaṇa defines Āsatti as the absence of break in understanding, or rather as an uninterrupted cognition. 152 The Mīmāmsaka maintains that, in addition to the concept of immediacy, Asatti embraces another concept of expression of the ideas, intended to be associated through the medium of words, so that in those cases, where all the concepts concerned are not clearly stated in words, but are cognised through perception or recollection, the intended judgmental cognition does not occur. Thus just as the term 'bring' does not get associated with the terms 'the jar', which are pronounced at a different time and the desired relational thought is not comprehended, similarly, from the simple statement: 'Tether the cow', intended to convey the idea of tethering both a cow and a horse, present before us, the desired relational thought is not gathered with reference to the horse. This leads us, the Mīmāmsaka asserts, to conclude that in a valid proposition, only those

concepts, as are expressed through the medium of words get related to one another. 153

The Vaiyakarana rejects the contention of the Naiyayika that Asatti or contiguity is an essential element of syntax: he maintains that, it might be necessary for quick comprehension of the judgment by a man of immature intellect, but is absolutely superfluous to a man of mature intellect, who understands quickly the relational thought-unit simply from syntactical expectancy. Our ordinary experience shows that intended relational ideas are comprehended from verses, where words are usually jumbled up together and thus the concepts, intended to be brought into syntactical relation are separated from one another by other concept or concepts. Had the knowledge of syntactical contiguity been essential for cognition of the sense of association, desired to be conveyed by a sentence, then such sense of relation would not have been comprehended from such stanzas. The observation that, syntactical contiguity is not a pre-requisite of judgmental cognition, Nagesa points out, enjoys the support of Patañjali. In his exposition on the rule: 'Na Padanta' etc., Patanjali makes it clear that, cognition of relational thought arises, even though words, expressive of concepts, intended to be related lack in syntactical contiguity. 154 As an illustration to this, he cites the seemingly non-sensical group of words: 'anadvāhamudahari yā tvam harasi sirasā kumbham bhagini sacinamabhidhavantamadrakṣih', which though arranged in a slip-shod manner conveys the relational idea-viz. 'O ye sister, who are carrying a pitcher on your head: have you seen a bull running in a zigzag course'? Thus, while the Naiyayika holds that, syntactical expectancy, possibility and contiguity-all these are essential pre-requisites of judgmental cognition, the Vaiyakarana maintains that, the only element absolutely necessary is syntactical expectancy: the other two elements of syntactical possibility and contiguity, he asserts, are capable of being dispensed with.

The question whether the function of denotation is competent enough to bring the import of a proposition into light forms another interesting study. Two different schools of the

Mīmāṃsakas, who claim themselves to be Vākyatattvajñas hold completely divergent views on the issue: these two schools are represented by Kumārilabhaṭṭa and his followers, who are regarded as Bhāṭṭas and by Guru or Prabhākara and his followers, who are regarded as Prābhākaras. While Kumārila and his followers regard an isolated term as a unit of expression and an isolated concept as a unit of sense, Prabhākara and his followers recognise a sentence as a unit of expression and the corresponding relational thought as the unit of sense: and this accounts for the divergence between the two theories, adumbrated by each. 155

According to the doctrine of Kumarila individual terms, used in a proposition, first of all, convey through the function of denotation their corresponding unrelated concepts. This function of denotation, it states, is unable to bring out the sense of relation between different concepts, which constitutes the import of the sentence itself. In reply to the question as to how then the idea of relation is comprehended from the sentence, this theory points out that, it is conveyed through the function known as Laksana, which pertains to the concepts denoted, and not to the words expressive of them156. The import of a proposition, thus, is attained through the instrumentality of individual concepts by virtue of their possession of syntactical expectancy, possibility and contiguity: and does not constitute the direct connotation of component terms. The advocates of Kumarila's doctrine take care to show that, there is every justification for regarding the meaning of the sentence, as being conveyed through Laksana, in as much as, the conditions necessary for its operation are present. The words in a sentence, they argue are chosen in order to give expression to a related integrated meaning and the primary meanings, which are nothing but universals in the view of the Mīmāmsakas are absolutely incapable of giving expression to this relational thought. Secondly, the relationship between the primary meaning and the secondary meaning is not wanting in the import of a sentence, because while the primary meaning consists of universals, the secondary meaning is comprised of individuals and their relation, -individuals in which the universals inhere. Thirdly, it is the common practice to convey the idea of association of concepts through the medium of a sentence, in which constituent terms are related to one another, -and not through that of an isolated term. Thus, according to Kumarila's thesis, in the sentence: 'Ghatamanaya', the word Ghata signifies through Abhidha the universal jar-hood, the second case-ending 'am' the idea of Karmatva, the root that of the act of bringing and the termination the sense of directive: the idea of relation between these concepts is comprehended subsequently through the function of Laksanā. In their eagerness to show that though the concepts themselves directly convey the idea of relation independently of terms, yet the relational thought as signified by a sentence is different from that cognised through other instruments of knowledge, the advocates of this theory maintain that, while in verbal cognition, the concepts, relation amongst which is comprehended—is expressed through the agency of words, in cognitions, other than verbal one, these concepts are presented through other means. Thus the relational cognition that, a white horse is running, which occurs in one's mind on seeing a moving white mass and hearing the sound of hoofs and neighing is incapable of being explained as an instance of verbal cognition, because the concepts amongst which relation is comprehended is presented through preception, and not through the agency of words: here the knowledge of the intended relation is effected through inference or logical postulation and consequently, it does not constitute a case of verbal cognition.

The Abhihitanvayavadin claims that the procedure that isolated words first convey the isolated concepts, which in their turn lead subsequently to judgmental cognition is confirmed by an impartial analysis of our verbal cognitions. A man labouring under some psychological delinquency is found to comprehend isolated concepts, presented by terms used in a vaild proposition, even though he fails to grasp the relational thought, and this, he says, goes to establish the point that, words are competent enough to generate the idea of isolated concepts destitute of

the relation that links them together. The opponent argues that, the doctrine of the Abhihitanvayavadin, which asserts that isolated concepts, independent of the words expressive thereof constitute the immediate causes of comprehension of resultant relational thought renders postulation of the concepts themselves as the seventh instrument of vaild cognition in addition to the already existing other six necessary. In reply to this the Abhihitanvayavadin points out that, in the doctrine of the Mīmāmsaka śruti (direct assertion), linga (mark), vālya (syntactical connection), prakarana (context), sthana (position) and samākhyā (nomenclature)—these six are equally regarded as different categories of the same source of knowledge, namely verbal testimony: of these six, śruti, vākya and samākhyā alone are capable of being counted properly as instances of verbal testimony, in as much as, they are verbal in essence; the other three-linga, prakarana and sthana belong actually to a different category of the class of concepts. 158 But the Mīmāmsaka classes all the six factors together as instances of the same verbal testimony and this reveals his idea that, there is no necessity of postulating concepts themselves as the seventh instrument of cognition. The procedure that is adopted in case of enumeration of the different instances of verbal testimony, the Abhihitanvayavadin asserts, is capable of being followed in this case also. In defence of his thesis, he further asserts that, though concepts alone constitute the proximate cause of relational thought, the actual causal factor of this thought is afforded by the verbal statement composed of isolated terms, in as much as, the cognition of the isolated concepts is generated by the isolated terms. It is the words alone, he continues, that are invested with the power of causation in respect of the final judgmental cognition and the recollection of individual concepts is only an inter-medium, being merely a subsidiary function of the words themselves.

The doctrine of the Abhihitanvayavadin, however, does not find favour with all sections of the Mīmāmsakas. It is pointed out that, this Bhāṭṭa view throws to wind the basic principle of the Law of Parsimony, since it leads to postulation of a

plurality of functions. It maintains that, in addition to the capacity inherent in words to convey their corresponding concepts, the concepts themselves are endowed with a capacity to generate cognition of the relational thought and the isolated terms are further possessed of an efficiency in respect of investing the isolated concepts with the said capacity of generating cognition of the final relational judgment. Thus, the opponents argue, the Bhāṭṭa thesis is based on assumption of three functions and as such is vitiated by the defect of complexity. For this reason, the Anvitābhidhānavādin propounds a new theory, which, as he claims, is strictly in conformity to the Law of Simplicity.

The Anvitabhidhanavadin challenges the proposition of the Abhihitanvavavadin that isolated words signify isolated concepts. He observes that, nowhere in practice is a word used singly to convey an isolated idea, - the meaning cognised even from a single word being one associated with the concept of existence. Of all the means of comprehending meanings from words, he continues, the first and consequently the most important is the usage of elderly people, who use a full sentence, and not an isolated word in order to engage one in the performance of an action or in order to dissuade him from that; thus, he asserts, what is proper is that propositions signify judgments. A child, first of all, hears a sentence, e.g. bring the cow, uttered by one occupying a superior position to his subordinate: then he sees the movement of the cow from one place to another and, thereafter, ascertains the significance of the sentence as a whole. He does not as yet realise the composite character of the proposition or the thought-unit; to him both the proposition and judgment are indivisible units of expression and thought respectively. Subsequently, by a close inspection of insertion and extraction of the component words and the corresponding variation in the significance of the sentence, he determines the meanings of individual terms: thus, he understands that, the meaning of the term 'cow' is the cow-individual, as related to the act of bringing, that of the term 'horse' is the horse-individual, as related to a particular action-entity, that of the term 'bring' the concept of bringing as related to a particular object, and so on. When meanings of individual terms are cognised in this way, the comprehension of an isolated concept is a myth. In sharp contrast to the doctrine of the Abhilitānvayavādin that, taking recourse to  $Lakşan\bar{a}$  becomes an imperative necessity in order to account for signification of the sense of association or relation, the thesis of the Anvitābhidhānavādin maintains that, as relation itself enters into the very constitution of the concepts signified by individual terms, there is no necessity of postulating this additional function  $(Lakṣan\bar{a})$ , pertaining to the concepts themselves with a view to the cognition of relation,— $Abhidh\bar{a}$  alone being competent to bring this idea into light.

The thesis of the Anvitabhidhanavadin, which holds that words signify related concepts is likely to be confronted with a serious problem. Does the word 'cow' as in the proposition: 'bring the cow' signify the cow-individual, as related to a concept, not necessarily conveyed through the mechanism of a word? Or does it denote the cow-individual as related to a concept, conveyed through a word? The first alternative is untenable, since its acceptance renders verbal cognition possible even in those cases where of two terms constituting a proposition only one is present. The second alternative is equally untenable, since it vitiates the entire proposition by the fallacy of mutual dependence, which arises as the knowledge of the meaning of the term 'bring' becomes necessary for cognition of the meaning of the term 'cow', which is the cow-individual, as related to the concept of bringing and that of the idea of the term 'cow' becomes essential for comprehension of the concept, signified by the term 'bring', which is nothing but the action of bringing as related to the cowindividual. 159 In order to avoid this difficulty, the Anvitabhidhanavadin adopts a new course of reasoning. He rejects the first alternative and accepts the second one: but there also to avoid the fallacy of mutual dependence, points out that, the cognition of related concepts is preceded by their comprehension in non-relational aspect. In reply to the question as to what causes this primary comprehension of isolated concepts in their non-relational aspect, he says that, this is simply an outcome of recollection, and is not caused by Abhidha or denotation which is responsible for effecting subsequent comprehension of the concepts as related to one another. Thus the Anvitabhidhanavadin thinks that, isolated terms primarily lead to recollection of isolated concepts and subsequently denotation conveys the concepts in their relational character. As regards the relation, which is supposed to be communicated by the denotative capacity of words, the Anvitabhidhanavadin asserts that this is general in character. But there is no fixity and uniformity in the relations conveyed by different verbal propositions, the composite relational significance of the same term varying according to the change in action from one proposition to another: thus while in the proposition: 'Bring the cow', the term 'cow' signifies the concept cow as syntactically related with the act of bringing, in the proposition: 'Tether the cow'. the same term signifies the concept cow as syntactically related with the act of tethering. In reply to the question as to what leads to comprehension of the exact particular relation which varies in different propositions, the Anvitabhidhanavadin says that, this is determined through syntactical association of terms based upon the triple requirements of expectancy, competency and contiguity: thus while in the sentence: 'Bring the cow' the term cow denotes the concept of the cow as related with the action bringing, because the meaning of the latter occurring in it is associated with that of the former, in the sentence: 'Tether the cow', the same term denotes the concept of the cow as related with the action tethering, because in it the word 'cow' is brought into relation with the word 'tether'. In conformity to the Law of Parsimony, which is so devoutly clung to by him, the Anvitabhidhanavadin holds that a single unvariant denotative efficiency conveys different composite judgments, and in support of his contention, he puts forward the parallelism of the self-same efficiency of revealing colour as inherent in the visual organ giving rise to different images like white, black, red, blue and so on according as it is brought into contact with objects, characterised by those colours. 169

Jayantabbatta in his Nyāyamañjarī gives a faithful resume of these two doctrines, which, however, he criticises in the end. The Abhihitanvayavadin, he points out, commits a great blunder by regarding an isolated term as a unit of expression, which is opposed completely to our ordinary experience. In our daily life a sentence is used in order to convey a relational thought, which is comprehended, as well, by the hearer: consequently, terms have no isolated status and their meanings are necessarily interlocked with one another in the verbal judgment ensuing from a proposition. 161 Secondly, he continues, by explaining that the syntactical relation is brought into light through Laksana, a function pertaining to meanings, which is set to activity after the words go out of office, the Abhihitanvavavadin converts the meaning into an independent instrument of cognition, and consequently, renders the judgment ensuing from a proposition anything but verbal. 162 By saving that a sentence is a real unit of expression, the Anvitabhidhanavadin. Jayanta observes, marks a definite improvement in the domain of analysis of conceptual thought, but he also makes a mistake in regarding a single unvariable denotative efficiency as competent to bring out the idea of relation, which varies from proposition to proposition. As the power of denotation is always confined to the data previously known and the relational thought, conveyed by a proposition is an unknown entity, it is not possible for the denotative capacity to signify the sense of relation, for the comprehension of which, postulation of a function distinct from it is necessary. Thus, Jayanta points out, the Anvitabhidhanavadin fails to distinguish between two actually distinct powers, which work simultaneously. 163 Secondly, his doctrine, he (Jayanta) continues, fails to justify the use of both the terms in a proposition, comprised of two words, in as much as, the concept of one, as related with another is capable of being expressed by one of the two terms. As both these doctrines are vitiated by serious defects, Javanta and following him other Naiyayikas do not agree with any one

of them. 164 After summing up the position of the two theories he gives his own verdict on the issue. He asserts that, all the parts of speech in a sentence co-operate to produce the verbal judgment and do not communicate it like their usually accepted meanings. First of all, Jayanta points out, by virtue of the denotative capacity, the parts of speech denote the meanings. which are invariably associated with them: then by another power-Tatparyaśakti, which pertains to the words themselves, they give rise to the relational thought. This power is more creative than communicative in character: it works in unison with the denotative power and does not cease until a complete self-sufficient verbal judgment is produced. 165 Thus like the Abhihitanvayavadin he thinks that, words convey unrelated concepts through denotation at the first instance, but does not agree with the former when he says that, the relational thought is signified later by the concepts themselves through Indication: then again like the Anvitabhidhanavadin he believes that, words are significant only when they are members of a sentence, but he differs from the former when he says that, the unknown relational meaning is comprehended through denotation. In order to account for comprehension of this thought, Jayanta feels the necessity of postulating a new capacity in addition to the well-known capacities of Abhidha and Laksana. This capacity is not capable of being equated with the other two functions, because it is not possible to know previously the relation between it and the relevant meaning. Jayantabhatta calls it Tatparyaśakti, while the logicians affiliated to the new school name it Samsargamaryada. 166

It is painful to observe that, all the Alamkarikas misrepresent the doctrine of Abhihitanyayavada, as propounded by Kumarila. Unfortunately, they call what is really the Nyāya Theory by the name of the doctrine of Abhihitanyayavada. Abhinavagupta sets the ball rolling by representing the theory in a manner which is consistent with the view of Jayantabhaṭṭa. While maintaining that an Abhihitanyayavadin is led per force to grant recognition to Vyanjana which brings an implicit idea into comprehension,—the capacities of other powers being exhausted

through performance of their respective functions, -- he observes that, a champion of the said doctrine recognises the existence of three powers: Abhidha, Laksana and Tatparya. The function of Tatparya, however, is posited not by the sponsors of Abhihitanyayayada, but by the Naiyayikas, affiliated to old school. Mammata relies possibly on the scanty information given by Abhinavagupta for ascertaining the intricacies of the theory, but he keeps himself immune from the charge of mis-representation by explaining it in a cryptic language. He simply states that the meaning of the proposition is the intended meaning (Tatparyartha) and that the import of the proposition is not merely the sum-total of the imports of individual terms used in it, implying thereby that the verbal judgment is not denoted by the parts of speech. 167 But as regards the nature of the function which brings out this import of a proposition, which consists in relational thought, he remains silent and does not specifically mention whether this is Laksanā or Tātparya. Possibly he does this intentionally in order to conceal his ignorance of the intricacies of the doctrine, propounded by Kumarilabhatta, with whose works themselves he does not seem to be familiar. The error committed by Abhinavagupta and Mammata persists in works of their successors, as well, who leave it uncorrected and unchallenged. Thus Govinda observes that the theory of Abhihitanyayavada is advocated in the Nyaya and Nagesa maintains that the stand of Kumarila finds support in other systems, as well. 168 Viśvanātha creates a hopeless confusion and observes that, the function of Tatparya is postulated by the Abhihitanvayavadin in order to account for comprehension of the import of a proposition, which constitutes the real intended meaning: this function, he continues, pertains to the sentence as a whole, and neither to isolated terms nor to isolated concepts. 169 This, however, is exactly the Nyaya Theory, as recorded by Jayantabhatta. It is really a pity that the appraisal of the doctrine of Abhitanvayavada, as made by reputed critics of the stature of Mammata and Visvanatha is based upon hearsay and guesswork, and not upon firsthand knowledge of the works of the great master Kumārila.

#### CHAPTER III

### SUB-TYPES OF POETRY

Anandavardhana divides Dhvanikāvya or Poetry par excellence into two broad classes: Avivakṣitavācya and Vivakṣitānvaparavācya. The characteristic features of these two types are evident from their very designations: in the first case, the expressed idea is not meant, i.e. to say is not intended to be accepted as such; in the second case, it is certainly meant, but ultimately it leads to manifestation of the suggested, to which it renders its own self subservient. The first is obviously based on Lakṣaṇā, which the poet employs consciously with the sole purpose of bringing the implicit into comprehension, and consequently, it is characterised by use of expressions in their transferred sense. The second is based on Abhidhā, the sense expressed by which ultimately amounts to the unexpressed.

Of these two broad classes of Dhvani, the first, namely Dhvani of Avivaksitav $\overline{a}$ cya type is divided into two sub-types:  $Arth\overline{a}ntarasam$ kramitav $\overline{a}$ cya and Atyantatiraskrtav $\overline{a}$ cya, according to the nature of Laksana, that forms its basis. In the first type, which, as the name suggests is based on  $Up\overline{a}d\overline{a}nalak$ sana, the expressed sense, though not totally incompatible, is transformed into one characterised by new attributes, while in the second, which is based on Laksanalaksana, the expressed being totally incompatible is abandoned altogether in favour of a new idea. As an illustration of the first sub-variety,  $\overline{A}$ nandavardhana quotes the  $\overline{Prak}$ rta  $\overline{Gatha}$ :

Tālā jāanti guņā jālā te sahiaehim gheppanti/

Raikiranannugahiaim honti kamalaim kamalaim// meaning: 'Merits become real ones, when they are appreciated by connoisseurs: the lotus becomes a true lotus, when favoured by rays of the Sun'. Here, he points out, the second term 'lotus' does not convey simply the concept of a water-lily, but that of a

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lily, as endowed with attributes like fragrance and tenderness: thus the expressed is transformed from a mere thing designated (sañjin) to some other sense, which includes within its scope the thing designated, as well. He further maintains that, the attributes are comprehended through suggestion and that, it is the inexplicable charm of this implicit idea, which bestows on this piece of poetic creation the status of Dhvanikāvya. It is a pity that an astute commentator of Gobinda Thakkura's status commits a blunder by regarding these attributes as indicated (lakṣya) units: this is against tradition, established by Alamkārikas of repute. As an example of the second subvariety of Dhvani, Anandavardhana cites the oft-quoted stanza of Vālmīki:

Ravisamkrāntasaubhāgyastuṣārāvṛtamaṇḍalah/

Niḥśvāsāndha ivādarśaścandramā na prakāsate//, meaning: 'With its orb covered by mist and glory transmitted to the Sun, the moon does not shine like a mirror, blinded by sighs'. In explaining this, At linavagupta points out that, the term 'blind' is a privative term and as such presupposes the capacity for seeing, which the look g glass totally lacks. The expressed is therefore altogether abandoned in favour of a new idea, which, does not comprise the former within its scope. This new idea which is brought out through the function of Laksanā is the concept of the mirror, unable to reflect images: Laksanā, it is said, is employed with the sole purpose of bringing the unexpressed into comprehension, which, in the present case, is extreme ugliness and complete lack of utility of the glass concerned.4 Bhattanayaka is of opinion that, the indeclinable 'iva' in the verse under consideration is indicative of sambhavanā and not of sādrsya, or in other words, the expression means: 'a mirror, as if blinded by sighs', and consequently, Laksanā does not operate here at all. Abhinavagupta, however, rejects this stand altogether. This explanation, he points out, fails to effect a plausible connection amongst different concepts, presented by the terms, used in the verse, in as much as, it renders the looking glass identical with the moon. The attempt to avoid this difficulty by repeating the indeclinable 'iva' and connecting it in two places in the same verse, in such a way that it may convey the idea of the moon, resembling a mirror, which is, as if, blinded by sighs is ludicrous, because, as Abhinavagupta says, such repetitions and connections are allowed in treatises on Philosophy, but not in specimens of Poetic Art.

The second division of Suggestive Poetry, the Vivaksitanuaparavācya is classified in its turn into two sub-varieties, according to the perceptibility or otherwise of the sequence existing between the comprehension of the expressed and that of the unexpressed. In the first of these two sub-varieties, which is named Asamlaksya-krama, the sequence that intervenes between the cognitions of the expressed and suggested meanings is imperceptible, i.e. the expressed brings the suggested imperceptibly into consciousness: in the second sub-variety, which is named Samlaksya-krama, the sequence existing between the cognition of the explicit and that of the implicit is clearly perceptible, i.e. the process of manifestation of the suggested is perceptible. Under the first group Anandavardhana places suggestion of Rasa, Bhava etc. by making it clear that only emotional states admit of suggestion in this way, and under the second group he places suggestions of Vastu and Alamkara, and in this way he connects the two-fold classification of Suggestive Poetry into Asamlaksya-krama and Samlaksya-krama, with the three-fold classification of Dhvani into fact (vastu), imaginative mood (Alamkara) and emotional state (Rasa). The Dhyanikara calls Rasadhvani 'one of imperceptible process', because the experience of suggested Rasa by means of various factors, such as Vibhava, Anubhava and Vyabhicaribhava necessarily involves a process, but from its quickness the process is not perceived, like the process, as Mammata and Visvanatha put it, of the apparently simultaneous piercing of a hundred lotus-leaves placed one upon another. At the time of relishing Rasa, the mind of the refined appreciator becomes so much absorbed in it that, he does not notice the process which suggests it, and consequently, it is quite in the fitness of things that, this suggestion is described as 'one of imperceptible process'.6

The question whether this classification of Dhvani into Asamlaksya-krama and Samlaksya-krama is absolute or not forms an interesting study. The advocates of this classification place Rasa under the first group and Vastu and Alamkara under the second. They, however, maintain that Rasadhvani is capable of being regarded as 'one of perceptible process', as well, in as much as, in some cases the appreciator perceives the process, which suggests the emotional state. Usually as soon as a piece of poetic creation is read, the reader becomes, as it were, simultaneously aware of the emotions, presented in it: but in those cases, where the context is not clear or the causal factors are to be thought out and as such, enjoyment of impersonal pleasure is delayed, consequential upon belated presence of these accessories, Rasadhvani is capable of being regarded as an instance of Samlaksya-krama-vyangya; in these cases, there exists perceptible interval between cognition of the explicit idea of a poetic creation, consisting of such factors as ensuents, excitants and accessories and that of the emotional mood depicted in it. With these arguments Jagannatha defends the stand of the Dhvanivadin that, at times Rasadhvani becomes 'one of perceptible process' as well. As an example of this typeof Rasadhvani, he cites the stanza:

Talpagatā'pi ca sutanuh Śvāsāsangam na yā sehe/

Samprati sā hṛdayagataṃ priyapāṇiṃ mandamākṣipati//
meaning: 'The beautiful girl, who though reclining on bed, could
not stand the slightest touch of her husband's breath is now repeling his hand placed on her breast mildly', commenting on which
he observes that, the comprehension of the suggested emotional
state is dependent on cognition of the exact sense of the term
'now' or in other words, on full understanding of the context.
The feeling of love of the girl directed towards her husband is
comprehended only when it is gathered that on the night before
the departure of her husband the shy bride is driving back the
hand of her husband placed timidly on her breast, and consequently, the process of suggestion here is perceptible. The
fact that, at times a perceptible interval exists between cognition of the expressed idea of a Poem and that of the emotions.

suggested by it, Jagannātha maintains, is corroborated by experience of connoisseurs. Moreover, he continues, it enjoyes the approval of such great theorists as Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta. Thus Ānandavardhna quotes the famous stanza:

Evamvādini devarsau pāršve pituradhomukhī/

Līlākamalapatrāni gaņayāmāsa Pārvatī//under the head Samlaksya-krama-vyanyya and Abhinavagupta in unequivocal terms mentions that, emotional moods do not, under all circumstances constitute the contents of Asamlaksya-krama Dhvani.9 In this connection, Jagannatha raises a pertinent question. If Rasadhvani becomes an instance of suggestion of perceptible process, as well, how can, he asks, Samlakşya-krama-vyanga be of twelve varieties, as enumerated by the ancients? Its number is to be raised to eighteen. In reply to this, he points out that, such permanent feelings as love, grief and the like are elevated to the status of Rasa only when they are suggested by clearly exhibited excitants, ensuents and accessories imperceptibly: then and then alone, he asserts, they form the content of a contemplation productive of disinterested pleasure. When, on the other hand, these are suggested through a perceptible process, they fail to attain the status of Rasa and are relegated to an inferior position of Vastu. Hence, Jagannatha argues, there is no contradiction between the assertion that Rasa is capable of being suggested through a perceptible process, as well and the statement that types of Dhvani of perceptible process are twelve in number. 10 The argument of Jagannatha is not in the least convincing, because when suggested through a perceptible process, a permanent feeling is not converted into a Rasa, but remains a sheer fact, there is no meaning in extending recognition of Samlaksyakrama-vyanjya to Rasadhvani, as well. These speculations of master artists are, however, of great importance to us, because by revealing their hesitancy to accept this two-fold classification of Dhvani as absolute, they go to bring out its unreal character. As the suggestion of Rasa occasionally comes under the group of Samlaks ja-krama, which includes the suggestions of Vastu and Alamkara, it is not possible to relate the two-fold classification with the three-fold division

of Dhvani into Vastu, Alamkara and Rasa. Then again, it is possible to group the suggestions of Vastu and Alamkara under the head Asamlaksyakrama, because at the time of perception of Poetry, the mind of the true connoisseur of Poetic Art remains so much absorbed in it that, he does not notice the process which suggests the implicit and, as if, simultaneously with the cognition of the expressed he becomes aware of the unexpressed. For this reason, while commenting on the observation of Anandavardhana that the comprehension of the implicit is preceded by that of the explicit, in the same way as the cognition of the import of a proposition is preceded by that of imports of terms. Abhinavagupta remarks that, just as the sequence between padartha-pratīti and vākyārtha-pratīti is perceptible only to a beginner, and not to a person of mature intellect, similarly the sequence between understanding of the expressed and that of the unexpressed is noticeable only to a novice and not to a true connoisseur of Poetic Art, for whom alone a specimen of this art is intended. 11 This remark makes it perfectly clear that Dhvani is always of an imperceptible process. Thus the classification of Dhvani into Asamlaksya-krama and Samlaksya-krama. is not perfect: it remains in theory mainly, and is introduced only to show the excellence of a suggested emotional mood to the other two suggested entities, -suggested fact and suggested imaginative mood.

Anandavardhana takes care to show that the poetic figure Rasavat, which smuggles the idea of Rasa in the field of Poetry does not comprehend the concept of Rasadhvani. While the ancients define Rasavat simply as a figure capable of presenting emontional states, Anandavardhana asserts that, whereas, an emotional mood suggested prominently creates the field of Rasadhvani, a mood, when rendered subservient to another idea of paramount importance constitutes the scope of Rasavadalamkāra. He thinks that, when Rasa is primarily developed in Poetry, it no longer remains an embellishment, but rather is converted into the very soul of Poetry, exceling in charm all such elements as Guṇa, Alaṃkāra, Rīti, Vṛtti etc. Commenting on these remarks, Abhinavagupta observes that, just as in an Upamā

an object goes to embellish another object, similarly in Rasavat one emotional mood goes to augment the beauty of another mood or another idea, primarily developed. The learned Dhyanikara claims that acceptance of his stand alone enables one to draw the line of demarcation between the spheres of Rasadhvani, such pure figures as Upamā, Rūpaka and the like and the poetic figure Rasavat. The acceptance, on the other hand, of the viewpoint of the ancients, who bring an instance, where the aesthetic emotion is principally developed, as also an instance, where the emotion is subordinate to the expressed sense or some other suggested idea, both under the same head Rasavat renders it difficult to find out independent instances of Upama, Rupaka etc. The argument that those passages alone, where animate beings are primarily described are instances of Rasavat, consisting in depiction of such permanent feelings as love, grief, heroism and the like, which relate only to conscious and living organisms, and those passages where inanimate objects like rivers or mountains are primarily described are instances of independent Upamā, Rūpaka etc. is without any value. Because even in those cases where insentient beings are painted, there exists a touch of human and conscious elements, brought in through the aid of one or other of the numerous figures of speech. And this happens, because an inanimate described simply as an inanimate does not and cannot form the subjectmatter of Poetry: either the behaviour of an animate is superimposed on it or it is brought into relation with a permanent feeling, since the content of a Poetry is either an excitant or an ensuent or an accessory. Thus as in every work of art there exists a human element, however predominantly descriptive it migh be of unconscious phenomena of nature, everywhere Rasavat creeps in, and what we exactly get in descriptions of inanimate beings is an admixture of Rasavat and such figures as Upama, Rūpaka etc. and not an independent Upamā or Rūpaka. Equally valueless is the argument that the existence of Rasavat is to be denied even though there exists an apprehension of human element, introduced in order to save the position, because such a course of reasoning is likely to declare many fine specimens

of Poetry as utterly devoid of the capacity of aesthetic relish or in other words, as highly Nīrasa. And this contingency arises, because, according to the ancients, the presence of the poetic figure Rasavat agrees with that of Rasa in a poetic creation, as also the absence of the former agrees with that of the latter. No such contingency arises, if, however, the view-point of the Dhyanikara is accepted, and this is so, because according to him, the sheer absence of the poetic figure Rasavat does not render a Poetic Art bereft of appeal, but it is the lack of competence to suggest emotions in the reader's mind which makes it so. So the considered opinion of Anandavardhana on this issue is this that, a predominantly suggested emotional mood brings in Rasadhvani, while such a mood, rendered subservient to another prominent idea brings in Rasavadalamkāra. Kuntaka challenges this proposition of the Dhvanikara: he does not regard Rasavat as a separate figure, because as he says, it is a misnomer,the possessive suffix matup being unmeaning and misleading even.13

The learned Dhyanikara observes that, it is not possible to enumerate the different varieties of principal emotions or of elements like the excitants, ensuents and accessories or of the different types of transient feelings, as also the numerous modes of allayment or dawning of them. By permutation and combination, there are likely to arise endless varieties, which it is impossible to enumerate severally.14 Thus, for example, he remarks, erotic emotion alone presents itself either in the form of love-in-union or in that of love-in-separation: love-in-union, again, manifests itself either through wistful gazing of lovers or through dalliance or through outing and love-in-separation, in its turn, is caused by jealousy or departure of one of the parties to love to a distant place or an imprecation or by similar other factors. The excitants, ensuents and accessories of both these types of love are of numerous types, in as much as, in some cases the hero is a divine being, in others he is a man, in others he is a semi-divine personality,—in some cases he belongs to the younger group, in others he is mature in age and experience, -in some cases he meets his opposite party in the richness of spring, in others under a canopy of cloud and so on. Thus the erotic emotion alone admits of classification into innumerable types and sub-types, the enumeration of which is humanly impossible. Taking this hint from Anandavardhana, Mammaṭa maintains that, for the sake of convenience it is better to leave out details and classify the different varieties of Rasa, Bhāva etc. under one single category, namely that of Asamlakṣyakrama-dhvani, since they possess one element in common,—the property of being suggested through an imperceptible process,—all the Rasas and Bhāvas being suggested without any perceptible sequence appearing between the cognition of the expressed, on the one hand, and final aesthetic relish on the other. Viśvanātha and Jagannātha endorse this view of Mammaṭa and express their opinion in favour of the unitary character of Asamlakṣya-krama-dhvani. 15

In sharp contrast to the Asamlaksya-krama-dhvani, in which the sequence existing between comprehension of the expressed and that of the unexpressed is imperceptible, in Samlaksya-krama this sequence is distinctly noticeable. Thus the suggested sense, emanating from this type of Dhavni resembles a vibration, the sequence between which and the first sound is distinctly noticeable, when a bell is rung. For this reason, this type of Dhvani is also called Anusvana-sanniva-dhvani. Though at the outset Anandavardhana classifies this type of Dhvani into two subvarieties, according as it is based on formal suggestiveness (śabdaśakti-mūla) or material suggestiveness (arthaśakti-mūla), towards the close of his discussion he grants recognition to a third sub-variety, as well, -a type which is based on formal-cummaterial suggestiveness (śabdarthobhayaśakti-mūla).16 Accordingly all later thinkers, including Mammata, Visvanatha and Jagannatha speak of three kinds of Samlaksya-krama-vyangya: (1) that in which the implicit idea arises from force of the word, (2) that in which the same arises from force of the expressed meaning and (3) that in which the same arises from the force of both-word and sense-units. In reply to the question as to what constitutes the criterion of determining whether suggestion proceeds from the force of a word or of a meaning or of both, the Dhyanivadin replies that, the simple test is to see whether the expressions, manifesting the implicit meaning admit of replacement by their synonyms or not. If they admit of substitution of their synonymns, then the suggestion is to be regarded as arising from force of the meaning; if, on the other hand, they do not admit of such substitution, -the slightest change, effected in them hampering the manifestation of the unexpressed, then it is to be regarded as arising from force of the word: when, however, these two types of expressions are equally balanced, i.e. to say, some words are capable of being replaced by their synonyms and others are not so, and of these two categories of words none outnumbers the other, then the suggestion is to be regarded as arising from force of both word and meaning. Jagannatha observs that, due to the absence of any decisive evidence, it is not proper to regard such a case of Dhvani as either Sabda-śakti-mūla or Artha-śakti-mūla; it is also improper, he continues, to regard it as a case of admixture or Samkara of these two types, because an instance of such admixture is found only when different implicit ideas are brought into light per force of word and meaning: in such cases, however, as both the sound and sense combine to bring the implicit idea into light, the question of such instances being recognised as specimens of Samkara does not arise.17

Anandavardhana thinks that an instance of Śabda-śakti-mūla-dhvani is always an instance of Alamkāra-dhvani, or in other words, in this type of Dhvani there necessarily exists an apprehension of a suggested poetic figure. In it such homonymous words are used, whose denotation is restricted to the contextual sense and the non-contextual, as also the relation existing between the two is comprehended through suggestion. Before citing an illustration of this type of Dhvani Ānandavardhana attempts to establish the thesis that, its scope is different from that of Śleṣālamkāra. And this he does, because there exists a great possibility of confounding one with the other, in as much as, both are characterised by use of homonymous words. It is a fact, he continues, that in both Śabda-śakti-mūla-dhvani and Śleṣa there exists an apprehension of more than one idea; but

while in the former, there arises, in addition, the cognition of an unexpressed poetic figure qua some definite relation like  $S\bar{a}dr\dot{s}ya$ , Virodha etc. subsisting between the two meanings—the expressed contextual and the unexpressed non-contextual, in the latter no such relation is comprehended. The point raised by the opponent that this distinction between the two is unsatisfactory and illogical, since in the case of  $\dot{S}les\bar{a}lam k\bar{a}ra$ , also, there arises at times a comprehension of such other poetic figures as  $Upam\bar{a}$ ,  $R\bar{u}paka$ , Virodha etc. is untenable, because while in  $\dot{S}lesa$ , the figures, whose apprehension remains mixed up with that of the former are conveyed through the function of denotation, in  $\dot{S}abda.\dot{s}akti.m\bar{u}la.dhvani$  these figures are brought into light through the function of suggestion; and this makes all the difference between the two categories. Thus, he observes, the verse running as

Tasyā vināpi hārena nisargādeva hārinau/

Janayāmāsatuh kasya vismayam na payodharau//, and meaning: 'The breasts of the lady, though devoid of a necklace, yet possessed of it (charming) caused wonder to all' constitutes an illustration of admixture of Ślesa and Virodhābhāsa.—the former paying the path for the latter,—and not that of Śabla-śakti-mūla-dhvani. The expression:

'Atrantare kusumasamayayugamupasamharannajṛmbhata Grīṣmābhidhānah phullamallikādhavalāṭṭahāso Mahākālah', meaning: 'In the meantime, putting an end to the spring season approached unbearable summer, in which the palaces became white with jasmine flowers in blossom (like Lord Śiva, the God of destruction, with his violent laughter as white as full-blown jasmine flowers appearing—foreboding the annihilation of Cupid), on the other hand, exemplifies this type of *Dhvani*, and not Śleṣa. In explaining this, Abhinavagupta points out that, here in utter violation to the maxim, which states that, of expressiveness, attributed by derivation and expressiveness, pertaining to the word as a whole, the latter prevails over the former, the denotation of the multi-meaninged term 'Mahākāla' conveys the idea of long unbearable summer, to which it is restricted through context, and subsequently the sense of Lord Śiva, as also the relation

of similarity subsisting between the two are comprehended through suggestion: hence, he says, this is a case of Upamadhvar i.19 This remark of Abhina vagupta is of great importance, in as much as, it betrays his belief that, the principle, according to which, in case of a conflict between Rudhi-śakti and Yaugikaśakti, the former is to be preferred to the latter is applicable in those cases only, where such factors as conjunction, disjunction and the like do not go to delimit the scope of denotation to the field of the contextual sense alone. The Dhvari Theorists maintain that, in this illustration, the function of suggestion brings out the idea of Lord Siva, as also that of similarity existing between the unbearable summer and the terrible Lord: the relation of similarity, they argue, is apprehended, for in the absence of such a relation, the two ideas would remain discrete and the poet would be charged of incongruity for using expressions, that yield ideas that have no bearing on the topic at hand. This relation of similarity, which forms the basis of the poetic figure Upamā, they continue, is comprehended through the function of Vyanjana alone, since there do not exist any such terms as iva,  $v\bar{a}$  etc., which are denotative of the idea of similitude or any such words as pratipakşa, pratispardhī etc. which are indicative of the said idea: hence, this constitutes an illustration of Upamā-dhvani of Śabdaśaktimūla variety. Following Anandavardhana, Mammata and Viśvanātha cite similar illustrations of this variety of Dhvani, in which the poetic figure Upamā is said to be conveyed through the function of suggestion. Mammata cites the stanza:

Ullāsya kālakaravālamahāmbuvāham

Devena yena jarathorjitagarjitena/

Nirvāpitah sakala eva raņe ripūņām

Dharajalaistrijagati jvalitah pratapah//, in which, as he says, the relation of similarity, subsisting between the contextual king and the non-contextual Lord Indra is brought into light through Vyanjanā: Viśvanatha quotes the verse:

Durgālanghitavigraho manasijam sammīlayamstejasā Prodyadrājakalo grhītagarimā viśvagvrto bhogibhih/ Nakṣatreśakṛtekṣaṇo girigurau gāḍhām rūcim dhārayan

Gamākramya vibhūtibhūsitatanūrājatyumāvallabhah//, in which, as he explains, the relation of similarity existing between the contextual king and the non-contextual Lord Mahādeva is comprehended through Vyanjanā. Appaya Dīksita of much later date holds a view which is somewhat different from the traditional view, held by the Dhyani Theorists. While such great masters as Abhinavagupta, Mammata and Viśvanātha hold that both the non-contextual itself and the relation which it bears to the contextual are conveyed through Vyanjana, Appyaya thinks that, the idea of relation alone is brought into light through Vyanjana. When from a particular homonym, Prakrta and Aprakrta ideas are cognised, he argues, both of them are equally conveyed through Abhidha, -the restrictive force of factors like conjunction, disjunction etc. as enumerated by Bhartrhari being logically unjustifiable. The non-contextual, he asserts, is not suggested as the followers of Mammata would have it: what Vyanjana actually causes is the apprehension of the relation only, which links the two apparently isolated ideas.20

Jagannatha raises an interesting point here. He argues that, the illustrations cited before are not examples of Dhyani, but are specimens of Gunībhūtavyangya. A close parallel of this case, he continues, is to be found in an instance of the poetic figure Samāsokti, in which the behaviour of the Aprakrta is superimposed on the Prakrta through the use of multimeaninged adjectives, applicable to both: just as in that type of Samāsokti, the unexpressed behaviour of the Aprakrta goes to embellish the beauty of the expressed Prakrta, similarly, in these examples also, he points out, the unexpressed idea of similarity goes to augment the beauty of the expressed contextual.21 The argument that, in these illustrations the suggested simile does not go to impart beauty to the contextual-is untenable, since it tantamounts to sheer denial of truth, in as much as, all connoisseurs of Poetic Art realise this within the heart of their hearts. Moreover by applying the same argument it is possible to assert that in Samāsokti also, the suggested Aprakrta does not go to beautify the expressed Prakrta, and

consequently, an example of Samāsokti is not a specimen of Gunzbhūtavyangya, as it is supposed to be by the learned Dhyanikara, but rather is a specimen of Dhyanikavya. Equally untenable is the argument that a case of the poetic figure Samāsokti is completely different from that of Sabdaśaktimūladhvani, because while in the former the noun is not a homonym, in the latter it is so, and hence, the particular poetic figure and the particular type of Dhvani do not meet on a common platform. And this is so, since this course of reasoning does not go to establish the proposition that in Sabdaśaktimūladhvani the unexpressed simile does not impart beauty to the expressed contextual: the simple fact that the noun also is a homonym does not go to render the suggested idea one of paramount importance and consequently, does not go to convert the expressions into specimens of Dhvanikavya. The opponents, Jagannatha continues, might try to defend their position by pointing out that, as in those expressions multi-meaninged words are used with the specific purpose of bringing the relation of similarity into comprehension, which being a figure is more charming than a sheer unembellished fact, it is not possible for the suggested simile to render itself subordinate to the expressed contextual (Lord Siva or King as the case may be): in support of their contention, they might cite the observation of the learned Dhyanikara that those specimens of Poetry in which figures are suggested by sheer facts constitute clear cases of Dhvani, since in such cases the unexpressed necessarily excels the expressed in charm. As in Samāsokti, however, the behaviour of the Aprastuta, which is a fact,—and not a figure—is conveyed through suggestion, it necessarily renders itself subservient to the expressed Prastuta, which is ornamented by it. Thus the contention of the opponents is this that, while an instance of the poetic figure Samāsokti is a specimen of Gunzblūtavyaigya, an instance of Sabdaśaktimūla-dhvani is definitely a specimen of Dhvani. In reply to this contention, Jagannatha maintains that, citation of even hundreds of observations of ancients and thousands of parallelisms does not go to establish a proposition, which is not backed by strong

argument and sound logic. The point that as the intention of the poet, composing those verses is to bring the relation of similarity into light, so the suggested figure necessarily excels the expressed content in beauty-is meaningless, since the real aim of the poet is delineation of an emotional mood and consequently, what is of paramount importance is an emotional mood, and not a figure: thus, the application of this argument, Jagannatha says, is likely to render the expressions cited before specimens of Rasadhvani, and not of Alamkara-dhvani, as the Dhvani Theorists claim them to be. 22 Panditaraja anticipates another objection to his conclusion that, the expressions, cited as examples of Alamkara-dhvani of Śabdaśakti-mūla variety are in reality specimens of Gunībhūtavyangya. It is possible, he argues, to point out that, an Upamā is comprised of three elements, namely the object of description (Upameya), the standard of comparison (Upamana) and the common attribute (Sadharana-dharma), and thus, has no existence separate from any one of them: in the expression and verses quoted before, though similarity goes to augment the beauty of the object of description, yet Upama itself cannot be regarded as doing so, because an Upamā cannot be conceived without an Upameya, which is comprehended within the figure itself. A similar case is to be found in the case of the poetic figure Samāsokti, where though the suggested Aprastuta goes to embellish the expressed Prastuta, yet the figure as a whole is not regarded as doing so, because it is comprised of both Prastuta and Aprastuta and is incomplete without either of them. In reply to this, Jagannatha asserts that, as Upama and Samasokti sail on the same boat and bear close resemblance to each other, it is proper to recognise both of them either as specimens of Dhvani or as specimens of Gunībhūtavyanaya. 28

Nāgeśa, the astute commentator, who defends the earlier theorists on many issues attempts to defend them on this issue also. In the verses, cited as illustrations of *Upamā-dhvani*, he maintains, the suggested simile being an excitant or an *Uddīpana-vibhāva* is more attractive than the expressed sense, which is comprised of *Ālambana-vibhāva*, and hence they consti-

tute specimens of Alamkara-dhvani: compared to Rasa, however, this Alamkara is subordinate, since Rasa alone constitutes the centre of gravity of all poetic creations. In Samāsokti on the other hand, comprehension of the idea of suggested noncontextual is essential for the establishment of the primary sense, and hence, it is proper to regard an example of this poetic figure as a specimen of Gunībhūtavyangya. Thus, Nāgeśa attempts to refute the contention of Panditaraja that Upamadhvani and Samāsokti sail on the same boat by pointing out that, there is a marked difference between the two, but he creates a great confusion by observing at the same breath that, those cases of Samāsokti, where the unexpressed is more attractive than the expressed, being more intimately related to the emotional mood in question are capable of being recognised as specimens of Dhvani, as well: this statement practically revives the argument of Jagannatha that, Upama and Samasokti meet on a common platform. In reply to the point that, how is it proper to regard the poetic figure Upamā itself as a suggested entity, when one of its elements—the Upameya is conveyed through denotation, Nagesa says that, the term Alamkaradhvani does not refer to suggestion of the figure itself, but to suggestion of a charm, caused by a figure.24

Though at the first sight, Jagannātha's new doctrine, going against the established tradition of the Alamkārikas causes our admiration and wonder, yet it is difficult to accept it. It is not that the factor which differentiates a case of Śabdaśaktimūlopamādhvani from that of the poetic figure Samāsokti is simply the use of double-meaninged noun in the former,—a noun, which is conspicuous by its absence in the latter: the two differ in their essential qualities also. In the poetic figure Samāsokti, the Aprakṛta, which is brought into light through the function of suggestion constitutes the very substratum of the behaviour of the same Aprakṛta, which is superimposed on the Prakṛta, because it is not possible for an attribute to reside without its substratum, and consequently, the suggested content renders its own self necessary for the establishment of the expressed one: here the explicit and the implicit ideas do not

seem to be totally disconnected, because, as has been pointed out, the former depends completely for its establishment on the latter. In the Śabdaśaktimūladhvani, on the other hand, the non-contextual, along with its peculiar attributes is conveyed through the function of suggestion and neither the expressed depends for its existence on the suggested, nor does the latter owe its existence to the former: here the relation of similarity, linking the contextual with the non-contextual is comprehended subsequently, in order that cognition of two independent ideasthe explicit and the implicit-may not lead to apprehension of two different propositions, one presenting the contextual and the other the non-contextual. This relation of similarity is comprehended through Vyanjana, since words, denotative or indicative of the idea of similitude are not there. As this relation of similarity does not help the expressed sense in any way to establish its own self, which is independent of the former, it is not correct to place Śabdaśaktimūloyamādhvani with Samāsokti on a common platform, and to observe that both exemplify Gunībhūtavyangya type of Poetry. The argument that in Śabdaśaktimūlopamādhvani, the suggested content is subordinate, because the very charm of the specimen of Poetic Art owes its existence to it and as such a case of this type of Poetry is Gunībhūtavyangya-kāvya is misleading, since it converts a Gunībhūtavyangya, which is regarded as a Poetry of mediocre type by all Dhyanivadins into a Poetry of the best type. Thus the arguments, advanced by Jagannatha, however ingenious they might be, are not in the least convincing: Śabdaśaktimūladhvani and Samāsokti do not sail, as is maintained by him, on the same boat: while the former represents the best type of Poetic creation, the latter exemplifies Poetry of mediocre type.

Jagannātha leaves the beaten track of the Ālaṃkārikas on another point also: he asserts that in the stanzas: 'Ullāsya' etc. or 'Durgā' etc., what is cognised through  $Vya\~njan\=a$  is the poetic figure  $R\=upaka$ , based on comprehension of identity between the contextual and the non-contextual,—and not the figure of speech  $Upam\=a$ , based on that of similarity between the

two, as is commonly supposed to be. In a case of the poetic figure Ślesa, he says, complete identity between two concepts, presented by the same word-unit is understood by all appreciators of Poetry: in such a case the cause which leads to cognition of this idea of identity is the use of the same word-unit to signify both the concepts. What happens in case of Slesa occurs in case of Sabdaśaktimula-dhvani, also, where multi-meaninged words are used in the same way as in the former: here, too, sameness of word or expression leads to understanding of identity between the two concepts, presented through the same sound-unit. Thus the expressions and stanzas cited by the learned predecessors as illustrations of Upamadhvani of Sabdaśaktimula type, he maintains, are in reality examples of Rupakadhvani. The argument that, there is a lot of difference between a case of Slesa and that of Śabdaśaktimūla-dhvani, because while in the former. two ideas are conveyed simultaneously through the function of denotation and as such are cognised at the same time, in the latter, one is conv yed through the function of suggestion in contradistinction to he other which is brought out through the function of denotation and as such the comprehension of which occurs after that of the latter-is without any force, since neither the fact that Vyanjana brings one of the ideas into light nor the condition that the cognition of the suggested non-contextual follows that of the expressed contextual is able to impede the comprehension of the sense of identity between the two concepts. Equally weightless is the argument that, as Rupaka is nothing but Upama, characterised by non-comprehension of distinction between the object of description and the standard of comparison. its cognition is always preceded by that of Upama, which furnishes its very basis and consequently, it is proper to regard such stanzas as illustrations of Upamā-dhvani. And this is so, because the simple fact that a knowledge is derived first leads more to its rejection than to its acceptance. This happens in case of an erroneous knowledge, which though generated first is dismissed subsequently by a right notion: thus the knowledge of silver is removed as soon as the real thing-the piece of nacre is cognised and in a similar manner, that of the snake is

dismissed as soon as the rope is known. Hence, Jagannātha concludes, there is no force in the observation of some of the commentators on Kāvyaprakāśa that, as the cognition of  $R\overline{u}paka$  is based on that of  $Upam\overline{a}$ , the relation which connects the contextual and the non-contextual in the expressions and stanzas cited before is that of similarity: what effects this connection in these cases, he asserts, is the relation of identity, and not of similarity: to state clearly, these are instances of  $R\overline{u}paka-dhvani$ , and not of  $Upam\overline{a}dhvani$ .

SUB-TYPES OF POETRY

While Jagannatha regards these cases as instances of Rupakadhvani, Mammata and Viśvanātha are of opinion that, these furnish illustrations of Upamadhvani: these, they think, are characterised by cognition of similarity between the contextual and the non-contextual, which possess such attributes as are capable of being conveyed through the same expression. When such great masters as Mammata, Viśvanātha and Jagannātha differ amongst one another, it becomes very difficult for us to accept one or other of the views, but the view-point of Mammata and Visvanatha seems to be more sound, being based on logic and conforming to the experience of appreciators of Poetry. The argument of Jagannatha that, the knowledge, which is derived first is dismissed by a knowledge gathered subsequently is applicable in case of an erroneous knowledge only, and not in the case of comprehension of Upamā and Rūpaka; the idea of a sanke is certainly removed by that of the rope, but the notion of Upama in these illustrations is not dismissed by that of Rupaka. Hence that argument is too weak to establish the proposition of Jagannatha that, the stanzas cited before are examples of Rupakadhvani. In those stanzas, the comprehension of similarity and identity, both are likely to ensue from the use of the same word in order to express the attributes pertaining to the contextual and the non-contextual: yet it is proper to regard those as being characterised by cognition of similarity, and necessarily as instances of Upamādhvani. And the reason is this. Those cases where both the object of description and the standard of comparison are present as possessed of similar attributes and where the sense of similarity is not clearly

expressed through words denotative or indicative of it are regarded as instances of Upamadhvani, whereas those cases, where attributes belonging really to the standard of comparison alone are mentioned, -the said standard of comparison itself remaining unmentioned—are recognised as instances of Rupakadhvani. In the stanzas cited before, the attributes, presented through multi-meaninged adjectives do not appear as pertaining to the non-contextual standard of comparison alone: in fact, in the first instance, they appear as belonging to the contextual object of description and it is only at a later stage after the comprehension of the non-contextual through Vyanjana that. they seem as belonging to that standard of comparison, as well. Thus as the common attribute is applicable to both the object of description and the standard of comparison, - and not to the standard of comparison alone, in the examples quoted before, it is proper to maintain that the figure comprehended through  $Vya\overline{n}jan\overline{a}$  in those cases is  $Upam\overline{a}$ , and not  $R\overline{u}paka$ , or in other words to regard those stanzas as specimens of Upamalhvani, as the ancients do, -and not as specimens of Rupakadhvani, as Jagannatha thinks.

The learned Dhvanikāra maintains that, other relations like contradiction, excellence and sequence, consisting the basis of the poetic figures Virodhābhāsa, Vyatireka and Yathāsaṃkhya respectively are capable of being conveyed through suggestion besides similarity, as already noted in Śabdaśaktimūla type of Dhyani.<sup>25</sup> Thus in the verse of Sūryaśataka:

Kham ye'tyujjvalayanti lūnatamaso yevā nakhodbhāsino
Ye puṣṇanti saroruhaśriyamapi kṣiptābjabhāsaśca ye /
Ye murdhasvavabhāsinah kṣitibhṛtām ye cāmarānām śirām
syākrāmantyubhaye'pi te dinapateh pādāh śriye santu vah //
the excellence of the solar rays over the feet of the anthropomorphic deity is comprehended through Vyañjanā, and accordingly, it affords an example of Vyatirekadhvani. It is silly to
point out that in the stanza quoted before, the suggested idea of
excellence qua the poetic figure 'Vyatireka is subservient to the
sense of deep love which the poet bears for the Sun God and
consequently the poetic figure is not competent to bestow the

status of Dhyani on the stanza under consideration. Firstly, as in the stanza the poet wants to give merely a graphic description of the Sun, the love which he bears for the anthropomorphic deity is not cognised at all; secondly, all the Dhyani Theorists agree in extending recognition as Dhyani Kayva to such pieces of poetic creation as are characterised by manifestation of suggested fact and imaginative mood, simply because of the fact that, such implicit ideas excel the explicit idea in charm, even though, they, in their turn, are excelled by suggested emotional mood in point of beauty. The argument that in order to constitute an instance of Vastudhvani or Alamkaradhvani, the suggested fact or figure must excel the suggested Rasa in charm is likely to wipe away the scopes of these two types of Dhvanikavya completely, because in all specimens of poetic Art Rasa being of paramount importance is subservient to none. Jagannatha makes this point clear in his dissertation on Śablaśaktimūla-dhvani.26 Thus in the view of Anandavardhana, in Śab laśaktimūla-dhvani, there necessarily exists an apprehension of unexpressed relation to link the two apparently discrete ideas, or in other words all instances of this type of Dhvani are instances of Alamkara-dhvani.

Over the correctness of the term 'Alamkara-dhvani', rhetoricians expend much of their thoughts and energies. It is pointed out that, the designation Alamkara-dhvani seems, at the first sight, to be a contradiction in terms, in as much as. so long as an attribute remains an instrument of decoration, it does not attain the status of Dhvani or the soul of Poetry and once it attains the status of Dhvani it is converted into an Alamkarya and, no longer remains an Alamkara. An Alamkara is defined as an attribute, which pertains primarily to sound or sense, which constitutes the body of Poetry, but at the same time goes to promote Rasa, or in other words, to heighten aesthetic effect. This very conception of an Alamkara is sufficient enough to bring out its subsidiary character; being attributes of word and meaning, it cannot supersede them: nor can it supersede Rasa being the means employed to bring that suggested content into light. Thus the state of a poetic figure and that of an unexpressed idea of paramount importance being mutually opposed the designation 'Alam'a aradhvani' becomes meaningless. Mammata tries to defend the correctness of the term by putting forward the analogy of 'a Brahmin monk' in explaining which Govinda says that, just as a Buddhist monk, who was a Brahmin before renunciating worldly life is referred to as a Brahman vśramana, similarly an element which was an Alamkara before being brought into comprehension through suggestion is referred to by the term 'Alam'ara-dhvani'. Govinda observes that, though a suggested element, attaining the status of Dhvani being brought out prominently through the function of suggestion no longer remains an instrument of decoration and necessarily a poetic figure, yet it is called an Alamkara only secondarily, since it resembles a poetic figure, being endowed with the capacity to beautify sound and sense in some cases: thus, according to him, the term, under consideration is capable of being explained away by taking recourse to Indication.27 This explanation of Mammata and Govinda, however, does not seem to be satisfactory: the parallelism of a Brahmin monk is not applicable to an 'Alamkara-dhvani'; before his conversion to Buddhism, the Śramana was certainly a Brahmana, but befo e its signification through the function of suggestion, the imaginative mood did not exist at all, -not to speak of promoting Rasa through the embellishment of sound and sense. For this reason, Jagannatha puts forward another suggestion: he cites the parallelism of 'a bracelet in a box', and says that, just as a bracelet is called an Alamkara through courtesy, even though it is always kept in a box and never put on the body, similarly an imagnative mood, when brought into light through the function of suggestion is named an Alamkara per favour even though it does not go to beautify sound and sense, constituting the body of Poetry.28 This analogy is an improvement on the one. introduced by Mammata, but, nevertheless, it is not to be drawn to its logical extreme, in as much as, there is a lot of difference between a Manjusa-kataka and an Alamkara-dhvani. The bracelet possessess the capacity of adorning the body, but the suggested imaginative mood does not: it decorates nothing,

—neither the word nor its meaning. In spite of all this, the Alamkārikas retain the term 'Alamkāra-dhvani' out of deference to past tradition and prolonged usage, established by ancients.

Mammața is the first critic to recognise Vastudhvani of Śabdaśakimūla variety: he observes that, in this type of Dhvani, not only an imaginative mood, but a sheer fact, also, is capable of being conveyed through suggestion. As an illustration of this class of Poetry he cites the Prākṛta Gāthā:

'Panthia na ettha sattharamatthi manam pattharatthale game/ Unnapaoharam pekkhia una jai vasasi ta vasa//, in which, context restricts the denotation of the terms 'satthara' and 'paohara' to the meanings of shelter and cloud respectively, as a result of which the idea of absence of a suitable shelter in the village and the inadvisability of halting there at a time when the sky is overcast with clouds is brought into light through Abhidha. Subsequently owing to the use of multimeaninged terms pointed before, the idea that, the residents of the village are blissfully ignorant of erotics and as such, there is every possibility of wanton enjoyment with the youthful girl of easy virtues going on unobstructed—is conveyed through suggestion: according to Mammata, the suggested fact is the intention of the speaker that, the wayfarer may halt here if he is able to enjoy. Viśvanātha endorses the view of Mammata, but Ruyyaka differs from him and maintains that, the Prakrta Gāthā quoted before furnishes really an example of Ubhayaśaktimulavastudheani, and not of Śabdaśaktimulavastudhvani. He thinks that in the verse under consideration, also, there exists apprehension of a relation between the non-contextual and contextual ideas; this relation, however, is different from that of similarity or contradiction: it is that which exists between an indicator and an indicated. Here the expressed contextual indicates the unexpressed non-contextual, and it does so, because it is endowed with the capacity to do it. This capacity, Ruyyaka continues, is nothing other than such factors as speciality of the speaker, person spoken to, place, time and the like. Thus it is clear that in the verse under

consideration, the suggested content is brought into light not only per force of word, but per force of meaning, as well, to which capacity to suggest the unexpressed idea is imparted by such factors as speciality of the speaker and the person spoken to: the suggested sense is certainly not comperhended by one, who is unaware of the antecedents of the speaker. Consequently, Ruyyaka concludes, the stanza illustrates Vastudhvani of Ubhayaśaktimula type, and not of Śabdaśaktimula type. It is for this reason, he observes, the learned Dhyanikara does not recognise Vastudhvani of Śabdaśaktimūla type. 29 It is curious to note that, though in this strain Ruyyaka criticies Mammata for regarding Vastudhvani as a variety of Śabdaśaktimūladhvani in his commentary called Kavyaprakaśasamketa, in his Alamkarasarvasva, he himself justifies the separate existence of this category of Poetry. 30 Jayaratha, the commentator on Alamkarasarvasya notices this incongruency between the two views of Ruyyaka as stated in two different places and in his eagerness to reconcile them says that, the criticism of Ruyyaka relates only to the particular Prakrta Gatha, cited as an illustration by Mammata, -and not to the category of Śabdaśaktimūlavastudhvani in general. Ruyyaka, he continues, certainly extends recognition to this type of Dhvani; what he challenges is the correctness of Mammata's example, which, as he says, really illustrates Vastudhvani of Sabdaśaktimūla type. 81 Though Jayaratha tries to reconcile the incongruity between the views of Ruyyaka, these incoherent observations betray clearly his hesitancy to grant recognition to Sabdaśaktimūla. Possibly Ruyyaka finds a strong logic in the conclusion of Anandavardhana that all instances of Śabdaśaktimūladhvani are instances of Alamkaradhvani. And the logic is this. The explanation that in Vastudhvani of this category two unconnected and unrelated meanings are cognised from the same sentence constrains us to construe a single sentence as two different sentences, which is an unusual and complex procedure. The point put forward to avoid this objection,—the point that in such cases, some relation either of similarity or of identity is comprehended between the two ideas-renders such cases instances of Alamkaradhvani, and not of Vastudhvani. It is perhaps to avoid this criticism that, Anandavardhana and Abhinavagupta do not make any mention of Vastudhvani under Śabdaśaktimūla category of poetry.

Jagannātha meets this objection cleverly: with astounding polemics he establishes the existence of Śabdaśaktimūlavastudhvani. As an illustration of this variety of Poetry, he cites the stanza:

'Rajño matpratikulanme mahadbhayamupasthtitam/

Bale varava panthasya vasadanavidhanatah //, in which the function of denotation brings out the idea of the request meted out to the village-girl by the traveller to give him shelter and thus to protect him from the angry King: subsequently, it is pointed out, the idea that, as the wayfarer is unable to stand the sight of the moon and its other associates, separated as he is from his consort, it behoves the village-girl to have dalliance with him. Towards the manifestation of this unexpressed content, Jagannatha observes, the double-meaninged term 'Rajan' pays maximum contribution, in as much as, replacement of this word by any of its synonymns obstructs the cognition of the said suggested sense: hence this Dhvani is of Sabdaśaktimūla type. The point that in this stanza, also, what is comprehended is the relation of similarity or that of identity between the King and the moon and accordingly, this verse, as well, furnishes an illustration of Alamkaradhvani-is untenable, because here of the two ideas, apprehended through homonymous words, one is intended to be merely covertly hinted at, instead of being plainly stated and the other serves as a cloak to hide the former and consequently, both the ideas are not cognised at the same time: when the expressed meaning, intended to conceal the suggested sense is known, the latter to hide which the former is presented is not cognised and once when the concealed sense is comprehended, the knowledge of the explicit idea ceases to exist. For this reason, the relation of identity or that as existing between an object of description and a standard of comparison, which is established between two entities cognised simultaneously is incapable of being placed beyond dispute between the expressed and unexpressed sense-units in the present case. 32 The objection that, such a course of reasoning leads to construction of two different sentences is not applicable here, because the question of interpreting a single proposition as two different propositions arises only in those cases where the two unrelated meanings are of equal prominence. In the present case, however, the expressed merely serves as a cloak to hide the unexpressed and as such the two ideas do not stand on an equal footing. Hence, Jagannatha concludes, postulation of Vastudhvani under the head of Sabdaśaktimula variety is absolutely correct. The silence of Anandavardhana and Abhinavagupta regarding Vastudhvani of this type, it is evident, is not to be taken to mean that this class of Pootry is impossible and unauthorised. The learned Dhvanikara and his astute commentator, it is true, do not mention this class: but they only point out the way, leaving it to the connoisseurs of Poetic Art to work out the details and discover many more sub-varieties of Dhvani, In fact, Anandavardhana explicitly states that there are several other sub-types of Śabdaśaktimuladhvani, and it is for the appreciators of Poetry to discover them. 3 8 Hence, it is not possible to bring such a charge against Mammata, Viśvanātha and Jagannātha that, by extending recognition to Sabdaśaktimūlavastudhvani they have deviated from established tradition, built up by the ancients.

While in Śabdaśaktimūladhvani the change of the homonymn or homonyms used is accompanied by the absence of the implicit idea and as such the sound-element is of more importance, in Arthaśaktimūladhvani it is the matter that is more important than the words expressive of it: in it a knowledge of speciality of the speaker, person spoken to, context and such other factors besides that of the matter itself is absolutely necessary for the comprehension of the unexpressed content. Anandavardhana classifies this type of Dhvani into three categories according as the idea which brings the unexpressed into light is objectively possible or is invented by the poet's own imaginative faculty or is brought into being by the imagination of a character, created by the Muse of the Poet. Without trying to justify the plausibility of the above classi-

fication, Mammata follows Anandavardhana closely and speaks of twelve sub-types of this variety of Dhyani; the number is fixed at twelve, because as he says, the matter which suggests may take the form either of a Vastu or of an Alamkara and the suggested idea, also, may in its turn appear either in the aspect of a fact or in that of an imaginative mood. In his Kavyaprakasasamketa Ruyyaka attempts to justify this scheme of classification, adopted by Mammata. In reply to the possible question as to why the suggested sense is not classified into three categories—that which is objectively possible and so on—, when the idea which suggests is classified so, Ruyyaka observes, the question of arranging the suggested meaning under three heads does not arise, because the character of that idea has no bearing on manifestation of the implied meaning itself. With the character of the expressed, which brings the unexpressed into light, however, the case is completely different: the nature of the suggestor exercises great influence not only on the form of the suggested, but on the process of suggestion, as well. In some cases, the expressed brings out a particular suggested, only because it is presented by the imagination of a character, introduced by the poet; when presented by the poet himself the same idea fails to bring out the particular suggested sense: and even when it is introduced by the imaginative faculty of a character, created by the Poet's Muse it does not bring any other implicit idea into comprehension. All these go to show that the nature of the expressed is as much auxiliary to cognition of the suggested sense, as is the knowledge of context, time, place etc. Hence, Mammata is perfectly right in classifying suggestion based on material significance into three categories according to the difference in the character of the expressed matter alone, which goes to convey the unexpressed. 38 Following the footsteps of Ruyyaka, Viśvanatha, also accepts without challenge Mammata's scheme of classification of Arthaśaktimūladhvani: the divisions of this Dhyani, according to these thinkers, are as follows:

(1) suggestion of a fact by a fact, which is objectively possible

- (2) suggestion of a figure by a fact, which is objectively possible
- (3) suggestion of a fact by a figure, which is objectively possible
- (4) suggestion of a figure by a figure, which is objectively possible
- (5) suggestion of a fact by a fact, which owes its existence to the imagination of the Poet
- (6) suggestion of a figure by a fact, which owes its existence to the imagination of the Poet
- (7) suggestion of a fact by a figure, created by the Poet's imagination
- (8) suggestion of a figure by a figure, created by the Poet's imagination
- (9) suggestion of a fact by a fact, which owes its existence to the Imagination of a character, created by the Poet's Muse
- (10) suggestion of a figure by a fact, which owes its existence to the Imagination of a character, created by the Poet's Muse
- (11) suggestion of a fact by a figure, created by Imagination of a character, who himself is a creature of the Poet's Intuition
- (12) suggestion of a figure by a figure, created by Imagination of a character, who is a creature of Poetic Intuition. 34

As an illustration of an expressed idea, which resides in the outside world, as well, and does not exist in the realm of the Poet's imagination alone, Anandavardhana quotes the stanza:

Evam vādini devarsau pāršve pituradhomukhī /

Līlākamalapatrāņi gaņayāmāsa Pārvatī //, where the counting of lotus-petals, it is pointed out, conveys the idea of bashfulness; the suggestiveness of this type of matter, Abhinavagurta remarks, is irrespective of any poetic description and imaginative remoulding. As an example of an expressed idea, which owes its suggestiveness to a new shape given to it by imagination of the Poet, he cites the Prākṛta Gāthā:

Sajjei surahimāso ņa dāva appai juaijaņalakkhamuhe /

Ahiṇavasaharamuhe ṇavapallavapattale aṇaṅgassa śare //, where the sense that the spring-time is only arranging its shafts, which are to be aimed at ladies signifies the idea that, love-sickness, which has just now dawned in young ladies will develop gradually. In this Gāthā, Abhinavagupta observes, the expressed meaning, as invented by the Poet's own imaginative faculty brings out the desired suggested content, in as much as, the simple statement that, in spring-time the mango and other trees are rich in fresh twigs and flowers is unable to bring the intended idea into comprehension. In order to illustrate an expressed idea, which is brought into being by the imagination of some one among the characters, created by the Poet, Anandavardhana refers to the verse:

Śikharini kva nu nāma kiyacciram

Kimabhidhānamasāvakarottapah/

Taruni yena tavadharapatalam

Daśati bimbaphalam śukaśāvakah//, in which, as he says, the idea that the opportunity to taste a Bimba fruit resembling the lower lip of the lady is certainly a result of religious merit, amassed through performance of rigorous penance by the parrot conveys through suggestion the intention of the lover to please his lady-love: in explaining this, Abhinavagupta maintains, the simple statement that the parrot is biting the red Bimba fruit is unable to bring out the said implicit idea. <sup>36</sup>

It is interesting to note that Hemacandra detects the flaw inherent in this scheme, drawn originally by Ānandavardhana and endorsed by Mammaṭa, Ruyyaka and Viśvanātha: 37 he contends that, this classification is unnecessary and incongruous, inasmuch as the three above-mentioned categories of matter have the essential property of being the outcome of poetic imagination common to all: even a matter, which is objectively real does not form the subject-matter of a specimen of Poetic Art unless transfigured by the poet's imagination; and imaginative faculty of a character, created by the Poet's Muse is nothing different from imagination of the Poet. Jagannātha draws a new scheme; he observes that a matter invented by imagination

of the Poet and one invented by imaginative faculty of a character, created by the Poet, both these should be really classed under one single head and consequently, it is proper to speak of two types of matter—svatahsambhavī and kavipraudoktimātraniṣpanna. Nāgeša, however, defends the learned Dhvanikāra on this issue: commenting on the above observation of Jagannātha, he remarks that just as the prattle of a child is more attractive than the speech of an adult, similarly a matter invented by one of the Poet's creations is more charming than that invented by the Poet himself, and so the learned Dhvanikāra is perfectly right in drawing the line of demarcation between the two varieties of expressed sense-units. 39

Anandavardhana extends recognition to a third type of Samlakşyakramadhvani, in which the sound and sense-elements conjointly suggest the implicit: this type he names Śabdāratho-bhayaśaktimūladhvani; the unit of this Dhvani is a sentence or a compound expression, half the components of which are double-meaninged terms and consequently irreplaceable by synonyms, while the rest admit of substitution of synonyms in their places. Mammaṭa accepts without challenge the proposition of the learned Dhvanikāra that in addition to Śabdaśaktimūla variety of Dhvani there is another variety known as Ubhaya-śaktimūla: as an example of this, he cites the verse:

Atandracandrabharana samuddipitamanmatha/

Tārakātaralā śyāmā sānandam na karoti kam//, in which the similarity between the particular heroine and night is brought into light through suggestion. Commenting on this, Govinda observes, the verse furnishes an example of Ubhayaśaktimūla, because while such terms as 'Atandracandrā' etc., are irreplaceable by synonyms, such words as 'Samuddīpita' etc. are quite replaceable and both combine to bring out the desired suggested content. Viśvanātha follows Mammaṭa on this issue, but there are others who are brave enough to strike a note of discordance. That the propriety of Ānandavardhana's scheme of classification formed the content of anxious thoughts of many Ālamkārikas is evident from the attempt made by some of the commentators on Kāvyaprakāśa to differentiate the scope of

Ubhayasaktimuladhvani from that of Dhyani of Sabdasaktimula variety. While in the Prakrta Gatha: 'Panthia na' etc. quoted as an example of Śabdaśaktimūladhvani, only two terms 'satthara' and 'payohara', which are irreplaceable by their synonyms play a prominent part in the matter of suggesting the implicit, the expressed matter playing only a second fiddle to it, in the stanza: 'Atandracandrabharana' etc., cited as an illustration of Ubhayaśaktimuladhvani, they point out, words replaceable by their synonyms and those which are incapable of being so replaced are evenly balanced, the number of each type being four -and the sound and the sense-elements combine to suggest the unexpressed. This defence of Ubhayaśaktimūladhvani, however is extremely weak, because the Dhvani Theorists themselves maintain that in every case the sound and the sense-elements conjointly suggest the implicit: the argument that the Prakrta Gāthā referred to above is recokned as an instance of Śabdaśaktimula, because in it two words do not admit of replacement of synonyms-makes all the more intense and legitimate the claim of the stanza, cited as an example of Ubhayaśaktimuladhvani. in which as many as four words are irreplaceable by their synonyms to be regarded as an instance of Sabdaśaktimūladhvani. Hemacandra gathers sufficient courage to go against the established tradition and to point out the inherent weakness of the classification, drawn by the ancients. He maintains that, the much-talked of Ubhayaśaktimūla of the ancients is nothing other than Śabdaśaktimūla, because there also a prominent role is played by the sound-element, without which the sense-element fails to bring the desired suggested content into light: accordingly, he cites the stanza, quoted by the ancients to exemplify Ubhayaśaktimūladhvani as an illustration of Śabdaśaktimūla-dhvani. 41 The view-point of the ancients once again finds a staunch supporter in Jagannatha, who defend their scheme with seemingly strong arguments: with meticulous care he draws the line of demarcation between the scopes of these three varieties of Samla ksyakramadhvani and shows that a case of Ubhayaśaktimula is not an instance of admixture of Sablasaktimula and Arthasaktimula.

Though Mammata accepts Anandavardhana's classification of

Samlakşyakramadhvani and extends recognition to a third variety known as Ubhayaśaktimūla he differs from his learned predecessor on the question of the nature of the suggested content in this variety. Anandavardhana does not give any example of Ubhayaśaktimūla type of Dhvani, but he cites a stanza in order to illustrate an exception to it: the stanza runs as follows:

Dṛṣṭyā keśava! goparāgahṛṭaya kiñcinna dṛṣṭam mayā

Tenaiva skhalitāsmi nātha! patitām kim nāma nālambase/ Ekastvam visamesu khinnamanasām sarvāvalānām gati-

rgopyaivam gaditah saleśamavatāt gosthe harirvaściram42// Commenting on this Abhinavagupta observes that the use of the word 'saleśam' meaning 'covertly' gives a fresh impetus to the function of denotation in conveying the idea that Kṛṣṇa should shower favour on the particular milk-maid by allowing her the pleasure of his company, -an idea, which otherwise would have been communicated through the function of suggestion, rendering the specimen of poetic Art an illustration of Ubhayaśaktimuladhvani. The idea, as pointed out by Abhinavagupta, which would have been conveyed through Vyanjanā is the intention of the milk-maid,—in the language of Indian Poetics—a Vastu, Hence the observations of the learned Dhvanikara and his commentator reveal that both of them are of opinion that a sheer unembellished fact is capable of being comprehended through suggestion in this variety of Dhvani. Ruyyaka endorses this view, as is evident from his remark that, the verse: 'Panthia na' etc. really furnishes an illustration of Vastudhvani of Ubhayaśaktimula variety. It is interesting to note that though Mammata, and following him Viśvanatha include Vastudhvani as one of the varieties of Śabdaśaktimūladhvani, both of them maintain that a poetic figure alone is capable of being suggested conjointly by sound and sense-elements, or in other words, a case of Ubhayaśaktimūladhvani is always an instance of Alamkaradhvani: in it a fact brings a figure into light through the function of suggestion.43

The learned Dhyanikara pronounces a note of caution in this connection: the idea conveyed through suggestion per force of word or of meaning or of both sound and sense, he asserts, should never be expressed in any form by the function of denotation: when the sense suggested through Sabdaśakti or Arthaśakti or Ubhayaśakti is again expressed in words, the piece under consideration is reduced to a mere poetic figure from the status of Dhvani or if there be any asamlakṣyakramadhvani besides the suggested sense in question, the latter becomes a sort of embellishment, somewhat different from the common poetic figures and enhances the effect of the emotional mood depicted. And this happens, because in such a case the very essence of Dhvani, which consists in charm of the unexpressed content springing from its concealment is jeopardized.

As the Dhyani theorists lay stress on the fact that, in a Dhvanikavya the unexpressed content should remain concealed and thus should not be capable of being comprehended by one. not initiated into the hieroglyphics of Poetry, they maintain that, a piece of poetic creation in which the suggested sense is clear and consequently capable of being cognised by all constitutes a specimen of Gunībhūtavyangya. Mammata classifies this type of Poetry into eight sub-types according to the character. of the suggested sense, presented in the piece, the cases of the eight varieties being as follows: (a) where the suggested sense is as clear as the expressed one and is capable of being cognised by ordinary persons as well, (b) where the suggested sense becomes a sort of embellishment and goes to enhance either the effect of the emotional mood or the charm of the expressed or other unexpressed units, (c) where the expressed is supported by the suggested, (d) where the suggested is so concealed that, it is not possible even for refined appreciators to catch it, (e) where doubt exists as to the prominence of the expressed or the unexpressed, (f) where these two ideas stand on an equal footing in respect of prominence, (g) where the unexpressed is presented by modulation of voice and (h) where the implicit is by its very nature unattractive. 45 Viśvanātha accepts this classification and quotes except in one or two cases. the same stanzas, cited by Mammata as examples of these types of Poetry. As an illustration of the first sub-type of Gunībhūtavyanīya, Mammata quotes the verse:

Yasyāsuhrt krtatiraskrtiretya taptasūcīvadhavyatikareņa yunakti karņau/

Kañcīguņagrathanabhājanameṣa so'smi Jībanna samprati bhavāmi kimāvahāmi//, in which

the expression:  $J\bar{\imath}vanna\ bhav\bar{a}mi'$  conveys through indication the idea that, the life of the speaker is not worth-living and the purpose for taking recourse to Indication is to bring home the point that, for him death is a boon: this suggested sense, Mammata thinks, is as clear as the expressed, capable as it is of being understood even by ordinary men. As an example of the second sub-type, i.e.  $Gun\bar{\imath}bh\bar{\imath}utavyanjya$  of  $Apar\bar{a}nja$  variety, he cites the stanza:

Ayam sa raśanotkarṣī pīnastanavimardanaḥ/ Nābhyrujaghanasparśī nīvīvisraṃsanaḥ karaḥ//;

here, he points out, the feeling of love goes to heighten the effect of the tragic emotion, inasmuch as, recollection of dalliance done with the hero, now slain in the battle-field goes to redouble the grief of his wives, or in other words the sentiment of love presents in fuller relief the poignancy of grief, and thereby enables it to attain the status of Karunarasa. Mammata is of opinion that, examples of such poetic figures as Rasavat, Preyas, Urjasvī etc. are instances of this variety of Poetry. Taking cue from the observations of Anandavardhana and Mammata, Govinda expressly states that, illustrations of the poetic figure Samasokti, as well, constitute specimens of this variety, because in all such stanzas, the expressed, as embellished by the unexpressed appears as the main source of attraction. The distinction between the second and third sub-types of Poetry which is commonly known as Vacyasiddyangyavyangya is extremely fine and so most of the commentators try to draw this line as clearly as possible. They say that, while in the second sub-type, the suggested serves as an embellishment to the expressed, established, by itself, independent of the former. in the third sub-type, it serves as the very support of the expressed, which depends entirely on it for the establishment of its own self. The verse .

Bhramimaratimalasahṛdayatām pralayam mūrcchām tamah śarīrasādam/

Maranam ca jaladabhujagajam prasahye kurute

viṣam viyoginīnām//, it is pointed out, exemplifies the third sub-variety, because the idea of poison, which is cognised through Vyanjana from the term 'Viṣa', Abhidhā of which is restricted to the sense of water serves as the very cause of establishment of the poetic figure  $R\bar{u}paka$  contained in the expression: 'Jaladabhujaga'; non-comprehension of this suggested content, Govinda observes, is likely to render the expression an example of Sandeha-samkara between  $Upam\bar{u}$  and  $R\bar{u}paka$ . As an illustration of the fourth variety of this Poetry, Viśvanātha cites a stanza in which reference is made to one King Allāvadīna who is often identified with the Muslim ruler Alauddin Khilji. The stanza runs as follows:

Sandhau sarvasvaharaṇam vigrahe prāṇanigrahah/ Allāvadīna-nrpatau na sandhir na ca vigrahah//

Commenting on this, Viśvanātha observes, the idea that conciliation and bestowal, only these two expedients are to be applied in case of the mighty emperor Alauddin is such a secret that, it is difficult to be cognised by appreciators of Poetry even: hence it illustrates Asphutavyangya type of Poetry. As an example of the fifth type, i.e. the type in which the prominence of the unexpressed forms along with that of the expressed a content of doubt, Mammata refers to the stanza:

Harastu kiñcit parivṛtta thairyaścandrodayārambha ivāmburāśiḥ/ Umāmukhe Bimbaphalādharoṣṭhe

vyāpārayāmāsa vilocanāni//, in which, as he points out, it is not clear as to whether prominence belongs to the expressed idea of gazing at the face of Pārvatī or to the suggested sense of desire to kiss: and this is so, because while the expressed is an Anubhāva of the erotic emotion, delineated in the passage, the unexpressed is a Vyabhicāribhāva of the same, and consequently, both are competent to bring the desired Rasa into comprehension, independent of each other

This type is technically known as Sandigdhaprādhānyavyangya type. In Tulyaprādhānyavyangya variety of Poetry, Mammaṭa continues, the expressed and the unexpressed are of equal prominence. Thus in the verse:

Brāhmaņātikramatyāgo bhavatāmeva bhūtaye/

Jāmadagnyastathā mitramanyathā durmanāyate//, which furnishes an example of Poetry of this variety, he points out, the expressed, namely the idea that, Paraśurama will court friendship with Ravana if he ceases to trouble the Brahmins is as much prominent as the unexpressed, namely the idea that, if Rāvaņa does not pay heed to the good counsel, tendered by Parasurama, he will annihilate the whole host of demons in the same way as he has destroyed the group of Ksatriyas: and this is so, because Paraśurama intends to press home the point that, to him both war and peace are of equal rank and that he has no special fascination for either of them: the prominence of the expressed is all the more contributed to by the mode of expression, particularly, as Govinda observes, by the use of the term 'Durmanayate'. In some cases, the implicit, presented by modulation of voice removes the incongruity of the explicit and thereby, renders it acceptable: in such cases the specimen of poetic art is known as Kakvākṣiptavyangya variety of Gunibhūtavyangya-kavya. Thus in the verse:

Mathnāmi kauravaśatam samare na kopāt

Duḥśāsanasya rudhiram na pivāmyurastah/
Samcūrnayāmi gadayā na suyodhanorū

Sandhim karotu bhavatām nrpatih panena//, the implicit idea of affirmation is cognised, as if, simultaneously with the explicit sense of negation, which being incongruous and inapplicable seems as absurd without the former. In drawing the distinction between Kakvāksiptavyangya and Vācyasiddhyangavyangya varieties of Poetry, the commentators observe, while in the former, the unexpressed removes the incongruity of the expressed, already established, in the latter the unexpressed serves as the very cause of establishment of the expressed. The Dhvani Theorists maintain that, a suggested content which by its very nature is unattractive renders a piece of poetic creation

an illustration of Gunībhūtavyanījya of Asundaravyanījya type. As an example of this variety of Poetry, Mammaṭa cites the Gāthā:

Vaņīrakudanguddīņasauņikolāhalam suņantīe/

Gharakammavāvadāe bahue sīanti aṅgāiṅ//, in which the suggested content, namely the idea that the lover, with whom an engagement was made has just now entered the grove—is not in the least charming: it is the expressed sense—the idea that the limbs of the village-girl are getting benumbed—which constitues the centre of attraction, inasmuch as, this numbness is an effect of love, which the girl bears for the village-youth and her eagerness to meet him, consequential threon.

In conclusion, Mammata maintains that, this division is not exhaustive and the different varieties of Dhvani, enumerated before are capable of being traced of Gunībhūtavyangya, as well, since the counter-instances of the former constitute instances of the latter. This, however, is to be taken with certain amount of caution, because, as Mammata points out, those cases where a fact suggests a figure are never treated as instances of Gunībhūtavyangya, but as illustrations of Dhvani alone. In support of his contention, he quotes an observation of Anandavardhana. which states that, a piece of poetic creation, in which an expressed fact brings out a suggested figure is always regarded as an instance of Dhvanikāvya, because a figure is always charming than a fact, and consequently in such a piece, the suggested necessarily excels the expressed in charm. 46 Govinda raises an interesting point here. If a figure is always charming than a fact, then how is it, he asks that a case where a figure suggests a fact is often treated as a case of Dhvani? In reply to this, he asserts, an idea, which when conveyed through suggestion appears as charming loses much of its attractiveness, when signified through denotation: experience of connoisseurs of Poetic Art, he continues, bears witness to it. Thus the very fact that, an idea is communicated through expression takes away beauty from it, while the fact that it is communicated through suggestion imparts fresh beauty to it. In a case where a figure suggests a fact, the figure being conveyed through denotation loses much of its charm and the fact, on the other hand, being brought into light through suggestion gains in beauty: and so it is perfectly right, Gobinda concludes to regard it as an instance of *Dhvani*. With a specimen of poetic art, in which a fact suggests a figure, however, the position is completely different: here the suggested figure excels without fail the expressed fact in charm, because first, a poetic figure by its very nature is more attractive than an unembellished fact and secondly it becomes all the more attractive being communicated through suggestion. It is for this reason that, Anandavardhana affirms that, such a poetic creation is always to be treated as a specimen of *Dhvanikāvya*: and Mammaţa closely follows the learned Dhvanikāra on the issue.

Following the footsteps of Anandavardhana, Mammata extends recognition to Citra as a variety of Poetry and classifies it into two types: Poetry abounding in figures of sound and Poetry abounding in figures of sense. As every content of Poetry is capable of being grouped either under Vibhava or under Anubhāva, Rasa is bound to manifest itself in each and every specimen of poetic art: still Citra variety of Poetry is described as Avyangya, because, as Mammata maintains, in this Poetry comprehension of Rasa is not clear. The two-fold classification of Citra seems to be untenable, at the first sight, because the relation between a word and its corresponding concept being inseparable, a figure, pertaining to a word ornaments the meaning, as well, and a figure, belonging to a meaning, embellishes the word, also. For this reason, Bhamaha while recording the view-points of his predecessors, according to some of whom a poetic figure pertaining to sense is a real instrument of decoration, since sense alone is related primarily to Rasa and according to others a figure belonging to sound is a true instrument of decoration since sound alone is created by a Poet, observes that, both are wrong and the correct view is this that, each type of Alamkara serves to heighten the beauty of both word and meaning, inasmuch as, a word is as much helpful to suggestion of an emotional mood as is a concept, and a meaning

is as much a creation of the Poet's muse as is its corresponding word. Thus though every Alamkāra pertains really to both sound and sense, a division is made between Poetry abounding in figures of sound and that abounding in figures of sense on the ground of prominence or subservience of either of these two types of figures of speech: in a Śabdacitrakāvya, the poetic figure belonging to sound is more prominent than that belonging to sense,—in an Arthacitrakāvya the position is just the reverse: in it the figure pertaining to sense is more prominent than that pertaining to sound. 49

# CHAPTER IV THE THEORY OF RASA

I

### **Explanation of Technical Terms:**

The postulation of Dhvani of Asamlaksyakramavyangya type leads us to the discussion on Rasa, theory relating to which forms one of the most important aesthetic foundations of Sanskrit Poetics. The starting point of all discussion is the meagre text of Rasasūtra, formulated by Bharata, whose exposition on it is as abstruse as the aphorism itself. In reply to the query. put forward by the sages as to what constitutes the essence of Rasa, which is so well-known in the circle of connoisseurs of dramatic art, Bharata places forth the famous dictum, which simply states that, Rasa is brought into being through the combination of the factors, known as Vibhava, Anubhava and Vyabhicāribhāva. The explanation of the dictum, as furnished by Bharata himself is as ambiguous and vague as the text of the dictum: it points out that, Rasa is referred to by the term Rasa, because it is relished by refined appreciators in the same way as a fine drink is relished, both having distinctive flavour of their own. Drawing this parallelism further, Bharata states, just as a nice beverage is composed through admixture of a number of ingredients, similarly Rasa is brought into being through combination of a number of Bhavas: just as, he continues, a plate of rice, the flavour of which is heightened by other cooked dishes of vegetable or fish or meat is tasted by appreciators, who derive pleasure at the time of tasting the food, in a similar manner a Sthayibhava, to which additional flavour is imparted through combination of Vibhavas, Anubhavas and Vyabhicaribhavas is relished by spectators, initiated into the hieroglyphics of drama, who derive elevated pleasure at the time of appreciating the specimen of dramatic art: hence, he

concludes, a Rasa is commonly known as Natuarasa.2 observation makes it clear that, according to Bharata, Rasa is relished by a spectator only at the time of witnessing of a theatrical performance, a corollary to which is this that, Rasa is not relished by a refined reader, as he peruses a specimen of Poetic Art, or in other words, Rasa is incapable of being presented in forms of Poetry, other than drama. Though Bharata describes Rasa in connection with drama only, the writers, affiliated to the Dhvani school give it a much more wide scope and explain Rasa not only in relation to drama, but in relation to Poetry in general. Thus Abhinavagupta relying on the observation of his venerable teachers remarks, Rasa is experienced by a refined reader, even when a drama is read out to him, but as it is relished in the same way in which it is enjoyed at the time of witnessing a theatrical performance, it is often referred to as Natyarasa. At the time of listening to the recital of a dramatic composition, a man of poetic sensibility sees, as if, the very characters present before him: as his mind by its own nature gets concentrated on the events described in the play, the necessity of presenting different characters on the stage or catering music does not arise in order to make his mind steady and free from distractions. This necessity is felt to keep the mind of an ordinary man concentrated on the incidents of a Play: as he lacks in trained intellectual powers, he is unable to imagine the presence of different personages before him and consequently stands in need of being a spectator to the imitation of the characters, done by the actors. It is for this reason that while in a specimen of dramatic art Rasa is experienced by all, in a specimen of poetic art this is relished only by persons, endowed with poetic sensibility: the observation of Bharata that, the gates of dramatic art, which as he names, the fifth Veda are thrown open to all—to Brahmanas and Sūdras alike bear testimony to it.

The ambiguity and vagueness of Bharata's aphorism, coupled with his silence on the exact nature of the relation which the  $Vibh\bar{a}va$  and other factors bear to Rasa give rise to a number of doctrines, which differ amongst themselves on the connotation

of the two most controversial terms—'Saṃyoga' and 'Niṣpatti', used in the Sūtra. Before entering into the intricacies of these doctrines, it is necessary to ascertain the meanings of the technical terms Vibhāva, Anubhāva, Vyabhicāribhāva and Sthāyi-bhāva, as understood by the ancients.

Bharata defines Bhava, the basis of Rasa as one, which brings into existence the sense of Poetry through four kinds of representation,-imitation by speech, costume, gesture and psychic changes: it is an element, which, as he says, makes one realise the main import of a Poem; he, also, explains it on authority of his learned predecessors as a particular mental condition.—a definite state of consciousness.—a feeling which is shared along with others by a refined spectator at the time of enjoying a specimen of dramatic art. Bharata speaks of three categories of Bhavas-Sthayibhava, Vyabhicaribhava and Sattvikabhava, all of which go to make the import of Poetry sensed: vet, as he puts it, it is Sthayibhava, alone, which is brought to a relishable condition through Vibhava, Anubhava and Vyabhicaribhava. Following the old method of introducing parallelisms, he says that, just as though all human beings are possessed of same limbs, yet some of them only attain kingship, others only following them and carrying out their mandates, similarly though the Sthayibhava and the Vyabhicaribhava, both are feelings, yet only the former is elevated to the status of Rasa, the latter, along with Vibhavas and Anubhavas going only to help in its proper manifestation.

The  $\bar{A}lamk\bar{a}rikas$  define a  $Sth\bar{a}yibh\bar{a}va$  as a feeling, which is incapable of being subdued by another  $Bh\bar{a}va$  whether compatible or incompatible, and which subsists in the mind for a long time: a  $Sa\bar{n}c\bar{a}ribh\bar{a}va$  or  $Vyabhic\bar{a}ribh\bar{a}va$ , on the other hand is fleeting in character and consequently is comparable to a flash of lightning; it appears and disappears during the experience of a  $Sth\bar{a}yibh\bar{a}va$ . Bharata does not try to draw any distinction between these two types of feelings, nor does he assign any reason as to why a particular feeling is regarded as a permanent one  $(Sth\bar{a}yibh\bar{a}va)$  in contradistinction to another, which is described as fleeting in character; he finishes his duty simply

by naming and defining eight Sthayibhavas and thirty-three Vyabhicaribhavas. Abhinavagupta is the first critic to maintain that, this classification of feelings is psychologically sound, and is not the product of mere caprice of the rhetoricians. The nine Sthayibhavas, he points out, exists permanently in every human mind in the form of latent impressions : they are evoked and developed by adequate causes and in proper circumstances, and when these causes and circumstances are withdrawn, they get back to their dormant conditions: Vyabhicaribhavas, on the contrary, exist only so long as the exciting causes are there and when these causes vanish, the Bhavas also cease to exist without leaving any trace whatsover behind. Abhinavagupta clarifies this difference by citing, an illustration: when, says he, the statement that 'one is fatigued' is made, the question that at once arises is 'why'?: when, on the contrary, the statement that 'Ram is full of heroism' is made, the question that arises is 'in whose presence?' The first question relates to the cause that gives rise to exhaustion and the second to the agency that brings out what already exists. This, Abhinavagupta asserts, is sufficient to show that, while a Vyabhicaribhava does not exist in the form of a latent impression, but is generated by exciting causes, a Sthayibhava exists in the form of an impression and is called into play simply by exciting causes and circumstances. The Sthayibhavas, Abhinavagupta continues, are acquired by a human being since his very birth, inasmuch as, he naturally feels sexual love for his opposite sex, experiences sorrow when something cherished or adored is destroyed, becomes angry upon one who destroys the cherished, experiences a feeling of spiritedness and consequently is prompted to do such acts as he cannot perform in the ordinary state of his consciousness, feels the dawning of fear at the sight of terrible things, experiences disgust at the perception or idea of some unwholesome or dirty object, meets with astonishment at the preception of some extra-ordinary or super-natural phenomenon, feels mirth as he preceives an incongruity in the form of an erroneous action or mutilated dress or speech etc. and experiences a feeling of

self-abasement blended with complete indifference towards worldly objects as he ponders over the transitoriness of these things. As these feelings dawn upon all human beings without a single exception, they are regarded as Sthayibhavas, the only difference between the psychological condition of one man from another being this that, while the feeling of love is predominant in one, that of fear is prominent in another, that of anger is supreme in yet another and so on. The Vyabhicaribhavas, on the other hand, Abhinavagupta maintains, are not acquired by a human being since his very birth: some of these feelings are not experienced by a man even for a single time during his whole life: thus, for instance a Yogin, addicted to an exciting drink may not experience the feeling of fatigue caused by some bodily exertion or that of inactivity from weariness and the like, -a saint, who has unearthed the mystery of the universe. may not feel pride and so on. Then again the Vyabhicarib'iavas exist only so long, as the exciting causes are there, while the Sthayibhavas continue to exist in the form of latent impressions, even when the exciting causes cease to be present. In support of this observation, Abhinavagupta quotes a statement of Patañjali, which says that, the very fact that Caitra feels attachment for a particular girl does not mean that he has aversion for others. In conclusion, Abhinavagupta remarks, the Sthayib'iavas are so many coloured strings to which remain sparsly tied the Vyabhicaribhavas having their parallels in stones of different hue: just as the colour of the string is reflected on the stones, similarly the Sthayibhavas influence considerably the Vyabhicaribhavas: then again as the stones of different shade tinge the intervening threads with their attractive hues, similarly the Vyabhicaribhavas, in their turn, influence the Sthayibhavas and render them relishable. This analogy of a garland, introduced by the learned critic shows the mutual dependence of Sthauī and Vyabhicaribhavas; the Sthavi forms the basis of the Vyabhicārī, which being completely dependent on the former bears no relation to the mind independently, but nevertheless it helps the former to attain a relishable state.6

Apart from Sthayi and Vyabhicaribhavas, Bharata speaks

of another category of Bhavas, which he names Sattvikabhavas. Hemacandra justifies this classification and observes that, Sattvikabhavas, dawning in the mind, in which the quality of goodness (Sattva) is brought into prominence are purely mental in character and are to be scrupulously distinguished from tears and perspiration, with which they are usually erroneously identified. When the feelings are experienced by a mind, in which the grossly material portion is prominent, the consciousness itself becomes benumbed and this state, he remarks, is called Stambha: - when they are realised by a mind, in which watery portion is conspicuous, the mind melts and this state is called Aśru; -when they are experienced by a mind, in which the fiery portion gains uppermost, the soul is either converted into a liquid form or it loses its original colour: the first of these two states is known as Sveda and the second as Vaivarnya,-when the feelings, he continues, are enjoyed by a mind in which the ethereal portion gains prominence, consciousness loses its very self even and this condition is known as Pralaya and when the feelings are experienced by a mind, in which the airy portion is the most conspicuous, the mind either thrills or shutters terribly or completely loses its normal tone and these states are referred to respectively by the terms Romanica. Vepathu and Svarabhanga. Paralysis, perspiration, tears etc. which are purely physical changes point out to the existence of these psychic conditions and thereby to that of such permanent feelings as love, grief and the like and therefore are nothing but Anubhavas. Hemacandra asserts that, the view expressed by him represents the conviction of the Alamkarikas affiliated to the school of Bharata.7 Though Bharata and Hemacandra draw a line of demarcation between Sattvikabhavas and their corresponding physical changes, through which they are usually brought into expression by actors and consequently which constitute Anubhavas, other Alamkarikas do not distinguish between Sattvikabhavas and Anubhavas. Thus Mammata does not grant separate recognition to Sattvikabhavas, implying thereby that they are capable of being comprehended under Anubhāvas, and Viśvanātha, though expressing this view in clear

and unambiguous language at the beginning tries to reconcile the view of Mammaṭa with that of Hemacandra by introducing the parallelism of the relation existing between a cow and a bull. A bull though identical with a male cow is different from a female cow: in a similar manner a  $S\overline{a}ttvikabh\overline{a}va$  though identical with an  $Anubh\overline{a}va$  is distinct from it, inasmuch as, it represents a state of mind, in which the quality of goodness is brought into prominence, while an  $Anubh\overline{a}va$  represents only a physical change. This attempt to justify the stand-point of both Mammaṭa and Hemacandra on the part of Viśvanātha by introducing the analogy of the relation existing between a cow and a bull shows that Viśvanātha regards  $S\overline{a}ttvikabh\overline{a}va$  as a species of the genus  $Anubh\overline{a}va$ .

While Sthayibhava and Vyabhicaribhava constitute the internal factors leading to aesthetic realisation, Vibhava and Anubhava, coming not from the ordinary world, but from the poetic one represent the external factors of such experience. Bharata says, the terms Vibhava, Karana, Nimitta and Hetu are synonymous units; a Vibhava, he asserts, is called so, because it presents a permanent feeling, brought into expression through different methods of representation in such a way, as it becomes a fit object of relish, or in other words, it makes the permanent mood capable of being sensed. The causes of such permanent feelings as love and the like when described in Poetry or presented on stage are termed Vibhavas. The feelings experienced in ordinary world are purely mundane in character and the causes which give rise to such feelings are also purely earthly in nature: the feelings experienced at the time of perception of Poetry, however, are transcendental, inasmuch as, they always generate supreme unmixed bliss in the mind of the appreciator, and the causes which give rise to such feelings are correspondingly supernormal in construction: these extra-normal factors leading to aesthetic experience, the Alamkarikas refer to by the term Vibhava. The Alamkarikas classify Vibhava into two types: Ālambana and Uddīpana. Ālambanavibhāva refers to the person or the object in respect of whom an emotion is experienced and whose appearance is directly responsible for evocation

of the particular emotion; Uddīpanavibhāva refers to the movement of that person or object, as also to the situation or the environment in which he is placed and which are helpful in intensifying the emotional experience. Thus Sakuntala represents the Ālambanavibhava of the erotic emotion experienced from perception of the drama Śakuntalā and the loveliness of her youth, as also the calm surroundings of the hermitage situated on the bank of the river Malini constitute the Uddipanavibhava of that emotion: in a similar manner, the wife of the Yaksa, pining in separation from her beloved represents the Alambanavibhava of the emotion of love-in-separation, experienced from perception of the Meghaduta and the advent of the rainy-season stands for its Uddīpanavibhava. An Ālambana, as the critics say, causes an emotion, while an Uddīpana enriches it. Before concluding his discussion on the Vibhavas, Viśvanatha introduces an interesting topic concerning the classification of the Hero and the Heroine: he divides and subdivides men and women, as Alambanavibhavas of the erotic emotion into numerous classes and sub-classes on the basis of their age, behaviour, situation and mutual relationship. The exuberant details and elaborateness with which Viśvanātha and his learned predecessors treat this subject capture possibly the imagination of the dramatists, whose strict adherence to these canons of dramaturgy is responsible for delineation of types rather than individuals in their plays.

THE THEORY OF RASA

Bharata defines an Anubhāva as a factor which indicates a permanent mood, imitated through words, gestures and organic changes, implying thereby that, the term is to be taken not only to mean what occurs after a Bhāva, but to mean what suggests or indicates a Bhāva. It is a matter of our ordinary experience that, when such feelings as love, hatred or anger appear in the mind they manifest themselves through certain bodily or organic changes or actions. The Ālamkārikas maintain that, these actions or changes, which are nothing but ensuents of these moods and are consequently regarded as ordinary effects in commonplace world, when presented in Poetry or on stage are regarded as extra-normal Anubhāvas, and hence the parti-

cular term is used to signify them to the exception of others: a Kārya, they continue, is ordinary, while an Anubhāva is extraordinary and the secret of this transformation of a commonplace effect into an extra-normal ensuent is a touch of the poet's imaginative faculty or the actor's art of imitation. 10 Thus in the drama Śakuntalā such factors as Dusyanta's aversion to hunting or sleeplessness or paleness etc. represent Anubhavas and in a similar manner, in the Meghaduta such factors as attempt to draw a portrait of his lady-love on the part of Yaksa or his emaciation stand for these. Devoid of technicalities a Vibhavamay be described as one which makes a permanent mood capable of being sensed and an Anubhava as one which makes it sensed. Though external manifestations of an emotion are innumerable, yet the writers on poetics make an honest attempt to fix their number and to name at least some of them. Thus Dhanañjaya speaks of twenty Sattvika Alamkaras or the natural graces of a Heroine, who is an  $\bar{A}lambanavibh\bar{a}va$  of the erotic emotion: he names these as Bhava, Hava, Hela, Sobha, Kanti, Dīptī, Mādhurya, Pragalbhūta, Audārya, Dhairya, Līlā, Vilāsa, Vicchitti, Vibirama, Kilakiñcita (Hysterical mood), Mottayita (manifestation of affection), Kuttamita (Pretended anger), Vivvoka (affected indifference), Lalita and Viliria. He says that, of these twenty graces, the first three are physical, the next seven come of their own accord and the rest arise from one's disposition. To this last category of graces, which arise from one's own disposition, or in other words, are Svabhavaja Alamkaras Visvanatha adds eight more, naming them as Mada, Tapana, Maugdhya, Viksepa, Kutuhala, Hasita, Cakita, Keli, and thus bringing the total number of graces of a Heroine to twenty-eight. These speculations reveal the excessive fondness of the Alamkārikas for types,—a liking, which prompts them to lay down fixed laws and means as applicable to all types of individual and consequently, which, as Dr. S. K. Dey puts it, is like prescribing one measurement for all feet, -- one garment for all bodies.'

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# Theories on Aesthetic Experience:

Bharata's cryptic dictum taxes greatly the ingenuity of commentators, who offer different explanations of the central terms: Samyoga and Niṣpatti appearing therein; while some say that Samyoga conveys the idea of mere combination and Niṣpatti that of production, others maintain that the two terms signify respectively the concept of the relation existing between the Probans and the Probandum and that of inference and so on, and upon the explanation of these two much-discussed terms depends the solution of the important problem as to what actually the process of aesthetic realisation consists in and what relation do Vibhāva, Anubhāva and Vyabhicāribhāva bear to Rasa in this process.

Bhattalollata is the earliest commentator to offer a solution to this puzzling problem. He is of opinion that, Rasa is a developed form of a permanent mood, which attains maturity as it comes in contact with the Vibhava, Anubhava and Vuabhicaribhava; the Vibhava, he says, generates this mood, while Anubhava manifests it and Vyabhicaribhava offers nourishment and thereby helps it to develop into Rasa. Thus according to Bhattlollata, the relation of producer and the produced exists between the Vibhava and the Rasa and that of indicator and indicated between the Anubhava and the Rasa, which is related to the Vyabhicaribhava in the same way as is a nourished to its nourishment. Though an Uddīpanavibhāva is related to the Rasa in the same way as an excitor is to the excited, inasmuch as, it stimulates the produced mood, and as such the relation of producer and produced is incapable of being asserted of Uddipanavibhava on the one hand and Rasa on the other, yet as an unstimulated feeling is not experienced at all, so a stimulant is as much regarded as a producing agent as is the actual producer cause, which is only the Alambanavibhava, and consequently, Bhattalollata makes the general statement that, the Vibhava generates the mood. The doctrine that Rasa is a mature mood seems to receive the approval of Dandin, inasmuch as, in his dissertation on the poetic figure Rasavat, he makes it clear that, the feeling of love is developed into Srigara-Rasa as it comes in contact with its excitants and accessories.11 Bhattalollata maintains that, Rasa, which is nothing but a mature feeling belongs actually to the original personage, whose character is imitated by the actor on the stage. This Rasa, he continues, is then superimposed on the actor by the absorbed spectator, who is deluded into the belief that the skilful actor himself is the original personage and as such possesses the emotion possessed by him. Subsequently the spectator perceives this emotion, belonging actually to the original personage but not now superimposed on the actor and the consequence is that, he enjoys pleasure. Thus, according to Bhattalollata, at the time of appreciation of the drama Sakuntala, the absorbed spectator gathers such perceptive knowledge as this Duşyanta is possessed of love with reference to Sakuntala and through this cognition he realises pleasure. Jagannatha raises an interesting point here. At the time of appreciation of Sakuntala, he points out, the actor, who is taken as identical with the original personage remains present before the spectator and as such it is quite possible to have visual perception of the said actor, now mistaken for the original character: but how can the feeling of love be perceived through visual organ, which is competent to cognise only a tangible thing, with which it establishes direct contact? In reply to this, Jagannatha states, the emotion of love, which is an adjunct to Dusyanta in the present case is comprehended not through ordinary perception, but through an extraordinary one in the same way as the fragrance of a piece of sandal-wood is cognised by the visual organ. The Naiyayika holds that, in an ordinary perception the sense-organ perceives that object only which is fit to be cognised by it and which is present before it at that particular time; in case of an extra-ordinary perception, however, the sense-organ perceives even such an object which is not competent to be cognised by it and which is not even present before it and that is why the form of perception is called an extra-normal one. When one sees a piece of fragrant sandalwood exhibited in the show-case of a selling centre and remarks,

'I see a piece of fragrant sandal-wood', direct contact of the piece of wood is certainly established with his visual organ, which comprehends the wood through the process of ordinary perception, but fragrance not being a proper object of cognition of the said organ is cognised through a process of extraordinary perception, as is effected by Jnanalaksana-sannikarsa. 12 Jnanalaksana-sannikarsa memory itself serves to effect the relation between the organ and the thing perceived, and consequently, as the Naiyayika says, a man who has perceived the fragrance of a piece of sandal-wood in past occasions, alone, is able to cognise the sweet scent of the wood, even though its contact is not established with his organ of smell: in such a case, a remote connection of the visual organ is established with fragrance, the form of connection being this: the organ is conjoined with mental apparatus, which in its turn has conjunction with soul, in which inheres the knowledge concerning fragrance: it is this remote relation of the object with the organ which effects perception in this case. In a similar manner, Jagannatha points out, in the doctrine propounded by Bhattalollata, the realisation of feeling, which appears as an attribute of the actor now taken as the original personage occurs through a process of extra-ordinary perception, the means of this process being Jnanalaksana-sannikarsa and that of the actor, whose identity is established with the hero through a process of ordinary perception. 18 This exposition of the doctrine adumbrated by Bhattalollata makes it clear that, he takes the term Samyoga, occurring in the dictum of Bharata to convey the idea of connection and the term Nispatti to signify the sense of superimposition, the meaning of the whole dictum being this that, Rasa, which is nothing but a mood attaining maturity as it comes in close contact with the Vibhava, Anubhava and Vuabhicaribhava is perceived after it is superimposed on the actor, taken as the hero himself.14

The doctrine of Bhattalollata does not find favour with the Alamkārikas, because there are a number of weak points in it. It states that, Rasa is a developed mood, but this statement is open to serious objection. Bharata scrupulously maintains a

distinction between Sthayibhava and Rasa, showing thereby that the one is incapable of being equated with the other: had Sthayibhava and Rasa been identical, then the great exponent of dramaturgy would have formulated definition and classification of Sthauibhavas and not of Rasas. Moreover the assumption that, Rasa is a developed form of an emotion renders it necessary to postulate gradation in Rasa, since an emotion becomes intense gradually and reaching a certain point starts to wane. The assumption that, there are different degrees of Rasa in rank, however, seems absurd, since, as the authorities on the subject assert, Rasa is a blissful state of ego, which consists in relish only and in which knowledge of other knowables is completely obliterated. In reply to the question as to why does an invalid cognition of an emotion generate subjective pleasure in the spectator, Bhattalollata simply cites the instance of an invalid cognition, which one has of a snake in respect of a rope and points out that invalid cognition often gives birth to real actions in men, inasmuch as, a men who mistakes a rope for a snake experiences fear and an impulse to run away: in a similar manner, he continues, the wrong notion that, the actor is possessed of an emotion, which belongs actually to the original character gives the spectator subjective pleasure. Unfortunately the parallelism introduced by Lollata fails to serve the purpose for which it is drawn. An invalid cognition does not necessarily give rise to pleasure: it, on the other hand, generates such feeling as are experienced from valid cognition of the things concerned. The perception of a snake produces fear, trembling and an impulse to run away and consequently the false cognition of a snake in a rope also produces the same effects. Hence it is only natural for a spectator to experience such feeling, as is realised by him, in case the original personage with his original feelings appear before him-and this feeling is not necessarily pleasure. The assumption that invalid cognition produces pleasure without fail, even though its corresponding valid cognition produces pain or batred is equally untenable, since it attributes greater power to false cognition. Moreover, it is not clear as to why perceptive knowledge of an emotion

belonging to one generates pleasure in the mind of another, particularly when it is experienced that, the tasting of delicious food by one does not bring satiety to another.

The next critic to formulate a theory on aesthetic experience is Sankuka. While Bhattalollata describes Rasa as a developed permanent feeling, Sankuka regards it as an imitation or copy thereof and says, when an actor personates Rama, the spectator has with regard to him the idea that 'this is Rama himself'; but this idea is of a peculiar kind being of the same nature as the idea of a horse which one has in respect to the picture of a horse; this idea, which he calls Citraturaganyayanusarini-Pratīti is different from all the four kinds of ordinary notions : (a) it is not of the nature of ordinary right notion that 'Rama is the person', which is confirmed by a subsequent cognition that 'this is Rama himself'; (b) nor it is of the nature of ordinary wrong notion such as 'this is Rama', which appears in regard to one who is not really Rama, and which is removed by subsequent cognition that, 'this is not Rama'; (c) nor it is of the nature of ordinary doubtful cognition such as 'this person may or may not be Rama'; (d) nor it is of the nature of commonplace cognition of similarity such as 'this person resembles Rama'. The actor on the stage on account of his extraordinary simulating faculty, peculiar costume and other devices of stage-make-up is recognised by the spectator on the Citraturaga analogy as the original character. The actor by reason of his superior imitative faculty cleverly exhibits on the stage the Vibhavas, Anubhavas and Vyabhicaribhavas, which though artificial and unreal are not known to be so to the spectator, who by means of these experiences through the process of a peculiar inference the permanent feelings, such as love and the like as existing in the actor, now known as the original personage. The feeling, thus inferred to exist in the actor is not real, but only a semblance of that which existed in the original character and because it happens to be an imitation of the real mental condition, Sankuka asserts, it is referred to by the term Rasa. Thus, at the time of appreciating the drama Sakuntala in which love-in-union is predominantly depicted, the

spectator derives such an inferential knowledge as, 'This Dusyanta is possessed of love with reference to Sākuntalā', and in a similar manner at the time of witnessing to the theatrical performance of the dramatised version of the Meghaduta his inference takes such a form as 'This Yaksa is possessed of anguish, separated as he is from his consort'. This inference, Sankuka maintains, is different from ordinary logical process of inference, because in it the thing inferred is of a peculiar type and consequently, it invariably causes delight. The above exposition of Sankuka's doctrine makes it clear that, according to him the term Samyoga occurring in the dictum of Bharata signifies the sense of existence of the relation of universal concomitance (Vyāpti) and the term Nispatti present there conveys the idea of inference (Anumiti), and consequently, the complete dictum of Bharata means this: Rasa is inferred from the Vibhava, Anubhava and Vyabhicaribhava, with which it bears the relation of universal co-existence. 15

Though Sankuka agrees with Bhattalollata in declaring Rasa as belonging actually to the original personage, he differs from the latter on many vital points. Bhattalollata thinks that, a permanent mood develops into Rasa as it comes in conjunction with the Vibhava, Anubhava and Vyabhicaribhava, but Sankuka asserts that, an imitation or a copy of such a mood attains the status of Rasa. Secondly, according to the former, the knowledge of the spectator that the actor is the original personage is an erroneous idea, while according to the latter, this notion is different from all the four kinds of ordinary notions and is of the nature of an idea, which one has of a horse in respect of a picture of a horse. Thirdly, while Bhattalollata states that, the knowledge derived by the spectator that 'this Dusyanta is possessed of love for Sakuntala' is perceptual cognition, Śankuka asserts that, this is inferential one. Jagannatha furnishes a clue to this difference of opinion between the two great commentators on this important issue. He refers to a principle which determines the respective strength of perception and inference in those cases where totality of conditions of these two valid instruments of cognition is equally present. The principle is

this that, in those cases where the content of these two instruments of knowledge is one and the same, perception prevails over inference and in those cases where the contents are different, inference prevails over perception. Thus when one sees a lion before him and hears its roar, he does not infer the presence of a lion from its loud deep sound, even though the conditions of inference are equally present: in such a case he perceives the lion by his visual organ, i.e. to say, the knowledge derived by him is perceptional in nature, and this is so, because the same lion constitutes the content of both these instruments of cognition. The assumption that when the same thing constitutes the content of both perception and inference, the former prevails over the latter is necessary in order to account for the perceptional nature of a right notion which occurs after a doubtful cognition. This cognition is exemplified by such knowledge as 'this may be a tree-trunk or a man',-a knowledge, which arises through comprehension of attributes, common to both tree and man and non-comprehension of features, special to either of them. As soon as the characteristic feature of man, namely possession of hands and feet is grasped, the dubious notion yields place to the certain knowledge, such as 'this is undoubtedly a man'. Relying on the experience of ordinary man, the Naiyayika describes this certain knowledge as perceptional in nature, even though it is capable of being inferential in character, inasmuch as, the condition of inference, which is such a notion as 'this is possessed of hands and feet, which necessarily co-exist with manhood' is equally present in this case. The Naiyayika contends that, here the same man constitutes the content of both perception and inference and consequently the condition of perception being more strong than that of inference, the certain knowledge, following the doubtful cognition is perceptional in nature. In a similar manner, the assumption that, when the contents of perception and inference are different, the latter prevails over the former is necessary in order to justify the very existence of inference as a separate instrument of valid cognition. The stock-illustration of inference, as furnished by the Naiyayika is the cognition that, the hill is fiery,

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because there is smoke on it: the condition of inference, which is technically known as Paramarśa and which consists in the knowledge concerning the presence of the probans, which coexists invariably with the probandum on the subject is in the stock illustration, the knowledge that the mountain possesses smoke which necessarily co-exists with fire. This knowledge, serving as the condition of Anumana, the Naiyayika argues, inheres in soul and consequently is capable of being perceived mentally, inasmuch as, the condition of such mental perception, which consists in contact of soul with mind is also present. The application of the principle under consideration, however, rules out the possibility of such mental perception of Paramarśa, as a result of which such inferential knowledge as, 'the hill is fiery' occurs, instead of such perceptive notion as, 'the hill as possessed of smoke, which invariably co-exists with fire is cognised by me'. Here inference gains mastery over perception, because the contents of these two are different: while Paramarśa, consisting in a form of knowledge, residing in soul through the relation of inherence constitutes the content of Pratyaksa, an external object in the form of the hill as possessed of fire constitutes the content of Anumana. Sankuka is perfectly right, Jagannatha points out, in describing the knowledge derived by the spectator at the time of witnessing to a theatrical performance as inferential in nature, because while the actor, now known as the original personage is the content of Pratyaksya, semblance of mental condition belonging to him is the content of Anumana. 16 It is interesting to note that, though Jagannatha speaks of two different contents of Pratyaksa and Anumana in course of analysing the knowledge derived by a spectator at the time of witnessing to a theatrical performance, a proper examination of this cognition reveals that the same object constitutes the content of both these valid sources of knowledge. Bhattalollata who describes the knowledge of the spectator as preceptive in character maintains that, cognition of the actor, now taken as identical with the original personage is effected through ordinary process of perception and that of his adjunct feeling through an extroordinary process, based on Jnanalaksana-sannikarsa, showing, thereby, that the actor, now identified with the original character and possessed of permanent moods such as love and the like forms the content of Pratuaksa: this original personage as possessed of permanent feelings constitutes the content of Anumana, as well. Thus the content of both Pratyaksa and Anumana is one and the same thing and consequently, the principle referred to by Jagannatha to justify the inferential nature of the knowledge derived by the spectator fails to serve the purpose for which it is introduced: instead of substantiating its inferential character it goes to establish its perceptional nature. This difficulty can somehow be avoided by assuming that the condition of inference gains mastery over that of extraordinary perception even in those cases where the same thing makes up the content of these two instruments of cognition. It is for this reason that the clever logicians declare that the conditions of Anumana prevail over those of Pratyaksa under all circumstances. The acceptance of this view renders a certain notion appearing in the wake of a dubious one a specimen of inferential knowledge and thus goes against our ordinary experience, but, nevertheless, as this principle is in conformity to the law of simplicity, it seems more sound and acceptable.

Abhinavagupta cites a lengthy criticism against the theory of Sankuka, which, as he says, is offered by Bhattatauta. Śankuka, Bhattatauta argues, is wrong in describing Rasa as an imitation or copy of a permanent mood, in as much as, it does not appear as such either from the stand-point of the spectator or from that of the actor or from that of the critic and even the great exponent of dramaturgy Bharata does not refer to Rasa as a semblance of a mental condition. The description that Rasa is a copy of a mood presupposes the existence of a thing other than the mood present before the spectator. When someone tastes a delicious drink before us, then and then alone we say that, in this manner another person drinks wine : this makes it clear that a notion relating to similarity develops only when a thing other than the thing imitated remains present before us. This thing, however, is conspicuous by its absence in the case of Rasāsvāda: the object which appears as a copy of a permanent

mood is unfortunately, not traced here. Such psychic changes as horripilation or perspiration and such effects as tossing of arms or sleeplessness are incapable of being regarded as this object, because while these changes and effects are perceptible entities, the feelings of others lie beyond the scope of perception and the difference between these two categories of objects being so wide, the one cannot be regarded as an imitation of the other. Secondly only one who knows the original is in a position to observe that a particular object is a mere imitation of the said original. As the spectator does not know the mental conditions of the original character, it is not possible for him to cognise the inferred mental conditions as semblance of those, existing in the original character. The argument that as the Vibhavas, Anubhavas and Vyabhicaribhavas, exhibited by the actor are unreal, being copies of those belonging to the original personage, the Sthaubhava inferred from them also is artificial and a mere copy of the actual Bhava belonging to the Hero,introduced in order to save the situation does not improve the position much. If the spectator realises the Vibhavas and the like as unreal entities he cannot infer mental conditions at all from them and if he accepts these as real ones, which, according to Sankuka himself he does, he cannot cognise the inferred mental conditions as semblance of those, belonging to the original character. Fog, cognised as smoke leads to inferential knowledge of real fire and not to that of such objects, which resemble fire, as glow of light and so on: in a similar manner, it is natural for the Vibhavas and the like, comprehended as real entities by the spectator to generate in his mind an inferential knowledge of real mental conditions and not of copies thereto. Then again, according to Sankuka, Bhattatauta points out, the knowledge of the spectator that, the actor is the original character is a peculiar cognition, being different from all the four recognised categories of cognition: this assertion, Bhattatauta continues, is unsound, inasmuch as, this notion is capable of being comprehended under either right or false cognition,-right when it is not replaced by a subsequent cognition and false when it is removed by a right notion coming in its wake. The

conception of the Citraturaga cognition, he proceeds, is not different from that of the cognition of similitude and as such is not something peculiar. Each time a spectator witnesses a theatrical performance of the same play, he regards every actor, who imitates the character of the original personage as the Hero himself, and this he does, because he notices the presence of the common characteristic Ramahood in all of them. This analysis shows that, at times the spectator recognises the actor as bearing similitude to the original character,-at times, he regards him as identical with the Hero himself, -and at other times he becomes aware of the difference of the actor with the original character, and consequently, his idea is not distinct from four recognised notions. Just as the spectator does not regard Rasa as a copy of a mood, similarly the actor also does not recognise it as a semblance of a mental condition. Through his learning and practice he presents on the stage merely external manifestations of the mental conditions, pertaining to the Hero, who remains unseen and thus as he does not see the original, it is not possible for him to imitate it : rather he remains fully conscious of the fact that he is not imitating anybody. Nor is Rasa a semblance of a mental condition from the stand-point of the connoisseur of Poetic Art; the concept of a copy presupposes the existence of an original, which unfortunately remains unnoticed by the connoisseur and consequently he is unable to recognise Rasa as a copy or imitation of a mood. Then again, Bhattatauta continues, nowhere in his work does Bharata describe Rasa as a semblance of a mental condition and this silence of the great exponent of dramaturgy on this issue is sufficient enough to refute the contention of Sankuka that Rasa is an imitation of a mood, belonging actually to the original personage.

In his eagerness to escape the blame of momentariness of the Rasa-realisation, Śańkuka assumes that, a series of inference, prompted by a desire for further inference takes place in the mind of the spectator, as a result of which he derives uninterrupted pleasure for a number of hours. This presumption is unsound, because, firstly, the desire for further

and further inferences, generated in the mind of the spectator is very likely to distract it and thereby obstruct the realisation of Rasa, and secondly, eagerness to know the probandum ceasing after its comprehension, the desire for further and further inferences is not likely to continue for a considerable period of time. A critical analysis of the theory, propounded by Śańkuka thus, reveals that, it has very slender legs to stand upon.

Bhattanayaka shifts the emphasis from the objective to the subjective side and attempts, for the first time, to explain Rasa by analysing the inward experience of refined appreciators : he refutes the view-points of the earlier theorists and sets up a theory of aesthetic enjoyment (Bhoga). Rasa, Bhattanayaka argues, is neither known nor produced nor is it revealed. The doctrines of Bhattalollata and Sankuka, which assume that knowledge concerning Rasa, which belongs actually to the original character develops in the mind of the spectator as a result of which he derives supreme bliss-fails to explain properly the enjoyment of disinterested pleasure by him. It is not clear, he continues, as to how and why cognition of feeling, pertaining to one produces pleasure in the mind of another. The realisation of Rasa is competent to generate supreme bliss in the mind of the spectator, if cognised as belonging to his own self only: unfortunately, however, the absence of Vibhavas, Anubhavas and Vyabhicaribhavas, related to the spectator does not allow us to describe Rasa as capable of being perceived mentally by him, as belonging to his own self. Sakuntala, with reference to whom love is generated in the mind of Dusyanta is an Alambanavibhava of the Hero only and it is not possible for the spectator to accept her as his own Vibhava. The argument that, as it is natural for the spectator to feel attracted towards a lady, the universal attribute determining whom is present in Sakuntala even, so it is possible for him to consider her as his Vibhava does not lead us anywhere, because the spectator remains fully conscious of his difference with the Hero to whom Sakuntala is related as a Vibhava. Moreover a thing is regarded as a true Vibhava only when it forms the content of certain spontaneous negative knowledge, or in other words only when such knowledge im-

plying denial of positive attribute or attributes develops concerning the object,-knowledge as is spontaneous, and not a make-believe one. Thus the spectator is in a position to recognise, at the time of witnessing presentation of a drama. depicting the erotic emotion only that character as his Vibhava with reference to whom he possesses such negative knowledge as she is not unfit to be enjoyed by him: in a similar manner only that character concerning whom there is such definite knowledge as he or she is not unfit to be wept for is competent to constitute a Vibhava in a drama, delineating the tragic emotion, and so on. The enunciation of this principle becomes an imperative necessity in order to preclude extension of recognition as a Vibhava to a sister of the spectator, as he sees dramatic representation of a play, depicting love-plays of his own sister: though this sister is endowed with the universal attributes of a lady, yet the spectator is not able to consider her as his own Vibhava, because with reference to her he has this positive knowledge that, she is unfit to be enjoyed by him. 17 What happens in the case of a sister occurs in the case of Sakuntala or Sītā also: as with reference to her as well, such a knowledge as, she is unfit to be enjoyed by him grows in the mind of the spectator, he finds it impossible to reckon Sakuntala or Sītā as his Vibhava. The argument that, the spectator thinks himself identical with the hero for the time being and this idea of identity impedes dawning of such knowledge in his mind, as a result of which he recognises Sakuntala or Sītā as his own Vibhava is without any force, because generation of this sense of identity itself is open to serious objection, inasmuch as, it is very difficult for a small spectator of modern age to think himself identical with such great emperors of ancient times as Dusyanta or Rama, whose difference with his own self is so marked. Thus due to lack of proper Vibhavas, Anubhavas and Vyabhicaribhavas, Rasa does not develop in the mind of the spectator and consequently, the question of its realisation through a process of mental perception does not arise. Nor is Rasa capable of being explained away as a product of verbal testimony, because such an explanation is likely to render its realisation

an unattractive one, in the same way as conceptual cognition of ordinary expressions, describing love-plays leads more to hatred or bashfulness than to supreme bliss. Nor realisation of Rasa, Bhattanayaka continues, is a case of recollection, because recollection occurs of those things alone, which are cognised before and Rasa. not being a comprehended entity, the question of its remembrance does not arise. Nor is Rasa manifested because manifestation or revelation occurs of an existent entity alone and Rasa being a non-existent entity, revelation is incapable of being asserted of it. The argument that, as the permanent feelings, such as love and the like lie in the form of latent disposition, their manifestation or revelation is not impossible, introduced in order to justify revelation of Rasa is dangerous, because it puts into prominence the inclination of the spectator to acquire more and more Vibhabas and the like, which are helpful to clear and clearer revelation of these impressions, and so long as this eagerness is there in the mind of the spectator, it is not possible for him to derive distintersted pleasure and relish Rasa, in which knowledge of all other knowables is completely lost. Thus, Bhattanayaka concludes, neither perception nor production nor revelation is capable of being asserted of Rasa, which is enjoyed in connection with the Vibhavas through the relation of the enjoyer and the enjoyed (Bhojya-Bhojaka).

The words incorporated in a Poetic expression, Bhatṭanāyaka asserts, are different from those used in an ordinary linguistic expression: such words, as are polished by use of literary excellences and poetic figures in Kāvya and by the four types of acting in Nātya, he continues, are possessed of three functions—Abhidhā, Bhāvakatva and Bhojakatva or Bhogīkṛti. This Abhidhā, however, is not merely denotation: an extended meaning is given to it, so that it may include Lakṣaṇā or Indication in its scope and thus embrace the two functions already admitted by previous speculation. The primary denotative power of terms and propositions, first of all, Bhatṭanāyaka says, explains to us their respective meanings and thereby makes us acquainted with the Vibhāvas, Anubhāvas and Vyabhicāribhāvās.

After this Bhavakatva comes to operate: with reference to Sītā or Sakuntala it obstructs generation in the mind of the appreciator of such knowledge as is detrimental to aesthetic realisation and presents those characters in their generalised forms. To state more clearly, it produces the desired negative knowledge, which is so essential for the recognition of a particular character as his Vibhava in the mind of the appreciator and thereafter causes that particular character to appear in its universal and impersonal aspect as opposed to the particular and individual. Thus Sakuntala does not appear as a particular lady, belonging to a particular place and particular era and standing in a particular relationship with a particular person and having a particular social status; she appears as a woman in general,—as a lovely maiden at the threshhold of youth, and the love of Dusyanta for her also sssumes a detached nature, i.e. it appears without any reference to the person who loves or the object loved. The power of Bhavakatva, Bhattanayaka continues, serves to purge the mind of the perceiver of his mundane prepossessions, so that during the perception of the literary phenomenon he does not think of anything else. Hence Bhavakatva is capable of being described as the power of generalisation, which makes the Vibhavas as well as the Sthayibhavas sensed in their general characters, without any reference to their specific properties, and at the same time clears the mind of the perceiver of his earthly prejudices. Then by a third function called Bhojakatva of Bhogakrttva the attribute of Sattvaguna, residing in the mind of the spectator is brought into prominence by subordinating the elements of Rajas, that goes to distract the mind and Tamas, that makes it hard and devoid of responsiveness, as a result of which the mind of the perceiver becomes steady and his own self, consisting in the nature of bliss shines in its undimmed glory. Enjoyment of pleasure after this is inevitable to the perceiver as the eternal bliss of his consciousness, latent in him is relished in natural course : for this reason, he realises nothing but pleasure, whatever be the emotional quality of his object of perception. According to Bhattanayaka, Rasa consists in the permanent mood, experienced

in its generalised form, and enjoyed subsequently by one's own consciousness, partaking of the nature of bliss, as also in this process of enjoyment itself. 18 This enjoyment, Bhattanayaka asserts, differs from enjoyment of pleasure in the ordinary world in that it is impersonal, while pleasure in the ordinary world is the result of personal possessions and advantages. It is different also from Yogin's supreme bliss, in that the Yogin sees only the Brahman, i.e. bliss itself, while the spectator at the theatre or the absorbed reader at the closest sees and derives enjoyment from objects like the parties to love and other emotions on the stage. In supreme bliss (Brahmānanda), there is complete detachment from the world : in the enjoyment of aesthetic pleasure (Rasananda), on the other hand, there is dissociation, no doubt, but attention on plurality of objects, like the Vibhavas, Aunbhavas and Vyabhicaribhavas makes for the incompleteness of concentration. So the spectator's pleasure, Bhattanayaka maintains, is not Brahmananda itself: it makes only a nearest appreach to this. Thus, it is clear that, this critic takes the terms 'Samyoga' and 'Nispatti', occurring in the dictum of Bharata to convey respectively the ideas of presentation in generalised forms and enjoyment, the whole dictum meaning this: Enjoyment occurs of Rasa, which is nothing other than the bliss-portion of self, having for its adjunct a permanent latent disposition, as is experienced due to the prominence of Sattvaguna in the mind of the perceiver after the generalisation of the Vibhavas and others through the function know as Bhavakatva. In the view of this critic, the different stages in the appreciation of Poetry are acquaintance with the Vibhavas and others,—their realisation in universal character and freedom from mundane prepossessions of the appreciator, consequential upon it,—and gaining of prominence by Sattvaguna in his mind, -effected respectively by the functions of Abhidha, Bhavakatva and Bhojakatva, of which the first operates in the outside world, the second in the external world as also in the realm of the appreciator's mind and the third only in the mind of the perceiver.19

The answer of Abhinavagupta, an ardent advocate of the doctrine of Dhvani to the problem of aesthetic experience is a

bit different from the solution, offered by Bhattanayaka. The observation of Bhattanayaka that Rasa is not realised, he points out, is perfectly right, if it is meant for refuting the contention of Bhattalollata or Sankuka that, the spectator derives perceptive or inferential knowledge of Rasa, which belongs actually to the original personage: if, however, it is intended to preclude completely the realisation of Rasa, then it sounds absolutely absurd, in as much as, the existence of a thing, not realised or known is incapable of being predicated. Beyond Pratīti or perception of Rasa, he asserts, there is no such process as Bhoga or enjoyment, and nothing is gained by giving it a new name: just as perception, inference, conceptual cognition, analogy, -all these are but different forms of knowledge, similarly experience of Rasa, also, is a different type of cognition, the causes leading to it being extra-ordinary ones, but that does not mean that this is not realised at all. In a drama, the Vibhavas, Anubhavas and Vyabhicaribhavas lead intially to inference of mental conditions, belonging to the original personage. which are comprehended through the process of conceptual cognition in a poem and thus the experience of Rasa takes at the outset the help of two well-known instruments of cognition, but nevertheless, the experience itself is completely different from the recognised forms of knowledge, effected as it is by the function of suggestion. Rasa, Abhinavagupta observes, is suggested by the union of the permanent mood with the Vibhavas etc. through the relation of the suggested and the suggestor (vycnaya-vyanjaka-bhava), or in other words, the Pratiti of Rasa is nothing other than Abhivyakti or manifestation through the power of suggestion, resulting in an extra-ordinary state of relish, known as Rasanā, Āsvāda or Carvanā. The objection of Bhattanayaka that, revelation or suggestion, which is capable of being predicated of an established existent entity only is incapable of being asserted of Rasa, which is brought into being at the time of its comprehension—is untenable, because what is revealed is the bliss-portion of our own consciousness, which is an eternal entity. This bliss-portion of our soul, Abhinavagupta points out, manifests itself in its undimmed glory as the

curtain of ignorance, which shrouds it usually in ordinary life is removed by the extra-ordinary power of the function of suggestion. The argument that, Vyanjana is competent to bring a sense alone into light proves of no avail, because, the champions of this function ascribe to it an extra-normal and unlimited power, which, they say, is capable of creating wonders like the magician's wand. Hence Bhoga, proposed by Bhattanavaka is nothing other than Abhivyakti. The function of Bhojakatva, postulated by Bhattanavaka brings into prominence the quality of Sattva in the mind of the perceiver and thereby making it steady and free from all distractions allows the blissportion of his soul to flash forth automatically. What is accomplished by Bhojakatva in the doctrine of Bhattanayaka, Abhinavagupta points out, is actually carried into effect by Vuaniana, in as much as, this function, also, leads to revelation of the same bliss-portion by removing for the time being the curtain of nescience: and the results produced by both the functions being the same, Bhojakatva is capable of being equated with Vyanjana. 20

Thus disposing of the power of Bhojakatva, Abhinanagupta turns to the other power assumed as Bhavakatva by Bhattanavaka. The function of Bhavakatva, being stimulated by the use of literary excellences in a Poem and the four recognised types of acting in a Drama, Bhattanayaka thinks, presents the Viblavas in their universal and impersonal aspect and at the same time sets the mind of the spectator free from mundane prepossessions. Commenting on this belief of Bhattanayaka, Abhinavagupta remarks that, there is no necessity, as well as no authority for assuming this separate function, because the Vibhavas and others appear automatically in their general character to a man of trained intellectual powers, for whom really a specimen of poetic art is intended. The observation of Bharata—'Kavyarthan bhavayanti iti bhavah' implies Bhavakatva to be an inherent capacity of of all Bhavas, 21 a capacity to cause comprehension of the sense of Poetry, the sense indicating the principal sense consisting in Rasa: the Bhavas, Abhinavagupta points out, are named so, because they lead to

aesthetic experience; as generalisation is the first step necessary for attainment of this experience, the power, inherent in them carries it into effect. The function of Bhavakatva, Bhattanayaka thinks, is assisted in Poetry by the absence of blemishes and introduction of figures and literary excellences and in drama by the four types of acting: this literary device of the artist or imitative faculty of the actor, however, Abhinavagupta observes, puts the appreciator in an appropriate frame of mind, so that it becomes possible for him to find out a general relation with the Vibhavas and others, appearing in their universal and impersonal aspect or abstract form and thereby to realise the principal sense of Poetry, consisting in the relish of Rasa. Hence, the so-called Bhavakatva of Bhattanayaka, Abhinavagupta points out, consists in nothing more than a suitable use of Guna and Alamkara in a poem and a proper employment of the four types of acting in a drama for the ultimate purpose of awakening Rasa through the function of suggestion, pertaining to both sound and sense. An analysis of the view-points of Bhattanayaka and Abhinavagupta reveal that both these scholars accept the principle of generalisation of characters and their mental conditions, but whereas according to the former, this generalisation is effected by a separate function known as Bhavakatva, according to the latter, this is effected naturally in the mind of a man of trained intellectual powers, whose intellect is helped by the employment of Gunas and Alamkaras in a Poem and the four types of acting in a Drama. Abhinavagupta is of opinion that, the much-talked of generalisation is produced incidentally in the process of effecting revelation of the bliss-portion of one's own consciousness, which happens as the curtain of nescience is removed by the supernormal function of suggestion. In our daily life, ignorance keeps our real nature shrouded, as a result of which the idea of difference haunts us: as soon as this nescience, causing the depressing sense of distinction goes, that idea also vanishes and the generalisation of the characters and mental conditions is accomplished automatically. Generalisation, as Govinda remarks, does not consist in understanding the characters and their mental conditions as related to all persons, but rather in

their realisation in universal and impersonal aspect as opposed to the particular and the individual: in fact to enjoy Rasa is to transcend all limitations. Thus, according to Abhinavagupta, generalisation is but a by-product of Abhivyakti. The argument that  $Vya\tilde{n}jan\bar{a}$  being competent only to manifest an accomplished entity in the same way as light is competent to reveal only an existent jar, it is not possible for it to produce generalisation does not disprove the contention of Abhinavagupta, because all indicators incidentally produce effects, inasmuch as, light also goes to bring removal of darkness into effect. For this reason, while drawing the distinction between the theories, adumbrated by Bhaṭṭanāyaka and Abhinavagupta, Jagannātha rightly observes that, the former differs from the latter only at the postulation of a new function, which he calls  $Bh\bar{a}vakatva$ .

Taking cue from Śankuka's Citraturaga-pratīti, Abhinavagupta asserts that, the spectator experiences a peculiar sensation at the time of witnessing a theatrical performance : because of his uncommon costume, he does not regard an actor as an imitator, nor does he consider him to be the imitated hero himself, and thus the person appearing before him is neither taken as an ordinary man of present times nor as an extraordinary personality of ancient age. In a similar manner, the moods inferred from the Vibhavas and the like are cognised by him in their idealised or abstract forms without existing in any concrete person and divested of all particularities: he regards them as being related strictly neither to the actor nor to the original character nor to his own self. This explains the interest taken by him in realisation of Rasa, which he would not have shown in case of its comprehension as a mood pertaining strictly to another person: this also accounts for the fact that ordinary feelings of pain and hatred, hope and disgust, horror and despair are not experienced by him at the time of appreciation of a Play.24

Though Jagannatha observes that, Bhattanayaka differs from Abhinavagupta simply at this presumption that, postulation of a separate function known as Bhavakatva is necessary in order to explain generalisation of the Vibhavas and others, there

is another important point of difference between the two. Abhinavagupta introduces a novelty by maintaining that, the Sthayin or the permanent mood, inferred from its laukika causes and effects remains in the hearts of appreciative spectators and readers in the subtle form of latent impression, which is evoked at his perception of the generalised Vibhavas etc., implying thereby that, aesthetic experience is absolutely dependent on existence of corresponding impression in the heart of the man who experiences Rasa. Expanding this dictum, Visvanatha states, men who are not endowed with subtle impressions (of love and the like), acquired either in this or in previous birth are not competent to enjoy aesthetic delight: this explains, he continues, non-realisation of Rasa by dry and insipid Grammarians and Mimamsakas, who, according to Dharmadatta, are as good as seats in the auditorium. 25 On reading a poem or witnessing a drama, this permament mood, remaining in the form of a latent impression in the mind of a perceiver, Abhinavagupta asserts, is awakened by the depicted Vibhavas, which cease to be called laukika causes, but go by the name of Vibhavas in poetry and drama, and which are taken in their general form without specific connections. The generalisation spoken of here is to be understood as excluding the individuality, not only of the characters in the piece, but of the Sahrdaya himself,—of his friends and foes. Why this is so is quite clear. If it does not exclude his personality, his own interest in guarding himself from observation, say in love-making -is sure to interfere with his enjoyment of aesthetic pleasure: if his enemies are not excluded, his passion of hatred or anger or revenge is likely to interpose itself between his mind and enjoyment of pleasure: if his friends are not excluded, his passions like joy at their success and sorrow at their failure are likely to interpose themselves similarly; if, on the other hand, the personality of friends or foes of the Sahrlaya is totally excluded, then he is not likely to consider Rasa as a veridity and consequently, to feel attracted towards its realisation. To quote Abhinavagupta, aesthetic realisation is 'Vitavighna Pratitih'.26 The generalised Vibhavas and the rest.

he maintains, call into play the latent Sthayibhava in the reader and the spectator, and this also is understood only in a general way, without any reference to himself as an individual. The latent impression which is aroused strictly belongs to the spectator, but by the process of generalisation it also appears in its abstract form. The process referred to above tends the spectator to loose the sense of his narrow individuality, and the common flow of thoughts, concerning his own joy and sorrow, gain and loss, hope and despair, -in short, multifarious problems of life stops, at least, for the time being: as his personality is rendered docile, the reader or the spectator loses his special form and is raised to a wider and higher plane of consciousness, being conducted to which he feels that, the mood is not relished by him alone, but by all persons of poetic sensibility. Abhinavagupta describes this celestial mental state as 'Sarvasamājikanām Ekaghanata.27 In his doctrine, generalisation presents itself in two aspects: on the one hand, it presents the Vibhavas and the rest in their universal and impersonal forms, and, on the other, raises the spectator or the closest reader to a wider and higher plane by lulling his sense of individuality into sleep. When the personality of the perceiver is sent to sleep, pleasure is derived by him in natural course, because the function of suggestion by removing the veil of nescience manifests to him the bliss-portion of his own being Abhinavagupta interprets the dictum of Bharata to mean this that, revelation in its undimmed splendour occurs of Rasa, which is nothing but a permanent mood relished by the bliss-portion of one's own consciousness or this consciousness itself having a permanent mood for its adjunct through the function of suggestion, pertaining to the Vibhavas, Anubhavas and Vyabhicaribhavas, the meanings of the two much-discussed terms Samyoga and Nispatti being respectively the function of sugsestion and revelation itself. 28 The greatness of this realisation, which consists in supreme bliss is not to be lowered, Abhinavagupta cautions, by attempting to equate it with inference or recollection. As a refined reader or spectator perceives poetry, he does not simply infer a mental condition belonging to another person, himself remaining neutral, nor does he re-

collect his past mental condition: what he actually does is that he experiences his own mood and being. For this reason, Abhinavagupta points out, Bharata leaves the term 'Sthāyi' unmentioned in his dictum, inasmuch as, use of the term is likely to cause this wrong notion that, Rasa consists in inference of a mood, belonging to a person, other than the appreciator himself. With all emphasis at his command, he asserts that, Rasa is something different from permanent mood: it is not that, the mood itself is converted into Rasa. The statement that, the Sthāyī becomes transformed into Rasa, however, is made loosely through courtesy, because the causes and effects of Sthāyī, which is a laukika one are converted into Vibhāvas and Anubhāvas of Alaukika-Rasa, which is brought by them alone to a relishable state. Hence, he observes, the remark is to be taken with a grain of salt and not too literally.<sup>29</sup>

The realisation of Rasa, Abhinavagupta maintains, being dependent on comprehension of Vibhavas, Anubhavas and Vyabhicaribhavas lasts so long as cognition of these factors lasts and ceases to exist when the latter vanishes. And this happens, because the Vibhavas evoke the latent impression in the appreciator and thereafter by removing the curtain of nescience causes the bliss-portion of his own being to manifest itself: consequently, when the Vibhavas and the rest cease to be comprehended, the said curtain of nescience covers his own being again, as a result of which he fails to experience elevated pleasure. This realisation, he further asserts, takes the form of a Samuhalambana type of knowledge, inasmuch as, it embraces for its content multiple objects, as the Vibhava, Anubhava, Vyabhicaribhava and Sthayibhava; but it is different from the usual type of such cognition, in which the objects forming the content are realised as distinct from one another, since in it, the excitant, ensuent, accessory and the mood itself lose their individual traits and merge into one greater whole. For this reason, the Dhyani theorists explain the phenomenon of Rasa under the analogy of a beverage, in which the taste of the ingredientssugar, camphor and others is not relished separately and thus, which gives, taste different from that of its constituents. This indissoluble unity of taste, they observe, constitutes the essence of aesthetic experience. 80

In his eagerness to establish the Alaukika nature of Rasa. Abhinavagupta describes it as forming the content of cognitions, opposed to each other. 81 The comprehension of Vibhavas and the rest, he says, does not produce Rasa, which does not admit of production at all, since it ceases to exist as soon this comprehension, put forward as its efficient cause vanishes,—a feature, which is not noticed in the ordinary world, inasmuch as, the death of the potter, who is an efficient cause of the jar does not lead to destruction of the jar itself. The argument that, the principle involving the continuance of an effect in the event of destruction of its efficient cause is falsified by cessation of the feeling of pleasure, produced through a touch of sandal paste as soon as this touch ceases to exist—proves of no help, because in the instance cited above, destruction of touch does not lead to annihilation of the said pleasure, but rather, as Govinda points out, the cause being absent, the effect is not produced at all, and the pleasure already derived is obliterated by a quality opposed to it appearing next, in accordance to the principle that, of special perceptible attributes, pertaining to pervasive entities, one is effaced by the other, closely following it. Nor is Rasa capable of being described as an indicated entity, similar to a jar, which is revealed by a lamp, because the said parallelism is not applicable here: the jar forms the content of a cognition, produced by the lamp, which is absolutely distinct from it; the realisation of Rasa, on the other hand, is effected by comprehension of Vibhavas and the rest, which are not distinct from Rasa itself, inasmuch as, experience of this phenomenon, characterised by indissoluble unity of taste is not separate from that of its constituents. Thus, the excitants, ensuents and accessories. Abhinavagupta asserts, neither produce Rasa nor do indicate it: but, nevertheless, this implicit idea of paramount importance is not a figment of imagination, since it is experienced by all persons of poetic sensibility; ascribing production of this experience to the thing experienced, Rasa is capable of being described as a produced entity and in a similar manner, revelation, as well, is capable of being predicated of it, simply because it constitute the content of a cognition, embracing the Vibliavas and the rest. This cognition, Abhinavagupta continues, is distinct from ordinary knowledge derived through common instruments of cognition, because whereas in an ordinary knowledge, the instrument of cognition itself is not known, in comprehension of Rusa, the process itself does not remain uncomprehended; this is distinct, also, from the knowledge relating to self derived by an immature Yogin,-knowledge, which is characterised by an idea of difference between the external world, on the one hand, and self, on the other, as also from that derived by a mature Yogin, in which concentration on the self is complete: and this is so, because the experience of Rasa is marked by effacement of knowledge relating to other knowables and concentration on plurality of objects like the excitants and the ensuents. Carrying this description further, Abhinavagupta maintains that, the cognition of Rasa does not take the form of an indeterminate knowledge, because the totality of the excitant, ensuent, accessory and the mood itself constitutes its content and supreme bliss its determinant: nor does it assume the form of a determinate cognition, because when Rasa is experienced, knowledge of other knowable vanishes completely, and consequently the idea of naming such realisation or giving a graphic description of it does not haunt the mind of the perceiver.

In course of epitomizing the theory on aesthetic experience, as adumbrated by Abhinavagupta, Jagannātha, gifted with a true Vedāntic insight points out the cases, where the tenets of the Vedānta system are applied in this doctrine. Just as on removal of its cover, the lamp reveals the objects present near it along with its own self, in a similar manner, he observes, on dismissal of nescience enveloping it, pure consciousness manifests the moods, attended with Vibhāvas and the rest, as also shines forth in its undimmed splendour. The simultaneous manifestation of pure consciousness, partaking of the nature of bliss and the moods occurs, because, love, grief and the like being attributes of mind are capable of being comprehended by soul itself without the help of instruments of cognition. This represents the

Vedantic stand-point, which differs from the Naiyayika doctrine, according to which, such attributes of soul as knowledge, desire, jealousy, bashfulness, fear and the like remain unknown at the first moment,-the moment they are produced and form at the subsequent moment the content of mental perception, effected through contact of the soul with the mind. The Vedantic doctrine, however, does not recognise mental perception, because, as it says, such assumption entails a violation to the law of simplicity: the attributes of knowledge, love and the like, pertaining to the mind, it asserts, does not stand in need of any instrument of cognition for their comprehension, because they being associated with the soul are revealed by it as soon as they are brought into being. Hence, Jagannatha argues, simultaneous revelation of mood and own being of the appreciator occurs, as he experiences a piece of poetic creation. He raises a plausible objection that, though the mood being an attribute of the mind is capable of being cognised by pure consciousness, the excitants and ensuents being external objects are incapable of being so comprehended and to this objection he himself offers a solution relying on the principle enunciated by the learned Vivaranacarya,—the principle, which states that, all such thing with reference to which knowledge or ignorance springs is revealed by luminous and conscious self. The Naiyayika, who extends recognition to the process of mental perception or Anuvyavasaya is of opinion that, the cognition concerning knowledge itself is effected through a process of ordinary perception and the content of this knowledge, without which knowledge becomes an unreality like the flower of a sky or the horn of a rabbit is comprehended through an extra-ordinary process, in which recollection connects the mind with the said content. The Vedantin does not recognise the process of Anuvyavasaya and asserts that knowledge being an attribute of mind is cognised by luminous self independent of any instrument of cognition: in order to establish the reality of this knowledge it is indispensable for him to maintain that, necessarily it concerns something, because knowledge with reference to its content alone is comprehended: consequently, this

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content concerning which knowledge develops and becomes comprehended, he points out, is also cognised by luminous and conscious self. What is true of knowledge is true of love. grief and such other moods, all of which are attributes pertaining to the soul, according to the Naivavika and belonging to the mind, according to the Vedantin. Just as knowledge free from its content is not cognised, similarly abstract love free from the parties between which this is generated is not comprehended and such is the case of other moods, as well; and just as the content of knowledge is revealed by selfluminous self, though it is an external object, in a similar manner, Jagannatha asserts, the excitants and ensuents, though belonging to the external world are cognised along with the moods,—the attributes of the mind by soul without the help of any instrument of cognition. In support of his thesis that, external objects, as well, are comprehended by conscious and luminous self itself, Jagannatha cites the analogy of a piece of silver perceived erroneously and a horse, seen in a dream. The Vedantin contends that, nescience or ignorance, being a material cause of mind is associated permanently with the self and the transformations of this nescience being so associated are cognised by pure consciousness independent of any instrument of cognition. A piece of silver produced on a mother-o'-pearl, as one derives an erroneous knowledge when awake or a horse experienced by him in dream when asleep is a transformation of nescience, and consequently, the Vedantin holds, though these are objects of external world, conscious self cognises them. What happens in case of this piece of silver or horse, Jagannatha points out, occurs in case of the excitants and the ensuents: though they are external objects and thus do not constitute attributes of mind, yet conscious and luminous self manifests them independently. The parallelism introduced by Jagannatha is not to be drawn too far: by bringing forward this analogy he wants to establish his position that, it is pessible for the conscious self to comprehend an external object, as well, without taking the help of a Pramana, or in other words, a thing, other than an attribute pertaining

to the mind may, as well, be Saksibhasya. It is not his intention to show that, like a piece of silver, produced on nacre or a steed cognised in a dream, the Vibhavas and the rest are conjured up by ignorance, and as such are unreal entities. He thinks that the Vibhavas and the rest are as much real as the moods themselves, in as much as, the theory established by him on aesthetic experience following the lines of his great master Abhinavagupta is not in the least based on Vijnanavada of the Buddhist. Thus explaining the doctrine of Abhinavagupta, Jagannatha points out that, though Rasa partakes of the nature of luminous and conscious self which is an eternal entity and thus does not admit of production and annihilation, yet these attributes, pertaining to its experience are ascribed to it, and accordingly production and annihilation are predicated of it: the use of the expression: 'Rasa is generated' or 'Rasa is destroyed', therefore, he holds, is a figurative one, capable of being justified with the help of Laksanā. 38

It is possible, Jagannatha continues, to dispense with the aid received from Laksana, which is usually taken recourse to only in an emergency by furnishing another interpretation of Abhinavaguptas doctrine. According to this interpretation like a consciousness of bliss growing in the mind of a Yogin absorbed in deep meditation, a man of poetic sensibility also experiences a peculiar feeling at the time of perception of Poetry: this feeling is caused by the magical powers of comprehension of the Vibhavas and the rest to which a helping hand is extended by the trained intellectual powers of the perceiver himself, and is of supreme bliss, which constitutes the very essence of his own being, as qualified by certain permanent moods; as he appreciates Poetry, his mind assumes, so to say, the form of bliss, which constitutes part and parcel of his own being. As this bliss is unqualified and complete, he derives refined and wholesome pleasure from perception of Poetry,-pleasure which is not, in any way, comparable to that, experienced in ordinary world. This explanation describes Rasa as a feeling of bliss or a state of mind assuming the form of bliss itself, and this feeling or state admitting of production and annihilation, literal use of the expression: 'Rasa is produced' or 'Rasa is destroyed', Jagannātha points out, is capable of being justified. Thus in the doctrine of Abhinavagupta, he concludes, Rasa consists in a permanent mood revealed by bliss, which forms part and parcel of one's own being and as such shines forth in its undimmed splendour, as the curtain of nescience covering it is dismissed.

Abhinavagupta speaks of seven factors, which, according to him stand in the way of aesthetic experience. These are: (a) absence of plausibility in the events described, resulting in an idea that the incidents and characters painted are unreal. (b) the realisation of the excitants, ensuents and accessories. as belonging to a particular place and time and related strictly to the appreciator's own self, (c) the comprehension of the above-mentioned factors as belonging solely to other, (d) awareness of one's personal joy and sorrow, possession and dispossession, which goes to distract his mind from the incidents depicted, (e) lack of clear cognition, springing from improper presentation of means, (f) relegation of Rasa to a subordinate position and (g) presence of doubt as to the exact nature of the mood delineated.34 If the events described in a Poem or a Drama do not have a show, at least, of truth or reason, then the mind of a connoisseur of Poetic Art becomes overpowered by a feeling of their unreality and consequently does not remain concentrated on the incidents presented. For this reason, the Alamkarikas utter a note of caution asking the writers of Epics and Dramas never to handle imaginary plot in their works, because, as they think, such a plot carries with it the risk of being an unreal one. At the time of relishing Rasa, the Vibhavas, Anubhavas and Vyabhicaribhavas, along with the Sthayibhavas evoked by them present themselves in their universal and impersonal aspect, as transcending the limits imposed by time and space. The realisation of the Vibhavas and the rest by the perceiver as being precisely related to his own self is likely to lead to wrangles of his personal feelings, and so long as these sensations are there, Rasa is not experienced, because, as Abhinavagupta says, it is a blissful state of ego in which knowledge of other knowables is completely obliterated. Like

comprehension of the Vibhavas and the rest, as related precisely to the perceiver's own self, their realisation, as related strictly to another person, Abhinavagupta continues, stands in the way of aesthetic experience, because, as he says, the appreciator, who cognises these factors in this fashion does not feel attracted towards perception of Poetry, inasmuch as, he is not in a position to regard characters, confined strictly within the limits imposed by time and space as Vibhavas of the mental condition produced in him. It is for this reason, he points out. as one enjoys aesthetic satisfaction, his mind does not search for the particular relation which a particular character bears to another nor does it probe into absence of this relation, inasmuch as, he understands the characters together with their mental conditions in their universal and impersonal aspect as opposed to the particular and individual. The stage and tiring-room equipment, including mask and dress, prescribed by Bharata conceal the identity of the actor and ascribe to him the personality of the hero and thereby, remove the limitations imposed upon him by time and space. Other devices, such as lighting arrangements, scenic effects and musical tones, -in short, the four types of acting render docile the sense of individuality of the appreciator and consequently, conduct him to a higher plane of consciousness. What four types of acting do in a drama is done by the use of literary excellences, poetic figures and chiselled expressions in a Poem: they also lull the sense of personality of the reader into sleep. A man, overwhelmed with thoughts of personal gain or loss, possession or dispossession finds it impossible for him to contemplate on the mood, presented in a poem or a drama: hence, the perceiver's personal feeling of pleasure and pain is regarded as a factor, that seriously interrupts enjoyment of Rusa. The equipments of the stage along with musical notes prove effective in diverting the mind of the spectator from his personal feelings and thus in allowing him to forget his narrow self for the time being. Abhinavagupta regards indistinct presentation of the excitants, ensuents and accessories as another obstacle in the way of aesthetic enjoyment. According to Bharata, he points out, Rasa is a process of enjoyment, of which

the Vibhavas, Anubhavas and Vyabhicaribhavas constitute the means and as such, unless these factors are presented clearly. the comprehension of Rasa does not arise. For this reason, the Alamkarikas lay great emphasis on proper representation of the Vibhavas and the rest by flawless acting and scenic arrangements in a Drama and by introducing Prasada-guna, consisting in perspicuity, resulting from use of words in their familiar meanings in a Poem. Dismissal of Rasa to an inferior position is regarded as another obstacle, since in those cases, where it is so relegated, the mind of the perceiver being engaged in search for the superior one fails to remain contented with its experience and when this happens, what is realised is anything other than Rasa, which, as Abhinavagupta says, is the cynosure of all minds. What the mind enjoys at the time of appreciation of Poetry is the permanent mood or feeling depicted therein, and not the subordinate factors, like the excitants, ensuents and accessories to it. The argument advanced by the Alamkarikas to establish superiority of permanent moods over other factors is this that, they alone lead to the four ends of life: thus, love, they point out, leads to enjoyment, indignation to riches, heroism to religious merits, quietism to salvation, and so on. Strongest testimony to this however is borne by inward expereience of men of cultivated taste: it reveals that, neither characters nor narratives form the centre of gravity of  $K\bar{a}vya$  or  $N\bar{a}tya$ , which is furnished by Rasa and Rasa alone. In order to bring into light the paramount importance of an emotional mood in Poetry. the Dhyani Theorists maintain that, in a best specimen of poetic art, the expressed idea comprised of the Vibhava and the rest renders itself subservient to the implicit mood of superior charm: suggestion of a fact or an imaginative mood, also, they point out, terminate ultimately in the suggestion of this emotional mood of supreme attraction. Abhinavagupta refers to presence of doubt as to the exact nature of the mood depicted as the seventh and last obstacle standing in the way of aesthetic enjoyment. The same thing constitutes the Vibhava of a number of moods and the same effect follows, in a similar manner, from a number of emotions and consequently, represent their

Anubhāvas: thus a tiger excites both anger and fear; tears ensue from both pleasure and pain,—and langour and anxious thoughts are common accessories to love and sorrow,—heroism and fear. To obviate this difficulty, the Ālamkārikas advise presentation of all the factors—the Vibhāva, Anubhāva and Vyabhicāribhāva as clearly as possible, so that the delineated emotion is brought into consciousness straightway, leaving no room for occurrence of doubt in the mental plane of the perceiver. Abhinavagupta utters a note of caution to the poets, dramatists, actors and stage-directors of posterity to see that these obstacles do not hamper Rasāsvāda, which consists in unimpeded enjoyment of unmixed bliss,—to quote bim 'Vītavighnā-Pratītih'.

In the preamble to the doctrine, adumbrated by him, Abhinavagupta acknowledges his indebtedness to earlier theorists, whose view-points, as he says, he uses as cross-bars in a ladder to arrive at the real truth. An analysis of his doctrine reveals the accuracy of this statement, inasmuch as, following Bhattalollata, he maintains that, the ensuents go to indicate the permanent moods, which are nourished and thus benefitted by accessories to it, -conforming to the Citraturaganyaya of Śankuka. he observes that, the spectator realises the actor neither as an imitator nor as an imitated, and concurring with Bhattanayaka accepts the principle of Salharanikarana,—the realisation of the Vibhavas and the rest in their universal aspect, as also that of revelation of supreme bliss, associated with the perceiver's own being. In the matter of aesthetic realisation, the processes of Abhivyakti and Sadharanīkarana, Abhinavagupta observes, are absolutely necessary as stages. Of these two, the first refers to the dismissal of the curtain of nescience and the manifestation of pure consciousness, consequential upon it, and the second to the realisation of the excitant, ensuent and accessory, as also of the mental disposition in their generalised forms, on the one hand, and the liberation of the mind of he perceiver from the shackles of narrow individuality, on the other, so that at the time of relishing Rasa, he feels that, it is relished not by him alone, but by all persons of poetic sensibility. And because of this, the reader or the spectator derives supreme bliss even from

perception of Poetry, depicting such unpleasant emotions as the tragic, the loathsome and the like; the relish of Rasa, Abhinavagupta points out, is an extra-ordinary bliss and is not to be likened to ordinary pain or pleasure, and the mind is so entirely lost in it that even when the sentiment of grief or horror is relished, it is done in such a state that pain is never felt. The bliss that is derived at the time of perception of Poetry does not come from the nature of the emotional mood or feeling, depicted therein: it comes from within one's soul: it is pleasure, associated with one's own being that is experienced at the time of appreciation of Poetry. Secondly, because of Sadharanikarana, the laukika causes are transformed into alaukika Vibhavas in Poetry and Drama, as a result of which the taste or relish of Rasa. though a nature of cognition—differs from the ordinary forms of the process. The main point which differentiates the experience derived by the original character from the aesthetic relish of the refined appreciator is this that, whereas the characters. presented in their particular forms appear as directly related to the former, to the latter they appear in their generalised aspect, not having any connection with his own personality even. and this slumber of one's individuality is the secret of metamorphosis of unpleasent feelings into pleasant ones, -- of particular and personal causes into universal and impersonal Vibhanas. It is a matter of common experience that, when grief is realised by one alone, it gives him acute pain: when, however, it is shared by many, it loses much of its sting. At the time of perception of Poetry, Abhinavagupta points out, the Sahrdaya does not remain conscious of his own personality: on the other hand, he becomes completely divested of all egotistic and egotistic feelings, and it is due to this transcendence that he derives aesthetic pleasure: as Poetry purges from his inward sight the film of familiarity, that obscures from him the wonder of his own being, it always generates refined and wholesome pleasure, whether it presents pleasant feelings or not. Abhinavagupta thinks that, as generalisation of the Vibhavas and the rest is produced incidentally in course of revelation of one's own being, partaking of the nature of bliss, brought into effect through dismissal of the curtain of nescience, done by  $Vya\tilde{n}jan\bar{a}$ ,—the operation of which differentiates a Poetic expression from an ordinary one, the postulation of two separate functions— $Bh\bar{a}vakatva$  and Bhojakatva, as introduced by Bhattanāyaka is unnecessary and unjustified, because as he points out, it entails a violation to the law of parsimony.

Jagannatha along with his learned predecessors Mammata and Viśvanātha accept in toto the doctrine of Abhinavagupta on aesthetic experience. In his Rasagangadhara he makes mention of eleven theories, which approach the problem from different angles, including the four explained before. Of the remaining seven, five are not backed by the authority of Bharata and as such are unreal and unscientific. Thus, while one of these theories states that, Rasa consists simply in the sum-total of the Vibhava, Anubhava and Vyabhicaribhava, the other asserts that, it consists in the most attractive one of these three factors, the third lays down that, Rasa is comprised of the excitant, which is experienced by the connoisseur, the fourth maintains that, it is comprised of the ensuent alone, so experienced and the fifth points out that, a transient feeling alone is raised to the status of Pasa. The other two, however, which have been presented by Jagannatha in the name of the Navya and the Para deserve treatment, as bearing same substance at least.

The Navya is of opinion, that the original character constitutes the locus of Rasa, or in other words, emotion actually belongs to the original personage,—the character whose life is either presented is a Poem or represented by an actor on the stage. The Vibhāvas, Anubhāvas and Vyabhicāribhāvas, first of all, he points out, bring into light the mood pertaining to the hero through the function of suggestion; that is to say, while reading the drama Śakuntalā or witnessing to its performance at the stage, the reader or the spectator, as the case may be, understands the fact that, love with reference to Śakuntalā has been generated in the mind of Dusyanta, and this love, the Navya says, is revealed to him by Vyañjanā. Subsequently, through a defect, arising from his concentration on the subjectmatter, depicted in the work, aided by his trained intellectual

powers, he identifies his own self with the original personage and as this idea of identity dawns in the mind of the appreciator, he regards himself as possessed of the mood resting really on the original personage. This Anirvacaniva mood, the Navva thinks is designated Rasa, as it is experienced by the soul of the appreciator independent of the sense-organs and the instruments of cognition. The term Anirvacaniva is a technical term of the Vedanta system of Philosophy, and as such requires explanation. The adherents of this system maintain that, a thing, which is neither real nor unreal, -neither existent nor non-existent is Anirvacanīya, possibly because it eludes all descriptions. The Brahman, they say, is a real entity, because its existence is not falsified by any subsequent cognition: the horn of a rabbit, on the other hand, is an unreal entity, because its cognition never occurs; the empirical world, however, is neither rightly real nor truly unreal, because being conjured up by  $M\bar{a}y\bar{a}$ , it is experienced till the knowledge of the self dawns, on the appearance of which it vanishes. This analysis of the Anirvacaniya reveals that, it is spurious having merely a show of reality. An illustration to this is afforded by a piece of silver produced on a nacre, which lacks both in real and working existence—Paramarthika and Vyavaharikasatta. inasmuch as, the former is capable of being predicated of the supreme self alone and the latter of such a thing, which though conjured up by nescience lasts till the dawning of the knowledge concerning the supreme self, and possesses simply an appearance or Pratibhasika satta, since it appears as a piece of silver as long as the error persists and is not removed by subsequent right notion. This piece of silver is neither wholly unreal like a sky-flower, because, at least for a given length of time it presents a semblance of reality. nor is it real, in the strictest sense of the term, because it disappears as the knowledge of real nacre dawns, and consequently, is capable of being characterised as Anirvacaniya. The adherents of the Vedanta system of Philosophy maintain that, nescience or ignorance itself is Anirvacaniya and is experienced by conscious soul itself without the help of sense-organs

or instruments of cognition, or in other words, it is saksibhasya, What is true of nescience or ajnana, is true of such moods as love and the like, because like nescience, a mood also is an attribute pertaining to the mind, and accordingly is capable of being experienced by pure consciousness itself independent of organs and instruments. The Navya points out that, just as due to a defect in the shape of dimness of light, resulting in absence of clear vision, a mother-o'-pearl is mistaken for a piece of silver, similarly from concentration on the subjectmatter presented in Kavya or Natya, a reader or spectator is taken by himself as identical with the original personage. and consequently, as possessed of mood, belonging to him: this identity of the original personage and the mood producedboth, the Navya continues, are Anirvacaniva. This mood. he asserts, is experienced subsequently by the self of the appreciator independent of sense-organs and instruments of cognition, and when it is so experienced it is raised to the status of Rasa: by ascribing to it the identity of the mood. belonging to the original character, which is brought into light through the function of suggestion, it is called a suggested unit and by considering its oneness with supreme pleasure, derived immediately after its experience it is called pure bliss. The Navya thinks that, generalisation of the Vibhavas and the rest, which is regarded as an element essential for aesthetic realisation and in which the different factors appear in their universal aspect, even though particular names are given to them—is nothing but the product of a short-coming and thus as the conception of a defect is an imperative necessity, the simpler process is to assert that, due to this defect an idea of identity with the original personage and the mood itself, consequential upon the growth of this idea dwans in the mind of the appreciator and is experienced subsequently by his own self. This analysis itself, he contends, is sufficient enough to reject the contention of the opponents that, the mood belonging to the original character is not likely to be relished and that pertaining to the appreciator's own self is not likely to be revealed owing to absence of proper excitants and

ensuents. Thus, according to the Navya, the terms Samyoga and Niṣpatti occurring in the dictum of Bharata convey respectively the idea of a short-coming resulting from realisation of the Vibhāvas and the rest and that of generation, the whole Sūtra signifying the sense that, Rasa, which is of the nature of a mood belonging actually to the original personage but now experienced by the self of the appreciator is brought into being through operation of a defect, resulting from realisation of the excitants, ensuents and accessories. 35

The Navya, who contends that the perceiver thinks himself as identical with the original character and consequently shares the emotions, experienced by him defends with meticulous care the blissful nature of Rasāsvāda. He anticipates a possible objection that, in the event of the reader or the spectator sharing the feelings of the Hero, it is not possible for him to derive from perception of Poetry, presenting an unpleasant mood, such as grief, horror, abhorrence and the like supreme pleasure, which is likely to ensue from appreciation of such Poetry alone as depict such pleasant moods as love, mirth and the like. In reply to this objection, he points out that, if realisation of a connoisseur of poetic art reveals that pure joy is experienced from perception of Poetry, delineating the pathetic, the furious and the disgustful even, then the assumption that, the super-normal function of Poetry impedes generation of pain in course of transfusing pleasure in his mind becomes necessary: the shedding of tears and the like do not constitute any proof of the feeling of pain, inasmuch as, on listening to the description of a deity, tears arise in a devotee, though he does not experience the slightest feeling of pain. If, on the other hand, he continues, the realisation of such a connoisseur shows that from perception of Poetry, depicting unpleasant emotions both joy and pain are experienced, then the necessity of ascribing the power of obstructing generation of pain to this super-normal function of Poetry does not arise, since such Poetry leads to both pleasure and pain: as, however, the feeling of pleasure is greater in volume, compared to that of pain, he is attracted towards this type of poem or drama.

In this respect, he maintains, a parallel is to be found in application of sandal paste, which generates both pleasure and pain, but nevertheless, to perform which a man is prompted, the feeling of pain springing from rubbing being insignificant in comparison to joy derived from touch of sandal-paste. The argument that, the sense of identity, which one feels with such a character as Daśaratha, a victim to sorrow in dream or typhoid and other ailments does not lead to pleasure, but rather to unalloyed sorrow, and consequently a similar sense of identity cognised at the time of appreciation of Poetry is likely to lead to unmixed pain is unsound, because the two cases are of completely different types. Aesthetic realisation which is effected by the function of Poetry, in the sense that, this function leads to concentration on the events and characters described in Poetry, which brings the short-coming into being, which in its turn, brings the relish into consciousness is distinct from a realisation, effected by other instruments of cognition. Such is the greatness of the supreme function of Poetry, the Navya asserts that, even unpleasant feelings presented by it generate nothing but elevated pleasure. 86 Poetry turns all things into loveliness: it exalts the beauty of that which is most beautiful, and adds beauty to that which is most deformed.

The theory referred to as Paramata by Jagannātha does not extend recognition to the function of suggestion and to the fact that the mood produced in the appreciator is Anirvacanīya and in this respect it differs from the doctrine propounded by the Navya: while that doctrine follows the tenets of the Vedānta system of Philosophy; this theory, propounded by 'others' displays affiliation to the Nyāya system. It states that, the Vibhāva, Anubhāva and Vyabhicāribhāva, first of all, bring the mood belonging to the original personage into comprehension through the process of Anumāna. Then through the shortcoming referred to in the doctrine of the Navya the appreciator thinks himself identical with the original personage, and as such, possessed of the mood belonging to him: this knowledge of the appreciator, which ensues from constant application of his mind to the incidents described in Poetry and arises through a process

of mental perception, this theory asserts, is Rasa. The idea of such identity derived in a dream is not the product of concentration on Poem or Drama and hence neither produces pleasure nor attains the status of Rasa. The perception referred to as Rasa, these theorists state, is different from the ordinary or laukika process of perception, inasmuch as, in it a mood that does not exist actually is experienced and as such, is rather of the nature of misapprehension. The wrong notion conceived as Rasa relates actually to the mood such as love, grief and the like and consequently, what is relished in this fashion is the mood itself: by attributing this capability of being relished, however, to the so-called Rasa, it is described as forming the content of an erroneous knowledge leading to pleasure. This theory states that the cognition constituting Rasa takes any one of the following forms: (a) the idea that I am the hero, possessed of the permanent mood, (b) the idea that the hero as possessed of the permanent mood is my humble self and (c) the idea that, my humble self is the Hero as also endowed with the permanent mood, pertaining to him. 37 In the first of these three forms of cognition, the appreciator remains oblivious of his narrow individuality from the very beginning, -in the second he superimposes the identity of the hero on his own self, as characterised by his individuality and regards the mood of the hero as a simple attribute of the hero himself,-in the third he cognises the identity of the Hero and his mood, both as separate attributes qualifying his own self, characterised by his peculiar personality. Thus the advocates of this theory interpret the dictum of Bharata to convey this idea that, Rasa, which is comprised of a knowledge is derived from comprehension of the Vibhavas and the rest 38

In the Theories of Rasa, propounded by the Navyas and others, a sense of identity with the original character, appearing in the mind of a true connoisseur of poetic art is put forward as the main factor that leads to aesthetic enjoyment, and it is further said that his sense of identity is not real, but mistaken. As the reader or the spectator thinks himself identical with the original character, nothing stands in the way of his establishing relation with the Vibhāvas, Anubhāvas

and the Vyabhicāribhāvas, belonging to the actual personage or to state more clearly, in taking these Vibhāvas as his own. For this reason, these theorists declare the process of Sādhāranīkarana to be absolutely unnecesary: according to them, as the erroneous knowledge, mentioned above presents all the requisites of Rasa, its unimpeded enjoyment.comes as a natural corollary.

It is difficult to accept this solution to the problem of aesthetic enjoyment, offered by the Navyas and others. First of all, there is no evidence to show that aesthetic enjoyment is a kind of misapprehension (Bhrama). Secondly, the fact that the reader or the spectator thinks himself to be the original personage is opposed to our common experience: at the time of witnessing a theatrical performance, nobody thinks himself as one with Rama or Dusyanta,-men removed from us by several hundreds of years. Thirdly, these theories are not much different in essence from the theories, propounded by Bhattalollata and Śankuka, inasmuch as they accept Rasa as primarily belonging to the original character: it is said that, the reader or the spectator is mistaken to take his own self for the original character, possessed of Rasa. But if the man of trained intellectual powers,—the Sahrdaya—who is identical with the original personage shares with him the same feeling or feelings, then the pleasure, derived by him is bound to be ordinary, because no extra-ordinary bliss is generated in the mind of the actual character: and naturally, the transcendental character of Rasa is bound to fall through. Fourthly, it is not clear as to why unpleasant feelings are not excited at the time of perception of Poetry, depicting distasteful sentiments, such as grief, indignation and abhorrence. The argument that it is the magic power of the function of suggestion (Lokottarakāvyavyāpāra), that turns all unpleasant sensations into pleasant ones does not lead us anywhere, as the extra-ordinary character of this poetic function is a matter of hot controversy. Lastly, the realisation of emotions, such as love and the like is, in our ordinary life, restricted: it is earthly and full of impediments. The emotions, experienced

by actual characters are of this type, and if it is a fact that, a sense of mistaken identity with him excites similar emotions in the minds of the perceivers, then these emotions can, in no case, be sources of refined pleasure to him, being earthly and full of obstacles. For these reasons, these two theories have been rejected by eminent critics, including Jagannatha, who makes only a passing reference to them, but accepts as the correct one the theory, propounded by Abhinavagupta.

It is to note that the defects, mentioned above do not go to vitiate the theories of Rasa, adumbrated by Bhattanayaka or Abhinavagupta. Firstly, in these two theories Rasa is described as a transcendental entity, and the question of its being an exclusively earthly thing does not arise at all, because aesthetic enjoyment is not produced by a false sense of identity with the original personage, but it is the realisation of the Vibhavas in their generalised forms that lead to this enjoyment: it is transcendence over all limitations,—the putting into sleep of one's individuality that generates poetic pleasure or bliss, According to Bhattanayaka, this process of Saaharanakarana is caused by a new function known as Bhavakatva: according to Abhinavagupta, it is caused by the function of suggestion, aided by the trained intellectual powers of the Sahrdaya. Rasa is transcendental, because at the time of its realisation, the Vibhavas, Anubhavas etc. are neither accepted as one's own, nor as not being one's own by a man of cultivated taste, who perceives poetry. The main point that differentiates the realisation of emotion of the original character from that of a man of trained intellectual power is that, whereas, the excitants, ensuents and accessories of Rasa appear as directly related to the former, to the latter they appear in their generalised forms, -not having any connection with anybody, -not even with his own personality. At the time of perception of Poetry, the sense of personality of the perceiver is completely put into sleep, and it is due to this transcendence that he derives aesthetic pleasure. Secondly, according to Bhattanayaka and Abhinayagupta, the bliss that is enjoyed at the time of appreciation of Poetry does not come from outside: it is not that the subject-matter of Poetry or the feeling, depicted

in it generates it: it is bliss that is associated with one's own being and as such comes from within. At the time of perception of Poetry, the bliss, associated with one's pure consciousness flashes forth, as the veil of ignorance is removed and as a natural corollary to it, he derives supreme pleasure irrespective of the nature of the feeling depicted. Thus it is evident that the theories, propounded by Bhatṭalollaṭa, Śaṅkuka, the Navya and others have no legs to stand upon, and the problem of aesthetic enjoyment is to be explained either according to the view of Bhatṭanāyaka or according to that of Abhinavagupta.

This analysis of the theories of Rasa propounded by different theorists reveals that, while according to some, Rasa is a state of pure joy or unmixed bliss, according to others it is not so. Bhattalollata, the earliest commentator says that, Rasa actually belonging to the original personage is superimposed on the actor and perceived by the spectator, who derives supreme bliss from its perception. It is not clear as to how the perceptive knowledge of a feeling, belonging to one produces pleasure in another,—the reader and the spectator. Then again, the perceptive knowledge of a leeling may generate unmixed pleasure, in some cases, but this proposition does not hold good in all cases. Knowledge of a pleasant feeling, experienced by an enemy is likely to produce pain, instead of pleasure in the mind of the perceiver, and similarly, cognition of an unpleasant feeling, experienced by him is likely to produce joy: in the same way, knowledge of an unpleasant feeling, experienced by his friend is likely to produce in him a a sense of deep sorrow, and not of joy. Thus it is evident that the theory, propounded by Bhattalollata fails to explain Rasāsvāda as a state of pure joy. And the same is the case with the theory, adumbrated by Sankuka, because according to him, also, the inferential knowledge of Rasa, actually belonging to the original personage, but superimposed on the actor by the spectator arises.

According to Bhatṭanāyaka and Abhinavagupta, however, the state of aesthetic realisation is one of unmixed bliss. And this is so, because the pleasure, that is experienced at the time of perception of Poetry does not come from the subject-matter,

but from within one's own being. What is manifested is not the mood or feeling, belonging to the original personage, but its reflection in the form of a subjective condition of aesthetic enjoyment in the mind of the reader or the spectator, as the case may be. This state, they say, partakes, no doubt, the nature of cognition: it is nevertheless, different from the ordinary or laukika forms of the process, because, its means, - the Vibuavas are not to be taken as ordinary causes. Actual Sakuntala, the lady of exquisite charm is an axcitant cause of the feeling of love, generated in the mind of Dusyanta, but when Sakuntala is presented in Poetry or Drama, she becomes Alaukika Vibhava in respect of the subjective condition of the ego, produced in the mind of the spectator, and such is the case with the Anubhavas and the Vyabhicaribhavas. The Vibhavas, Anubhavas and Vyabhicaribhavas are not to be taken as ordinary or laukika causes, but as extra-ordinary or alaukika ones, and this is so, because the Vibhavas are presented in their generalised forms either through the function of Bhavakatva or through the function of suggestion. In the view of Abhinavagupta, the Vibhavas, Anubhavas and Vyabhicaribhavas are cognised in their universal and impersonal aspect by an appreciator of l'oetry, and in the same way, the permanent mood, also, which is the source of Rasa is experienced as belonging not to any particular appreciator, but to appreciators in general; so that, at the time of relishing it, he thinks that it is relished not by him alone, but by all persons of poetic sensibility. The process of Sadharanikarana, accepted by Abhinavagupta as an essential factor in the matter of aesthetic realisation presents itself in two aspects: (1) on the one hand, the Vibhavas etc. are sensed in their general forms, and (2) on the other hand, it tends an appreciator to lose his narrow sense of personality, and conducts him to a higher plane of consciousness. As the means of Rasāsvāda are Vibhāvas etc., different from the Laukika causes, and as at the time of enjoyment of Rasa, a particular condition of the ego in which the sense of individuality is put into sleep is created, so the cognition of Rasa differs from ordinary or Laukika forms of the process. For this reason, emotions like Karuna,

III

### The Number of Rasas

In his Natyaśastra Bharata mentions eight Rasas, capable of being presented in a dramatic representation: these arethe erotic (Śringāra), the comic (Hāsya), the tragic (Karuna), the furious (Raudra), the heroic (Vīra), the frighful (Bhayānaka), the disgustful (Vibhatsa) and the marvellous (Atbhuta). Of these eight, the erotic, heroic, disgustful and furious emotions are regarded as basic ones (Prakrti-Rasas): the other four follow from these. Though Rasa, consisting in enjoyment of the bliss-portion of one's own being is always one and the same, yet it appears as different due to difference in attributes,attributes which are nothing but particular states of the mind. These attributes are, according to Dhananjaya, blooming (Vikāśa), expansion (Vistāra), agitation (Kṣova) and perplexity (Vikṣepa). These qualities, as Vidyādhara says, bear resemblance respectively to the blossoming of a flower, growth of a tree, roughness of an ocean and turbulence of a hurricane. 39

Bharata, and following him, Dhanañjaya maintain that, the comic springs from the erotic, the tragic from the furious, the marvellous from the heroic and the frighful from the disgustful.40 This observation is not to be carried too far, because the excitants and ensuents of erotic emotion being different from those of the comic, the relation of cause and effect cannot exist between them: and the same is the case of Rasas. grouped in other three pairs. The statement, referred to above only shows that Rasas, mentioned in each of the four pairs have attributes common to them: to state clearly, the enjoyment of both Erotic and Comic causes blooming of the mind,-the realisation of Furious and Tragic produces its expansion,-the relish of Heroic and Marvellous leads to agitation, and the appreciation of Frightful and Disgustful creates perplexity. While Bharata discovers the innate similarity of Rasas on the basis of mental states, produced from their appreciation, Abhinavagupta explains their affinity on the basis of the four

Vibhatsa or Bhayānaka, which cause pity, disgust or horror are converted into Rasa, in which enjoyment of unmixed bliss is essential. The relish of Rasa is an extra-ordinary bliss,—not to be likened to ordinary pain or pleasure, and the mind is so entirely lost in it that, even when grief or horror is relished in such a state, pain is never felt. The fact is borne out by the common experience that, when grief is represented, the reader or the spectator says: 'I have enjoyed it'. Hence, Viśvanātha remarks that, those very things, which are called causes of pain in the ordinary world, like the banishment of Sitā and the like, when consigned to Poetry or dramatic representation possess the right to be called, in consequence of their being converted into generalised entities, Alaukika Vibhāvas etc., and from them only pleasure ensues, as it does from bites and the like in amorous dalliance.

The Navya leaves the answer to the problem completely to the inward experience of the refined reader or the spectator. He says that if our experience reveals that only pleasure is felt at the time of appreciation of Poetry, depicting distasteful moods, like grief, horror or abhorrence, then it is better to attribute to the extra-ordinary function of Poetry, a capacity to prevent infiltration of sorrow in the mental plane of the appreciator. If. on the other hand, our experience reveals that a painful pleasure or a pleasurable pain is felt at the time of enjoyment of Poetry. then there arises no necessity of presuming this capacity belonging to the transcendental function of Poetry. In that case it is better to point out that, both pleasure and pain are produced by poetry, but as the volume of pleasure is much greater than that of pain, which is insignificant, in comparison to the former, a connoisseur of poetic art is attracted towards, poetry, depicting distasteful mood even.

ends of human existence they lead to. Thus the Erotic and the Comic, he says, lead to enjoyment,—the Tragic and the Furious to riches, and the Marvellous and the Heroic to religious merits: the same thing excites both the Frightful and Disgustful and both of them lead to different ends of

The question whether  $S\overline{a}nta$  is to be admitted as a separate life. Rasa, capable of being presented in a Poem and a Drama forms one of the most controversial issues in the field of Alamkaraśastra. Dhanañjaya, the author of Daśarupaka and his commentator Dhanika deny an independent status to Śanta. The grounds for their denial are detailed below: (1) Bharata has made no mention of Santa -its excitants, ensuents and presiding deities; (2) the manifestation of Santa is a myth, because total annihilation of attachment, jealousy and such other feelings is an absurd proposition; (3) Indifference to worldly objects, which is regarded as the basic feeling of Santa is not a permanent mood, because neither it resides in the minds of appreciators of Poetry in the form of a latent impression, nor is it incapable of being wiped away by other feelings; (4) Connoisseurs of Poetic Art are unable to derive enjoyment of this Rasa: (5) As the state of the ego in which this Rasa is relished is a peculiar one, having no pleasure, no pain, no anxiety, no love, no hatred and no desire, it is possible only in the state of liberation and this being so, Santa is incapable of being delineated in a Poem or a drama: (6) Some critics like to comprehend it under the Heroic and the Disgustful. The proposition of Abhinavagupta that the Drama Nagananda represents the Quietistic emotion is unacceptable: what actually is represented in it is the Heroic sentiment, having munificience for its basic feeling (Daya-Viru).

The advocates of Śānta Rasa, however, consider these grounds too weak to establish the proposition of the antagonists. Though Bharata makes no mention of Śānta or its basic feeling, yet he begins his enumeration of Vyabhicāribhāvas with a reference to indifference to worldly objects, which is

inauspicious by nature: and this goes to show that it is to be regarded both as a  $Sth\bar{a}y\bar{\imath}$  and a  $Vyabhic\bar{a}r\bar{\imath}$ . The aphorisms do not express all points clearly: they hint at many, and in this capacity to hint lies their excellence. But the fact that, Śanta is a Rasa and Nirveda is a Sthāyibhava is not only known from hints, offered by the Sutras of Bharata; it is evident, as well, from its express mention in the Dhvanyaloka by the learned Dhvanikara. According to Anandavardhana the existence of Santa Rasa, having for its basic feeling happiness, springing from annihilation of desire is undeniable: it is established by Śāstra, as also by the inward experience of refined roaders.41 The feeling of supreme happiness produced by annihilation of desires that constitutes the basic feeling of this Rasa-is comparable to supreme satisfaction, which one finds on eating to satiety and in which state of mind one feels a complete aversion to the most dainty dishes offered to. him. The argument that, the Quietistic emotion is incapable of being delineated in a Poem or represented on the stage has no legs to stand upon. When Sama is relished fully and reaches its acme, then certainly it transcends the bounds of verbal and histrionic expression; but the same is the case with other Rasas also: when other Rasas like Śringara and Karuna reach their climax, then they also become unexpressable and inimitable. But antecedently to that point, Sama like other Sthayibhavas can form the object of our expressions and imitations. The argument that, Sahrdayas do not feel attracted towards this Rasa is a travesty of truth, because a good number of men find pleasure in listening to narration of the transience of mundane existence from the Bhagavata and the Gita. The point that it has not the capacity to attract all persons of poetic sensibility towards it does not lead us anywhere, because even Śringāra has not got the capacity to draw the minds of all human beings, inasmuch as, a recluse, has no taste for it. The proposal to comprehend Santa under Daya-Vira does not hold good, because whereas the former consists in total negation of pride, the latter is characterised by existence of an element of pride. Nor can it be comprehended under the Disgustful,

because abhorrence, that constitutes its basic feeling is completely wiped away when the Quietistic reaches its climax.

In view of the great claims of Santa to be regarded as an independent Rasa, Mammata, however grudgingly it may be, regards Santa as the ninth Rasa: according to him detachment from worldly affairs forms its basic mood. Abhinavagupta says that, this basic feeling is happiness, springing from annihilation of desires, leading to rejection of all worldly objects: in the view of some, this is negation of all activities, but as a Sthaybhava is a positive entity, this view is unacceptable. The proposition of Abhinavagupta on this issue seems to be more plausible. The basic mood of Quietistic emotion is tranquillity, consisting of supreme happiness, springing from total annihilation of desires and worldly objects: detachment is only an accessory to it. Viśvanātha, the author of Sāhityadarpaņa mentions in details the excitants, ensuents and accessories to this Rasa: according to him, tranquillity forms its Sthayibhava,—the transitoriness of the world and the nature of the supreme soul its Alambana-vibhavas, - seeing of holy hermitages and places of pilgrimage and association with great men its Uddīpanavibhāvas, -horripilation and tears its Anubhavas and detachment, joy, remembrance and compassion its Vyabhicaribhavas. 42 In his Rasagangadhara, Jagannatha analyses fully the arguments, advanced against the admission of Śānta as an independent Rasa, and finally asserts that, the status of an independent Rasa has got to be granted to Santa, which is capable of being represented in a poem, as well as on a stage. 48 The argument that, as a state of tranquillity is not produced in the mind of an actor, so Santa is incapable of being represented on the stage does not hold good, because Rasa is relished by spectators, and not by actors, and nothing stands in the way of development of a tranquil state in the mind of a perceiver. The objection that, an actor being devoid of tranquillity ts unable to exhibit the Vibhāvas, Anubhāvas and Vyabhicāribhāvas clearly is misleading, because it is equally applicable to demonstration of excitants, ensuents and accessories to other moods, such as fear and indignation, which also do not belong actually to the actor. The solution that, by constant training and practice the reactions to fear and indignation are capable of being simulated effectively supplies an answer to the problem raised, because the same can be done in case of Sama also. The adverse statement that, such accessories like orchestra and music hamper the manifestation of Santa, consisting in detachment from the objects of enjoyment in the minds of refined spectators is untenable, because instead of proving an impediment, they become helpful in production of that state of mind in which relish of the Rasa becomes possible. In support of this contention it is possible to cite the case of sound, emanating from the tabor in accompanient of which Sri Caitanya used to sing praises of the Lord: that music, instead of proving an hindrance became helpful in production of tranquillity in the minds of all devotees.

The emotion of parental affection (Vatsala) receives recognition as an independent Rasa in the hands of Visyanatha. for the first time: affection towards children, he says, constitutes its Sthayibhava, sons and daughters its Alambanavibhavas. their scholarship, valour and conduct its Uddīpanavibhāvas, embrace, touch, kisses and tears its Anubhavas and anxiety, joy and pride its Vyabhicaribhavas.44 The advocates of Vatsala Rusa argue that, as its basic mood affection is not directed towards a lover of the opposite sex, it is not Śrinjara: nor is it capable of being equated with other Rasas, such as Hasya, Karuna and the like, because their basic feelings are entirely different in nature. Bharata and Anandavardhana, as also other Dhyani Theorists, however, deny the status of a Rasa to it: they say that, it is not relished in the same manner as a true Rasa is relished, because it does not reach the point of perfection: it is only a Bhava. Jagannatha opens this question, but depending entirely on the mandates of Bharata he solves it by declaring Vatsala to be a Bhava, and not Rasa. Whether the emotion of parental affection reaches the desired acme and earns for it the enviable appellation 'Rasa' or not, is a matter to be decided solely by the connoisseurs of Poetic Art. If their experience reveals that, it does not reach the climax, then it is better to call it Bhava: if, on the other hand, their experience

points out the opposite, then it is proper to call it Rasa. But even then its status of an independent Rasa is open to controversy. When Vatsala has for its permanent mood affection, it is possible to comprehend it under Śṛṅjāra. If tradition prevents us to regard Vatsala as a variety of Śṛṅjāra, then the question of admission of number of new Rasas,—like Bhakti, having love for the Lord for its basic feeling and Sauhārda, having friendly affection for its permanent mood, which also cannot be regarded, for the same reasons, as types of Śṛṅjāra—arises, vitiatiang the entire proposition by the fallacy of violation to the law of parsimony (Gaurava).

Depending similarly on the authority of Bharata, Mammata, Viśvanātha and Jagannātha consider love directed towards a deity as reaching the state of a Bhava, being manifested by Vibhavas, Anubhavas and Vyabhicaribhavas: this, they say, is incapable of attaining the perfection of Rasa. But the Alamkarikas, affilia ed to Vaisnava school regard Bhakti not only as a Rasa, but is the most perfect Rasa,—the only Rasa. They say that, undivided love for God constitutes its basic feeling; God it its Alambana-Vibhava; horripilation and tears its Anubhavas and joy, sorrow and disappointment its Vyabhicaribhavas: as an incontrovertible evidence in favour of the existence of this Rasa, they refer to the actual experience of transcendental bliss, which one deduces at the time of listening to the achievements of the Lord, as narrated in the Bhagavata. It is not possible to equate it with Santa Rasa, because while this is characterised by an attachment for the supreme Lord, in Santa there is complete detachment.

Kavikarṇapūra, the author of Alaṃkārakaustubha, a contemporary of Sri Caitanya is the first to regard Bhakti as a separate Rasa in addition to the ten Rasas enumerated above. The other Rasa that receives his approval is Prema Rasa, concerning the divine love of Lord Kṛṣṇa and Rādhā. This Rasa, he says, is the most important of all the Rasas, which are included in it, and its importance is established in this way. God is the source of all Rasas of which love is the most predominant. In order to have the experience of aesthetic pleasure of love,

God incarnated Himself as Lord Kṛṣṇa and relished the love of Rādhā, the dynamic source of delight, known as 'Hlādinā Śakti' in the language of Vaiṣṇava Philosophy. As the parties to this emotion are Kṛṣṇa, the source of all Rasas and Rādhā, the eternal source of delight, so it affords exquisite pleasure to the devotees.

The wide scope and predominance of Bhakti Rasa is recognised for the first time in the work 'Muktaphala', compiled and annotated by Vopadeva. According to him concentration of mind on Lord Krsna by any means constitutes its Sthauibhava; a devotee is its Alambana Vibhava; hearing of the achievements of the Lord or conduct of his devotees is the Uddīpanavibhava; horripilation, perspiration and benumbness are Anubhavas, and aversion, sorrow etc. form its Vyabhicaribhavis. Bhaktirasa, he states, is a charming state of the mind produced on listening to the tales of the Lord or his devotees or on witnessing to theatrical performances concerning them: this Rasa manifests itself in other Rasas, that are nothing but its transformations.46 This proposition finds expression in a better form in the speculations of Rupagoswamin the author of Bhaktirasamrtasindhu and Ujjalanilamani. Rupagoswami takes Bhakti Rasa as the only Rasa, and says that, it presents itself in twelve different forms, which are Santa, Prīti, Preyan, Vatsala, Madhura, Hasya, Adbhuta, Vīra Karuna, Raudra, Bhayanaka and Bibhatsa. Other writers on the subject prefer to call Prītibhaktirasa as Dāsyabhaktirasa and Preyobhaktirasa as Sakhyabhaktirasa.47 Of these twelve, the first five are regarded as primary, and the last seven as secondary, the criterion of classification in this case being the permanence or otherwise of the basic feelings of these different aspects. The basic feelings of Santa, Dasya, Sakhya, Vatsala and Madhura are experienced by all devotees for all time to come, inasmuch as, they are incapable of being eradicated by other moods. The basic moods of the last seven types of Bhaktirasa, however, are not experienced by all devotees for all time to come. and are replaced by other aspects of Bhaktirasa, even when they reach the highest point.

The claim of Bhakti to be recognised as a Rasa, and Rasa par excellence finds a staunch supporter in Jīvagosvāmin, who establishes with strong arguments its superiority to other Rasas. The factors, necessary for elevation of a permanent mood to the state of Rasa is, he points out, (a) ability of the mood to reach the highest point, (b) power of the excitants. ensuents and accessories to develop it, so that it may reach climax, and (c) capacity of the appreciators to appreciate it. Undivided love for God is a permanent feeling; it resides in the form of a latent impression and is incapable of being eradicated by other feelings; on the other hand, it moulds into its own shape other transient moods. It raises a devotee above the bodily passions and releasing him from the bondage of worldly existence affords him supreme bliss. leading him to a state in which his mind becomes pure, calmand steady. The Vibhavas, Anubhavas and Vyabhicaribhavas of Bhaktirasa are competent enough to develop the mood, because they are alaukika in their very nature. The causes, effects and accessories to other moods, such as love and the like are earthly in their nature : it is only due to the art of presentation and poetic faculty of the poet that they become alaukika, and produce transcendental pleasure. This being so, there is greater likelihood of the Vibhavas of Bhakti Rasa being converted into alaukika ones and producing supreme bliss, because themselves unearthly in their nature, they are rendered all the more unearthly by the touch of poetic genius and art of presentation. The devotees, thirdly, have the necessary capacity to relish this Rasa, because unflinching love for the God is always present in them in the form of a latent impression. The argument that, all persons are not able to appreciate it has no weight whatsoever, asit is equally applicable to all other established emotions as the erotic, quietistic and the like.48 In trying to establish the superiority of Bhakti to other rasas, Jīvagosvāmin argues that, love between two human beings, though developed fully is unable to produce unmixed pleasure, because union is bound to be followed by separation, resulting in grief: this is the case with other feelings, belonging to men, who due to their bodily exitence are destined to suffer untold miseries. Moreover, the thought of abhorrent and ghastly nature of bodies is likely to interpose itself at the time of relish of these *Rasas*, and thus the experience in all cases is bound to be one of Disgustful emotion.<sup>49</sup>

Another ardent advocate of Bhaktirasa is Madhusudana Sarasvatī who in his 'Bhagavadbhaktirasāyana' justifies with great care the superiority of Bhaktirasa to other emotions. According to him, mind that resembles lac in many respects melts when it comes in touch with such heating factors as love, anger, grief, fear, compassion and the like, and in such a fluid mind the shape of the thing experienced becomes firmly implanted. This form of the thing experienced reflected in mental apparatus, or in other words, the moulding of the mind into the form of the thing experienced is regarded as Sthayibhava: when it manifests itself as supreme bliss coming in contact with Vibhavas, Anubhavas and Vyabhicaribhavas, it is transformed into Rasa. Following this line of argument, Madhusudana regards Bhakti as the conversion of the molten mind into the form of the Divine Lord and says that, when the Divine Lord himself reflected in a fluid mind constitues the basic feeling of Bhaktirasa, it is but natural that this is blissful in nature. Other emotions, such as the erotic and the tragic, the disgustful and the comic, that have for their excitants lady and child, dead body and incongruity generate supreme pleasure only because the absolute reality (Brahman) that is blissful in nature is present in all those excitants, being omniform in character. Thus, while in case of Bhaktirasa unqualified consciousness flashes forth in its undimmed glory, in case of other emotions, consciousness, qualified or determined by objects experienced manifests itself, and accordingly, greater amount of pleasure is derived from the realisation of Bhaktirasa. In drawing the distinction between Bhakti and other emotions, Madhusudana compares the first to the splendour of the Sun and the second to the feeble light of glow-warm. 50

The search for unity in multiplicity, that constitutes a peculiar trait of Indian outlook manifests itself for the first time

in this field in the observations of Bhavabhuti, who regards all emotions as formal transformations of the tragic one (Karuna Rasa). His commentators try to establish the reality and supremacy of Karuna-Rasa by pointing out to the fact that, it is relished equally by persons of different dispositions: moreover, they say, the conversion of mind into a liquid form, as is, effected by enjoyment of Karuna is an essential condition necessary for relishing of other Rasas, and as such, the tragic emotion can rightly be described as the basic one. This observation of Bhavabhuti bears testimony to the firm Indian conviction that a Poetry is an emotional approach to an ideal that eludes tight grasp,—a belief that finds a beautiful expression in the Meghadūtā of Kalidāsa. This inability to realise the exact nature of his ideal casts a gloom in the mind of the poet, which he attempts to transmit to the appreciator. also, through his Poetry. For this reason, a sting of pain is experienced even in moments of exalted ecstasy, and what we actually relish at the time of appreciation of Poetry is painful pleasure, because pleasure, without pain is a contradiction in terms. The statement: 'Eko Rasah Karuna Eva Nimittabhedat Bhinnah Prthak Prthagivaśrayate Vivarttan/Āvartabudbudatarangamayan Vikaran Ambho Yatha Salilameya hi Tatsamastam (Uttararamacarita 3.47) speaks of a deep psychological knowledge and high poetic sense of the speaker and reminds one of the observation of Shelley that, 'Our sweetest songs are those that tell of saddest thoughts'.

The next critic to establish the unity of Rasas is Bhojarāja. In his Śṛṅgāraprakāśa he describes Śṛṅgāra as the only absolute reality and asserts that the speculations of earlier thinkers on the number of Rasas are wrong and misleading. But it is curious to note that, Bhojarāja's 'Sṛṅgāra' has an altogether different connotation: it refers to a particular quality of the Ego. that forms the very basis of desire. As Rasa consists of a particular state of Ego, so one devoid of it has no capacity for aesthetic experience, because this inherent quality alone urges one to enjoy Rasa. According to Bhojarāja a man tempted to appreciate poetry by Śṛṅjāra is a real enjoyer (Rasika). This argument,

advanced by Bhojarāja, in addition to the old one that the erotic emotion is relished equally by all due to its own inherent quality throws a new light on the subject and points out to the futility of probing into the question of number of Rasas.

In arriving at the conclusion of unity of Rasas, Bhojarāja is influenced possibly by Ānandavardhana who remarks that, the enjoyment of quietistic emotion makes itself felt in experience of all other Rasas (Sarveṣāṃ Rasānāṃ Sāntaprāya Eva Āsvādah). As at the time of perception of Poetry, depicting all sorts of emotions, the mind of the perceiver becomes free from all distractions and consequently, clear and calm, so it is but natural to regard Śānta, having for its permanent mood aversion to worldly objects as the basic emotion.

Viśvanātha in his Sāhityadarpaṇa quotes a remark of Dharmadatta, which states that, according to Nārāyaṇa the Marvellous (Adbhuta) is the only emotion. Nārāyaṇa takes Adbhuta as identical with charm and states that, whenever an emotion is experienced, the mind of the enjoyer becomes charmed so to say, and relishes supreme impersonal pleasure; this charm he says, constitutes the essence of Rasa and accordingly, the enjoyment of Adbhuta occurs in all cases. The observation of Nārāyaṇa, which runs as: 'Rase Sāraścamatkāraḥ Sarvatrāpyanubhūyate/Taccamatkārasāratve Sarvatrāpyatbhuto Rasaḥ//Tasmādadbhutamevāha kṛtī Nārāyaṇo Rasam// (Sāhityadarpaṇa III) testifies to the deep penetrating insight of this great critic and exerts considerable influence on the speculations of Jagannātha, who straightway declares charm (Camathṛti) as forming the secret of a poetic expression.

It is refreshing to note that while most of the Ālaṃkārikas are busy in advancing arguments and counter-arguments to determine the exact number of Rasas, there are at least some who are eager to establish the unity of emotions; the undercurrent to find out unity in multiplicity makes itself evident not only in the speculations of Bhavabhūti, Bhoja, Nārāyaṇa and Rūpagosvāmin, but also in the casual remarks of Ānandavardhana, Viśvanātha and Jagannātha, who defend with great care the multiplicity of Rasas. Critics, in this connection,

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observe that, multiplicity here is not incompatible with unity. Rasa is nothing but manifestation of bliss-portion of one's consciousness, and enjoyment of impersonal pleasure consequential upon it. This is true in respect of all Rasas and so it is reasonable to regard their unity. Their multiplicity also can be defended in this way. Consciousness when reflected in intellect that attains diverse states as a result of experience of different Vibhavas, Anubhavas and Vyabhicaribhavas appears as different; and in this respect it has a close parallel in the face that appears as round when reflected in mirror, but as long when reproduced in sword. Thus the difference of Rasas arises through difference in attributes (Upadhi), which are in this case Vibhavas, Anubhavas, Vyabhicaribhavas and Sthauibhavas. Kavikarnapura recognises this aspect fully and he is the only rhetorician to draw a distinction between permanent moods belonging to the appreciator and those belonging to the original personage, of which the former, he asserts, is only one. The permanent mood belonging to the appreciator is an attribute of the mind in which the quality of goodness (Sattva) attains prominence by rendering the other two qualities of hardness (Tamas) and fickleness (Rajas), subservient—attribute that prompts him to relish Rasa. When the qualities of Tamas and Rajas are subordinated, the mind becomes free from distractions and in this serene mind bliss-portion of one's own being automatically manifests itself. This attribute Kavikarnapura says, is blissful in nature, as otherwise its transformation Rasa could never have partaken the nature of supreme bliss. According to Kavikarnapūra, this single permanent mood appears as dissimilar in different emotions owing to the diversity of substratum and excitant: thus in the Erotic emotion it takes the form of love, in the Tragic one it appears as grief, in the Heroic as heroism, in the Marvellous as wonder and so on. The unity of Rasas is a corrollary to oneness of Stha, ibhavas. Just as the same space is described differently owing to diverseness of attributes,—as Ghatākāśa when delimited by a jar and Patākāśa when delimited by a picture, similarly Rasa that consists of transcendental bliss appears as different and assumes a number of names owing to diverseness of attributes, which are in this case Vibhavas, Anubhavas and Vyabhicari-bhavas.<sup>52</sup>

The proposition of Karnapūra that, mood belonging to an appreciator is different from that of the original character is acceptable from the psychological point of view: it gives a clue further to the futility and absurdity of classifying Rasa into eight or nine fixed forms, as has been done by Sanskrit Alamkārikas, who instead of recognising this truth have expended their energies in determining the exact number of Rasas with subtlest arguments.

A psychological analysis of Rasa reveals that, as a mental state produced from perception of Poetry, it is composed of a number of feelings that are aroused in the mind of an appreciator on hearing a poem or on witnessing a theatrical performance. It is not a fact that in all cases the mood aroused in the mind of the connoisseur of poetic art corresponds exactly to that of the original personage: a poetry depicting erotic emotion does not necessarily excite love, -a drama, presenting tragic does not necessarily stimulate sorrow: and such is the case with other specimens of poetry and drama. Moreover, there are a number of poetic creations that portray objects of nature and customs of society without presenting any feeling whatsoever: the appreciation of these creations also stirs up a number of feelings in the mind of the man who experiences them. So the proposition of the ancients that a permanent mood that lies in the form of a latent disposition and which corresponds exactly to the mood of the actual character is aroused in the mind of an appreciator at the time of perception of Poetry does not hold good.

The first and foremost of the feelings constituting Rasa is amazement. Some specimens of poetry surprise a reader or a spectator, as the case may be, by expression of poetic individuality, others astonish him by description of form, taste, smell and touch of the external world, yet others fill his mind with wonder simply through handling of the plot or treatment of character or presentation of ideal. All these specimens of poetry

stir up amazement in the mind of an enjoyer first and thereafter, making his mind completely free from thoughts of other knowables make it clear and calm and stimulate to activity the sense of beauty, lying dormant in it. At the time of experiencing specimens of objective poetry, such as the Ramayana, the Mahabharata and the court-epics sympathetic and antipathetic feelings are produced in the mind of an enjoyer, and so these also constitute the component feelings of Rasa. Witnessing of the drama Sakuntala on board excites sympathetic feelings, and this is done as soon as the idea of unreality of characters present before is shifted from the centre of consciousness to its outer fringe, i.e. to quote Coleridge 'temporary suspension of disbelief' is effected. This stimulation of sympathetic feelings possibly leads the ancient Alamkarikas to describe the mood of the perceiver as corresponding exactly to that of the actual hero, but they confuse the entire position by regarding as identical the moods of the enjoyer and the hero. Appreciation of Sakuntala certainly excites joy and that of Uttararamacarita stirs up compassion, but joy and love and compassion and sorrow are never indentical. Just as joy is derived from knowledge of success of such characters as Sakuntala, Sītā and the like and sorrow is derived from their failures, similarly grief is experienced from knowledge of success of such villainous characters as Ravana and Sakara and joy is derived from their failures. While sympathetic feelings are called forth by the characters who are noble or viciously oppressed, antipathetic feelings are generally evoked by ignoble and villainous characters. The third type of feelings constituting Rasa is the class of Recollectional feelings. As literature is nothing but a reflection of life, in it one is likely to come across such incidents that have been experienced by him previously and perception of these incidents is bound to revive in him memories of the past. When this happens, the appreciator no longer remains neutral and his feelings do not take the shape of sympathetic and antipathetic feelings only, but he feels a genuine emotion as the excitants become available to him with the help of his memory. The fourth one constituting Rasa is the class of Reflectional feelings.

As life is growing more and more complex in modern times, greater amount of complexity of human phenemenon is being reflected in literature, which appeals more to the head than to the heart. When one experiences this type of literature, he becomes conscious of the problems of human life and society and goes on thinking about remedies to them. This group of feelings includes the class known as critical ones, and are evoked relating not only to complex human problems delineated in literature, but also to such things as the diction of a poet, the successful characterisation of a dramatist, the simulating faculty of an actor and so on. Every composition or representation having a plot excites some curiosity in the mind of its perceiver, but this is experienced in abundance when one reads a detective novel, the relish of which consists solely in one's curiosity to know how a mysterious murder or a cautious theft is traced to its original perpetrators.

As the determinants of aesthetic relish Sanskrit Alamkarikas describe only Vibhavas, Anubhavas, Vyabhicaribhavas and Sthayibhavas, of which the first two are external factors being presented in poetry and the last two are internal feelings pertaining to the appreciator. The mention of Vibhava and Anubhava which constitute the subject-matter of poetry as essential for aesthetic experience speaks of high critical insight of these theorists, but at the same time non-mention of other determinants in clear terms by them is likely to evoke much criticism. The experience of Rasa depends apart from the subject-matter on the form and style of composition. The description of some letters and compounds as proving conducive to suggestion of some emotions and detrimental to the manifestation of others, as drawn by Alamkarikas gives an idea of partial realisation of this truth by them. Then again, aesthetic experience differs according to the method of perception: the witnessing of a theatrical performance produces highest relish in the mind of the spectator,-relish that is not comparable with that derived from listening to a poetry by its listener or reading of a poem by its reader. Possibly for this reason, a drama is regarded as the most charming of all the forms of

poetic creation (Kāvyeṣu nāṭakam ramyam—Nāṭyaśāstra). Secondly the relish of a poetry is affected by enviornment and atmosphere in which the poetry is experienced. The same specimen of poetry produces different degrees of pleasure, being enjoyed differently in different circumstances. Thirdly aesthetic experience is influenced, not to a mean extent, by nature and taste, mood and fancy, and understanding of the appreciator. This truth is recognised partially by Abhinavagupta who regards aesthetic relish as completely dependent on the mental inclination of the perceiver, and it receives approval of Viśvanātha also.

As Rasa is constituted of a number of feelings, having for its determining elements a number of factors including the mood of the appreciator and the method of perception, it is incapable of being grouped under a few definite heads; and naturally it is wise to call it as one marked by unity. The speculations of Kavikarnapūra, Jīvagosvāmin and Bhojarāja deserve commendation in this respect, because they conform fully to the analysis of Rasa from psychological stand-point.

Sanskrit Alamkarikas scrupulously distinguish Bhava from Rasa: while the latter is a developed form of a permanent mood, that reaches its acme coming in contact with its excitants, ensuents and accessories, the former, they say, is either a developed form of a transient mood, reaching a relishable state, being in touch with the Vibhavas and Anubhavas, or the highest shape of love directed towards a God or a king. 53 Neither the love of a man for a woman is comparable to the devotion of a devotee for his deity, nor is a transient mood of equal status with a permanent one, which is common to all men of all ages and resides in their mind in the form of a latest impression. The distinction between Bhava and Rasa is important from the stand-point of theory, but in practical field it is of no use. because both Rasa and Bhava being blissful conditions of the ego, in which knowledge of other knowables vanishes, no line of demarcation is drawn between their basic moods at the time of enjoyment of aesthetic pleasure. According to the rhetoricians, a Bhava manifests itself in many aspects as being endowed

with a number of attributes, and according to the difference in these attributes gets different designations. Thus a piece of poetic creation, in which the dawning of a particular feeling is predominantly depicted is regarded as an illustration of Bhavodaya and a specimen of poetry in which the allayment of a particular feeling is prominently suggested is recknoned as an example of Bhavaśanti. Similarly an admixture of two antagonistic feelings in the same substratum, they say, creates the field of Bhavasandhi and likewise the generation of a number of antagonistic or indifferent feelings in the same substratum or different substrata at different times forms the scope of Bhavasabalata 54 In all these types Bhava is of supreme importance, because its expression through the function of denotation renders a poetry one of inferior type, even though the generation or allayment of such Bhava is conveyed through the function of suggestion.

Rasabhasa or the semblance of Rasa is emotion improperly manifested. Improper excitants and indecent basic moods. both render an emotion improper, but as impropriety of excitants do not lead to all types of Rasabhasa, as enumerated by the Alamkarikas, it seems that in their opinion what renders an emotion improper is the indecency of its basic mood. A feeling with respect to which the sense of impropriety arises in the mind of men of trained intellectual powers is to be regarded as an improper basic mood. The postulation of Rasabhasa as a separate category is prompted possibly by the strong belief of the Alamkarikas that, impropriety is the only defect that manifests itself in different forms and a touch of which is sufficient to render a thing defective, -a belief, that, finds expression later in the form of a definite theory in the writings of Ksemendra. Mahimabhatta, though opposed to the theory of Dhvani recognises the ability of impropriety to vitiate a thing and his observation relating to this is praised, by Śriharsa in his 'Khandanakhandakhādya'. 55 Indecency of basic moods cannot render Rusa one of inferior type, because, when Rasa, consisting of a blissful state of ego is enjoyed, the knowledge of other knowables vanishes and naturally there does

not arise the question of its inferiority or wrongness. What impropriety of basic moods do is that they hamper the manifestation of Rasa, or in other words impede the generation of this blissful state. Indecency of basic moods obsesses the mind of the appreciator, who being unable to identify himself with the events and characters described in poetry fail to sense the Vibhavas in their generalised forms, and coseequently Rasa is not manifested for lack of ingredients. Depiction of love with a paramour or with a number of men or with the wife of a perceptor or with an enemy, as well as, that of attachment in which one of the parties is indifferent or both tho parties are animals other than men affords examples of the semblance of Śrinjāra-Rasa. Similarly, delineation of grief for the death of a villain creates semblance of Karuna-Rasa, that of anger towards elders makes semblance of Raudra-Rasa, that of amazement springing from witnessing of magical feats forms semblance of Vismaya-Rasa, and so on. 56 The proposition that depiction of love between lower animals forms Śrijārarasābhāsa is open to controversy. Vidyadhara, the author of Ekavalī thinks that, this is a case of Rasa proper and not of its improper manifestation. The reason is not far to seek. In verses depicting amours of lower animals, the excitants and ensuents to Rasa of the appreciator are there. The argument that Iower animals have no knowledge of Vibhavas and the like has no legs to stand upon, because, what is necessary for the manifestation of Rasa is the existence of determining elements and not their knowledge on the part of parties to love or anger. 57 Moreover, according to the doctrine of Abhinavagupta on aesthetic realisation, that has been accepted as the correct one by later theorists, the Vibhavas etc, are taken by an appreciator not in their particularised forms, as presented by the poet and dramatist, but in their generalised forms as incarnations of certain permanent ideals, and this being the case, the lower animals who are parties to love or anger do not present themselves as insentient beings to the refined reader, who realises them as representations of permanent ideals. And as this argument applies to depiction of love with the wife of a preceptor or a parmour, whose claim to

be regarded as a Rasa proper necessarily becomes great, so the actual existences of such a separate category as semblance of emotion  $(Ras\bar{a}bh\bar{a}sa)$  is thrown open to great challenge.  $Bh\bar{a}v\bar{a}$ bhāsa is semblance of manifestation of a Bhāva. Shyness in a prostitute and anxious thoughts in a paramour furnish its illustrations. To an appreciator of poetry Bhava and Bhavabhasa make no difference, as do Rasa and Rasabhasa, both resulting in an experience of supreme bliss in the same process. Similarly Rasa and Bhava also have no distinctive features of their own. It is argued that while Rasa is a developed form of a Sthayibhava, Bhava is a developed form of a Vyabhicaribhava. But the classification of  $Bh\bar{a}vas$  into two groups :  $Sth\bar{a}y\bar{\imath}$  and  $Vyabhic\bar{a}r\bar{\imath}$  seems to be rather arbitrary. The proposition that, through an inherent miraculous power a Sthayin irremovably exists in our minds sounds ridiculous, because feelings are always replaced by posterior ones. If the test of a Sthayibhava lies in its capacity to exist throughout the poetical marrative, then a number of feelings, classed permanent by ancient theorists such as resentment, disgust and wonder have got to be regarded as Vyabhicaribhavas, because none of them has the capacity to become a predominant feeling of a whole work. The observation that, a Sancaribhava has its parallel in a flash of lightning so far as transitoriness is concerned is inadmissbile, because anxiety ( $cint\overline{a}$ ), sleep ( $nidr\overline{a}$ ) and intoxication (mada) last for hours, sickness (vyādhi) and insanity (unmāda) for months and death (marana) for ever. Thus there being practically no distinction between Sthayi and Sancaribhavas, the experience of both these types of feelings is likely to produce the same state of mind in the refined appreciator. The description of such separate categories as Rasa, Bhava, Rasabhasa etc. as done by the ancient Alamkarikas points out to the great influence exercised on them by the Codes of Conduct, set by the learned Sastrakaras, as well as by the views fixed by tradition. Nevertheless, their awareness of the whole situation and depth of psychological knowledge are evinced by their considered opinion that, Asamlaksyakramavyangya type of Dhyani is marked by unity.

#### IV.

## Antinomy of Emotions (Rasa-Virodha) and other defects

The expression 'Antinomy of Emctions' is a contradiction in terms, because Rasa, being a blissful state of the Ego, in which nothing but its own self is relished, there does not arise any question of realisation of conflict or contradiction between Rasas; -a realisation, that rules out, in its turn, the possibility of experience of real Rasa; thus, so long as there remains an apprehension of conflict, Rasa is not experienced and once it is enjoyed, all idea of contradiction is obliterated. So what the Alamkārikas actually mean by 'Antinomy of Emotions' (Rasavirodha) is 'conflict of basic moods' (Sthayibhava-virodha). 58 Some basic moods of the Rasas discussed above bear the relation of benefactor and beneficiary between each other, while others have between them the relation of destroyer and the thing destroyed. The emotions that have no conflict between each other are heroic and erotic, erotic and comic, heroic and marvellous, heroic and furious, and erotic and marvellous, while those that are mutually opposed to each other are erotic and disgustful, erotic and tragic, heroic and frightful, quietistic and furious, and quietistic and erotic. A poet, desirous of depicting a particular emotion is advised to eschew insertion of excitants and ensuents belonging to another emotion, opposed to the former one, because, as the Sanskrit rhetoricians say, such elaboration hampers the manifestation either of the intended emotion or of both. If at all such elaboration is found necessary, then he is advised to do so after adopting such means as are recommended to avoid the conflict which appears in two aspects: (a) in the form of absurdity of the basic mood of one to remain in the same substratum with the basic mood of the other, and (b) in the form of antagonism between the cognitions of two Rasas, in the case of which experience relating to one is obstructed by that relating to other. 59 The first form of conflict in which opposite basic moods remain in the same substratum is avoided by effecting a change of substratum, that is to say, by depiction of one of the moods in a different base. 60 Thus a poet can

safely portray heroism in a king who happens to be his patron and fear in his antagonist, without any loss of charm whatseover. Ancient Alamkarikas suggest a number of remedies to the second form of conflict in which experience of one is obliterated by that of the other. Firstly this conflict is avoided by presentation of a neutral emotion between the two mutually opposed ones, -an emotion that serves to bridge the gulf between the two. 61 Thus for a poet, desirous of delineating both erotic and quietistic moods, what is necessary is portrayal of marvellous emotion in between them. In such case, the experience of the neutral marvellous emotion serves as a buffer, and thereby removes the chances of clash between appreciation of two opposed moods. Similarly, a poet desirous of delineating the erotic and the disgustful is advised to arrange for enjoyment of the heroic between the appreciations of two emotions mentioned first. The reason for adoption of such a step is quite clear : in such case, the experience of the neutral heroic removes the cognition of erotic, presented first and thereby makes the enjoyment of the disgustful unimpeded. Secondly, this is also avoided by effecting a relation of predominance and subservience between the mutually opposed sentiments or by rendering both of them subservient to another predominant emotion. 62 Though erotic and tragic are mutually opposed to each other, yet when the former is rendered subservient to the latter, depiction of both becomes all the more charming, because the poignancy of grief experienced by one of the parties to love at the demise of the other is put into fuller relief when placed in the setting of their mutual love. This practice is usually followed by Sanskrit poets, who in their eagerness to delineate both these emotions in a charming manner occasionally follow also the procedure of rendering both of them subservient to another predominant mood,—the love of the poet for his royal patron. Thirdly, as a means to avoid conflict Sanskrit Alamarikas speak of presentation of both the mutually opposed emotions with the help of common sets of adjectives. 63 As an illustration to this principle, Jagannatha quotes a verse meaning: O warrior! your enemies, with their bodies besmeared with blood (having sngtro attachment), puffed up with the pride of their youthfulness are lying embracing snugly earth (their lady-loves), -in which, he says the tragic and the erotic being presented through the same adjectives leave aside their enmity and manifest themselves in full glory (Nitantam jauvanonmattah gadaraktah sadahave/ Vasundharām samālingya serate vīra terayah//). A poet endowed with a strong imaginative faculty is advised not to get afraid of handling the excitants and ensuents of an opposite Rasa: it is rather imperative on his part to delineate an emotion. opposed to the one intended to be depicted after avoiding the conflict by taking recourse to the means suggested above, because the victory of the intended emotion over its rival naturally brings it out in flying colours. Anandavardhana advises poets to avoid carefully conflict of emotions in their creations, particularly in those depicting the erotic predominantly. This is a must, because the erotic being the most tender of all emotions is liklely to suffer greatly even from slightest incongruity.64 At the same time, he thirks insertion of excitants and ensuents of erotic emotion in a p m, depicting another prominent emotion advisable, as the for er being highly attractive induces the appreciators to experience other distasteful feelings and to devour the pill of advice, administered by poetry in good grace : it also enhances in general the beauty of a poetic creation. Thus the depiction of erotic and quietistic in the verse: 'Satyam manoramā rāmāh satyam ramyāh vibhūtayah / Kintu mattanganapangabhanga-lolam hi jivitam', meaning: 'Truly ladies are attractive: verily riches are charming, but life is as fickle as the side-glances of a passionate lady-renders the piece of poetic creation more beautiful, instead of making it defective. 65

A specimen of poetic art is rendered unattractive and defective mainly due to the defects of emotion of which this antinomy is one: these have been elaborately discussed by the ancient Alamkarikas. According to the Alamkarikas an emotion is never to be expressed through the function of denotation from the use of general word 'Rasa' or from the use of such words as 'Śrigāra' and the like, that are significant of particular types

of Rasa. As Rasa is brought into comprehension only through the function of suggestion, the attempt of denotation to express it becomes equivalent to ejection of food already taken and thus is vitiated by the defect technically known as Vamana. Moreover, Rasa, signified through the function of denotation only is incapable of being relished, and naturally, the operation of this function to convey it proves futile. 66 In a similar manner, mention of words, denotative of permanent (Sthayi) and transient (Vyablicari) feelings is regarded as a blemish, pertaining to Rasa. Absence of clear knowledge of Vibhavas and Anubhavas. or the late dawning of such knowledge is regarded as another Rusadosa, because it proves a hindrance to aesthetic realisation. The next defect consists in insertion of the Vibliavas and the like of an emotion, that is more powerful than or is of equal strength with or is opposed to the intended one: it hampers the manifestation of Prakrta-Rasa. 47 An emotion that has been brought into light fully through clear portrayal of excitants and ensuents should not be attempted to be brought into consciousness again, after its experience has been halted by description of other things. Such attempt renders a piece of poetic creation vitiated by the defect known as Vicchinnadipana, and as such is to be avoided. This prohibition is to be taken with an amount of reservation: it applies only to subsidiary emotions and not to the prevailing one in a particular piece. As blemishes pertaining to Rasa, the Alamkarikas speak of both depiction of a Rasa at a time in which it should not have been presented and its non-presentation at a time in which its experience should not have been put to a halt. A violation to this principle is illustrated by delineation of love in union at a time when others are engaged in performance of evening rites or in offering worships to Gods, as also by description of such performances and offerings made by the hero at a time when an enemy has committed aggression on his, own territory. Poets are advised by learned critics to describe achievements and riches of an enemy of his hero in such a way. that they do not seem to excel those of the latter, because non-conformity to this rule fails to bring into light the superiority of the hero and aesthetic relish, consequential upon it. Ancient critics, including Dandin prefer description of high lineage, superhuman strength and massive scholarship of a rival to the hero and says that defect of such a great rival at the hands of the hero amply shows his greatness in all respects. 68 But Jagannatha warns against application of this principle to its extreme: he says that only that much of excellence of the rival, as remains subservient to that of the hero, bringing as it does in bold relief his royal dignity and valour is to be described, because sheer victory of the hero over his rival is unable to signify the glory of the former. An illustration to this is to be found in the case of a forest-ranger killing a great King by a single poisonous arrow,—a fact, that does not convey any idea of superiority of the fowler. 69 A poet whose mind is concentrated on contemplation of an emotion is further advised to describe the party, with respect to whom a particular feeling is excited, as also the party in whose mind the feeling is generated at regular intervals, as constant application of an appreciator to them leads to aesthetic realisation. A violation to this principle forms a serious defect. As all the elements in Foetry, including the plot itself is nothing but a means to an end, which is aesthetic realisation (Rasāsvāda), so insertion, also, of incidents, that have nothing to do with manifestation of Rasa is to be carefully avoided. 70

The principal blemish, pertaining to Rasa, however, is inappropriateness which is to be avoided scrupulously by a poet, because it distracts the mind from enjoyment of poetry, and thereby hampers realisation of Rasa; the hindrance caused by it to pleasant appreciation of Poetry is often compared to that caused by a grain of sand to enjoyable drink of a beverage. This defect consists in description in objects and characters of qualities and actions, other than proper and appropriate ones. An example of this is afforded by delineation of valour in a cow,—piousness in a tiger,—decrepitude in heaven,—immortality in earth,—water-sports in winter,—use of hearth in summer, urge for dalliance in oldage,—aversion in youth and so on. Anandavardhana states that, characters are of different

types being either good (uttama) or bad (adhama) or mediocre (madhyama), and again either a divinity (divya) or a human being (manusa); he warns against depiction of feelings common to a man in a divine character and of those, associated with a God in ordinary men. Thus description of such incidents as crossing of Oceans, done easily by characters, who are ordinary human beings or of their indignation as consuming the entire universe and putting a change to the order of day and night being inappropriate produces a suspension of belief in the minds of appreciators and consequentially hampers aesthetic realisation. For this reason, a dramatist is advised by Bharata to select plot of his Nataka, that is regarded as the best type of a dramatic composition from such great works at the Ramavana and the Mahabharata and to have for his hero such famous and distinguished characters as Rāma, Yudisthira and Bhīma, Invention of plot in a work of this type is strictly prohibited because it is apprehended that there is every likelihood of an inventor describing inappropriate feelings and actions in his new characters. 72 Anandavardhana says that though Indian tradition approves depiction of love between human and divine beings, yet the principle of propriety is to be followed strictly: the method of portraying love-in-union between noble parties, one of whom is a King and the other a princess,—a method, in which bites, nail-marks, kisses and similar other repugnant actions are avoided—is to be followed in case of depiction of love between a God and Goddess. The way in which Kalidasa has delineated love between Lord Siva and Parvatī by describing their dalliance in a common manner is a serious defect, according to Anandavardhana: but at the same time he asserts that, the strength of poetic intuition of this great poet covers up the defect which does not stand in the way of enjoyment of aesthetic pleasure. 78 Jagannatha uses more strong language and while accusing Jayadeva for violation of the principle of propriety warns poets of posterity against imitating him. The argument that, in such cases the process of Sadharanakarana presents Siva and Parvatī, Kṛṣṇa and Rādhā in their generalised forms as representations of certain ideals and divested of divinity proves abortive, because this process operates only in those cases in which poetic relish is experienced by refined appreciators. The only standard of judging a Poetic creation, along with its elements and functions is the pleasure derived from its perception by connoisseurs of poetic art and nothing else. As poems, depicting amorous dalliance of Siva and Parvati, Krsna and Rādhā prove distasteful to a refined appreciator like that describing enjoyment of his own parents, the question of operation of the process of Sadharanikarana does not arise.74 Describing inappropriateness as the greatest factor that subdues aesthetic experience, the secret of which lies in strict adherence to the principle of propriety, Anandavardhana advises poets to select such incidents as their plots, as contain Vibhavas, Anubhavas and Vyabhicaribhavas appropriate to the manifestation of intended emotion. Special care is to be taken in case of selection of a subject-matter, that is purely imaginary, because slightest negligence on the part of a poet in this respect is likely to cause disaster and hamper the manifestation of Rasa. A poet who selects plots of his creations from such works as the Rāmāyana and the Mahābhārata, the emotions presented in which are non-controversial and accomplished entities (Siddharasa) is further advised not to effect such a change in the plot, that is likely to prove detrimental to the principal emotion.75 A caution, however, is necessary here. If it is found that some of the episodes described in the source are harmful to depiction of the intended emotion, then it becomes imperative on the part of a poet to replace those incidents by new invented ones, that are more conducive to presentation of Rasa, because sheer narration of incidents does not constitute the duty of a poet, who is not a historian: what forms his actual aim is delineation of emotion. A poet is to be guided solely by this consideration in matters of insertion of five junctures (Sandhi) and improvisation of figures. Junctures are to be arranged not merely out of reverence for the mandates of scholars in dramaturgy, but with an eye to realisation of aesthetic relish. Similarly figures are not to be heaped up to make a display of one's craftsmanship, even though a poet is expert in their insertion, because

this tendency carried too far is likely to lead to such descriptions, that have absolutely no bearing on the depiction of the principal emotion. The purport of the whole discussion is this that, Rasa is the end of all poetry and all poetic elements are to be so arranged as they prove helpful to its manifestation. The

#### CHAPTER V

# THE DHVANI THEORY OF SANSKRIT POETICS

I

#### The views of Anti-Dhyani schools

From early times the function of suggestion and the suggested sense of the Dhvanivādin have been hotly challenged by rival theorists, who oppose the claim of Dhvani to be regarded as a distinct category, forming the essence of poetic creation. The question whether it is necessary to postulate the separate function of  $Vya\tilde{n}jan\bar{a}$  or whether it may not be comprehended in other recognised functions like  $Abhidh\bar{a}$  and  $Laksan\bar{a}$ , and in other intellectual processes like Inference and Logical Postulation forms the subject-matter of many animated discussions. For this reason a scholar of the stature of Anandavardhana feels the necessity of refuting the contentions of the schools opposed to the theory of Dhvani, before enunciating it in clear cut terms, and this act, in fact, earns for him the enviable title  $Dhvanik\bar{a}ra$ .

Jayaratha, the learned commentator on Alamkārasarvasva of Ruyyaka cites a verse, according to which the problem of suggestion is capable of being explained away in twelve different ways, which are detailed below:

- (1)  $Vya\tilde{n}jan\bar{a}$  is identical with the function known as  $T\bar{a}tparya$ .
- (2) The function of suggestion is no function at all; it is a myth,—a brain-wave of the Dhvani Theorists.
- (3) The function of suggestion is nothing different from that of denotation.
- (4) The function of suggestion is capable of being equated with the function of Indication of Inclusive type  $(Up\bar{a}d\bar{a}na-Lakşan\bar{a})$ . This point is illustrated by such figures as  $Sam\bar{a}sokti$ ,  $Aprastutapraśams\bar{a}$  and the like, in which the expressed meaning

brings in the non-contextual (Aprastuta) and contextual (Prastuta) elements respectively in order to establish its logical connection with the rest of the sentence.

- (5) The function of suggestion is capable of being equated with the function of Indication of Exclusive type (Lak sana-Lak sana). This point is illustrated by such figures as  $\bar{A}k sepa$ ,  $Vy\bar{a}jastuti$  and the like, in which the expressed meaning completely surrenders itself in favour of a new meaning,—injunction or prohibition in case of the first, and censure or praise in case of the second.
- (6) The function of suggestion is capable of being comprehended under the process of Inference of informal type (Svarthanumana). Inference, the Naivavikas say, is a knowledge that springs from Parāmarśa or consideration, which in its turn again, is the knowledge of the reason, as distinguished by invariable concomitance; as for instance, the knowledge that this mountain has smoke which is invariably accompanied by fire is consideration, while the knowledge born of it that the mountain is fiery is inference. According to the Naiyayikas, Inference is of two types: Svartha and Parartha. Of these two, the first one is the source of one's own knowledge; in it as the premises are immediately known to a man and are derived from his own experience, he does not require them to be stated with exact formality. An example of this type of Inference is afforded by the knowledge that the mountain is fiery, derived by a man, who having himself ascertained by frequent observation the generalisation that wherever there is smoke, there is fire, as in a kitchen approaches a mountain and sees smoke on it. In Pararthanumana, on the other hand, the premises that are discovered by one man are imparted to another through the medium of language, and as such, they stand in need of being stated with precision. An example of this type of Inference is afforded by the knowledge that the mountain is fiery, derived by a man on hearing from an enlightened person the following five-membered syllogism: Mountain is fiery, because it smokes; whatever smokes is fiery; as is a kitchen; this is so; hence this is fiery. The point, pressed forward by this section of opponents

is capable of being illustrated by the verse of Abhijñānaśakuntalam, that runs as:

Stananyastośīram prasithilamṛṇālaikavalayam Priyāyāh sābādham kimapi kamanīyam vapuridam/ Samastāpah kāmam manasijanidāghaprasarayoh

Na tu grīṣmasyaivaṃ subhagamaparāddhaṃ yuvatiṣu// and means: 'This body of my beloved with the ungent of Uśīra applied to the breasts, and with a single loose bracelet of lotus-stalks round the arm, though full of torment is exceedingly lovely. Granted that the affliction caused by the operation of love and heat is equal; yet the injury caused to young maidens by heat is not so charming', and in which the so-called suggested sense, namely the dawning of love in the mind of Śakuntalā is known by Duṣyanta through inference.

(7) The function of suggestion is capable of being comprehended under the process of Inference of formal type  $(Par\bar{a}rth\bar{a}num\bar{a}na)$ . This point is illustrated by the well-known verse:

Bhrama dhārmika viśrabdhah sa śunako'dya māritastena/ Godānadītīrakuñjavāsinā dṛptasiṃhena//, that means:

'O religious-minded person! roam about freely, that wretched dog has been slain to-day by the mighty libn, residing in the groves situated on the banks of the river Godavari.' The Pararthanumanavadin argues that the syllogism, presented by the speaker produces a knowledge that the bank of the river Godavari is not a proper place for free movement of a man afraid of a dog in the mind of the religious-minded person.

(8) The function of suggestion is capable of being comprehended under the process of Logical Postulation (Arthāpatti). Logical Postulation or Arthāpatti, recognised by some section of philosophers as a valid source of knowledge consists in presumption of a cause from a known effect. The stock-example given of Arthāpatti is the expression: 'Pīno Devadatto divā na bhunkte', in which from the known fatness of Devadatta, the taking of meal by him during night is arrived at. The viewpoint of this section of opponents is demonstrated by the

presumption of a cause in the shape of dalliance in the oftquoted verse:

Nihśe sacyutacandanam stanatatam nirmrstarāgo' dharah Netre dūramanañjane pulakitā tanvī taveyam tanuh/ Mithyāvādini Dūti vāndhavajanasyājñātapīdāgame

Vāpīm snātumito gatāsi na punastasyādhamasyāntikam//
Here the given effects, namely the complete wiping away of sandal paste from the slopes of breasts, the total disappearance of redness from the lower lip and such other changes lead us to have a knowledge of the unknown effect, namely dalliance.

(9) The figures of speech comprehend the concept of *Dhvani*. There are certain figures, that are characterised by emergence of an unexpressed meaning, and these *Alaṃkāras* can safely include *Vyañjanā* and *Vyaṅgyārtha* under their purview.

(10) Rasa, a type of suggested meaning of the Dhvanivādin is not really indicated by the  $Vibh\bar{a}vas$ ,  $Anubh\bar{a}vas$  and  $Vyabhic\bar{a}ribh\bar{a}vas$ : what the  $Vibh\bar{a}vas$  and others actually do is that, they combine to produce the non-existent unit of Rasa.

(11) The so-called suggested meaning Rasa is not brought into light through suggestion, but its enjoyment is produced through a function known as Bhojakatva, or in other words, Rasa is not suggested, but is enjoyed.

(12) The function of suggestion is unable to bring Rasa into comprehension: this exquisitely charming element is raised into our consciousness by another function. Though Jayaratha does not mention this function by name, Viśvanātha, while quoting the view-point of one school calls it Rasanā.

Of these twelve views, the last three relate to one type of suggested sense only, namely the suggested emotion, but the other nine have in their view suggested meaning in general, that presents itself in the form of a fact or a figure or an emotion. The Introductory stanza of the Dhvanyāloka summarises these antagonistic views into three groups. One sceptical school entirely denies the existence of the suggested sense in poetry, a second school tries to trace it back to the recognised function of Lakṣaṇā and the third school holds that it is beyond the province of words and can only be perceived

by a man of refined discernment. The third chapter of the work, however, while attempting to establish the separate existence of the function of suggestion introduces the point of view of that school that wants to equate  $Vya\tilde{n}jan\bar{a}$  with  $T\bar{a}tparya$ , as also of that, that tries to comprehend it under the process of Inference.

The school that declares Dhvani to be entirely non-existent takes up three different positions, and approaches the problem from three different angles. One sub-section of the school argues that, Poetry consists of a combination of sound and sense and the elements known as Gunz as Alamkara only go to augment the beauty of such a combination. The Rīti of Vāmana, it asserts, is formed through combination of Gunus and the Vrtti of Udbhata, in a similar manner, is capable of being dissolved into an Alam'cara, inasmuch as, alliteration formed through repetition of different types of letters constitutes different varieties of this element. This sub-section firmly denies the existence of Dhvani and asserts that, there is no decorating element in Poetry other than the Guna and the Alamkara. A second sub-section of this school denies the existence of Dhvani on the ground that, its admission tantamounts to total rejection of the existing principles of literary criticism. Ancient scholars define Poetry as a combination of word and meaning, competent to generate supreme pleasure in the minds of connoisseurs of Poetic Art through literary excellences and figures of speech, inserted in it: as acceptance of Dhvani goes against this belief, and consequently, throws to winds the established norms of literary criticism, so, it points out, this element cannot be accepted as an existent entity. A third sub-section maintains that, Dhvani lends such a charm to a Poetic creation as is imparted to it by the much-talked of Guna and Alamkara, and as such, these factors comprehend the concept of Dhvani. It is a fact that the list of poetic figures is being continually swelled by the speculations of critics and it is just possible that a new turn of expression is named Dhvani by the Dhvani Theorists, but still it is not proper on their part to wax eloquent in selfapprobation and to raise such a hue and cry over this self-styled

achievement. In summing up the view-points of these three sub-sections, Abhinavagupta remarks that, while the first says that there is no such beautifying element in Poetry, which is not recognised by it, the second states that an element which is not recognised by it is not an instrument of decoration at all, and the third asserts that if such an element imparts beauty to a poetic creation, it is capable of being grouped under the Guna or the Alamkara. In conclusion the Abhavavadin observes that, Dhvani is a figment of imagination and consequently, does not stand critical test. In support of his observation, the Abhāyayadin cites a verse, said to be composed by one Manoratha a poet and contemporary of Anandavardhana, -which records a sarcastic fling at the Dhyanivadin for his departure from the traditional views on Poetry: it states that, though a Dhyanivadin showers profuse praise on a specimen of Poetic Art, in which neither a charming figure nor a chiselled expression is there, simply because of the fact that it remains marked by revelation of Dhvani, he is not in a position to expound the nature of Dhvani, when challenged.2 This sad state of affairs, the Abhavayadin asserts, testifies to the fact that, Dhvani is a mere brain-wave of the Dhyanivadin, having no objective and real existence.

The second school of rival theorists prefers to equate Dhavani with  $Bh\bar{a}kta$ -artha. This peculiar term  $Bh\bar{a}kta$ , Abhinavagupta comments, is comprehensive enough to denote the ideas as are conveyed by both the functions of  $Laksan\bar{a}$  and  $Gaun\bar{i}$ , recognised separately by the  $M\bar{i}m\bar{a}msaka$ . Thus Bhakti, he points out, refers to a well-known relation, which constitutes one of the conditions necessary for manifestation of the secondary sense, which itself, consequently is described as  $Bh\bar{a}kta$ : then again, he continues, it refers to an attribute, which constitutes a part and parcel of the connotation of a particular term and the new sense to signify which this term is used simply because this attribute is traced in it is necessarily regarded as  $Bh\bar{a}kta$ . The term  $Bh\bar{a}kta$  is capable of being derived in other ways also: Bhakti is the devotion which an idea other than the primary one bears to the relation or the attribute, which constitutes a part and

parcel of the connotation of the word concerned and naturally, Bhakta-artha is the meaning brought into light through the functions of both Laksanā and Gaunī, -functions, which depend on the relation or attribute referred to above for their operation. The term Bhakti, Abhinavagupta continues, conveys the idea of inapplicability of the primary meaning, as well, and these different types of derivation bring out, he asserts, the conditions necessary for operation of Laksanā and Gaunī. 8 It is admitted by rhetoricians and philosophers alike that, Abhidha conveys the conventional idea and when this idea becomes inapplicable in the context, Laksanā or Gaunī approaches to bring the Lāksanika or the Gauna artha into light, relying either on usage or on some purpose. According to this school of rival theorists, Dhvani in all its aspects is identical with Bhakti, or in other words, a suggestive word is identical with an indicative word,—a suggested content is the same with the indicated content and the function of suggestion itself is nothing other than the function of Indication. The argument that the view-point that Vyanjana in all its aspects is identical with Laksana, as attributed to a section of the ancients is a misrepresentation, since in no works of earlier theorists do we come across the term Dhvani-is misleading, because, as Anandavardhana points out, by accepting Laksana as an additional function, these theorists touch the fringe of Dhvani, inasmuch as, in a Prayojanamīlā-Laksanā, the Prayojana or motive for the signification of which Laksana is resorted to is signified solely through Vyanjana: these theorists, however, do not give a separate status to the function of suggestion and their silence on the issue is sufficient enough to bring out their belief that Vyanjanā is identical with Lakṣaṇā. To state clearly, these theorists recognise only two functions-Abhidha and Laksana, of which the first conveys only the primary sense: consequently, it is an a priori conclusion that all other ideas are brought into comprehension through Laksanā, and as the suggested content is one different from the primary one, is to be subsumed under the indicated idea (laksyartha).

It is very difficult to describe definitely as to who of the earlier theorists equates or equate Bhakti with Dhvani. While

Abhinavagupta quotes the names of Bhamaha, Udbhata and Vāmana as the upholders of the Bhaktivada, Ruyvaka maintains that, these earlier theorists like to comprehend Dhvani under the Alam's aras: these critics, he asserts, recognise the essentiality and importance of the poetic figures—the instruments of decoration in a specimen of poetic art 5 This difference between the view-points of Abhinavagupta and Ruyyaka, though appearing as highly puzzling at the first sight resolves itself on a closer. analysis, which reveals that an indicated content goes to augment the beauty of an expressed idea in the same way as a poetic figure does it; this is further corroborated by the fact that the western critics grant the status of a figure of speech to Indication, which they name Metonomy or Synecdoche. The first of these figures, they point out, consists in substituting the name of one thing for that of another to which it bears a certain relation and the second in the use of a more comprehensive term for a less comprehensive or vice versa: this, it is clear, is nothing other than Upacara of Sanskrit rhetoricians.

Another school of rival theorists declares Dhvani as lying beyond the scope of words. Shy as they are in formulating an accurate definition of Dhvani, these critics maintain that, the suggested content is something inexplicable and is to be relished only by men initiated into the heiroglyphics of Poetry. In summing up the relative position of these three anti-dhvani schools. Abhinavagupta points out that, each of the views recorded in succession marks a definite improvement on the preceding one: thus, while the first group, which denies completely the existence of Dhvani recognises only the function of Abhidha, the second, which wants to equate Vyanjana with Laksana extends recognition to the second function of Indication, as well, though it is not sure as to the existence of Vyanjana and the idea signified by it, and the third section, which describes Dhvani as lying beyond the comprehension of words hesitates only, though sure of its existence to formulate its definition in clear-cut terms.6

#### II

# Dhvani-a profound verity

Against the attacks of the anti-dhvani schools, which deny the existence of Dhvani or try to comprehend it under different processes, Anandavardhana replies that, being a profound verity it is capable of being established positively by an examination of aesthetic facts, as well as facts of experience and that this unexpressed content is incapable of being satisfactorily explained as revealed by Abhidha, Laksana or similar other means. The inward experience of connoisseurs of poetic art, he asserts, reveals the fact that, Dhvani constitutes the essence of all poetic creations of master artists: it is different, he continues, from the expressive word and the expressed meaning and is incapable of being equated with such elements as Gunas and Alamkaras even. In his eagerness to establish the distinction of Dhvani from other elements of Poetry, Anandavardhana introduces the parallelism of grace of a lady; just as the loveliness of a lady is something different from her limbs or ornaments or absence of defects, similarly, the suggested sense-unit, also, he points out, is something distinct from the primary meaning, the instruments of decoration and the absence of blemishes in Poetry. An examination of historical facts also, he observes, points out to Rasadhvani as forming the essence of a poetic creation: thus, the first specimen of Poetry-the Ramayana is an external manifestation only of the tragic emotion aroused in the mind of Valmiki on hearing the pitiful cries of the poor bird, separated from its consort. In explaining this observation, Abhinavagupta remarks, the ordinary sorrow, experienced by the bird generated extra-ordinary tragic emotion (Karuna-Rasa) in the mind of the seer, and in the manner of water gushing forth from its container, overflown by it, this emotion extending beyond the limits of his mind appeared outside and as it came, it assumed the shape of the verses of the Ramayana. This remark of Abhinavagupta is quite in keeping with his theory on aesthetic experience, inasmuch as, it maintains the distinction between a laukika feeling and an alaukika-Rasa, showing, thereby, that the ordinary cause-and-effect theory is not applicable in case of extra-ordinary Rasa.

Before adumbrating the doctrine of Dhvani, Anandavardhana proceeds to establish the absolute distinction of the suggested content from expressed one. The suggested sense-unit or the Pratīyamānārtha, which is raised into comprehension by the suggestive power of a word and its corresponding primary concept, he asserts, presents itself in three different aspects. It may either be a suggested fact or matter (Vastu) or an unexpressed imaginative mood which may be put into the shape of a poetic figure (Alamkara) or an implicit emotional mood (Rasa) or feeling (Bhava). The first occurs when a distinct subject or thought-a matter-of-fact is suggested: the second when the suggested sense constitutes something imaginative, -- being something distinct from a matter-of-fact,-which, if expressed in so many words, would assume the form of a poetic figure: and the last where a feeling or a mood, which is directly unexpressable, but which can be suggested is brought into comprehension as the principal element. Rasa or Bhava is directly unexpressable: it is only suggested by the Vibhava, Anubhava and the Vyabhicaribhava, that constitute the expressed sense. The fact that Rasa is incapable of being conveyed through the function of denotation, Anandavardhana points out, is testified to by nongeneration of any feeling, whatesoever, on hearing the simple word Rasa or words denotative of its particular types, such as Śrigāra, Karuna and the like: naming a mood or feeling is not equivalent to expressing or developing it. Nor do such words as Vibhava Anubhava and Vyabhicaribhava present Rasa directly. On the other hand, Rasa is experienced from perception of Poetry. depicting the Vibhava, Anubhava and the Vyabhicaribhava: at the time of enjoyment of Poetry these factors are not conceived as ordinary causes and effects by the refined reader or the spectator, as the case may be, whose sense of narrow individuality is put into sleep through the process of generalisation, but are taken consequently, as certain abstract general ideas, as a result of which impersonal pleasure is derived by him: and this happens in all cases, irrespective of the nature of mood,

depicted in Poetry. Bightly does Dr. S. K. De remark, "We can give a name to them, such as love, grief, horror, but naming a mood or feeling is not equivalent to expressing or developing it. At best, therefore, it can be suggested. What the poet can directly express or describe are the Vibhavas etc. but with the help of these expressed elements, which must be generalised and conceived, not as they appear in the natural laukika world, but as they may be imagined in the world of Poetry, the poet can awaken in us through the power of suggestion inherent in words and their meanings, a particular dissociated Alaukika condition of the soul in which the relish of feeling is possible. It is true that the poet cannot rouse the same mood or feeling, as for instance, Dusyanta whom he describes felt, but he can call up a reflection of it, which is similar in some respects; and the condition of the reader's soul in the enjoyment of such feeling in Poetry and Drama is the relish of Rasa, which can be brought into consciousness only by the power ef suggestion inherent in words or ideas". Thus it is clear that, the suggested mood or feeling is absolutely distinct from the expressed content.

The second type of suggested sense, viz. the suggested imaginative mood, also, is distinct from an expressed poetic figure. It is recognised by such ancient scholars as Bhamaha and Udbhata that certain expressed figures remain characterised by apprehension of a few imaginative moods in the background. Thus, for example, in the expressed figure Vyatireka, there exists an apprehension of suggested Upamā in the background, and such is the case with Dipaka also. This observation of the ancients, Anandavardhana points out, testifies to the ability of the function of suggestion to bring an Alumkara into comprehension. In fact, when the figures of speech are conveyed through the function of suggestion, they become endowed with unexpressable charm and attain the status of the soul of Poetry. Commenting on this observation of Anandavardhana, Abhinavagupta remarks, an expressed figure, when improvised skilfully by a poet endowed with strong creative genius can utmost be brought into an intimate relation with the body of Poetry in the manner of saffron-paste, but it can never be transformed into the soul of a poetic creation: a suggested poetic figure, on the other hand, does not remain a mere instrument of decoration, but rather is elevated to the status of soul of Poetry, which, in its turn, is ornamented by other instruments. The imaginative mood, Anandavardhana maintains, may be conveyed through suggestion in both Śabdaśaktimūla and Arthaśaktimūla types of Dhvani. Thus the stanza:

Unnatah prollasaddharah kalagurumalimasah/

Payodharabharastanyāh kaṃ na cakre' bhilāṣinam//
in which similarity between the rows of clouds and the breasts
of the lady is brought into consciousness through Vyanjanā
furnishes an illustration of Alaṃkāradhvani of Śabdaśaktimūla
type. The Dhvani theorist thinks that this is a case of
Upamā-dhvani: as the relation of similarity, referred to above
is not clearly stated in words, so, he continues, the Upamā,
contained in the stanza is incapable of being regarded as an
expressed figure. In a similar manner, the verse:

Lāvaṇyakāntiparipūritadinmukhe'smin. Smere' dhunā tava mukhe taralāyatākṣi/ Kṣobhaṃ yadeti na manāgapi tena manye

Suvyaktameva jalarāśirayam payodhih//, in which identity between the face and the moon is brought into comprehension through  $Vya \widetilde{n}jan\overline{a}$  affords an example of  $Alam k \overline{a}radhvani$  of  $Arthaśaktim \overline{u}la$  type. Explaining this illustration, Abhinavagupta observes, the expressed figure here is Śleṣa, based on the use of the word  $Jalar \overline{a}\acute{s}i$  and the suggested figure is  $R \overline{u}paka$ , causing a superimposition of moon on the face of the heroine: as the suggested  $R \overline{u}paka$  is more charming than the expressed Śleṣi, so, he continues, in accordance with the dictum: ' $Pr \overline{a}dh \overline{a}nyena$  vyapadeśa bhavanti', the verse is designated  $R \overline{u}paka$ -dhvani.

The suggested fact, also, in its turn, Anandavardhana continues, is absolutely different from the expressed fact. The suggested differs from the expressed (1) in point of form, (2) in point of substratum of cognition and (3) in point of cause of comprehension, as well. This difference, he asserts, is a

definite pointer to the absolute distinction of the unexpressed from the expressed.

Hemacandra in his Kāvyānuśāsana quotes a number of Prākṛta Gāthās to establish the difference between the expressed and suggested meanings in point of form. In the verse:

'Bhama Dhammia visattho so suņao ajja mārio teņa/ Golāņaikatthakudaṅgavāsiṇā Dariasīheṇa//

meaning: 'O religious-minded person! roam about freely now, because that dog has been slain to-day by the powerful lion, residing in the groves situated on the banks of the river Godavari', the expressed meaning is injunction, but the suggested meaning is prohibition, because the intention of the speaker is to tender covertly an advice not to move about freely on the banks of the river, infested with a mighty lion. The verse;

'Atta ittha nu majjai ettha aham diasayam paloei/

Ma pahiya rattiandhaya sijjāe maham nu majjihisi//
meaning: 'Herein lies my mother-in-law; 'herein do I; mark
O traveller, during day-time: blind as you are at night, do
not steal into my bed' apparently presents negation, because
the traveller is prohibited to steal into the bed of the speaker,
but in reality, however, it gives an indication to him to
approach the sleeping-place of the lady secretly at night; thus
the expressed meaning is negation, but the suggested sense
is affirmation. These verses go to show that, the expressed and
suggested meanings are mutually opposed to each other. There
are certain specimens of poetic creation in which two different
injunctions or prohibitions are brought into light through the
functions of denotation and suggestion. In the verse:

'Bahalatamā haarāī ajja pauttho paī gharam suṇṇam/ Taha jaggisajju sajjiya na jahā amhe musijjāmo//

meaning: 'The wretched night is terribly dark, my husband has gone abroad this very day: there is nobody in the house; O dweller next door, keep vigil so that theives may not rob us' the expressed meaning is affirmation because a request to keep wakeful is being tendered through  $Abhidh\bar{a}$ , and the suggested meaning also is another affirmation, in as much as, a request-

to approach the speaker fearlessly during night is being conveyed to the neighbour. The verse:

'Āsāiyam aņāena jettīyam tattieņa baṃdhadihim/ Uramasuvasahainhim rakkhijjai gabayichittam//

meaning: 'The land of the householder is being protected from wicked bulls, moving to and fro according to their sweet wills' apparently prohibits one from allowing free access to wicked bulls in the field of the householder, but really it gives a hint to the paramour not to approach the house. There are certain specimens of poetic creation in which the expressed meaning is neither affirmation nor negation, but the suggested is either a positive injunction or a definite prohibition. The two verses:

'Mahuehim kim ca panthiya jai harasi niyamsanam niyambāo/ Sahemi kassa ratne (?) gāmo dūre aham ekkā//

meaning: 'You are a fool, O traveller; if you take away the garment of my waist, how shall I.....; the village is far of and I am alone' and

'Jīvitāśā balavatī dhanāśā durbalā mama/

Gaccha vā tistha vā pāntha svāvasthā tu niveditā//

meaning: 'With me the urge to live long is strong and the desire to acquire riches is feeble; O traveller! you are at liberty to go or stay: my condition has been made known to you' are illustrations to the point. In these verses the expressed meaning is neither affirmation nor negation, as it consists only in statement of sheer fact, but in the first one the implicit meaning is an injunction, as a subtle hint is given to the person addressed to remove even the waist-garment of the speaker, and in the second one, this is prohibitive in character, because the words of the lady, perturbed by thought of impending separation go only to prevent the departure of her husband. In some cases denotation presents affirmation relating to one and negation relating to another, while suggestion conveys injunction or prohibition as the case may be, concerning a different thing. The two verses:

'Niadaiadamsanukhitta pahiya annena vaccasu pahena/ Gavaidhūyā dullanghavāgurā iha hayaggāme// meaning: 'O traveller, proud of the beauty of your wife as you are, proceed by another route; in this village there is the daughter of our householder,—an uncrossable noose' and

'Ucciņasu padiyam kusumam mā dhuņa sehāliyam haliyasunhe/

Esa avasanaviraso sasurena suo valayasaddo// meaning: O daughter-in-law of the farmer, collect flowers dropped on the ground: do not shake the Sephalika tree; the sound of your bangles, harsh at its end is irritating your father-in-law' are illustrations to the point. In both these verses the expressed meaning is comprised of one affirmation and one negation, inasmuch as, in the former the traveller is asked not to proceed by old route, but to go by another, and in the second the lady is asked to collect dropped flowers and not to shake the tree, but whereas in the former a covert hint is given to the traveller to enjoy the company of the beautiful maid, in the latter a similar hint is given to the girl not to make sound with the bangles at the time of wanton enjoyment. The fact that a suggested meaning does not bear any definite relation to the expressed one is testified to by the verses:

'Siniam vacca kisoyari paena yattena thavisu mahivatthe/ Bhajjihi sivicchayacchani vihinā dukkhena nimmaciyā// meaning: 'O slim-figured lady, go slowly: with great care live in this world; enjoy at your sweet will your desired objects; providence has set you free from sufferings,'

'De ā pasiya niyattasu muhasasijonhāviluttatamanivahe/
Ahisāriyāṇaṃ vigghaṃ karesi aṇṇāṇaṃ vi hayāse//
meaning: 'Be pleased O Lady! the dispeller of darkness with
the light of your moon-face: go back; O disappointed one!
you are hampering the cause of other girls also set out for
their lover's places',

'Vacca maham viya ekkāe humtu nissāsaroiyavvāim/
Mā tujjha vi ttir viņā dakkhinnahayassa jāyamtu//
meaning: 'Proceed, let sighs and lamentations remain with me
alone; may not these overpower thee also, separated from your
new love and tired of showing impartiality towards all', and

'Nahamuhapasāhiyamgo niddāghummamtaloyano na tahā/ Jaha nibbaṇāharosā malamga dūņesi maha hiyayam//

meaning: 'Your limbs bearing nail-marks and sleepy eyes do not pain me so much as do these lips of mine, devoid of scarmarks'. In the first of this group of four verses, the expressed meaning is affirmative in character, because the lady is advised to proceed slowly, but the suggested sense is only the desire of the speaker to do good to her. In the second the expressed meaning is prohibitive in nature, because the girl is requested to refrain from further journey, but the implicit meaning is the intention of the speaker to please her. In the third the expresed meaning is comprised of both affirmation and negation, because while movement of the lover is affirmed, appearance of sigh and lamentations in him is prohibited, but the suggested sense is the indignation of the irritated lady. In the fourth verse the expressed meaning, comprised as it is of a mere statement of fact is neither injunctive nor prohibitive in character, and the suggested meaning is the feeling of the speaker that as the hero is over head and ears in love with a new love, there is no chance of her attaining his favour and attachment now.9

In order to demonstrate the distinction of the implicit idea from an explicit one in point of substratum of cognition, Anandavardhana, and following him Hemacandra quote the Prākṛta Gātha, that runs as:

'Kassa vā na hoi roso daoṭṭhūṇa piāe savvaṇaṃ aharam/

Sabhamarapaumagghāini vāriavāme sahasu ehnim//
and means: 'Who indeed is not enraged to see the lips of her
beloved, bearing scar-marks thereon; O lady! you attempted to
take the fragrance of a lotus with bees hovering about it without
paying heed to our prohibition: now you have got to stand the
admonition of your husband'. Abhinavagupta says that, this
verse is addressed by a lady to her friend in whose limbs signs
of dalliance with paramour are fully manifested in presence of
her husband. Here the expressed meaning is meant for the
friend—the person addressed to, but different suggested meanings
are comprehended by different persons. The husband understands that the girl is not at fault, the dweller next door knows

that she has done no wrong, the co-wife realises that she basks in the sunshine of her husband's favour, the paramour cognises that clear signs of dalliance should not be affixed to the limbs of his fiancee again and the refined reader is charmed as he grasps the keenness of intellect of the speaker, as is evinced by the act of managing the situation in this way.

According to the Dhvanivādin, the difference in the causes of comprehension of these two meanings, also, go to differentiate them from each other. Whereas the expressed meaning is cognised by one conversant with the rules of grammar and lexicons, the suggested sense is comprehended only by him who has got a special type of intellectual training. This exquisitely charming suggested sense remains undiscovered to one not initiated into poetic hieroglyphics, just as the real nature of musical notes remain unknown to one, who though well-versed in the theory of music does not sing at all.<sup>10</sup>

#### TII

## Dhvani versus Abhidha and Laksana

The Mīmāmsakas regard the function of suggestion as one identical with that of denotation. In support of their proposition they quote the dictum 'Yatparah śabdah sa śabdarthah', which is interpreted to mean this that, a meaning to signify which a sentence is used forms the primary meaning of that sentence. The application of this dictum renders an unexpressed meaning, for the signification of which all poetic elements are used in such a way that they become subservient to it-an expressed one, capable of being conveyed through the function of denotation. According to the Mīmāmsakas, Abhidhā produces cognition of both the expressed and the so-called unexpressed meanings of the Alamkarikas,—the cognition of the first leading to that of the second in the same way, in which understanding of the import of a term leads to the knowledge of the import of a whole proposition. As against this view, the Alamkarikas hold that, not only is the suggested sense different from the

expressed one, but the function of suggestion, also, is absolutely distinct from the function of expression. And this is so, because the meanings conveyed by them, as well as their nature are essentially different. Abhidha signifies a meaning that is directly and eternally related to a word, and as such is known as the primary meaning, while Vyanjana brings into light a meaning that is related to a word in an indirect way,-being suggested by the primary meaning of the word. The very fact that musical notes and gestures that are never endowed with the function of denotation, not being word-entities bring into comprehension certain Rasas through suggestion proves beyond doubt the absolute distinction of Vyaniana from Abhidha. As regards the dictum 'Yatparah śabdah sa śabdarthah' the Alamkārikas observe that, it relates only to Vedic injunctions and is to be interpreted to mean this: Of the meanings of terms, flashing forth on the understanding of an import of a proposition, those that are already accomplished are never laid down: what a sentence enjoins is a meaning, that is yet to be accomplished; to state clearly, the drift of a sentence lies in what is actually laid down in it and this constitutes the actual meaning of the sentence, because to signify this, which is not known from any other source, a sentence is used. The Vedic injunction 'Dadhnā juhoti', meaning 'he makes an oblation of curds' opens before us two alternatives as regards the actual action enjoined in it, of which one is performance of sacrifice and the other is oblation of curd. Now as another Vedic sentence: 'Agnihotram juhoti' enjoins performance of sacrifice, that becomes an accomplished fact; thus, what the injunction 'Dadhnā juhoti' lays down is not performance of sacrifice, but instrumentality of curd in oblation: it gives information about the material to be used, and that indeed is the drift of the sentence. Similarly the moving about of priests being known from other sources, in the sentence 'Lohitosnīṣā Rtvijah Pracaranti' the assertion is meant simply to lay down that the priests should wear red head-dresses, and not to lay down that they should move about. This interpretation of the dictum makes it clear that, the spirit of a sentence lies only in meanings, expressed through words actually used, because actions, presented directly through words alone are enjoined. If anything that may be implied be included in the import of a proposition, then the sentence 'the former man is running (Purvo Dhavati)' may also mean 'the latter man is running (Aparo dhavati)', because the sense of latter is implied by the term 'former', both being relative terms. The suggested sense is neither conveyed through words, denotative of them nor does it form in all cases an enjoined meaning : so it is incapable of being regarded as the primary sense of a proposition, conveyed through the function of denotation. The explanation of the dictum 'Yatparah śabdah sa śabdarthah', as furnished by the Alamkarikas is challenged by some critics who refers as an illustration to violation to the maxim two sentences: 'Eat poison, and do not eat in this man's house (Visam bhunksa ma casya grhe bhunkta)', the real import of which lies in the meaning: 'meal should not be taken in this house',-a sense, that is not expressed through words, actually used in the first sentence. In reply to this Mammata says that, in reality, these two sentences, as is indicated by the particle 'ca' constitute a single sentence. Two independent propositions, containing two different finite verbs, however, cannot normally form a single sentence, nor can the first proposition be taken in its face value, because it is not possible for a man to advise swallowing of poison to his friend. The primary meaning of the proposition, thus, being incompatible, indication is taken recourse to, and it signifies the sense that, eating in the house of the man concerned is more harmful than swallowing of poison. The first sentence, expressing this meaning through Laksanā provides a reason for establishment of the sense of the second sentence, and is thus, for all practical purposes, a clause subordinate to the second one. Thus as the two sentences form a single sentence, whose import lies in a meaning, conveyed by words, actually used, the question of violation to the dictum, as pointed out by opponents does not arise.

With irrefutable logic Ānandavardhana points out that, the speculations of the Mīmāṃsakas themselves go to establish the separate existence of the function of suggestion. A sound,

according to the Mīmāmsakas, is neither produced by vocal organs nor is liable to disappearance as soon as the act of utterance is over. But what actually takes place is that the operation of the vocal apparatus serves to manifest, instead of producing, the sound, that is ever existent. To the Mīmāmsakas. relation between words and their meanings is natural or eternal and not something brought about by convention of human origin. The author of the Bhasya interprets this relation as inseparable, that is to say, words and their corresponding things are not first of all produced and then get themselves connected with one another: but their reciprocal association is fixed by nature. The Mīmāmsakas are compelled to ascrible eternality to both words and their relation to meanings for the sole purpose of maintaining the unquestionable trustworthinesss of the Vedas. Now as an ordinary expression, composed by a human being presents the same eternal meaning as is done by a Vedic expression, that has for its author a mystic agency, - relation between sound and sense being eternal, what differentiates the former from the latter is the intention of the speaker brought into light through the function of suggetion. This intention that forms a suggested meaning is an accidental attribute (Aupādhika-Dharma) that is transmitted to word and expressed meaning by such factors (Upadhi) as the speciality of the speaker, person spoken to, time, place, context and the like. A parallel is to be found in redness, communicated to a pearl by its sheer proximity to a red flower. An ordinary expression, though conveying its eternal meaning through the function of denotation signifies, at the same time, the intention of the speaker, who being a human being is very likely to err, and accordingly it presents incorrect meanings: a Vedic expression, on the other hand, does not convey through suggestion any intention of a human agency and so it always conveys correct and trustworthy facts. The argument that the same ordinary expression can never convey eternal and as such correct meanings and false facts simultaneously does not hold good, because things that do not give up their real nature are found to produce contrary results, when borrowed attributes are communicated to them.

An illustration is found in the case of the moon, which, though pleasing the entire world by its cool rays consume a passionate lover. With these arguments  $\overline{A}$ nandavardhana establishes that the  $\overline{M}$  $\overline{m}$ 

Taking cue from Anandavardhana, Mammata launches another attack on the Mimamsakas and shows that neither the doctrine of Abhihitanvayavada, as propounded by Kumarila nor that of Anvitabhidhanavada, as adumbrated by Prabhakara is competent enough to equate Vyanjana with Abhidha. These two views refer to the construction of a sentence as also to the meaning expressed by it. In accordance with the former view, a sentence is to be explained either as a combination of words (samyhāta) or as an order (Krama), and according to the latter, inflected words, possessing mutual expectancy (sarvapadam sākānkṣam) go to constitute a sentence. The doctrine of Abhihitanvayavada, as interpreted by Mammata states that, words convey meanings in general, having no connection with others, and in a sentence as the function of denotation ceases after bringing into light the imports of individual terms, a function known as Purport (Tatparya) begins to operate and brings into comprehension connection among the meanings of different words, that forms the import of the whole proposition. An Abhihitanvayavadī is inclined to make association (samsarya) the import of a proposition and says that a sentence acquires some special feature in course of its denoting the intended sense. To make it more clear, when the meanings of different words in a sentence are correlated with one another, there arises invariably some additional signification, distinct from those of the constituents, that is to say, the sense that is evolved from such association or correlation of meanings is something more than a mere totality of them. To signify this new sense these thinkers postulate the existence of a separate function.

known as Purport (Tatparya). Apart from conveying special signification this new function according to some, presents particular meanings in the form of individuals of component words,-Abhidha ceasing to function after bringing into light the sanse of class-element only. The postulation of a separate function in order to bring into light the import of a proposition itself, Mammata points out, proves the absurdity of establishing identity between Abhidha and Vyanjana: the stages recognised in Arthasaktimula type of Dhvani are understanding of imports of individual terms, cognition of import of the whole proposition and comprehension of the suggested sense; as Abhidha is incapable of going up to the second step and signifying the sense of a sentence, the question of its moving upto the third step and bringing into comprehension the implicit idea does not arise. Contrary to the view of the Abhihitanvayavadī, the Anvitabhidhanavadī holds that, the meaning of a sentence is for all practical purpose the same as signified by its component parts. What is special signification or import to the adherents of the former view is considered by them to be nothing more than those that are denoted by individual words themselves. These thinkers say that, of all the factors, leading to knowledge of meanings, the usage of elderly people is the most important, because it is the first to bring home to children the imports of terms. In ordinary life a child understands meanings from a sentence alone, because this has the capacity to enage a man in a particular work, as also to dissuade him from that. When a child hears a man say to his servant 'Bring the cow (Gamanaya)', he sees the employee moving an animal having dewlap and horns from one place to another and infers that the latter has grasped the import of the proposition, as otherwise he would not have cared to move an animal like that : subsequently, the relation of signifier and signified (vacyavacakabhava), existing between the indivisible proposition and the total import is comprehended by him through the process of logical postulation (Arthapatti), that consists in arriving at an unknown cause from a given effect. According to an Anvitabhidhanavadī, the relation existing between words and meanings is thus grasped through

three processes—Perception (Pratyaksa), Inference (Anumana). and Logical postulation (Arthapatti). At a late stage the child hears such expressions as: 'Take away the cow (Gam naya)', 'Bring the horse (Aśvamānaya)' and by applying the methods of Agreement and Difference ascertains the imports of individual terms, that appear to him not as unconnected entities, but as connected ones. Thus the term 'Bring (Anaya)' conveys through denotation the sense of the act of bringing related to an object and the term 'Cow (Gam)' signifies the sense of an animal, having connection with others. As the connection existing between different meanings is conveyed through the function of denotation, these writers do not think it necessary to postulate the separate existence of a function known as Purport, It is to note in this connection that, Abhidha expresses things as connected with others in general and not having any connection with a particular thing: for example, the word 'Bring' denotes the act of bringing as being connected with an object in general, and not with any particular object. In a proposition, however, particular meanings and their mutual correlations are realised, for the comprehension of which an Anvitabhidhanavadī is forced to depend on the efficacy of expectancy (Ākānkṣā), competency  $(Yogyat\overline{a})$  and proximity (Asatti). These factors, they say, help the function of denotation to bring into light the import of a proposition,—the extremely particular nature of a meaning. Now as Abhidha, unaided by expectancy, compatibility and proximity does not signify even an import of a proposition it is wrong to attribute to it the signification of an implicit idea, that flashes forth only after the cognition of the explicit meaning of a sentence, —the Vakyartha. 12 The argument that, causes are inferred from effects, and cognition of all meanings, appearing in chain on hearing of a particular word, being caused by that word itself, a single function is competent enough to bring into light the different types of meanings has slender legs to stand upon. Words are not generators (Karakahetu) of meanings, because the latter, being eternal do not admit of production: what they actually do is that, they make the already existing meanings known, and are thus regarded as their indicators (Jñapaka-hetu).

But until the relation of a particular word with a particular meaning is known, that word does not signify that special sense, which is brought into light solely through a function. This proposition holds good in case of a suggested meaning also, that is pointed out through the function of suggestion by its indicator word-unit, -a unit that can never be regarded as a cause unless the power of suggestion is taken into account. The counter-proposition that, it is possible for a word to signify a sense even without the help of a function is dangerous, because it cuts Abhidha also at its roots. In a similar manner, the analogy of the same arrow destroying the armour, piercing the heart and ultimately killing the enemy by a single velocity quoted to illustrate the magnitude of power of Abhidha is of no help. This parallelism drawn to its logical extreme renders the feelings of joy and sorrow, arising in individuals on hearing pieces of good and bad news,-that are known through inference -as specimens of primary meanings, being conveyed through the function of denotation. This extended power granted to denotation not only comes in clash with the scope of inference (Anumana), but expressing the indicated sense lands Indication (Laksına) also in jeopardy. The omnipotence of Abhidha is further falsified by an axiom of Jaimini according to which, in case of conflict between Śruti, Linja, Vākya, Prakaraņa, Sthana and Samakhya, the former prevails over the latter, because apprehension of meaning is gradually more and more delayed in each of these successive pointers. A word independent of other evidence is Śruti: the potential power of a word is Linga: words signifying one unified sense through mutual expectancy constitute Vakya: mutual expectancy itself is Prakarana: Sthana is mention in same place, and a word, whose derivative meaning is taken into account constitutes Samākhyā. The assumption of delayed cognition, as found in the aphorism of Jaimini renders the proposition of Abhidha bringing into comprehension all meanings-untenable, because the very idea of the function of denotation conveying all meanings simultaneously is opposed to the concept of gradual and delayed cognition. 13

There are other evidences that go to prove the absolute

distinction of Vyanjana from Abhidha. Of these the prohibition. enunciated by the Alamkarikas to use such expressions as 'Rucimkuru' (meaning: Be thou attached) in a specimen of Poetic Art is one. The reason behind this prohibition is this that, in the expression quoted above, the term 'Cinku', formed through an euphonic combination of the two words 'Rucim' and 'Kuru' is sufficient enough to bring into light an indecorous sense, as the term 'Cinku' itself denotes private part of a female species. The indecorous sense, referred to above is incapable of being comprehended through Abhidha, because its expressive word is conspicuous by its absence in the sentence. It is the function of suggestion alone that conveys the indecorous idea, and so, a Dhyanivadī argues, it is wrong to deny its existence. The classification of defects, relating to Poetry into two groups: defects that are universally regarded as blemishes (Nityadosa) and defects that are not always considered as faults (Anityadosa) also bears testimony to its existence. The first group is represented by such defects as Cyutasamskara and Klistatva and the second by such as Srutidustatva and Punaruktatva. If Poetry is considered to consist of expressive word and expressed meaning only, that constitute its body, then the proposition that defects do not always mar its charm becomes an absurd one, because, in all cases, a defect is sure to render a body ugly. This proposition, however, seems acceptable, if the separate existence of a soul of Poetry, which according to the Dhyani Theorists, is nothing other than a suggested emotion is posited: Srutidustatva is an anityadosa, because it mars the beauty of erotic (Śrigāra), but not of heroic (Vīra). Thirdly, the observation of the Alamkarikas, that in a good poetry words actually used by a Poet do not admit of replacement by the synonyms,such substitution failing to bring out all that is intended to be conveyed by the word itself and making the poet say something new-goes to establish the contention that Vyanjana is a profound verity. The well-known verse of Kumārasambhayam. that runs as follows:

Dvayam gatam samprati śocanīyatām Samāgamaprārthanayā kapālinah/ Kalā ca sā kāntimatī kalāvata-

Stvamasya lokasya ca netrakaumudī//

and means: Two things have now become pitiable by their desire for union with the holder of skulls—the sweet digit of the moon and the good self of Parvati, both of whom enchant the eves-illustrates the point pressed forward by the Alamkarikas. The pitiableness of the situation implied by the term 'Kavalinah here is incapable of being conveyed by its synonymn 'Pinākinah' though there is absolutely no difference between the primary meanings of the two terms, both being names of Lord Siva. And the reason is clearly traceable. The term 'Kanalinah' presents through suggestion the disgustful picture of Lord Siva, and thereby brings into full relief the pitiableness of the situation,—the terribly deplorable lot of Parvati, eager for union with him. A completely different picture, however, is presented by the term 'Pinākinah', that refers to the holder of a Bow: it brings into light the heroism of the Lord and thus is not an appropriate substitute. Fourthly, the primary meaning differs from the suggested one in point of number also; the first one is always one and the same, but the second one differs according to the speciality of the context, speaker and person spoken to. Thus the sentence 'The Sun has set (Gato'stamarkuh) conveys through denotation only one sense which is constant, but signifies through suggestion different ideas under different circumstances; it means (1) This is just the time to attack the enemy, when spoken by a General to his soldiers, (2) The time to approach the lover secretly has come, when spoken by a friend to a lady of easy virtues, (3) In no time will your darling be back, when addressed by a friend to a lady whose husband has gone out, (4) we should stop now. when uttered by labourers among themselves, (5) Let the vespertine rites be started, when uttered by hermits among themselves, (6) Don't go far, when addressed by a man to a person going out on an errand, (7) Bring back the cows home, when spoken by a man to the tenderer of the cows, (8) Now the temperature will come down, when spoken by a friend to one afflicted with heat in summer, (9) Let the things displayed for sale be collected,

when said by a shopkeeper to his employee, (10) Even now your husband has not come back, when addressed by a friend to a lady, waiting for her consort, and so on. Fifthly, the primary meaning differs from the suggested one in point of time of cognition; the expressed is grasped first, the unexpressed is comprehended next. Sixthly, the conveying agents of these two differ: the first one is conveyed by a word-unit, but the second one is brought into light by a word, as also a portion of it, the primary meaning, letter, style etc. Seventhly, the expressed and the unexpressed meanings differ in point of their respective effects. One who grasps the expressed sense is known as intelligent, but one who catches the subtle sense is regarded as really of cultivated taste; further, the former brings about only a comprehension, while the latter produces exquisite charm. Eighthly, the two meanings, as is evident from the expression: 'Gato' stamarkah' quoted above differ in point of number also. Thus it is clear that the suggested meaning can in no case be equated with the expressed one.

The Dhvani Theorists proceed, as well, to establish the distinction of a sugge tive unit from a denotative unit. A word that brings into light the conventional primary meaning is regarded as a denotative word, and naturally, it depends for its existence on a primary meaning. A suggestive word, however, is independent of it: it is capable of conveying any idea not having any connection whatsoever with the primary one. Secondly, a denotative unit in all cases is a word, but suggestive unit is not necessarily a word; even ideas are endowed with the power to suggest subtler meanings. The distinction of the suggested sense from the expressed one, as also that of the suggestive unit from the expressive one goes only to establish the absolute distinction of the function of suggestion from that of denotation.

It is said that a suggested meaning is multiple in number, is a cause of special appellation, inasmuch as, a person who apprehends it is called a man of cultivated taste, and is dependent on word, primary meaning and context for its comprehension. It

is pointed out that all these features are present in the secondary sense, conveyed through the function of Indication. An indicated meaning, also, is characterised by multiplicity; in the expression Rāma as I am, I shall endure everything (Rāmo'smi sarvam sahe)', the term Rama means 'One who has suffered much', but the same term refers to 'a hard- hearted person' and 'famous as being the hero of many battles' in the expressions: 'Very fond of life, Rāma as I am, I have not done what befits love (Rāmena priyajīvitena tu krtam premnah priye nocitam)' and 'This Rama has attained fame by the excellence of his valour (Ramosau bhuvanesu vikramagunaih pravtah prasiddhim param)' respectively Secondly an indicated meaning, in its turn, entitles a piece of poetic creation to achieve such new appellations as Arthantarasamkramitavācya and Atyantatiraskrtavācya. Thirdly the comprehension of this meaning depends on the knowledge of word, primary meaning and context, and this is so, because incompatibility of the primary meaning, presented by expressive word with the rest of the sentence, along with its inability to convey the intention of the speaker is a necessary condition for operation of Indication. In the light of these similarities existing between the indicated and the suggested sense-units, it is argued that, there is no necessity of admitting the function of suggestion as distinct from that of Indication.

To refute this contention, the Dhvanivadin argues in the following way: Firstly, though the indicated meaning appears differently in different expressions, in a single expression it is always one and the same. A number of suggested meanings, however, as is evident in the sentence 'The Sun has set (Guto' stamarkah)' are apprehended from the same expression, according to the difference in the characters of the speaker and the person spoken to. Secondly, an indicated meaning always bears some definite relation to the expressed one, but the suggested one has only an accidental or remote or even no connection with it. Thirdly, the incompatibility of the primary meaning with the rest of the sentence is an essential condition of the operation of Indication, but this factor though present in Avivakṣitavācya type of Dhvani is totally absent in Vvakṣitānyaparavācya type.

Fourthly, in Indication based on puropse, the motive for the signification of which Indication is taken recourse to is, as has been established before, incapable of being conveyed through the functions of Denotation and Indication. Fifthly, Indication depends for its operation on a set of conditions, which areinapplicability of the expressed meaning in the given context, existence of some connection between the primary and secondary sense-units and the presence of usage or purpose. And such is the case with denotation also: it too depends for its operation on a condition in the shape of convention, because it brings into light only the conventional meaning that forms the object of divine volition. Neither Denotation nor Indication conveys any and every sense, their powers being restricted by two factors,by Divine Will in the case of the first and by a set of conditions. in the case of the second. For this reason, Indication is regarded as an extension of Denotation: to quote the Alamkarikas 'a tail of Abhidha. As Laksana is merely a tail of Abhidha and as Vyanjana is incapable of being identified with Abhidha, it is perfectly clear that it is incapable of being equated with Laksana. also. The powers of Abhidha and Laksana are restricted, but the same cannot be said of Vyanjana; its powers are unlimited: it goes to any length and brings into light any idea.

In order to establish the absolute distinction of Vyanjana from Gunaviti, Anandavardhana introduces the question of difference between these two in points of form and content. Gunaviti, as is evident from its nomenclature, refers to a function of word, that operates depending on such qualities as proximity and the like or on such attributes as sharpness and others. Pure Indication or Śuddhā Lakṣaṇā, that is illustrated usually by the expression: 'Gangāyām ghoṣah' depends for its operation on such relation as that of proximity and others, and Qualitative Indication or Gaunī Lakṣaṇā, that is usually illustrated by the expressions: 'Gouravāhīkah' and 'Agnirmānavakah' operates because the cow and the carrier bear similitude to each other in respect of stupidity, and so on. As the Mīmāṃsakas hesitate to regard Gaunī Lakṣaṇā as a type of Lakṣaṇā proper, and treat it as a separate function,

named Gauni, Anandayardhana cleverly uses the term. 'Gunaritti', which though referring to Laksanā of the Alamkarikas is comprehensive enough to include Laksana and Gauni of the Mimamsakas. The form of Gunavetti, Anandavardhana says, is different from that of Vyanjana; the former is regarded as a secondary function, because its operation is obstructed by such impediment as inapplicability of the primary meaning with the rest of the sentence, -a factor, that accounts for its inability to signify the secondary sense straightway; the latter, on the other hand, is a primary function in this sense that, in no stage is its operation put to a halt by obstructing factors, whether the meaning revealed is a fact or a figure or a mood, each of which is brought into light by it straightway. Secondly, Gunavitti, as has been established, is an extended Abhidha, while Vyanjana is completely different from it. Thirdly, when a fact indicates another fact by Laksina, it surrenders its own self and is transformed totally into the new indicated fact. In the expression: 'Gangāyām ghosah', the sense of flowing mass of water completely gives it up in order that the sense of bank may establish its logical connection with the establishment of dairy-colony. In case of Vyanjana, however, the position is otherwise; when a fact suggests another fact, it retains its self in toto and at the same time manifests another idea. A close parallel of a suggestive idea is to be found in a lamp, that retains its distinct self and at the same time brings into light a jar. In the verse: 'Evam vadini devarsau parsve pituradhomukhī / Līlākamalapatrāņi ganayāmāsa Pārvatī', meaning: 'as the divine sage introduced the topic of her marriage, Parvatī with her face bent down began to count the petals of her play-lotus, standing by the side of her father' the expressed sense namely the counting of the petals of play-lotus by Parvatī brings into comprehension through suggestion the idea of her bashfulness, and ultimately presents the erotic emotion: here the expressed meaning is not transformed into a new shape; it is cognised as such and its cognition is followed by apprehension of the implicit idea.

The content of Gunavitti again differs from that of Vyanjana. The meaning that is conveyed through Vyanjana presents. itself in the form of a fact or a figure or an emotion, while the sense signified through Gunaretti always presents itself in the shape of a dry fact. Neither cognition of Rasa nor that of Alamkara can be said to be effected by Laksana, because the conditions, necessary for its operation are absent in the case of both. Comprehension of a fact is effected by Laksana, no doubt, but the fact conveyed through Vyanjanā excels much the one conveyed through Gunavrtti in charm. Such is the greatness of the transcendental function of suggestion that, its slightest touch even is sufficient to invest an idea with exquisite charm; Laksanā, however, lacks this greatness and the meaning conveyed by it is not necessarily charming. Anandavardhana adds that, the circumstances under which Gunavitti functions are, in their turn, different from those under which Vyanjana operates. While Gunartti is regarded as a function belonging to a 'skhaladgati śabda', - a word, whose ability to signify idea is impeded by obstructing factors, the case is otherwise with Vyanjana. Secondly, as absurdity of establishment of logical connection of the conventional meaning with the rest of the sentence is a condition, necessary for operation of Gunavrtti, this function is to depend, though not directly, but indirectly on Divine Volition; Vyanjana, however, is independent of it, because even non-significant letters and gestures are endowed with it. Thirdly, Gunarytti takes the help of mukhyārthavādha and others for its action, whereas Vyanjana takes the help of speciality of speaker, person spoken to, time, place, context and such other factors, for its operation. Fourthly, in case of Gunarrtti, only the secondary sense is cognised; in case of Vy njana, however, both the explicit and implicit ideas are distinctly comprehended. Thus as Laksanā and Vyanjanā differ from each other in points of form, content and conditions of operation, Anandavardhana asserts, the one cannot be equated with the other.14

 $Vya\overline{n}jan\overline{a}$ , is based sometimes, on  $Abhidh\overline{a}$ , and sometimes on Lak;  $in\overline{a}$ . The action of the first is traced in Dhyani of

Vivaksitanyaparavacya type and the operation of the second in Dhvani of Avivaksitavācya type. Vyanjanā is not identical with either of its foundations Abhidha and Laksana, because its operation follows the action of those two. In Avivaksitavacya type of Dhvani, suggestion appears when the function of indication, losing its power by signifying the secondary sense ceases to operate; in Vivaksitanyaparavacya type of Dhvani, also, suggestion starts functioning, only when denotation stops, losing its potency by conveying the conventional meaning. Nor is Vyanjana an appendage to Abhidha or Laksana only, because it is found to exist in letters and syllables, also, that are absolutely meaningless. This supreme power belongs not merely to words and their fragments, but also to sideglances and wistful looks, that are suggestive of inner feelings, as also to musical notes, that generate impersonal pleasure in the minds of real connoisseurs. From these considerations, the Dhvanivadin argues, it is evident that the existence of Vyanjana as separate from Abhidha and Laksana cannot but be admitted. 15

The proposition of the Bhaktavadin that Dhyani is identical with Bhakti or Laksanā is discussed threadbare by Anandavardhana, who asks them at the outset, to clarify their position precisely. What is actually meant by identity of Dhvani and Bhakti? Do these theorists mean that the nature of Dhvani is identical with the nature of Laksana? Or do they mean that Bhakti is an essential differentiating mark of Dhvani? Or do they take Bhakti to be an occasional differentiating mark of Dhvani? The opponents who endeavour to deny Dhvani an independent status may take up these three different positions and may hold that Dhvani is identical in nature with Bhakti or the second one is the definition of the first one, or it is merely an accidental mark of Dhvani of the Dhvani theorists. Of these three possible contentions, the first one is unacceptable, because the nature of Dhvani and Bhakti are entirely different. The term Dhvani signifies the sense of a charming suggested meaning; this appellation is also applied to a piece of poetic creation, in which the

expressed meaning subordinates itself to the inexplicably charming suggested sense. But Bhakti or Lakṣaṇā is not the appellation of a piece of postic creation. It consists merely in attribution to an object of an attribute, that does not originally belong to it,—in giving to a thing a name, that does not pertain to it. This is exactly transference of epithet of Western Rhetoricians. Thus while the beauty of the suggested meaning is the first condition of Dhvani, in Bhakti this charm of the suggested meaning is not at all a necessary factor. For this reason, Anandavardhana observes, the form or nature of Bhakti and Dhvani cannot be regarded as identical in all respects. 16

The second proposition that, Bhakti or indication is an essential differentiating mark or definition of Dhvani is also unacceptable, because this proposed essential differentiating mark, Anandavardhana points out, is vitiated by the fallacies of too narrow and too wide definition. The absence of Dhvani does not agree with the absence of Bhakti and the absence of Bhakti also does not agree with the absence of Dhvani. Bhakti is a function belonging to the primary meaning; when the logical connection of the primary meaning of a term cannot be established with the rest of the sentence, then this Bhakti brings into light a secondary sense, connected in some form or other with the primary one, depending either on usage or on some motive. Taking the basis of Bhakti or Laksanā into consideration it admits of classification into two types : one based on usage—Rūdhimūlā and the other on purpose—Prayojanamūlā. Of these two types, the first one is characterised by the absence of a suggested sense, while in the second variety, the purpose to signify which indication is resorted to is conveyed solely through the function of suggestion. As in Bhakti based on usage, the implicit idea is conspicuous by its absence, so the absence of Dhvani does not agree with the absense of Bhakti. In illustrating this type of Indication, Anandavardhana quotes the term 'Lavanya'. This term (as well as such words like 'Kuśala' etc.) is used figuratively to convey a meaning that is entirely different from its strictly derivative meaning, yet it is not proper, he maintains, to regard a piece of poetic creation,

in which this word is used as a specimen of Dhvani Kāvya, only because of the presence of this term. In the  $Prayojana-m\overline{u}l\overline{a}$  variety of  $Lakṣaṇ\overline{a}$ , also, Dhvani is not always present, because in order to form Dhvani, the suggested meaning has got to be extremely charming. Even in cases where the purpose is insignificant and devoid of charm, the poets employ figurative words merely in obedience to past tradition; but these cases can never be regarded as cases of Dhvani. In the verse:

Parimlānam pīnastanajaghanasangādubhayatah Tanormadhyasyāntah parimilanamaprāpya haritam/ Idam vyastanyāsam ślathabhujalatākṣepavalanaih Kṛśangyāh santāpam vadati bisinīpatraśayanam//

meaning: 'This bed of lotus-leaves, extremely faded at the two ends, that came in contact with heavy breasts and thighs. and retaining its greenness in the middle, that did not come in touch with thin waist and disarranged by tossing of drooping creeper-like arms speaks of the agony of the slim-figured lady', the word Vadati cannot be taken in its literal sense, as it is not possible to establish logical connection of the agency of a bed made of lotus-leaves with the act of speaking. So the word 'Vadati' through indication conveys the secondary sense of 'pointing out'. The 'clarity in understanding' is the purpose for the signification of which indication is resorted to, but this purpose has no charm whatsoever; it is not in the least attractive, and for this reason this verse cannot be regarded as a specimen of Dhvani Kāvya. In this connection, the learned Dhyanikara enunciates the essential characteristic of a truly suggestive word, that entitles a piece of poetic creation to receive the covetable appellation Dhvani. He thinks that, a word that brings into light a beauty, that is incapable of being conveyed through any other expression entitles a specimen of poetry to be regarded as Dhyani-Kavya. 18 In the verse: 'Parimlanam' etc, quoted above, however, the implicit idea is not inexplicably charming; it can as well be expressed through the function of denotation, without any appricable loss of charm. This fact also points out to the

proposition that the absence of *Dhvani* does not agree with the absence of *Bhakti*.

The Dhvanikāra classifies Dhvani into two types: (a) that based on  $Abhidh\bar{a}$  and (b) that based on  $Laksan\bar{a}$ . Of these two types, Dhvani that is based on the function of denotation or in other words Dhvani of  $Vivaksit\bar{a}nyaparav\bar{a}cya$  variety, of which Rasadhvani is a subtype is characterised by the absence of  $Laksan\bar{a}$ . So the absence of Bhakti also does not agree with the absence of Dhvani.

There are other reasons also that go to point out to the fact that Bhakti cannot be regarded as an essential differentiating mark of Dhvani. The contents of  $Laksan\bar{a}$  and  $Vya\bar{n}jan\bar{a}$  are entirely different; the first one signifies the secondary sense and the second one brings into comprehension the purpose for the signification of which  $Laksan\bar{a}$  is taken recourse to. The relation of qualification and the thing qualified cannot exist between two things whose contents are entirely different. It is also wrong to suppose that Bhakti or Laks  $n\bar{a}$  brings into comprehension both the secondary meaning and the purpose, because the supposition leads to a number of irreconcilable incongruities; first of all, the conditions of  $Laksan\bar{a}$  are absent and secondly, the proposition of  $Visista-Laksan\bar{a}$  is untenable.

The third point that goes to establish the truth that Bhakti is not a definition of Dhvani is this: Bhakti or  $Lakṣan\overline{a}$  is based on the function of denotation, because one of the three conditions of its operation is inapplicability of the primary meaning. For this reason,  $Lakṣan\overline{a}$  is regarded as merely an extention of  $Abhidh\overline{a}$  ( $Abhidh\overline{a}pucchabh\overline{u}t\overline{a}$ ). Dhvani on the other hand, is based entirely on the function of suggestion,—a function that belongs to words, meanings and even to unmeaning sounds and movements. This being the case, it is absurd to maintain that Dhvani and Bhakti are identical or the one is defined by the other.

The third proposition of the rival theorists that wants to make *Bhakti* an occasional differentiating mark of *Dhvani* is acceptable, because the *Avivakṣitavācya* type of *Dhvani* is based on the function of indication. It is a fact that *Bhakti* is an

occasional mark of *Dhvani* as is attested to by the existence of *Bhakti* in the varieties of *Avivakṣitavācya* type of *Dhvani*, but the rival theorists, thereby, Ānandavardhana asserts, gain nothing, nor is the position of the *Dhvani* theorists compromised, in any way, by such admission.

#### IV

## The relation between the expressed and the unexpressed

In maintaining that the unexpressed or the suggested manifests itself in the form of a fact or a figure or an emotional mood, the Dhvani Theorists recognise the truth that the essence of Poetry may consist of fact or imaginative mood or emotional mood, but at the same time it is maintained that the emotional mood is of highest importance in it. In fact, Abhinavagupta asserts in unambiguous language that Rasadhvani constitutes the quintessence of Poetry and the other types, namely Vastudhvani and Alamkaradhvani terminate ultimately in it. 20 The end of all Poetry, the Dhyani Theorists say, is Rasa: and the different poetic elements such as the expression and the expressed, the metre and the figure are but means to manifestation of this Rasa of paramount importance. Rasa constitutes the soul of a poetic creation, the body of which is comprised of its plot. The fact that the relation existing between a plot and a Rasa has its close parallel in that existing between a body and a spirit is challenged by some theorists, who point out that, though after death a body is cognised separately from spirit, a plot of a poetic creation is never comprehended separately from Rasa, and this is sufficient to prove the untenability of the proposition. These theorists say that, the relation existing between an emotional mood and a plot,-Rasa and Itivitta is exactly like that existing between an attribute and a thing endowed with it; just as a thing possessed of an attribute is not known as something absolutely separate from that attribute, similarly an Itirrtta, also, is not comprehended as something distinct from Rasa. Of this new relation, proposed by the

opponents, the Dhvanivadins point out several flaws. The admission of this new relation, they say, renders Rasa capable of being comprehended by all, having knowledge of the plot, irrespective of the fact whether the appreciator is a man of poetic sensibility or not, and this happens because an attribute such as fairness of complexion is known by any man, who sees the body endowed with such fairness. In reality, however, aesthetic experience is not derived by all conversant with the rules of grammar and imports of terms, as embodied in lexicons: only those initiated into poetic heiroglyphics can enjoy it. The analogy of a discerner alone knowing the excellence of a precious gem does not prove to be of much help, because it lands us into another difficulty. When a precious gem is known to be of excellent type by a connoisseur, its excellence is not noticed as something distinct from its own self; the case is, however, completely otherwise with Rasa and Itivrtta: the former is comprehended as something definitely distinct from the latter by a connoisseur of poetic art. Thus as the new relation, said to exist between an emotion and a plot is not acceptable, the Dhvani Theorists say the exact relation between the two is that current between a spirit and a body.21

It is said that the comprehension of a suggested meaning is always preceded by the understanding of an expressed meaning. An expressed meaning of a poetic creation is comprised of the Vibhavas, Anubhavas and Vyabhicaribhavas, and as such is capable of being grouped under any of these three heads, and this is so, because the aim of a poet, who is not a historian is not mere narration of bare incidents, but depiction of sentiments. 22 The dictum of Bharata: 'Vibhabhanubhavavyabhicarisamyogat Rasanispattih' by stating that the excitants, ensuents and accessories raise Rasa into consciousness renders the cognition of Vibhavas and the like the causal factor of comprehension of Rasa. Thus as the relation of cause and effect exists between cognition of Vibhavas qua the expressed meaning and experience of Rasa, it is clear that a sequence certainly exists between them; this sequence, however, is imperceptible, and accordingly Rasadhvani is said to be one of Asamlakşyakr-

amavyangya type. The objections that the word, being aided by speciality of the speaker, person spoken to and context presents both the expressed and the unexpressed simultaneously and as such no sequence exists between the cognitions of two meanings and that, the understanding of the expressed meaning is not a condition necessary for comprehension of the unexpressed, inasmuch as, aesthetic experience is derived from mere hearing of musical notes, having no meaning whatso ver do not go to vitiate the proposition of the Dhyaniyadin. According to these theorists, suggestion is twofold in nature: the one emanates, as in the case of musical notes and tunes from words comprehended by our auditory organ, and the other follows, as in the case of poetic creations from the understanding of expressed meanings. The first has for its cause auditory perception of sound and the second has for its generator cognition of the expressed meaning. Thus as the apprehension of the explicit generates comprehension of the implicit, the latter is always preceded by the former. The bid to trace the existence of first type of suggestion, operating simply from auditory perception of sound in specimens of poetic art is ludicrous, because it renders enjoyment of aesthetic experience possible from mere hearing of poetic expressions by men, blissfully ignorant of conventional meanings.

Rasadhvani is said to be one of imperceptible process: but in other types of Dhvani the sequence existing between the understanding of the expressed meaning and the comprehension of the unexpressed one is clearly perceptible. In Arthaśaktyudbhava type of Dhvani, the expressed meaning, being aided by the speciality of the speaker, person spoken to, context and such other factors brings into light through the function of suggestion the unexpressed idea; the relation of cause and effect existing between the apprehension of the explicit and the comprehension of the implicit is incapable of being denied in it. And as existence of a sequence is quite natural between a cause and its effect, it is absolutely in the fitness of things that a sequence is traceable between the understandings of two types of ideas. The Prākṛta Gāthas: 'Bhamo Dhammio' etc.

and the like amply illustrate the difference between the two types of ideas in point of form, and completely rules out the possibility of simultaneous cognition of the two meanings. This sequence is perceptible in case of Śabdaśaktimūla Dhvani, also, in which the denotation of multi-meaninged words is restricted to the contextual sense, and the non-contextual meaning, as well as the relation linking the two is brought into light through the function of suggestion. The expression: 'Atrantare kusumasamayayugamupasamharannajrmbhatagrismabhidhanah phullamallikadhavalattahaso mahakalah', meaning: 'In the meantime, the unbearable summer season, rendering the palaces white by jessamine flowers in blossom approached putting an end to spring time (like Lord Siva, having laughter as white as full-blown jasmine flower)' furnishes an example of this type of Dhvani: in it, first of all, denotation presents the idea of summer season; after that suggestion brings into light the idea of Lord Siva; and subsequently the same function conveys the relation of similarity existing between the explicit and implicit ideas. As the cognition of Upama, as in the present case, is dependent on knowledge of Upameya, appearing in the form of expressed meaning and Upamana, taking the shape of suggested sense, it is clear that a relation of cause and effect, and consequently, a sequence exists between the apprehension of the expressed and unexpressed facts, on the one hand, and the comprehension of the suggested figure on the other. The postulation of a different category of Dhvani, known as Dhvani of Avivakṣitavācya type, as separate from Asamlakşyakramavyanjya and Samlakşyakramavyanjya types does not go to show the absence of sequence between the understanding of the expressed and the comprehension of the unexpressed in this category. In fact, in it the primary meaning is cognised first and after that, as its logical connection is not established with the rest of the sentence, it is either transformed into a shape, characterised by certain new attributes or is totally replaced by an altogether new sense through the function of Indication, and at a subsequent stage only the suggested meaning is presented through suggestion: thus it is perfectly clear that, this is also characterised by perceptibility of sequence existing between the comprehension of the expressed and that of the unexpressed. As in this type of *Dhvani*, the primary meaning is not accepted in its original form, or in other words, the apprehension of the expressed (in its original form) does not occur, the Dhvanivādin does not think it necessary to examine closely the question of perceptibility or otherwise of the sequence existing between the cognitions of two ideas in it. This non-mention is not to be taken as an indication of non-existence of sequence. Thus with irrefutable logic the Dhvanivādin establishes that, a sequence certainly exists between the apprehension of an explicit idea and the comprehension of an implicit meaning,—the two cognitions, that bear the relation of cause and effect to each other.<sup>23</sup>

In order to explain the exact relation existing between the two cognitions, the learned Dhvanikara puts forward the analogy of Padartha-vākyārtha-nyāya, and asserts that just as understanding of the import of the whole proposition is caused and as such is preceded by knowledge of the imports of individual terms, occuring in it, similarly the comprehension of the unexpressed is caused and, accordingly preceded by apprehension of the expressed. It is said that, at the time of understanding of an import of a proposition, the meanings of individual terms, as presented by the function of  $Abhidh\overline{a}$  are known first, and after that through the function known as Tatparya, that is called into play by expectancy, proximity and compatibility the import of the whole proposition in the form of correlation of meanings of individual terms is grasped and in a similar manner the explicit sense is apprehended first and after that the implicit idea is comprehended. This parallelism, however, is to be taken with some caution. And this is so, because the reality of terms and their imports is open, firstly, to great controversy. The Vaiyākaraņas describe a sentence as a real unit, and assert that, just as a letter is incapable of being split up into component parts, similarly, a term and a sentence, in their turns, also are incapable of being analysed into letters and terms respectively: from this it follows that a Vakyartha is the

real entity and a padārtha, though unreal is necessary because it leads to knowledge of vākyārtha. Secondly though the

Mimamsakas ascribe reality to Padas and Padarthas, they point out that, padarthas constitute intimate causes of Valenarias.

An intimate cause is not known separately from the effect when

the latter is produced and accordingly, a Padartha is not traced

separately when the Vakyartha is known. When the import of

a proposition is understood, then the imports of individual terms

lose their separate existence and merge themselves completely in

the judgemental cognition. As the Padarthas constitute parts

of the whole Vakyartha, knowledge of them as distinct from the

latter, -that is equivalent to division of the whole into parts is

likely to endanger the cognition of the Vakyartha. With Vacyartha

and Vyangyartha, however, the case is completely otherwise.

When the suggested sense is comprehended, the expressed meaning is not obliterated absolutely: at the time of comprehension

of the implicit, the knowledge of the explicit also lingers in the

mind of a refined reader. This leads one to suppose that the

cognition of the explicit constitutes an efficient cause (nimittakāraņa) of the comprehension of the implicit; even after the

production of an effect like a jar, its efficient causes, such as the

rod and the like are realised as entities separate from the effect.

So the learned Dhvanikara concludes by saying that, the exact

relation existing between the comprehensions of the explicit and

the implicit bears similitude to that remaining between a lamp

and a jar and not to one existing between the understanding of the imports of individual terms and the knowledge of the import

of the whole proposition. A lamp manifests an already existent

jar, and when the jar is manifested, then the lamp does not lose

its existence; similarly an expressed meaning brings into light

the unexpressed content of Poetry, and when this unexpressed

sense-unit is brought into comprehension, the cognition of

the expressed meaning does not cease to exist. The analogy of  $Pad\overline{a}rtha$ - $V\overline{a}ky\overline{a}rtha$ - $Ny\overline{a}ya$ ,  $\overline{A}$ nandavardhana himself observes,

is not to be taken too seriously: it brings out only the idea

that the comprehension of the implicit is caused by the

apprehension of the explicit.24

V

## The Doctrine of Dhyani

The Doctrine of Dhyani derives its inspiration from the works of grammarians, the chief among whom is Bhartrhari and their semi-philosophical speculations on speech: in its eagerness to show that it is an old theory, it seeks the protection of the grammarian's authority by asserting that it is based on the analogy of the theory of Sphota. The Vaiyakarana says that, as the momentary sounds, pronounced by operation of our vocal organs cannot combine to form a term or a proposition. they cannot signify imports of terms or propositions: what they do is this that they bring into light the eternal soundunit called Sphota, which alone is capable of conveying ideas. The function of the Sphota, thus, is two-fold in nature: on the one hand, it is manifested by letters and on the other, it is an entity from which, alone, the sense emanates. Taking the second function of the Sphota into consideration, the Vaiyakrana enumerates eight varieties of Sphota-Varnasphota, Padasphota, Vākyasphota, Varnajātisphota, Padajātisphota, Vākyajātisphota, Akhandapadasphota and Akhandavākyasphota. When the Vaiyākaraņa speaks of Varnasphota, he does not mean that each and every letter is expressive of a sense: what he means is this that, individually and separately stems and suffixes express ideas. A word, however, is not regarded as a combination of a stem and a suffix at the time of comprehension of its sense: rather it expresses the required sense in its entirety, and for this reason the Vaiyākarana is compelled to posit the existence of Padasphota, as something distinct from Varnasphota. In a similar manner, he finds a strong justification for admitting Vakyasphotu, because, as he says, a child, who is yet ignorant of the technicalities and principles of grammar and consequently of the analysis of a sentence into component terms understands the import of a sentence, when between two persons, in its presence, it observes one to do a certain act, after he has been told by the other to do it. The Vaiyakarana who extends recognition to Jatisphota, as well, argues that, when the import

that is denoted is the universal, it is perfectly reasonable to admit that what expresses the sense, also, is of the nature of the universal. Thus, he points out, the individual word Ghata uttered by a certain person does not express the desired idea: what actually conveys the sense is the universal, which finds its expression through different use of the said word. Though the Vaiyakarana emphasises his point that, the Sphota is completely devoid of all ideas of sequence and the question of priority and posteriority does not arise in relation to it, yet he speaks of an entity as Akhandasphota, implying thereby that, there is another entity known as Sakhandasphota, which admits of classification into component parts. This, however, does not represent his true stand, since it goes to annul the transcendental character of Sphota. By Akhandapadasphota, the Vaivakarana means this that one indivisible word, which is but an aspect of the Eternal Verbum or Sabdabrahman manifests itself through different words in the line of word, as the cosmic process starts: the conception of Sakhandapadasphota, as opposed to it refers to numerous indivisible words, each of which is expressive of an idea. Thus, while an advocate of Akhandapadasphota believes in the unitary character of Sphota, an advocate of Sakhan lapadasphota thinks that it is multiple in number. And the same is the case with Vakyasphota. With all emphasis at his command, Nagesa asserts that the Akhandavākyasphota or the Akhandapadasphota alone are real entities, since they alone are significant of complete ideas. This assertion shows that by Padasphota Nagesa does not refer to the fact that the words used in a sentence are expressive of ideas themselves, since a sentence does not admit of division into component parts: he refers rather to a word which is competent to bring a complete thought-unit into expression independent of others.

Taking his cue from this somewhat mystical conception, the Alamkārika develops the idea of *Dhvani* by analogy. The Vaiyākaraņa, who subscribes to the wave-theory of sound asserts that, one sound gives rise to another, which produces another, which in its turn gives rise to a fourth, and thus, the last

of a series of sounds, produced like a series of waves is comprehended by our auditory organ. A sound that is produced by another sound is parallel to a vibration, that arises after the original sound, when a bell is rung. A suggested meaning, also, bears similitude to this vibration, inasmuch as, like a vibration appearing after the original sound, its comprehension occurs after apprehension of the expressed sense.25 As the Vaiyakarana uses the term Dhvani to signify this type of sound, produced by another sound, the Alamkarika also uses the term to denote the implicit idea, whose cognition is caused by understanding of the explicit. Secondly the Vaiyakarana applies the term Dhvani to the momentary sounds pronounced by our speechorgans, -the sounds that manifest the sound-essence or the eternal Sphota; 26 accordingly, the Alamkarika also uses the term Dhvani to signify suggestive word and meaning, which bring the unexpressed content into light. Thirdly, the Vaiyakarana speaks of two types of Dhyani—the one Prakrta (natural) and the other Vaikrta (unnatural): Prakrta Dhvani, he contends. is necessary to manifest the eternal Sphota and Vaikrta Dhvani. which has no contribution towards revelation of Sphota makes only the sounds felt as long and short, -sweet and harsh, quick and slow, and so on. Thus, according to the Vaiyakarana. an effort, that is required in excess to that which is absolutely necessary for revelation of the eternal sound-unit in order to pronounce harsh or sweet sounds, quick or slow notes is Dhvani,27 and similarly, in the view of the Alamkarika, also, a function, that is required in addition to the three well-known functions of Denotation, Indication and Purport to bring into comprehension the unexpressed content of Poetry is Dhyani. The above discussion goes to show that a suggested sense, a suggestive word, a suggestive idea and the function of suggestion,-all these are recokned as Dhvani by the Alamkarika: he uses the term to signify a piece of poetic creation, also, that is comprised of all these elements. While commenting on the observation of Anandayardhana that, the Doctrine of Dhvani is backed by the authority of the Vaiyakarana, Abhinavagupta brings out this four-fold connotation of the term Dhvani and

thereby, furnishes a strong point, competent enough to show the indebtedness of the Alamkārika to the Vaiyākaraṇa. Though the theories of *Dhvani* and *Sphoṭa* have scarcely any mutual connection, the Dhvanivādin harps on this point, because, what he actually wants is an authority and the theory of *Sphoṭa*, adumbrated by the Vaiyākaraṇa by accepting the proposition of revelation of an eternal entity affords him an opportunity to boast of the authority of the Vaiyākaraṇa,—the 'Prathams Vidvāmsah'.

In formulating the Doctrine of Dhvani Anandavardhana states that, a piece of poetic creation in which an expressive word making its primary concept subservient and the expressed meaning rendering its own self subordinate go to manifest an implicit idea, which alone attains prominence is regarded as the Dhvani-Kavya: in this type of Poetry, he asserts, the suggested is of paramount importance, being the most attractive element, and the expressive word and the explicit idea remaining subordinate and thereby, playing only a second fiddle to it. 28 The greatness of a Poetry, he continues, does not depend on insertion of an expressive word or presentation of an expressed sense, but rather on the capacity of its creator to incorporate a suggestive word and bring an implicit idea into light. Though Anandavardhana connects the Doctrine of Dhvani with somewhat mystical theory of Sphota, he takes care to show that Dhvani is not something mystical, but is an entity, which is capable of being properly defined and grasped. In fact, this element is the most striking element in Poetry and no Poetic Art worth the name can afford to go without this essential element. Any literary composition that is not touched by this element can never be regarded as a specimen of Poetic Art at all. Dhvani is not an airy nothing: it is not a figment of imagination: on the other hand, Anandavardhana asserts, it is grasped and relished by men initiated into the hieroglyphics of Poetry.

In a Poetic creation both the word and the expressed meaning conjointly bring the implicit into light and to bring home the part played by both these elements in the matter of suggestings.

tion Anandavardhana uses the verb 'Vyanktah' in dual number in the definition of Dhvani, propounded by him. The objection that, it is not possible for the word and the expressed senseelements to combine with each other, since the cognition of the sense follows that of the word and the two are not comprehended simultaneously, his commentators point out, is not tenable: and this is so, because, according to the Vaiyakarana, whose authority the Dhyanivadin boasts of, the word itself constitutes along with its primary concept its own connotation, in the same way as the knowledge itself constitutes along with the knowable the content of the said knowledge. Thus, as the word and the thing syombolised by it both form the connotation of the same word and consequently, the content of same cognition, the combination of word and explicit idea, they assert, is not an absurdity. But it is a fact that these two elements are not equally important in all cases: in some cases, the wordelement is of more importance than the sense-element, and in others, the latter is of more importance than the former, which goes only to help it in revealing the implicit. In order to bring home this idea that, the choice is between importance of sound and sense, and not between sound and sense themselves, Abhinavagupta makes it clear, the particle  $v\bar{a}$  is used in the said definition. But of all the terms used therein, the most important is 'upasarjanīkrtasvārthau', because it precludes the possibility of inclusion of Dhvani within the domain of Poetic figures. It is said that in a Dhvani-Kavya, the words and meanings are of secondary importance; but this is not the case with the figures of speech. The figures merely adorn the sound and sense and consequently, are subordinate to them: they themselves cannot augment the beauty of a Poetic creation unless incorporated in it, and it is only when they are applied to sound and sense that they go to embellish them. Thus the Alamkaras depend absolutely on words and meanings for their very existence, and as such, are subordinate to them: in a Dhvani Kavya, however, the words and meanings are subordinate to the implicit idea of paramount importance and have no independent status of their own. For this reason, Anandayardhana points out, the definition of Dhvani itself is competent enough to draw the line of demarcation between the scope of *Dhvani* and that of the Poetic figures.<sup>29</sup>

In reply to the proposition of the rival theorists that *Dhvani* can be subsumed under the figures of speech, Anandavardhana contends that, as *Dhvani* has nothing to do with denotation,—it being conveyed solely through the function of suggestion and as the figures are based on the function of denotation, so the former cannot be subsumed under the latter. Moreover, *Dhvani* is the name given to a whole piece of poetic creation of which the figures of speech form merely a section of decorative elements. Thus as the relation of part and whole exists between *Alamkāra* and *Dhvani*, the one cannot be equated with the other.

There are certain figures that are characterised by the emergence of the unexpressed sense; these figures are Samā-sokti, Ākṣṇa, Paryāyokta, Apahnuti, Dīpakā and the like. The question of inclusion of Dhvani within the domain of these figures, that are characterised by apprehension of suggested meaning naturally arises. But Ānandavardhana firmly asserts that these figures, also, cannot comprehend the concept of Dhvani. In Dhvani-Kāvya the suggested meaning is inexplicably charming, but in the illustrations of such figures as Samāsokti and the like, it is the particular way of expression that is more attractive than the unexpressed hidden sense.

In the verse:

Upodharāgena vilolatārakam Tathā grhītam śaśinā niśāmukham/ Yathā samastam timirāṃśukam tayā Puro'pi rāgādgalitam na lakṣitam//

the behaviour of two lovers are superimposed on the moon and the night; both are presented with the behaviours of two lovers ascribed to them. Yet in the verse under consideration the unexpressed meaning in the form of lovers is incapable of being accepted as forming the final import of the proposition and as such of paramount importance; it is the description of the moon in the evening that is the final import of the verse. The lovers only render the moon and the night suitable Vibhāvas

for the manifestation of erotic emotion. Thus in the illustration of Samāsokti the expressed sense, whose beauty is heightened by superimposition of the behaviour of the unexpressed idea is of more importance than the subtle meaning itself. In the figure of speech  $\bar{A}k$  sepa also predominance belongs to the expressed meaning and not to the suggested one. This figure consists in a semblance of negation,—the negation being apparent only, and it is expressed in order to bring into light another hidden sense. In this figure the mode of expression, i.e. the apparent negation is more striking than the hidden intention of the speaker, and as prominance belongs to the expressed meaning, so Dhvani cannot be subsumed under it. In determining which of the two meanings,—the expressed and the unexpressed one—is principal and which of them is subordinate, the sole criterion, according to the Dhvani theorists is Carutva or beauty. 31

In the figure of speech Dīvaka the contextual and the noncontextual meanings are connected by the same action or attribute, and this connection ultimately leads to the apprehension of a suggested similitude existing between them. But nevertheless, the form of expression, - the mode of connecting two things with the same attribute or action—is more attractive than the suggested Upamā lying in the background, and as such Dīpaka cannot comprehend Dhvani. In Apahnuti, the object of description is rejected and in its place a standard of comparison is established. Here also, there lies in the background an apprehension of suggested Upama, but the mode of rejection of the one and establishment of the other being more attractive, this figure also cannot include Dhvani. In the figure of speech Viśesokti, the effect is described as absent, even though all the causal factors are apparently present. This apparent violation to the law of causality creates charm and entitles this form of expression to receive the status of an Alamkara. This mode of expression, however, leads to the apprehension of some factors, that are responsible for the non-production of effect. Though this factor is signified through the function of suggestion, yet it is not charming; in it the mode of expression is more

attractive than the suggested special factor. So illustrations of this figure also cannot be regarded as proper fields of Dhvani.

In the figure of speech Paryayokta, the same meaning is conveyed through the functions of denotation and suggestion, the only difference being in the respective process of conveying it: the manner in which the suggested sense is conveyed is different from that in which it is expressed in words. Anandavardhana states that, if in an illustration of Paryayokta the suggested sense appears as more striking than the expressed one, then these cases can safely be regarded as cases of Dhvani Kavya; or in other words, these examples of Paryayokta can be subsumed under Dhvani. But it is not possible for the figure Paryayokta to comprehend Dhvani, for the scope of Dhvani is much more extensive than that of Paryayokta. Moreover, Dhvani constitutes the soul of a poetic creation and the figures of speech are analogous to such instruments of decoration, as bangles and the like. Just as a bangle cannot be identified with soul, similarly a figure also cannot be identified with Dhvani.

Mixture of a number of figures creates two different species of figures known as Samsrsti and Sankara. In Sam rsti the connection between the figures is separable: in Sankara this is inseparable. The Alamkarikas speak of three different cases of Sankara: (1) when a number of figures are located in the same substratum, (2) when a doubt as to the nature of the exact figure lingers in the mind of appreciator and (3) when one figure paves the path for the emergence of another figure. Of these three cases, the first can never be regarded as a case of Dhvani because the suggested meaning is conspicuous by its absence in it. In the second case both the Alamkaras-suggested as well as expressed-are equally predominant. For as there is no definite clue as to which Alnmkara should be expressed and which suggested, both may be suggested as well as expressed alternatively and it would be illogical to arbitrarily mark out one as predominant in preference to the other. Thus the second case of Sankara also cannot be regarded as a case of Dhvani, because in order to form Dhvani the suggested meaning must be predominant, being the most attractive element in the whole piece. Normally *Dhvani* cannot be subsumed under the third type of *Sankara* also, because in that, too, the expressed sense appears as more attractive. In the verse:

Pravātanīlotpalanirvišesamadhīravipreksitamāyatāksyā/ Ťayā grhītam nu mrgānganābhyastato grhītam nu

mrganganabhih//

the expressed figure is Sandeha and the path for the emergence of this figure is created by the suggested Upama that lies in the background. Of these two figures the suggested Upama bringing into light the affinity of Parvati's unsteady glances with those of the deer is less attractive, and as such subordinate to the expressed Sandeha, which is more charming: so this verse cannot be taken as an illustration of true Dhvani. If however such illustrations of Sankara are found, in which the suggested figure excels the expressed one in charm, then those illustrations are capable of being regarded as proper fields of Dhvani; but for that reason it is wrong to contend that, Sankara comprehends the concept of Dhvani. Moreover, in Sankara a complete merger of individual traits of the component figures is effected and the very designation 'Sankara' rules out all speculations concerning the existence of Dhvani in it. Because in Sankara the different figures lose their separate independent traits, and naturally it is futile to contemplate the relation of principal and subordinate between them. 32

The figure of speech Aprastutapraśaṃsā is based on the cognition of the suggested meaning in the background. In it from the expressed non contextual meaning, the contextual one is apprehended through the function of suggestion, and this happens because a definite relation exists between the expressed and the suggested meanings. These relations are (1) the relation existing between a universal and a particular, (2) the relation of causality and (3) the relation of similarity. Those poetic creations, in which the expressed and the unexpressed meanings stand in the relation of universal and particular or in that of cause and effect can never be reckoned as true cases of Dhvaṇi, because in such pieces the suggested and the expressed meanings are equally prominent. It has been

made clear by the Dhvanikara that in order to form Dhvani the suggested meaning should excel the expressed one in charm; and as such should be more prominent than it. In cases where the expressed and the suggested meanings stand in the relation of universal and particular, the predominance of either of these cannot be argued, because a universal cannot reside without its substrata—the particular and the particulars also cannot be conceived without knowing the universal; thus as the universal and the particular are of equal importance, so both the expressed and the unexpressed meanings are equally prominent in such cases. This proposition holds good in case of the second type of Aprastutaprasamsa also, that is based on the relation of causality; and this is so because at the time of understanding the effect, the cognition of the cause lingers and at the time of the comprehension of the cause, the effect also continues to exist in the mind. In the third variety of Aprastutaprasomsā, in which the expressed non-contextual suggests a similar contextual, there might be Dhvani, provided the latter is intended primarily to be conveyed by the poet and the expressed sense is subordinated to it. But for that reason it cannot be argued that the figure Aprastutapraśamsa comprehends Dhvani, because the scope of Dhvani, as has been pointed out, is much more wide than that of a variety of figure of speech. Thus by showing with strongest arguments that the figures of speech cannot comprehend the concept of Dhvani, Anandavardhana in the Samkseya verses clearly draws the line of demarcation between the scope of true Dhvani and that of the figures of speech, characterised by the apprehension of an unexpressed sense. Thus run the Samksepa verses:

Vyangyasya yatrāprādhānyam vācyamātrānuyāyinah / Samāsoktyādayastatra vācyālamkṛtayah sphuṭāh // Vyangyasya pratibhāmātre vācyārthānugame' pi vā / Na Dhvaniryatra vā tasya prādhānyam na pratīyate // Tatparāveva śabdārthau yatra vyangyam prati sthitau / Dhvaneh sa eva viṣayo mantavyah sankarojjhitah //

-DL. I. pp. 130-31,

These verses mean this: a piece of poetic creation, in which the

suggested sense is subordinate to the expressed and serves only to embellish it forms the field of such figures as  $Sam\overline{a}sokti$  and the like. This can in no way be taken as an illustration of Dhvani. A piece of poetic creation, in which the unexpressed meaning is not clearly cognised or it stands on an equal footing with the expressed sense, so far as charm is concerned, or its predominance is not clearly apprehended does not form similarly a field of Dhvani; this is a case of such expressed figures as  $Aprastutapraśaṃs\overline{a}$ ,  $D\overline{\imath}paka$  and the like. That only is a genuine case of Dhvani where the expressive words and the expressed meanings subordinate themselves to the suggested sense, that excels in charm all other poetic elements, and this Dhvani is immune from the possibility of being comprehended under the figures of speech.

Just as cases of Vastudhvani cannot be comprehended in such figures as Samāsokti, Dīpaka and the like, similarly Rasadhvani is incapable of being comprehended in the muchdiscussed figure Rasavat, which is recognised by old poetics and which helps to smuggle as it were, the idea of Rasa into their systems. Really in the figure of speech Rasavat, the moods and feelings are supposed to have been roused not for their own sake, but only to embellish the expressed thought or another unexpressed idea. Just as such things as the moon and the like can augment the beauty of the face in such expressions as 'Mukhacandra' and the like, similarly emotional moods or feelings also can embellish other expressed or unexpressed ideas. Thus while in Rasadhvaui, Rasa is primarily developed and as such, attains the status of the soul of poetry, in the figure Rasavat, Rasa is not primarily relished, but is made subservient to the expressed thought or some other suggested idea. \* Illustrations of these figures are instances of Gunībhūtavyangya type of poetry and just as Samāsokti and such other figures cannot comprehend Vastudhvani, similarly Rasavat cannot comprehend Rasadhvani. The verse:

Kim hāsyena na me prayāsyasi punah praptaścirāddarśanam Keyam niṣkaruṇā prayāsarucitā kenāsi dūrikṛtah / Svapnanteşviti te vadan priyatamavyasaktakanthagraho

Buddhvā roditi riktabahuvalayastāram ripustrījanah //
—is an illustration of this figure. Here the poet eulogizes
his royal patron and depicts the sad plight of the ladies of
rival kings only to bring into bolder relief the glory and valour
of his patron. As the greatness of the king is manifested
clearly by tragic emotion, it can be said that the latter
beautifies the former and as such is subservient to it. Similarly
in the verse:

Kṣipto hastāvalagnah prasabhamabhihato' pyādadāno' mśukāntam Grhnan keśeṣvapāstascarananipatito nekṣitah sambhrameṇa/

Alinganyo' vadhūtastripurayuvatibhih sāśrunetrotpalābhih Kāmīvārdrāparādhah sa dahatu duritam śāmbhavo vah śarāgṇih//—the erotic emotion suggested by the expression 'Kamīvārdrāparādhah' brings into full relief the prowess of the Lord Śiva, and as such serves only as an instrument of decoration. These cases can never be regarded as cases of true Rasadhvani, because emotional moods are not primarily developed in these.

In this connection Anandavardhana quotes the view-points of the writers belonging to the pre-dhvani school on the nature of the poetic figure Rasavat. In the view of Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin this figure consists in the presentation of such permanent feelings as love, grief, heroism and the like. Though these scholars are cognisant of the existence of Rasa, yet they are unable to draw the line of demarcation between Rasadhvani and Rasavat as the concept of Dhvani is unknown to them.

In criticising the view-point of these theorists Anandavardhana states that, if their proposition is accepted then the scope of pure simile and such other figures become completely wiped away. Now it may be contended that, as the permanent feelings belong only to animate beings, so description of them are cases of the figure Rasavat and descriptions of inanimate beings form the scopes of other pure figures such as Upamā, Rūpaka and the like. In reply to this contention Anandavardhana argues that, the inanimate objects like hills and rivers are states and as such apparently there can be no possibility of certainly devoid of conscious activities and permanent mental

the poetic figure Rasavat in their description, but it is a fact that in poetry these inanimate things are presented with some touch of human and conscious elements in them. Thus as in the descriptions of inanimate things there exists a touch of human elements, so in these we shall find illustrations of Samsrsti or Samkara between Rasavat and other figures. If, on the other hand, it is contended that descriptions of inanimate beings, even though characterised by touches of human elements form illustrations of such pure figures as Upamā and the like, and do not come under the purview of the figure of speech Rasavat, then we have got to regard many specimens of really good and great poetry as dry compositions, because in the view of the ancients, absence of the poetic figure Rasavat agrees with the absence of emotional mood. And a poetic creation that is not characterised by the presentation of an emotional mood can never be regarded as a specimen of true poetry. Such poetic creations as:

Tarangabhrubhanga kṣubhitavihagaśreṇirasanā
Vikarṣantī phenaṃ vasanamiva saṃrambhaśithilam /
Yathāviddhaṃ yāti skhalitamabhisandhāya bahuśo
Nadīrupeṇeyaṃ dhruvamasahanā sā pariṇatā //

and

Teṣāṃ gopavadhūvilāsasuhṛdāṃ rādhārahaḥsākṣināṃ Kṣemaṃ bhadra kalindaśailatanayātīre latāveśmanāṃ / Vicchine smaratalpakalpanamṛducchedopayoge'dhunā

Te jāne jaraṭhībhavanti vigalannīlatviṣah pallavāh //
in which a river has been imagined as an irritable lady and the
groves are described as excitant causes of love contain descriptions of inanimate objects no doubt, but nevertheless they can
not be regarded as totally devoid of Rasa. Thus it is clear
that, if the view-point of the ancient theorists on the nature
of the poetic figure Rasavat is accepted, then it becomes difficult
to distinguish between the fields of pure Upamā and pure
Rasavat. If, on the other hand, the view of Dhvani theorists
on this point is accepted, then it becomes possible to properly
demarcate the spheres of Dhvani, Upamā and Rasavat. Those
poetic creations in which an emotional mood is ornamented by

other things or superimpositions or introsusceptions, and where other secondary emotional moods are absent form the scopes of such pure figures as  $Upam\bar{a}$ ,  $R\bar{u}paka$ , Atisayokti and the like; those compositions in which an emotional mood is predominently depicted form cases of Rasadhvani and those poetic creations in which Rasa,  $Bh\bar{a}va$  etc. are rendered subservient to other contents of poetry are regarded as illustrations of the poetic figure Rasavat.

The above discussion goes to show how the theory of Dhvani is utilised by the learned Dhyanikara himself to refute the contentions of those, who want to deny the existence of Dhvani by comprehending it under different figures of speech, as also of those who want to identify Dhvani with Laksana. The formulation of this definition itself is sufficient enough to show the absurdity of the proposition of the Anirvacanivavadin, who declares Dhvani as lying beyond the province of words. In conclusion, the learned Dhvanikara remarks that, if the proposition of the Anirvacaniyavadin is a mere hyperbole intended to convey the immense charm of Dhvani that surpasses all other elements of poetry in point of strikingness, then he concedes the reasonableness of such a view and agrees with him wholeheartedly. In a poetry, the unexpressed content really surpasses all such elements as Guna, Rīti and Alamkara in point of beauty and strikingness.

#### CHAPTER VI

# DHVANI VERSUS ANUMĀNA

]

## Anandavardhana's stand

After refuting the contentions of the critics, who like to equate Vyanjana with the figures of speech or with Laksana and who declare it as something undefinable, the learned Dhvanikara takes up the proposition of those, who want to comprehend Dhvani under the process of inference. The advocates of this theory maintain that a suggestive unit is only an indicative one, and the relation existing between a suggestive unit and a suggested idea is exactly that, which connects an indicator and an indicated. The relation of indicator and indicated, as is evident in the stock illustration of Anumana-'Parvato vahniman dhumat' exists between a probans and a probandum, also, inasmuch as, smoke indicates the existence of fire on the hill. For this reason, these critics argue that the relation. linking a suggestor and a suggested is that, which connects a probans and a probandum, or in other words, Vyanjana is identical with Anumana. In support of their contention these critics quote the remarks of the Dhvanikara himself. who in course of rejecting the view-point of the Mīmāmsakas says that, the intention of the speaker is brought into light solely through the function of suggestion; these opponents point out that, as the intentions of others are capable of being comprehended through the process of inference alone, so the proposition established by the Dhvanikara itself goes to equate Vyanjana with Anumana.

In replying to these charges the  $Dhvanik\bar{a}ra$  first of all congratulates the  $Anum\bar{a}nav\bar{a}din$  for the latter is at least convinced of the fact that  $Vya\tilde{n}jan\bar{a}$  is not identical with  $Abhidh\bar{a}$  or  $Lak\$an\bar{a}$ ; because otherwise he would not have

attempted to regard a suggestive unit as a probans. Secondly, he argues, cognition of a word produces knowledge concerning four entities, of which two are capable of being known through inference and two through denotation or indication and suggestion. The knowledge of a word reveals, first of all, the desire of the speaker to make a sound: secondly, it manifests the intention of the speaker to signify a sense: thirdly, it brings into light the conventional meaning, and fourthly it brings home the purpose for the signification of which that particular word is used. Of these four entities that form the content of one knowledge, produced on hearing of a word, the first thing, namely, the desire of the speaker to make a sound has no bearing on verbal testimony: it only points out to the consciousness of the speaker, because an animal, having consciousness alone can make significant or unmeaning sounds. The second thing namely the intention of the speaker to signify a sense is connected in a remote way with verbal knowledge, because in between the apprehension of this intention and cognition of the conventional meaning, there exists knowledge of the particular word or words used. These two factors, the Dhvanikara says,—the desire of the speaker to make a sound and his intention to convey an idea—are capable of being known through inference. But the other two factors,-the ideas, that form the object of his desire, being the meanings intended to be conveyed by him are incapable of being known through the process of inference. In some cases, these objects are signified by words, directly expressive of them, and in others, where the speaker wants to bring home some charming motive, through another mode. The object that is conveyed by an expressive word is regarded as an expressed meaning and that which is conveyed by a word, not denotative of it in another mode is regarded as a suggested sense. According to the Dhvanikara these two types of objects, intended to be brought into light are signified through the functions of denotation and suggestion respectively, and never through the process of inference. The fact that doubts arise as to the rightness or wrongness of meanings, or in other words, meanings

constitute the objects of doubts goes to show the absurdity of their comprehension, being caused by  $Anum\bar{a}na$ : because the knowledge produced through  $Anum\bar{a}na$  assumes the form of a right notion, and not of a doubtful cognition; when the existence of fire is inferred from presence of smoke, no such doubt as to whether the fire actually exists or not arises in the mind of the knower. The argument that it is not possible for a word to bring into light a suggested sense with which it bears no relation whatsoever does not hold good. The suggested meaning being brought into comprehension per force of expressed sense, conveyed by a word, certainly bears relation to the word-unit, though of course, the relation in this case is an indirect one. An indirect relation existing between a word and a meaning is as much competent to reveal a sense as is a direct relation, linking the two. The verse:

Harastu kimcit parivṛtta-dhairyaścandrodayārambha

ivāmvurāśih/

Umāmukhe Bimbaphalādharoṣṭhe vyāpārayāmāsa vilocanāni//meaning: 'Like the Ocean perturbed at moon-rise, Lord Śiva, with his fortitude shaken slightly placed his eyes on the face of Pārvatī, bearing lips resembling Bimba fruits' furnishes a nice illustration to the point. Here the desire of Lord Śiva to kiss, as also his love for Pārvatī that constitutes the inner content of this poetry is incapable of being described as an inferred entity. What inference presents here is the skill of the poet, as well as his intention to bring out an idea. The desire of Lord Śiva referred to above can not be conveyed through the function of denotation, because that does not constitute the conventional meaning. So for the signification of this inner content, the Dhvanivādin argues, one has got to admit the separate existence of the function of suggestion.

In order to explain the exact relation existing between an expressed and an unexpressed, the *Divanivādin* generally quotes the analogy of the relation existing between a lamp and a jar, and says that, like a lamp manifesting an already existing jar, an explicit idea brings an implicit one into light. This parallelism itself goes to refute the contention that a *Vyanjaka*.

is nothing other than a Hetu, and Vyanjana is nothing different from Anumana. In Anumana, a relation of universal concomitance (vyāpti) exists between the probans and the probandum; no such co-existence however exists between a lamp and a jar: neither the presence of the lamp agrees with the presence of the jar, nor does its absence agree with that of the jar. Thus it is clear that in the case of the lamp manifesting the jar, the latter cannot be described as being known through Anumana; and it is quite in the fitness of things that Vyangya-vyanjakabhava, which is based on Ghata-pradipa-nyaya is incapable of being equated with Anumana.2 Moreover, in Anumana the knowledge of the Probans produces a series of actions in order to make the inference a valid one: it sets the mind of the knower thinking about the relation of co-existence, linking the probans and the probandum, as also about the presence of the probans on the subject (Paksa); no such action, however, is produced by a suggestive unit in course of its signification of the implicit idea. This, also, goes to establish the proposition of the Dhvanivadin that, a vyanjaka is not identical with a hetu. The argument that, inference that makes known the correctness or other vise of the suggested idea brings into light the self of the idea, also does not lead us anywhere, because by applying the same argument, the case of the explicit idea being conveyed through the process of inference, that establishes its validity or otherwise arises. No body, however, regards an expressed meaning as a product of inferential knowledge. The Dhvanivadin does not object to the proposition that the correctness or otherwise of an implicit idea is determined through inference: what he objects to is this that, the idea itself is known through inference. The firm conviction of the Dhvanivadin is this that, the unexpressed content of Poetry is brought into comprehension through suggestion and suggestion only. Moreover, the determination of correctness or otherwise of an idea, however, necessary it might be in case of expressions found in the Vedas, as also those used in our daily life, is absolutely unnecessary in case of poetic expression. And this is so. because a presented fact is of secondary importance in poetry,

the prime purpose of which is generation of impersonal pleasure in the minds of real appreciators: accordingly, an attempt to find out the rightness or wrongness of a fact, presented in poetry, points out, as it does to lack of appreciative genius on the part of the discerner, sounds ridiculous. Thus, it is clear that Anumana does not comprehend the concept of Dhvani. The intention of the speaker to signify a sense, no doubt, is comprehended through Anumana, but this inferred idea, the Dhvanivadin says, is unable to acquire the covetable appellation Dhvani for a piece of poetic creation; an implicit idea alone other than this intention, that is common to both ordinary linguistic expression and poetic expression is able to bestow the status of a Dhvanikāvya on a poetry. If the intention of the speaker is regarded as the factor, due to which a piece of poetic creation is considered as the best specimen of poetry, then the question of admission of ordinary linguistic expressions, too, that are characterised by manifestation of this intention of the speaker as best specimens of poetry arises. The proposition of accepting ordinary linguistic expressions as best specimens of Poetry, however, is an absurd one. Thus with convincing arguments, the Dhvanivadin establi hes that a Vyanjaka is something different from a Hetu,—the function of Vyanjana is something different from the process of Anumana.3

### II

# Mahimabhatta's criticism of the Doctrine of Dhvani

The movement of the Anumānavādin receives a fresh impetus in Vyaktiviveka of Mahimabhaṭṭa who claims to have established in his work the inclusion of all types of *Dhvani* within the domain of *Anumāna*. To start with, Mahimabhaṭṭa takes up the theory of Dhvani, as adumbrated by the learned *Dhvanikāra*, and points out ten defects, that are said to vitiate, and as such, render the theory unacceptable. The epithet 'Upasarjanīkṛtasva', as applicable to 'artha' in the definition of *Dhvani*, Mahimabhaṭṭa maintains, is unnecessary. According to

the Dhvanivadin, in a Dhvanikavya, the expressed meaning, making itself subservient suggests the implicit sense. Now, as in this type of poetic creation, the expressed is presented as a means leading to manifestation of the unexpressed, it goes without saying that the former is subordinate to the latter. A column of smoke, that leads to inferential knowledge of fire certainly renders itself subordinate to the comprehended fire. Thus as in a Dhvanikavya, in which an expressed is presented not for its own sake, but solely for the sake of bringing the unexpressed into comprehension, the former does not transgress its subservience to the latter, and accordingly, the mention of that characteristic with the help of an adjective, Mahimabhatta thinks, is redundant. A real adjective, it is said, presents an attribute, which though competent to reside in the thing qualified is yet found to dissociate itself occasionally from the latter. The use of the adjective 'hot' in the expression 'hot fire' is defective, because the attribute presented by it, namely heat is incapable of being trangressed by fire; similarly defective is the use of the adjective 'cold' in the expression 'cold fire', because it is not possible for the attribute coldness, presented by it to reside in fire. The relation of qualification and a thing qualified, however, as existing between blueness' and 'lotus' in the expression 'a blue lotus' is appropriate, because it is possible for the quality of blueness to reside in a. lotus, and at the same time, this quality is found occasionally to dissociate itself from a lotus. inasmuch as, a red lotus is not marked by blueness. In a Dhvanikāvya, under consideration, the attribute of subservience to the implicit, belonging to the explicit is never found to dissociate itself from the thing qualified: the expressed never transgresses its character of subordination to the unexpressed which is of greater importance, because it is presented for the sole purpose of bringing in a manifestation of the suggested. So, Mahimabhatta says, the use of the adjective 'Upasarjanīkrtasva' as qualifying 'artha' is inappropriate and unnecessary.

The Dhvanivadin explains that this adjective precludes the possibility of comprehension of *Dhvani* under the domain

of such figures as  $Sam\bar{a}sokti$  and the like, that are characterised by manifestation of a suggested fact. In the verse:

Upodharāgena vilolatārakam tathā gṛhītam śaśinā niśāmukham / Yathā samastam timirāmśukam tayā puro'pi rāgādgalitam na

laksitam //

the expressed meaning comprised of moon and night, he says, is of more importance than the implicit idea, consisting of the hero and the heroine, that serves only as an embellishment to the former. He says that, as in this case, the expressed meaning violates its character of subservience to the unexpressed, so the proposition of the Anumanavadin that an expressed meaning introduced in order to bring an unexpressed into light never transgresses its character of subordination to the implicit. and the conclusion drawn by him on the basis of that proposition are wrong. In reply to this contention, Mahimabhatta points out that, prominence of the explicit idea, as laid out in the verse quoted above is only due to the fact, that it constitutes the contextual sense. A contextual sense, irrespective of the fact whether it is primary or secondary or suggested, is of importance, because it forms the subject-matter of poetry; this importance derived from the sheer fact of its constituting the subject-matter of Poetry, however, merits no consideration in a Dhvanikāvya, based solely on the function of suggestion. However important an explicit meaning may be, being the subject-matter of the Poetry concerned, it is always subordinate to the implicit idea, for the comprehension of which it is introduced. In the verse quoted above, the expressed meaning, comprised of the description of moon-rise in evening is important no doubt, as it forms the final import of the sentence; but it is undoubtedly subservient to the suggested idea, consisting of the behaviour of the hero and the heroine: and this is so, because the expressed meaning is presented for the sole purpose of manifesting the suggested one. Of the two,-the means and the end,-the way and the goal-the former is definitely of less importance than the latter. The argument that, prominence and subservience, in the present case, refer respectively to charm and absence of charm, and

as in some specimens of poetic creation, the expressed meaning is capable of attaining prominence, being excellent in charm, so the proposition that, the expressed never transgresses its character of subordinating itself to the unexpressed is incorrect,—is misleading because the unexpressed is found to excel the expressed in charm, even in the Gunībhūtavyangya type of Poetry, reckoned by the Dhvanivādin as Poetry of second class. Thus the Anumānavadin concludes that, the expressed sense being a way leading to comprehension of the unexpressed content of Poetry remains always subservient to that, and accordingly, qualification of the expressed sense by the adjective 'upasarjanīkṛtasva', as is done in the definition of Dhvani, propounded by the Dhvadivādin is inappropriate and unnecessary.

Secondly, Mahimabhatta argues, the use of the epithet 'Upasarjanikṛtārtha' as an adjective to 'Śabda' in the definition of Dhvani is improper. According to the learned Dhvanikara in a best specimen of poetry, either the expressed meaning making itself subservient or the expressive word making its primary meaning subordinate brings into light through suggestion an implicit idea of paramount importance. Mahimabhatta challenges the very belief of the  $Dhvaniv\bar{a}din$  that, an expressive word is endowed with the ability to render its primary meaning subordinate; he says, that a word, which makes known the unknown is endowed with no function other than that of signifying its meaning. A parallel is to be found in the case of the lamp, that only manifests others, and does nothing else. The assertion that apart from its ability to bring into light a meaning, a word has competence to render its import subservient to others is ridiculous. The capacity to render its import subservient to others, as belonging to a word-unit is, however, found in case of imitation-words, commonly known as 'anukaranaśabda' in the language of Indian poetics, but it is to note that such words are unable to bring into light their meanings that are cognised in some cases, from the words imitated (anukāryaśabda). The verse:

'Tam karṇamūlamāgatya palitacchadmanā jarā / Kaikeyīśaṅkayaevāha Rāme śrīrnasyatāmiti // meaning: 'In the guise of grey hair decrepitude came near his ears, as if, through fear of Kaikeyi and said: To Rama thou hand over the goddess of fortune', furnishes an illustration to the point. The indeclinable 'iti' inserted after the imitationword, quoting the message of decrepitude delivered to king Dasaratha secretely indicates that the expression brings out its form only, and no content whatsoever: the content is brought into light by the actual message, and not by its quotation by the poet, -by the Anukārya-śabda, and not by the Anukarana one. An Anukārya-śabda, the Śābdikas say is two-fold in nature: one is significant (Sarthaka) and the other is insignificant (Nirarthaka). When a significant word is imitated by another word, the imitator Anukarana-śabda brings out only the form of the imitated and this Anukārya-śabda subsequently conveys the actual import, if, of course, it remains one of Sarthaka type. In those cases, in which the Anukarya-śabda is one of Nirarthaka type, the question of cognition of sense does not arise. Moreover, expressions are used with the sole object of signifying imports, and so it is never possible for them to render their primary meanings subservient. A thing introduced for the sake of another never makes that another object subordinate: on the other hand, it renders its own self subservient to the object. An illustration is to be found in the case of a jar, requisitioned in order to fetch water; the jar never attains more prominence than water: on the other hand, it keeps its ownself completely subordinate to that. In a similar manner, an expression used to convey a meaning never subordinates that meaning: on the other hand it makes its own self subservient to that. Thus, Mahimabhatta asserts, the notion of the learned Dhvanikara that it is possible for an expression to render its expressed meaning subservient is erroneous, and the introduction of an epithet that brings out this competence on the part of an expression vitiates the definition by the fallacy of absurdity. The argument that, in a Gunībhūtavyangya type of Poetry the expressed meaning excels the suggested one in charm and as such attains more prominence than the latter, and naturally it is possible for an expressed meaning to violate its character of subservience to the unexpressed—is misleading and fallacious. Equally fallacious is the argument that expressions are capable of making their expressed meanings subservient to the unexpressed. Both these, intended to remove the defect of absurdity, by which the definition is vitiated lead to another defect, known as tautology. As expressions and expressed meanings are introduced for the sole purpose of bringing into light the unexpressed content of Poetry, it is obvious that they are subservient to the latter; their subordination to the implicit idea does not stand in need of further assertion.

Not only is the definition of Dhvani faulty by the defects of absurdity and repetition: it is vitiated also by the fallacy of too narrow definition. Non-mention of the function of denotation, along with expressive words and expressed meanings, Mahimabhatta thinks, leaves many good specimens of Poetry out of the purview of Dhvanikavya. An illustration is to be found in case of expressed Dipaka or Samśaya, - figures. that lead to comprehension of suggested Upamā. Examples of such figures as Dīpaka and Samśaya are correct illustrations of Dhvanikavya, but the definition, propounded by the Dhvanivadin is unable to bring them under its scope. In case of Dipaka and Samsaya neither an expressed meaning, rendering its own self subservient suggests an implicit idea nor does an expression making its primary meaning subordinate brings out an implied meaning: what actually happens is that, an expressed figure brings into light a suggested figure, that excels the former in charm and as such attains more prominence than that. The words 'artha' and 'sabda', incorporated in the definition are unable to include figures within their connotation. Figures of speech are nothing but peculiar turns of expression and consequently they are identical with Abhidha. Abhidha is the name given to a relation, existing between a sound and a sense, that has for its another nomenclature the connection between an expressor and an expressed', -'vacyavacakabhava'. This relation, as goes without saying is a quality belonging to both sound and sense. When this quality, being imparted by the creative genius of the poet becomes charming, it is

converted into an Alam'tara. So, Mahimabhatta maintains that, in order to include that specimen of poetry, in which an expressed figure brings a suggested figure into comprehension, as is done by the figure Dipaka, within the province of Dhyanikavya, mention of Abhidha in the definition, under consideration is imperative. The objection that examples of Dipaka and Samsaya do not form fields of true Dhvani does not help us in any way, because the argument on which a Dhvanivadin bases this objection is erroneous. According to the learned Dhvanikāra, in order to form a Dhvanikāvya, an expressed figure has got to manifest a prominent suggested figure; he thinks that in illustrations of Dipaka, prominence does not belong to the suggested Upama, which is excelled in charm by the expressed Dipaka, and naturally these are not regarded as specimens of Dhyanikāvya. Challenging this chain of argument, Mahimabhatta says, the figure Dīpaka attains the status of an Alamkara being a charming mode of expression, only when, it points out to the implicit idea of similarity, existing between the Prakrta and the Aprakrta. A Dipaka that does not lead to comprehension of this implied sense is unable to claim the designation 'Alam'tara'. And such is the case with Samsaya, also. Thus as the suggested Upamā is the most beautiful element, bestowing charm, necessary for its very existence on the expressed Dipaka, so there is no reason to deny an example of Dīpaka the status of Dhvanikāvya. And non-mention of Abhidh $\bar{a}$ , resulting as it does in denial of this status is a serious defect. The explanation that Abhidha is obtained through implication from 'artha' with which it bears a relation of inseparable association, inasmuch as, without this function of denotation apprehension of meaning does not occur and that subservience of Abhidha is obtained through implication from the epithet 'upasarjanīkrtasvārthau' that presents the idea of subservience of expressive word and expressed meaning, inasmuch as, the prominence of the function of  $Abhidh\bar{a}$  is bound to result in prominence of word and meaning connected by it lands a Dhvanivadin into fresh troubles, because by applying the same argument, the question of deletion of 'sabda' arises;

like subservience of Abhidha, being known through implication, subservience of śabda and the meaning presented by it also is capable of being known through implication from 'artha', with which a śabda is inseparably associated. The counter-argument that a sabda is not comprehended through implication from artha and as such requires separate mention in the definition makes, as stated before, the distinct statement of Abhidha imperative, because in point of signifying meaning an Abhidha meets on a common platform with a Sabda. The justification for the use of the word śabda, as advanced by the Dhvanivadin, according to which, though a word is incapable of making its expressed meaning subservient to its own self is competent enough to make the primary meaning subordinate to the suggested idea does not cut much ice, because the existence of a function of suggestion, in addition to that of denotation as belonging to a word is itself open to great controversy. Thus it becomes clear that the learned Dhvanikara has committed a blunder by inserting the term 'sabda' in his Theory of Dhyani, which should, in the fitness of things, have been avoided.

Mahimabhatta approaches the problem of language and meaning in a novel way, and asserts that all verbal knowledge, based as it is on the relation of premise and conclusion is identical with inferential cognition. An expression is used to engage a man in performance of a particular action or in order to dissuade him from that. Now the man who hears the expression performs an action, only when he is fully convinced of the propriety and strength of the arguments, advanced by the speaker. This fact goes to show that all verbal knowledge, competent to excite a man to discharge a particular action or to dissuade him from performance of that is based on inference, and as such is one and the same with inferential knowledge.

Following Bhartrhari, Mahimabhatta classifies expressions into two types: word (Pada) and sentence  $(V\overline{a}kya)$ . Corresponding to this two-fold classification of expression the expressed, also, admits of division into two categories: import of a term  $(Pad\overline{a}rtha)$  and import of a proposition  $(V\overline{a}ky\overline{a}rtha)$ . The import of a term is always conveyed through  $Abhidh\overline{a}$ , and as such is

regarded as Vacya only. According to Mahimabhatta a word is endowed with only one function, which is Abhidha. It is not possible for the process of inference to bring into light the idea of a word, because it being unitary in character does not admit of being split up into two parts-premises and conclusionfactors, that are essential for operation of inference. The import of a proposition on the other hand, is conveyed through the function of Abhidha, as well as through the process of Anumana. Whereas a Dhvanivadin regards facts and imaginative moods, as capable of being signified through both Abhidha and Vyanjana, Mahimabhatta considers them as both Vaya and Anumeya, and while a Dhyaniyadin declares an emotional mood (Rasa) as being brought into comprehension solely through Vyanjana, Mahimabhatta thinks it as a unit, brought into light through the process of Anumana, alone. In sharp contrast to the import of a term, that does not admit of division into fragments. the meaning of a sentence admits of division into two parts.—the subject-portion and the predicate-portion. In cases of some sentences, the predicate being an established entity does not stand in need of being proved beyond dispute with the help of justifying reasons: in cases of others in which the predicate is not an established entity, it has got to be proved with convincing arguments, In the first type of these two categories of propositions, a bare statement of fact is made, while in the second type, the subject and the predicate stand in the relation of premises and conclusion, the knowledge of the former leading to comprehension of the latter, with which it is associated inseparably. The poetic expression: 'astyuttarasyam diśi devatātmā himālayo nāma nagādhirājah' meaning: 'to our north exists the Himalayas, the foremost of the mountains, ensouled by diety' furnishes an illustration of the first type of proposition, consists as it does of a statement of fact. The verse:

'Kayasi kamin sarasaparadhah

Pādānatah kopanayāvadhūtah /

Yasyāh karişyāmi dṛḍānutāpam

Pravālašayyāšaraņam šarīram //

meaning: 'O passionate one, by which lady, you, fallen at her

feet after perpetration of a fresh offence have been despised; tell me, which remorseful lady will have to be confined to bed of tender leaves?' affords an example of the second type of proposition, because the relation of cause and effect is traceable between perpetration of an offence and propitiation, as also between irritable temper and repudiation, and this relation is nothing other than that, existing between a probans and a probandum. This connexion existing between the premises and the conclusion of a syllogism, as is noticed between the different portions of a meaning conveyed by a sentence, Mahimabhatta maintains, is capable of being clearly stated through words as also of being known through implication: in the first case it is called  $S\bar{a}bda$ , in the second it is named  $\bar{A}rtha$ . The poetry:

'Sara-yāmetasyāmudaravalivīcīvilulitam

yathā lāvanyāmbho jaghanapulinollanghanaparam /

Yathā lakṣyaścāyam calanayanamīnavyatikara-

stathā manye magnah prakaṭakucakumbhasmaragajaḥ // meaning: 'As the waters of grace, tossed by waves in the shape of folds, appearing in the belly of this lake are about to overflood the banks of thighs, and as fishes in the shape of moving eyes are noticed, it seems, the elephant in the form of cupid, with its temples of breasts visible has entered it (the lake)' constitutes an example of śābda-sādhya-sādhana-bhāva, because the relation of reason and conclusion, as exists between the imports of the two clauses, presented in the first three feet on the one hand and the idea of the last foot on the other is clearly stated by use of such words as 'yathā.....tathā.' The poetry:

'Divam yadi prārthayase vṛthā śramah pituh pradeśāstava devabhūmavah /

athopayantāramalam samādhinā na ratnamanvisv. ti

mrgyate hi tat //

meaning: 'If you hanker after heaven, fruitless is this toil: your father's regions are the abodes of Gods; if you are eager for union with a groom, useless in this practice of penance: a gem does not search after suitors; it, on the other hand, is found out' furnishes an example of  $\bar{a}rtha-s\bar{a}dhya-s\bar{a}dhana-bh\bar{a}va$ , because the relation of middle and minor terms, as existing

between the imports of the second and the first propositions, and the meanings of the fourth and the third propositions though not clearly expressed through words is gathered through implication. The relation existing between the middle and minor terms of a syllogism, that is traced between different portions of an expressed meaning of a sentence is also found to reside between the primary import of a proposition and the meaning inferred from it; in such cases the knowledge of the primary meaning leads to comprehension of the inferred, as does smoke to existence of fire. In the verse:

'Suvarņapuspām pṛthivīm cinvanti purusāstrayah / Śūraśca kṛtavidyaśca yaśca jānāti sevitum //

meaning: 'A brave, a learned and one who knows how to serve,—these three persons only pluck the golden flowers of this earth', the knowledge of the expressed meaning leads to cognition of the fact that prosperity is under the grip of brave, learned and servant, because the connection, linking the two ideas is the relation existing between a probans and a probandum. Not only is an unexpressed idea inferred from an expressed; it is inferred also from an idea, inferred from a primary meaning. The verse:

'Evam vādini devarsau pāršve pituradhomukhī / Līlākamalapatrāni ganayāmāsa pārvatī //

meaning: 'As the divine sage said this, Pārvatī, standing by the side of her father, with her face bent down began to count the petals of her pleasure-lotus' furnishes an illustration of emergence of an unexpressed content, inferred from an idea, deduced through inference from the expressed sense. Here at the first instance, bending down of the face of Pārvatī and counting of lotus-petals by her point out respectively to bashfulness and attempts on her part to conceal her real feelings, with which they stand in the relation of middle and minor terms of a syllogism: subsequently, these ideas deduced through inference point out to the dawning of love for Śiva in the mind of Pārvatī, with which they are connected in the same way as a Probans is with a Probandum.

It is clear that in the process of inference, the cognition

of the premises leads to a knowledge of the conclusion, and as such the sequence existing between apprehension of Probans and comprehension of Probandum is easily perceptible. Mahimabhatta thinks that, this sequence is clearly traceable in case of inference of facts and imaginative moods, but is imperceptible in case of inference of emotional moods, and this imperceptibility of succession is responsible for production of a false notion that the apprehension of the conclusion occurs simultaneously with that of the premises. This false notion, Mahimabhatta considers, leads the Dhvanivadin to posit the relation of suggestor and suggested (vyangyavuaniak i-bhava) between the expressed excitants, ensuents and accessories, on the one hand and the unexpressed emotional mood on the other, on the basis of Ghata-pradipa-nyāya. Thus vyan ya-vyan jaka-bhava itself, being the product of an erroneous knowledge, vyangyartha is a myth, and so is the designation dhvani added to Vastu, Alamkara and Rasa. The expression 'Rasadhvani' used to denote an inferred emotional mood is not to be taken literally, inasmuch as, no mood can be brought into light through suggestion,-a function that does not exist at all. Mahimabhatta thinks that, the abovequoted expression, found in the work of the learned Dhyanikara is used figuratively only in order to bring home the ability of the emotional mood to produce refined pleasure in the hearts of connoisseurs of Poetic Art, and the charm, consequential upon it. Direct presentation of facts is not so much appealing as their presentation in a veiled and round-about way: a portrait, a portion of which is covered in fun, when shown subsequently pleases the mind more, and so does gradual presentation of a hidden character or incident of a play on stage, which by arousing curiosity of the spectator attracts him more and more. In a similar fashion, a meaning, when expressed directly through the function of denotation does not produce so much pleasure in the minds of appreciators, as it does when presented by modulation of voice or comprehended through the process of inference. This characteristic feature of meanings is ingrained in them, and so does not

require any proof. Even the Dhvanivadin prefers indirect mode of presentation of meanings to direct way of presentation. Thus Mahimabhaṭṭa maintains, an emotional mood, when comprehended through the process of inference produces exquisite charm, and in order to give an idea of charm of this mood, the expression 'Rasadhvani' is used figuratively to signify it.'

A Dhyanivadin regards a Rasadhvani as one of imperceptible process and a Vastudhvani and an Alamkaradhvani as Dhvani of perceptible process: as in the case of manifestation of unexpressed fact and imaginative mood, the sequence existing between apprehension of the expressed and comprehension of the unexpressed is clearly traced, there is no reason to deny the relation of probans and probandum between the two,-the expressed being the Salhana, and the unexpressed Sadhya. Thus as an unexpressed fact and an imaginative mood are capable of being known through inference, there is absolutely no reason to regard them as suggested entitites. And this procedure is followed in case of understanding of the primary meaning of a proposition, the different portions of which stand in the relation of premises and conclusion: the unestablished predicate-portion of a proposition, the different parts of which remain connected through the connexion of Artha-sadhya-sadhana-bhava is regarded as an inferred unit, and not a suggested one. The objection that the theory of Dhvani, as adumbrated by the learned Dhvanikāra is based on the theory of Sphota of the Vaiyakarana, according to which the momentary sounds, that are pronounced by our speech-organs and are called Dhvanis bring into light through suggestion the eternal sound-essence called Sphota, and that, as the function of suggestion is incapable of being denied in the field of Vyakarana, it is proper to recognise it in the field of Alamkara, also, -has no force whatsoever, because the manifestation of Sphota itself through the function of suggestion is open to controversy. Mahimabhatta challenges the proposition that the relation of suggestor and suggested exists between Dhvani and Sphota, and that the former brings into light the

eternal Sphota through suggestion; he thinks that, because a knowledge of Dhvani produces a knowledge of Sphota, which, in its turn generates a cognition of meaning, the existence of the relation of cause and effect necessitating presence of sequence between the two is to be postulated between them, and consequently the designation 'Dhvani' applied to a specimen of Poetry on the model of the Vaiyākaraṇa's Theory of Sphoṭa, based on the relation of suggestor and suggested as existing between the expressed and the unexpressed is too weak to stand upon its legs. It is improper to regard Dhvani as Vyañjaka of Sphoṭa, because as the relation of cause and effect exists between knowledge of Dhvani and that of Sphoṭa, the simultaneous appearance of two comprehensions is incapable of being asserted. 10

To the proposition that a sequence exists between apprehension of the expressed meaning, comprised of the excitants, ensuants and accessories of a permanent mood and comprehension of Rasa, a Dhvanivadin replies by pointing out that, realisation of Rasa arises simultaneously with the cognition of excitants, ensuants and accessories and in between the two cognitions no such process as recollection of the relation of universal concomitance interposes itself, and as such, Rasa is correctly regarded as a vyangya unit. The concept of vyangya-vyangaka-bhava, developed on the parallelism of Ghața-Pradīpa-Nyāya recognises simultaneous manifestation of the indicator and the indicated; when a lamp is lighted, it is seen simultaneously with other objects, such as jar and the like, there being no sequence between cognition of the lamp and realisation of other objects: and in a similar manner a suggested Rasa is comprehended simultaneously with the cognition of the Vibhavas, Anubhavas and Vyabhicaribhavas. The analogy of Ghati-Pradipa-Nyāya, a Dhvanivādin contends, brings into light, further, another characteristic feature of vyangya-vyunjaka-hhava; when the jar is known, the knowledge of the lamp persists; and similarly when the vyangyartha is comprehended, the cognition of vyanjaka lingers. In his attempt to refute this contention of a Dhyanivadin, Mahima-

bhatta refers only to the observations of the learned Dhyanikara and asserts that those remarks are competent enough to establish his own proposition that, as the comprehension of Rasa arises simultaneously with the apprehension of the Vibhavas and the like, the postulation of the relation of suggestor and suggested, as effecting connexion between the two is incorrect, and consequently, Rasa is incapable of being regarded as a vyangya unit; the term 'vyanyya' or 'dhvani' however is used to denote it figuratively. The learned Dhvanikara, himself, recognises the apprehension of vacyartha as a cause leading to comprehension of vyangyartha, the effect, and maintains that as a sequence definitely exists between cognition of a cause and that of its effect, in the present case, also, it exists between understanding of the expressed and knowledge of the unexpressed. 11 Thus as the relation of cause and effect qua that of middle and minor terms of a syllogism exists between knowledge of the expressed and comprehension of the unexpressed, it is possible to comprehend Dhvani under the process of inference; the question of comprehending Anumana under the domain of Dhvani does not arise, because the scope of the former is much more wide than that of the latter: the operation of the process of Anumana is traced even in those specimens of poetic creations that are regarded as Kāvya of Gunībhūtavyangya variety or illustrations of such figures as Paryayokta, Samasokti and the like,specimens that are not considered as illustrations of Dhvani in any way.12 And because in poetic creations expressions are used by poets or speakers in order that others may grasp the intended idea through inference, this Dhvani is Anumana of Parartna type. The argument that Purarthanumana being formal in type, the statement of illustration, that leads the knower o accept beyond dispute co-existence between Sadhya and Sadhana, a factor, that is essential for validity of a syllogism is absolutely necessary in it, and as in a Dhvani Kavya no mention of illustration is found, it is not a case of Pararthanumana -does not hold good, because statement of such an illustration is not an imperative necessity in a syllogism in which the

 $S\overline{a}dhana$  is strong enough to point out undisputedly to the  $S\overline{a}dhya$ ; the logicians, themselves, hold that mention of an illustration, that forms a component member of a five-membered syllogistic reasoning proves only helpful to the immature intellect of a man. <sup>13</sup>

Mahimabhatta maintains that, the Rasa is really an inferred entity, and when a Dhvanivadin uses the term 'dhvani' to signify it, he does it figuratively, only in order to bring home the charm of the inferred emotional mood,—the capacity of the feeling to generate impersonal pleasure in the mind of appreciators. To this an objection is raised that, the inference of feelings, belonging to one by other does not produce pleasure in his mind in all cases in the outside world, and so this inference is not likely to generate supreme bliss in the minds of appreciators, irrespective of the nature of feeling depicted in the realm of poetry, also, because the causes that lead to such inference in poetry and drama are not substantially different from those that lead to it in outside world; and this being the case, the gurative use of the expression 'Rasadhvani' is unjustified. As ag inst this objection Mahimabhatta uses his own polemics, and asserts that, neither the excitants, ensuents and accessories are exactly identical with causes, effects and attendant causes of ordinary world, nor is the mood that is raised to the status of Rasa equivalent to feeling of ordinary world. The causes, effects and attendant transient feelings, when described in poetry are converted into alaukika Vibhavas, Anubhavas and Vyabhicaribhavas. Inference of feelings caused by knowledge of laukika karana and karya produces earthly pleasure or pain or hatred, as the case may be, but inference of moods, caused by knowledge of alaukika Vibhavas. Anubhavas and Vyabhicaribhavas unfailingly generates transcendental pleasure; this happens due to inherent nature of these factors, as found in the realm of Poetry, and as such it is neither proper nor judicious to question it. Mahimabhatta maintains that laukika causes and alaukika Vibhavas differ in point of both form and field: a hetu of a feeling of the external world is real, a Vibhava of the realm of poetry is artificial;

a hetu operates in the external world, a Vibhava moves in the world of Poetry alone: and as such, the two are incapable of being regarded as identical in nature. The inferred mood, in its turn, too, is distinct from similar inferred feeling of ordinary world, because while the latter is real, the former is artificial, inasmuch as, the mood inferred by the spectator at the time of witnessing of a theatrical performance, as belonging to the actor, seen on the stage is unreal. Poetry affords, as it does, an opportunity to know through the process of inference unreal emotional moods from presentation of artificial Vibhavas, Anubhavas and Vyabhicaribhavas causes supreme bliss in the minds of appreciators. In replying to the objection as to how is it possible for knowledge of non-existent unreal moods, which is erroneous in character to generate transcendental pleasure in the minds of appreciators, Mahimabhatta refers merely to the observation of the ancients, according to which even wrong notion turns to serve fruitful purpose under some circumstances, being a means of knowing the real. A man taking lustre of a gem to be the gem itself and accordingly striving to attain it meets on a common platform with a man taking the glow of light as a gem and thereafter running to have it, so far as wrong notion is concerned; but whereas the efforts of the first man are crowned with success, those of the second end in vain. 13

The unreality of the inferred emotional mood does not in any case stand in its way of generating supreme bliss in the minds of appreciators: what pleases the connoisseurs of Poetic Art is comprehension of emotional mood,—the question of determination of reality or unreality of the mood itself having no place in appreciation of Poetical works. In external word real and existent feelings are inferred from real causes and effects, and consequently, inference of feelings in ordinary world differs from that of moods in the realm of Poetry: the former generates pleasure, pain or hatred, as the case may be,—the latter produces nothing but supreme bliss. Thus Mahimabhaṭṭa concludes, Rasa is capable of being regarded figuratively as a vyangya artha. 14

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In the view of Mahimabhatta the unexpressed content of Poetry can never be rightly regarded as a suggested unit, because the relation of suggestor and suggested is not competent to effect a connection between the expressed and the unexpressed. And this is so, because it is not possible to treat manifestation of the unexpressed as suggestion (Abhivyakti) in the technical sense of the term. Abhivyakti, Mahimabhatta says, consists in manifestation of an existent or a non-existent entity by an indicator, which reveals its own self as well, -an indicator, that does not stand in need of recollecting its relations. with the indicated. This Abhivyakti of an existent entity, he continues, is three-fold in nature. In some cases it refers to production of an object in the sense that an effect lying in a latent form within the cause is perceived first by a sense-organ; in other cases it signifies the sense of manifestation of a produced object, whose visibility is obstructed somehow, along with the manifestation of its illuminator, and in others it refers to awakening of an impression deposited by an object experienced previously by another thing with which the first object bears the relation of co-existence. Abhivyakti of the first type is explained in conformity to the view of the upholders of the Samkhya system of Philosophy, according to which an effect, resides in a latent form in its cause and what is production in ordinary sense is nothing but its manifestation in a different form. Abhivyakti of the second type is illustrated by revelation of a jar by a lamp, which produces simultaneously with knowledge of its own self cognition of the jar: appearance of knowledge concerning both the indicator and the indicated at the same time constitutes the essence of this type of Abhivyakti. Abhivyakti of the third type is illustrated by awakening of an impression left by fire through a sight of smoke, which bears the relation of universal concomitance with the said fire. This is further exemplified by revelation of the original caused by a knowledge of its imitation, as also by manifestation of a concept, caused by cognition of its significant word-unit. Manifestation of a non-existent entity is of one type only: an illustration to this is to be found in the appear-

ance of a rain-bow in the rays of the Sun, passing through water-sprays. Now as the unexpressed content of Poetry is not a non-existent entity, having appearance only, its manifestation can not be explained as parallel to the manifestation of rain-bow. The revelation of the unexpressed content is also incapable of being explained as Abhivyakti of the first and second types, because neither the implicit idea residing in a latent form in the explicit one is perceived by a sense-organ, nor is it experienced simultaneously with the understanding of the expressed meaning, inasmuch as, the learned Dhyanikara himself, Mahimabhatta points out, recognises the existence of a sequence between apprehension of the expressed and comprehension of the unexpressed. The third type of Abhivyakti is identical with Anumana in all respects, and as such, the postulation of a separate process known as Abhivyakti is unnecessary and unwarranted. The much-talked of instrument of cognition Upamana, in which knowledge of one object leads to that of another, bearing similarity to it is nothing different from Anumana, because the operation of the process of analogy, also, demands the presence of such conditions as Vyāpti and Parāmarśa, -factors that constitute the essence of Anumana. Thus it is evident that Anumana having a wider scope comprehends Abhivyakti and Upamana alike, and just as the separate existence of Upamana cannot be posited, similarly, that of Abhivyakti, too, cannot be asserted. In this way it is possible to show that Anumana comprehends Smrti also. The third type of Abhivyakti, which is but a different name of Anumana, demanding as it does the relation of universal concomitance between Sadhya and Sadhana, Mahimabhatta continues, is traced in the manifestation of the unexpressed content of Poetry, caused by a knowledge of the expressed content, which bears a relation of inseparable association with it. This is testified to by the fact that, while persons not initiated into the mystries of this relation do not grasp it, men who are aware of this inseparable association do comprehend it. The proposition of the Dhvanivadin, based on the analogy of Ghata-Pradipa-Nyaya, which demands occurrence of comprehension of

the expressed and unexpressed in Potery at the same time is untenable, because the apprehension of the expressed being the cause of comprehension of the unexpressed, the two understandings are bound to happen in succession. Thus as it is not possible for an expressed idea to bring into light through suggestion the implicit sense of Poetry, the definition of *Dhvani*, which takes for granted without question the above concept is vitiated by the defect of absurdity.<sup>15</sup>

After explaining the nature of Abhivyakti in details and showing that a suggested sense is nothing but an inferred idea, Mahimabhatta turns to the meaning which suggests and observes that, this also is nothing different from a Probans. A thing that suggests, he remarks, assumes either the form of an Upālhi or the shape of a distinct object. An Upādhi that manifests others is often self-luminous in character, i.e. to say, it manifests others, and at the same time for its own manifestation no other illuminator is necessary. Knowledge, word and lamp reveal others in this way. Knowledge itself being an attribute of the knowable manifests that and in a similar manner word itself which constitutes a portion of its connotation becomes an attribute of the thing signified by it and subsequently manifests it: a lamp is called Upadhi in the sense that it tinges the jar and such other objects with its colour or in other words, ascribes to them the quality of manifestedness. Of these three entities that reveal others, the first and the third—the knowledge and the lamp—are not definitely regarded as V, unita units in a Dhvani Kavya because this assertion renders things perceived by sense-organs specimens of Poetry: nor is the second entity—the word considered a Vyanjaka, because this assumption renders primary meanings illustrations of best specimens of Poetry. Thus as attributes or adjuncts are incapable of being treated as Vyanjaka units in a Dhvani Kavya, what we are left with is that a distinct object reveals another, without changing or qualifying or colouring it in any way; and this distinct object is nothing other than a Probans: in a Dhvani Kavya the explicit brings into light the implicit, without attributing a new quality to it. The above discussion shows, Mahimabhaṭṭa concludes that, neither Abhivyakti occurs of the unexpressed content of Poetry, nor is the expressed meaning its Vyañjaka: what actually happens is Anumāna of the implicit idea and the explicit, which brings this into light is really a linja or hetu. 16

The objection that comprehension of Rasa occurs simultaneously with apprehension of Vibhava, Anubhava and Vyabhicaribhava, and as such, the second type of Abhivyakti is capable of being asserted in case of Rasa does not help a Dhvanivadin in any way, because, as Mahimabhatta points out, the learned Dhvanikara himself accepts the existence of sequence between the cognition of the Vibhavas and the comprehension of Rasa. The point that from the definition of Abhivyakti, the clause, stating simultaneous manifestation of the indicator and the indicated is to be deleted and what actually happens in a Dhvani Kavya is that apprehension of the explicit produces subsequently comprehension of the implicit helps an Anumanavalin more, because in Anumana, also, knowledge of Probans leads subsequently to knowledge of Probandum. The solution that, Abhivyakti occurs of a non-existent entity as Rasa, alone, and Anumana, consisting as it does in knowledge of an existent thing does not comprehend Dhvani-lands a Dhvanivadin into further troubles, because it makes the definition of Abhivyakti inapplicable to Ghata-Pradīpa-Nyāya,—an analogy on which the whole Theory of Dhyani is based. The point that from the definition of Abhivyakti, the clause stating manifestation of a non-existent is to be deleted is unacceptable, because leaving the revelation of a non-existent rainbow out of the purview of Abhivyakti it renders the definition vitiated by the fallacy of too narrow definition. The solution that, in the said definition mention should be made neither of an existent nor of a non-existent entity, offered to obviate the above difficulty makes the case of an Anumanavadin stronger, because, as Mahimabhatta points out, the definition, thus enunciated becomes that of Anumana.17

According to the Dhvanivādin in a Dhvani Kāvya, word rendering its primary meaning subservient and meaning, which he explains as expressed meaning rendering its own self sub-

servient bring into light through suggestion the implicit idea of Poetry. Mahimabhatta challenges this proposition that, in a Dhvanikāvya an expressed meaning alone manifests the unexpressed content, and asserts that express mention of expressed meaning in the definition of Dhvani vitiates it by the fallacy of too narrow definition, inasmuch as, it makes impossible attainment of the covetable status of Dhvani by the verse: 'Evam vādini Devarsau pāršve pituradhomukhī/ Līlākamalapatrāni ganayāmāsa Pārvatī', in which the implicit idea of love for Lord Siva of Parvatī is brought into light not by the primary sense, but by the meaning of bashfulness, inferred from that explicit idea. The argument that by the term 'artha', used in the definition of Dhvani, a Dhvanivadin means both an explicit and implicit idea and specimens of Poetic creation in which the unexpressed content of paramount importance is brought into comprehension by expressed and inferred meanings constitute illustrations of Dhvani is untenable, because, firstly, in the Vrtti on this definition, the learned Dhyanikara himself explains the term 'artha' as referring to 'va:ya artha' only, and secondly, mention of vyangyartha in the subsequent portion of the definition makes it clear that what actually is meant by 'artha' is the primary meaning only, and not primary and inferred both. Moreover, this argument renders many poetic creations of second rate, in which the cognition of an inferred fact follows apprehension of one or two implied facts, manifested by expressed meaning cases of Dhvanikavya, and thereby vitiates the definition by the fallacy of too wide definition. The Verse:

'Sihipicchakannaura vahua vahassa gavviri bhamai/

Muttāhadaraiapasāhanānā majjhe savattīņam//

meaning: 'The wife of the fowler, holding peacock-plumage in her ears is moving with pride in the midst of her co-wives, decorated with pearls' forms an illustration of this type of Poetry. Here the expressed meaning leads to knowledge of this idea that, while the fowler, being not attached to his other wives go deep into the forest and kill elephants when he remains in their company, he, being eager to enjoy the company of this girl does not move much but bags such games,

as are available near at hand, and this inferred idea, in its turn. leads to cognition of good luck of the girl, along with misfortune of her co-wives. Mahimabhatta argues that, the contention that in a Dhvanikāvya both expressed and inferred meanings are capable of giving rise to comprehension of implicit idea gives to this verse the status of Dhvani, which it does not actually deserve. The point that absence of recognition granted to the verse under consideration is likely to bring the verse: 'Evam vadini' etc. also out of the purview of Dhvani is untenable. because the cases of the two stanzas are entirely different from each other. It is a fact that in both these stanzas an apprehension of an inferred meaning interposes itself between the cognition of the expressed meaning and comprehension of the so-called implied idea, but while in the case of the verse: 'Sihipiccha' etc. the intervening factor is a Vastu, in the case of the verse: 'Evam vadini' this factor is a Vyabhicaribhava. The nature of these two intervening factors are entirely different from each other: the first is absolutely distinct from the subsequent inferred idea, as is smoke from fire, but the second namely bashfulness is not entirely separate from the inferred idea of love, inasmuch as, the two move hand in hand, the one sharing the beauty of the other. The intervening agent, being absolutely distinct from the final inferred idea, the first verse is unattractive, while the second one in which this agent is not totally separate from the final unexpressed content is endowed with supreme charm. Thus Mahimabhatta maintains, it is wrong to regard the two stanzas as similar cases, and to deny the status of Dhvani to the verse: 'Evam vadini' etc. A similar illustration is afforded by the verse:

> Lāvaṇyakāntiparipūritadinmukhe'smin Smere'dhunā tava mukhe taralāyatākṣi/ Kṣobhaṃ yadeti na manāgapi tena manye Suvyaktameva jalarāśirayaṃ payodhih//,

in which cognition of the sense of total identity of moon and the face is intervened by apprehension of the relation of substratum of superimposition and the thing superimposed (Rūpya-rūpaka-bhāva), existing between face and orb of the

moon. Here, Mahimabhatta thinks, the understanding of the expressed content leads to cognition of the said  $R\overline{u}pya-r\overline{u}paka-bh\overline{a}va$ , which, in its turn, leads to apprehension of the idea of total identity,—an idea, whose manifestation alone is competent to acquire for the verse the covetable appellation 'Dhvani'; the intervention caused by an  $Alamk\overline{a}ra$  does not stand in the way of this verse being regarded as a specimen of Dhvani, because an  $Alamk\overline{a}ra$ , unable as it is to reside without an  $Alamk\overline{a}rya$  is not totally distinct from that in the same way as a  $Vyabhic\overline{a}ribh\overline{a}va$  is not absolutely separate from a  $Sth\overline{a}yibh\overline{a}va$ .

These considerations lead to the inevitable conclusion that. while the verses: 'Evam vadini' etc. and 'Lavanyakantiparipuritadinmukhe'smin' are capable of being regarded as specimens of Dhvani, the stanza 'Sihipicchakannaura' is incompetent to receive this recognition. Thus as the point that 'artha' in the definition refers to vacya artha only vitiates the definition by the fallacy of too narrow definition, similarly the explanation that the term refers to both expressed and inferred meanings, also, renders it vitiated by the fallacy of too wide definition.18 Mahimabhatta points out that in one place only the learned Dhvanikara uses the term 'artha' to convey the idea of both expressed and unexpressed contents but there, too, he commits a blunder by describing both these meanings as forming the soul of Poetry. This observation is contradictory to his own assertion that, the suggested sense alone constitutes the essence of poetic creations.

After finding fault with all the possible explanations of the term 'artha', used in the theory of Dhvani, Mahimabhaṭṭa proceeds to criticise the use of the indeclinable 'vā' in the definition. This indeclinable is capable of signifying either the sense of option or that of aggregate. The acceptance of the first alternative leads to the conclusion that, in a Dhvanikāvya either the word-element or the sense-element brings into light the unexpressed content of Poetry. Now as words are endowed with no function other than that of denotation, it is not possible for them to suggest implicit ideas, and naturally, the indeclinable

is not significant of option. The question of choice arises only when more than one objects are present: as in a Dhvanikavya only the sense-element, and not the word-element is competent to suggest, so the question of extending choice does not arise. Moreover the explanation that the indeclinable ' $v\bar{a}$ ' signifies option renders justification of the use of the dual number in the verb 'vyanktah' impossible: in all such expressions as: 'Sirah śva kako va drupadatanaya va parimrśet' in which option is granted between two or more things, the verb is always put in the singular number, and never in dual or plural. The acceptance of the second alternative brings out this characteristic, that in a Dhvanikavya the sound and the sense-elements cenjointly suggest an implicit idea. This explanation fails to bring under the scope of Dhvanikavya those specimens of poetic creations, in which the implicit idea is brought into light severally by sound or sense, and thus vitiates the entire definition by the fallacy of too narrow definition. Moreover this explanation makes unnecessary the use of the epithet 'upasarjanīkrtārtha' as an adjective to śabda, because the assertion that in a Dhvanikavya the explicit idea renders itself subordirate to the implicit one, alone, is able to convey this intended sense, In fact for this reason, the learned Dhvanikara does not mention Abhidha, in the definition of Dhvani: he thinks that the clause, signifying the subordination of the expressed meaning to the suggested one is quite competent to bring out the idea of subservience of Abhidha, also, in a Dhvanikavya. Thus, with irrefutable logic Mahimabhatta proves that, the indeclinable 'va', used in the Theory of Dhvani neither conveys the idea of option nor that of aggregate. Abhinavagupta attempts to justify the use of this indeclinable as also that of the dual number in 'vyanktah' by saying that, in the matter of suggestion words and meanings both have their roles to play, though of course, in some cases the word-element is of more importance than the sense-element and in others the case is just the reverse: he points out that, the dual number in the verb conveys the idea that the sound and sense-elements conjointly suggest an implicit idea and the indeclinable 'va' refers to option

This statement, Mahimabhatta argues, is wrong; it is not possible for word and meaning to act conjointly and bring into comprehension the unexpressed content, because these elements are not apprehended simultaneously,—the knowledge of the word arising first and the cognition of the meaning following it. This argument, coupled with those advanced above goes to establish beyond doubt the futulity of Abhinavagugta's attempt.

Another minor defect in the Theory of Dhvani, adumbrated by the learned Dhyanikara is the use of the masculine gender in the term 'tam', denotative of the unexpressed content of Poetry. The pronoun tat refers to a contextual thing: as in the preceding Karika the suggested element is described, this pronoun stands for that element; but because the suggested idea is referred to by a word in neuter gender in the Karikas: 'Pratīyamānam punaranyadeva' etc. and 'Sarasvatī svādu tadarthavastu' etc., it is proper to refer it here also by a word in the neuter gender. To obviate this difficulty Mahimabhatta suggests modification either in the two preceding Karikas, which should read as: 'Pratīyamānah punaranya eva so'rtho'sti vanīsu mahākavīnam yo 'sau.... etc.' and 'Sarasvatī svadutamam tamartham.....etc.' respectively or in the body of the definition itself, which should read as: 'Yatrarthah sabdo va vastu tat' etc. Of these two courses he prefers the first one.

Continuing his criticism of the Theory of Dhvani, Mahimabhaṭṭa points out to the impropriety of the use of the word 'Viśeṣa', which the Dhvanivādin, according to whom Dhvani is the name given to a species of poetic creation explains as conveying the sense of type. Mahimabhaṭṭa thinks that, Poetry does not admit of classification into types and subtypes, inasmuch as, each and every poetic creation is marked by manifestation of Rasa. The learned Dhvanikāra himself recognises Rāsa as constituting the essence of all poetry, beginning from the Rāmāyaṇa to the latest productions, and emphatically asserts that, no speciman of poetic art can do without this charming element. Thus as all poetry constitutes case of Rasadhvani, the use of the word 'Viśeṣa', signifying the sense

of type is redundant and misleading. Mahimabhatta agrees with the Dhvanivadin in accepting the essentiality of Rasa in Kavya which is established in this way. Poetry is an extranormal description of Vibhavas, Anubhavas and Vyabhicaribhavas, that bring Rasa unfailingly into comprehension, made by a Poet, expert in drawing such description. From the point of form and mode of appreciation, Poetry is grouped under two heads: Abhineya and Anabhineya. The first is fit to be enacted on the stage, while the second admits of reading and recital only: the first exhibits excitants, ensuents and accessories on the stage, when the second merely draws their descriptions. The aim of both these groups of Poetry is delivery of counsel, comprised of injunctions in some cases and prohibitions in others, and in this respect a Poetry meets on a common platform with a Sastra: it asks man to imitate the conduct of some, and not to follow that of others. The difference, between Kayya and Sastra lies, however, in this that, while advice that is tendered by poetry is caught by men of tender intellect, that delivered by a Sastra is grasped by men of mature intellect, averse to the study of the Vedas and dullards. An bhineyakavya is meant for princes of such tender intellect, and Abhineyakavya is meant for dullards, averse to reading or hearing of Sravyakavya, but attached to music and dance. These persons, disincl ned to the study of Vedas and Sastras feel inclined to read poetry or witness a theatrical performance, because poetry attracts them by generating in their minds supreme bliss, springing from aesthetic realisation. Just as a patient is drawn to a pungent medicine by taste of sugar administered previously, similarly a man opposed to Vedic studies is attracted towards the pill of advice by a taste of bliss, springing from relish of Rasa. A specimen of poetic creation that does not afford relish of Rusa fails to draw readers or spectators towards it: they do not derive any lesson whatsoever from such poetry and naturally its very purpose is defeated. This discussion. Mahimabhatta asserts, goes to establish the essentiality of Rasa in Kavya, and as all poetry presents Rasa, the question of a particular type of Poetry delineating it does not arise.

The argument that Poetry is capable of being classified into numerous types according to the principle of great merit or inferiority of the Rasa delineated and a species of Poetry in which excellence of Rasa manifests itself is Poetry of the best type does not hold good, because excellence or inferiority is not likely to be asserted of Rasa, which is a peculiar blissful condition of the ego, in which knowledge of other knowables is completely obliterated Nor is it correct to say that, a Poetry, depicting a particular emotion is Poetry of the best type, because such proposal renders the definition of Dhvani vitiated by the fallacy of too narrow definition by bringing specimens of Poetry, delineating other emotions out of the purview of Dhvanikāvya. It is equally wrong to mantain that, a combination of sound and sense, ornamented by the elements known as Gunas and Alamkaras forms Foetry of the best type, because a specimen of poetic creation, though beautified by Gunas and Alamkāras, but bereft of Rasa is not regarded as Kāvya at all. The opponents might meet the objection of the Anumanavadin by pointing out that, though the concept of superiority or inferiority does not arise in case of Rasa, the superiority or inferiority of fact and imaginative mood, that terminate ultimately in the suggestion of Rasa is shifted to Rasa itself, and taking this transmuted merit or demerit into consideration, Poetry is regarded as one of superior or inferior type. As against this. Mahimabhatta replies that, the facts (vastu) and imaginative moods (Alemkāra), whose manifestation terminates ultimately in the suggestion of Rasa are regarded as causes leading to its comprehension: the excellence of cause does not produce a similar excellence in effect; and naturally the superiority or inferiority of Vastu and Alamkara is not competent to infuse merit or demerit into Rasa. A similar instance is found in the case of physical structure of cows of different colour and size, the difference of which is unable to produce any change in the universal element of cowness, manifested by that structure. The argument that superiority of Vastu and Alumkara produces superiority of Rasa, whose delineation entitles a piece of poetic creation to receive the appellation 'Dhvani' lands a Dhvani-

vadin into further croubles, because on the one hand, it denies the status of Dhvani to poetry, not marked by manifestation of Vastu and Alum'iara but characterised by emergence of Rusa alone, and on the other hand, extends it to riddles even, presenting Vastu only through suggestion and thereby creating wonder. Equally untenable is the point that, the speciality of the Rasa in the shape of its subservience to Vastu and Alamkara renders a poetry one of special type, because in the view of the learned Dhvanikāra himself, in a Dhvanikāvya the suggested emotion manifests itself prominently and absorbs all our consciousness. Moreover, when Poetry, depicting emotion predominantly is found, the designation 'Dhvani' is to be added to this Poetry, only, in conformity to the dictum: 'Gaunamukhyayormukhye kāryasampratyayah', which states that, in the event of applicability of a rule to both primary and secondary cases, action enjoined by the rule operates in primary cases only and not in secondary ones. The epithet 'Kāvyaviśeṣa' applied to such poetic creations as the Meghaduta and the like is dependent neither on the excellence of Rasa nor on the delineation of a particular type of emotion nor on the superiority of Vyanjaka Vastu nor on the subservience of Rusa to Vastu or Alumkara: excellence of the expressed meaning is attributed here to Kavya and naturally the use of the term 'Kavyavišesa' is Aupacārika. In conformity to his view that, all poetry is Dhvanikavya and the genus dhvanitva is but a different name of the universality Poetryness, Mahimabhatta regards examples of such figures as Samāsokti and the like, that are considered as Poetry of the mediocre type by the Dhvanikāra as specimens of Dhvanikāvya; as all Poetry depicts Rasa without which a composition is not counted as Kavya at all, the unexpressed content of a Poetry, he says, presents itself either in the aspect of a fact or in the aspect of a figure. To a critic who wants to justify the use of the term 'Viśeşu' in the definition of Dhyani, Mahimabhatta puts the simple question: is the definition one of a special type of Poetry or is speciality of Poetry comprehended from its definition? If the first alternative is accepted and it is argued that, the definition, propounded by the Dhvanikara is one of a

special type of Poetry, then the use of the term Viśeṣa becomes superfluous, because what is a special type of Poetry of the Dhvanivādin is nothing but Poetry in general. If the second alternative is accepted and it is said that, speciality of the Poetry is comprehended from its definition, then also mention of the term becomes redundant, because the peculiar nature of the Poetry defined is brought into light by the special traits, incorporated in the definition. Thus Mahimabhaṭṭa shows that, the mention of the term 'Viśṣa' renders the definition vitiated by the defect known as Avācyavacana, that consists in express statement of one, that is not fit to be mentioned.

Similarly superfluous is the use of the word 'Suribhih' denotative of the sense of agency of the act of describing, presented by the term 'Kathitah'. The express mention of the subject may bring out either the idea of agents in general or that of a particular type of agents: to put it more clearly it may either be said that, Dhvani is described by men or it may be posited that, Dhvani is described by a particular section of men. The contention that Dhvani is described by scholars in general makes the express mention of agents superfluous, because the idea of agency is capable of being known through implication from the statement of action, with which it is associated inseparably. In a similar manner the proposition that, Dhvani is described by one section of scholars makes the use of the term 'Suribhih' redundant, because the fact that Dhvani is postulated by a certain section of critics is capable of being comprehended from the very attempt on their part to formulate a definition of Dhvani in clear cut terms.

Thus the defects that go to vitiate the definition of Dhvani,
Mahimbhaṭṭa sums up, are ten in number and are enumerated as
follows:

- (a) The mention of Artha, as qualified by the adjective 'Upasarjanīkṛtasva.'
- (b) The mention of Śabda, as qualified by the adjective 'Upas rjanīkṛtārtha.'
- (c) The mention of the adjective 'Upasarjanīkṛtasvārthau.'
- (d) The use of the pronoun tat in masculine gender.

- (e) The use of the dual number in the verb 'vyanktah'.
- (f) The use of the indeclinable  $v\bar{a}$ .
- (g) The assumption that Abhivyakti takes place of the unexpressed content of Poetry and that śabda and artha are vyanjaka units.
- (h) The mention of the term 'Dhvani', which being in no way different from  $K\overline{a}vya$  is needless.
- (i) The use of word 'Viś şi', which is superfluous.
- (j) The mention of the agent 'Sūribhih', which is redundant 19

The definition of Dhvani, free from the defects enumerated above. Mahimabhatta says, comes to this: A piece of poetic creation in which an expressed or an inferred meaning manifests a sense with which it bears the relation of universal concomitance is regarded as a case of  $K\bar{a}vy\bar{a}numiti$ . Mahimabhatta fully agrees with the learned Dhvanikāra in accepting the essentiality of Rasa in  $K\bar{a}vya$  and recognising it as the soul of poetic creation, but he differs from him in regarding Rasa as being comprehended through the process of  $Anum\bar{a}na$ , and not through the function of  $Vyanjan\bar{a}$ .

Mahimabhatta challenges the proposition that, words are endowed with more than one function, and asserts that the function of conveying the secondary sense or bringing into light the suggested content really belongs to the explicit idea. In cases where a number of powers co-inhere in the same substratum, they are found to act simultaneously and independent of one another and produce their respective results. An illustration is found in case of fire, that forms the common substratum of the power to illuminate and that to consume: the two powers act simultaneously and none is dependent for its operation on that of the other. The functions, that are supposed to belong to a word-unit, however, do not act simultaneously and independent of one another, inasmuch as, the functions of Laksanā and Vyanjanā always depend on Abhidha, whose operation precedes that of them without fail. This goes to show that, the secondary sense is not conveyed by a word-unit through the function of Laksona. What actually conveys it is the explicit idea and that too through the process of  $Amum\bar{a}na$ .

The critics who recognise the separate existence of Laksanā put forward the expressions: 'Gourvahikah', meaning 'the carrier is a bull' and 'Gangayam Ghosah', meaning 'A hamlet on the Ganges' as illustrations respectively of Gauni and Suddhā types of Laksanā; they say that, in the first expression, the term 'Gauh' signifies through Laksanā the sense of a man resembling a cow and in the second one, the word 'Gan'a' conveys through the same function the idea of the bank of the Ganges. Mahimabhatta thinks that, these two meanings are capable of being comprehended through the process of inference. He says that, in the first expression, the establishment of identity between a cow and a man, being opposed to our ordinary experience leads to a knowledge of similarity of the man concerned with a cow in some respects through Anumana: as no sane man speaks of physical identity of a man with a bull, the hearer, who knows the speaker to be a sane man, at once, realises through Anumana the similarity of the man with the bull in some respects, -similarity that leads the speaker to identify the two in that fashion. The purpose served by use of the term 'bull' to signify the man resembling the bull is to bring home the idea of bovine stupidity of the man concerned. Similarly in the second expression, the primary meanings of the two terms being incompatible with each other, the simple mention of the term 'Ganaa' shows that its identity is sought to be established with something, related to it, and this ultimately leads to knowledge of the bank of the Ganges through inference. The purpose served by use of the term 'Ganga' to signify the sense of Gan ateta is to bring home the idea of excess of coolness and purity as belonging to the bank. In the view of Mahimabhatta, the assertion of identity between two things, that are actually different leads in such cases to inferential knowledge of a relation existing between the two: it is not that superimposition of identity of one on another is caused by the relation of similarity alone: this is caused, as well, by such relations as that of proximity, that

of association, that of contradiction, that existing between a cause and an effect and the like. Mahimabhatta thinks that, the superimposition of identity of one on another leads unfailingly to the knowledge of existence of a relation between the two. because superimposition of identity is co-existent with such relations as that of similarity, proximity and the like. This co-existence is ascertained from expressions used in daily life even: it is seen that one having long neck is called a camel and one having a fat frame is named an elephant, and similarly children reclining on cradles are referred to as cradles themselves. In order that, Laksanā might not convey any and every sense, the Alamkarikas speak of three conditions necessary for its operation: these conditions, they say, are inapplicability of the primary meaning with the rest of the sentence, existence of some sort of connection between the primary and the secondary meanings and existence either of usage or of motive. Mahimabhatta argues that, the factors necessary for operation of Laksana are really the probans leading to inferential knowledge of the secondary sense,—the probandum. In case of Gauni Laksana, the superimposition of identity between two distinct objects leads to comprehension of similarity existing between them and in cases of Suddha Laksana, similar superimposition prompts one to apprehend the relation of proximity or of cause and effect, as existing between them. Thus. according to Mahimabhatta, both the types of Laksana, postulated by the Alamkarikas are nothing but fields of inference.21

The Dhvanivadin regards indication as an extention of denotation, and points out that, as in certain expressions the primary meanings seem incompatible with the rest of the sentence, the word instead of conveying the primary sense signifies through an extended denotation the secondary meaning. Mahimabhaṭṭa challenges this proposition and asserts that neither does a word gives up its primary function of denotation nor does it convey a secondary sense through a function other than that of  $Abhidh\bar{a}$ : this secondary sense, he continues, is comprehended through the process of inference. To those critics who regard  $Lakṣaṇ\bar{a}$  as a case of transference of epithet,

consisting in use of a word to signify a sense other than the primary one Mahimabhatta points out that, this concept of Sabdāropa is wrong, and what actually is superimposed is the thing itself, and not the word denotative of it. The argument that, in case of Lakṣaṇā superimposition of both word and object occurs—is unacceptable, because the two types of superimposition are not of equal status,—the superimposition of one object on another that leads to superimposition of one word on another being the more important of the two: moreover, as the desired result is produced by mere superimposition of object, the presumption that, both objects and words are superimposed leads to complexity. Thus as words have no role to play in the matter of bringing into light the secondary sense, what brings this idea into comprehension is the meaning and that, too, through the process of inference.

Contrary to the view of the Dhvanivadin, who holds that neither Bhakti and Dhvani are identical, their forms being different, nor is the former a definition of the latter, the proposed definition being vitiated by the fallacies of too wide and too narrow definition, Mahimabhatta regards the two as identical in all respects, because, as he says, both Bhakti and Dhvani are nothing but forms of Anumana. This observation is in accordance to the principle that things that are equal to the same thing are equal to one another. Bhakti is not, as the Dhvanivadin thinks, based on the function of denotation: similarly Dhvani also is not based on the function of suggestion, because Abhivyakti of the unexpressed content does not take place simultaneously with the manifestation of the expressed, and the parallelism of Ghata-Pradīva-Nyāya, on which the whole theory of suggestion rests itself has slender legs to stand; both Bhakti and Dhvani, Mahimabhatta thinks, are based on the relation existing between a probans and a probandum, and as such the presence of the former agrees with that of the latter and the vice versa. He recognises the presence of Dhvani even in illustrations of Laksanā, based on Rūdhi. Mahimabhatta holds further that Bhakti is capable of being regarded as the definition of Dhvani.

The contention that in the expression: 'Suvarṇapuṣpāṃ pṛthivīṃ cinvanta puruṣāstrayaḥ / Śūraśca kṛtavidyaśca yaśca jānāti sevitum', Dhvani is present, but Bhakti is absent, and the absence of Bhakti not agreeing with the absence of Dhvani, the former cannot constitute a definition of the latter—is unsound, because Bhakti, that relates to both  $Pad\bar{a}rtha$  and  $V\bar{a}ky\bar{a}rtha$  is fully present there; even a Dhvanivādin admits the existence of  $Lakṣaṇ\bar{a}$  as belonging to a proposition, and not merely to a term. <sup>28</sup>

Mahimabhatta thinks that the function of Tatparya, also, is capable of being comprehended under the process of inference, and as such its postulation is unnecessary. Of the operation of Tatparya Sakti the stock illustration that is quoted is the expression: 'Visam bhaksaya mā cāsya grhe bhunkthāh', in which it is pointed out that, the idea that, taking of meal at this man's house is more dangerous than swallowing of poison is brought into light through this function. Mahimabhatta believes that in the expression, sudden request meted out to swallow poison coupled with a prohibition never to take meal at the house of a particular man leads one, cognisant of the speciality of the speaker, person spoken to and context to comprehend through inference the idea that taking of meal at this man's house is more dangerous than swallowing of poison. The point that the whole proposition conveys the idea through the function of Tatpurya is without any value, because first of all words are endowed with no function other than that of Abhidha, and secondly the idea referred to above is made known not by the word-element, but by the sense-element, namely the sudden request meted out to swallow poison, with which it is related in the same way as is a probandum to a probans. Thus as the sense conveyed by the Tatparya Śakti is capable of being arrived at through the process of Anumana, Mahimabhatta does not think it necessary to accept the existence of this function.24 Some scholars are in favour of investing the function of Abhidha with an extensive power: they argue that just as an arrow discharged by a strong person produces through the same velocity a number of actions, inasmuch as, it pierces

the armour of the enemy, cuts into his vital parts and kills him, similarly a word, used by a great poet brings into light all the ideas, beginning from the explicit to the implicit one, and all these through the same function of Abhidha In support of their view, they quote the dictum 'Yatparah Sabdah sa sabdarthah', and maintain that, in the matter of bringing the intended sense or the implicit idea into light, meaning has no role to play. In reply to this contention, Mahimabhatta points out that, a word is incapable of being regarded as the cause of apprehension of all meanings, appearing in succession on hearing of a particular term; a word produces the cognition of the primary meaning only, and this meaning, in its turn, leads to comprehension of another idea. The argument that, word, having remote connection with an idea, made known by its primary meaning is likely to be regarded as the cause of that idea is dangerous, because adoption of this logic renders a potter as much efficient cause of blossoming of flowers as the advent of spring itself, simply because of the fact that he happens to be a producer of the jar, with which the saplings in blossom are watered. Thus as words do not constitute the causes of comprehension of meanings, made known by their explicit ideas, these ideas, Mahimabhatta remarks, are to be regarded as causes leading to knowledge of new meanings, with which they stand in the relation of premises and conclusion. The action performed by an explicit idea cannot be described as that discharged by its denotative word, in the same way as an act done by a son cannot be taken as one performed by his father. The analogy of the arrow, put forward, Mahimabhatta continues, is not applicable in the present case; an arrow pierces the armour, cuts into the vital parts and performs other actions naturally and independent of others: a word, however, does not act independently, completely dependent on divine volition as it is: it signifies only that meaning that forms the object of divine volition. The proposition that words do act independently of divine volition and convey meanings other than those with respect to which convention is accepted is misleading, for it renders comprehension of the sense of horse from the term 'cow' likely <sup>25</sup> The above discussion clearly shows that the comprehension of a meaning other than the primary one is neither caused  $Abhidh\bar{a}$  by nor by  $T\bar{a}tparya$ ; in fact, word has nothing to do with signification of that sense, which is made known by the primary meaning alone through the process of inference.

In his eagerness to show that all poetic functions are nothing but forms of inference, Mahimabhatta turns to the concept of Vakrokti of Kuntaka and opines that, this also can be dispensed with, comprehended as it is under the process of Anumana. Vakrokti of Kuntaka is a turn given to a poetic expression by the imaginative faculty of the post, -a turn, that differentiates it from ordinary linguistic expression: he says that, it is this Vakrokti that constitutes the essence of poetic creation. To the scholars affiliated to the school of Vakrokti, Mahimabhatta puts this simple question; what do they actually mean by declaring Vakrokti as the soul of Poetry? Do they mean that appropriate combination of sound and sense invests a linguistic expression with the status of Poetry or do they mean that capacity to signify an implicit idea differentiates a poetic expression from an expression of daily life? Of these two alternatives. the acceptance of the first one renders separate assertion of Vakrokti as forming the very life of Poetry superfluous, because no poetic expression can afford to do without appropriate combination of sound and sense. The function of a poet is presentation of suitable Vibhavas, Anubhavas and Vyabhicaribhavas, competent to bring Rusa into comprehension: the slightest touch of the defect of impropriety is sufficiently able to render the excitants, ensuents and accessories ineffective in the matter of conducting the mood to a relishable state and so it goes without saying that appropriateness constitutes the very essence of Poetry. The acceptance of the second alternative, that is to say, the assertion that, the capacity to signify an implicit idea differentiates a poetic expression from an ordinary linguistic expression makes the position of the Vakroktivadin exactly identical with that of the Dhvanivadin. according to whom an unexpressed content forms the essence of Poetry. Mahimabhatta thinks that, by the term Vakrokti

the Vakroktivadin really means a round-about expression,a mode to express meanings in a way other than the normal one; that this is nothing other than Dhvani is corroborated by the fact that like the classification of Dhvani into Padaprakāśya,—that brought into light by a word-unit, Vakyaprakāśya,—that brought into light by a whole proposition and so on, Vakratā also is classified into Padavakrātā, Vākvavakratā, Pravandhavuktratā and so on. In conformity to his belief that a word is endowed with only one function named Abhidha, that brings the primary meaning alone into light and that, meanings other than the primary one are made known by the expressed sense, Mahimabhatta holds that Vakrokti, which is but a different name of implicit idea, and which is distinct from the expressed sense, as is evident from its classification into numerous types is made known by the primary meaning through the process of inference.26

The proposition that a word expresses meanings only and is not competent to suggest or manifest them seems untenable at the first instance, because in the science of language a distinction is scrupulously made between a vacaka and a dyotaka, and it is asserted that an upasarga is a dyotaka and not a vacaka: the terms 'manifestor', 'suggestor' and 'illuminator' are all synonymous units. In this connection, Mahimabhatta remarks that dyotakatva of an upasarga is asserted only in a figurative sense; really speaking the upasargas do not manifest ideas in the sense a lamp illuminates others; what they do is this that, they express meanings in the same way as is done by vācaka words. The point that, such roots as spac and the like signify the general act of cooking, that includes within its orb all particular types of cooking and accordingly, this sense of particular that is expressed by the root itself is manifested merely by such prefixes as 'Pra' and the like-indicates the ingenuity of the critic, but is, nevertheless, unacceptable. This is in accordance with the dictum 'Nirvisesam na sama yam bhavecchasavisanavat' which states that a universality, having no individuals to inhere in is an unreality like a rabbit's horn, and conformity to this doctrine gives it a show of probability. But such upasargas as 'Pra' and the like do not merely convey the idea of that particularity as is necessary for comprehension of the sense of generality: they convey in addition the sense of speciality, which differ according to difference in context and theme. As this idea of speciality is not expressed by the root itself, it is proper to regard upasaryas as directly vacakas of that sense. Moreover the drawing of this logic to its extreme point is likely to render adjectives also dyotakas, because it is possible to argue that in the proposition 'a blue lotus', the term 'lotus' directly conveys the sense of water lily in general in which are included all particular types, such as blue, red and white, and what the adjective 'blue' does is this that, it merely indicates the sense already conveyed by the noun. Adopting this chain of argument, such terms as Ghata, Pata also can be explained as Dyotakas, because eternal consciousness reflected in the form of a jar or a picture is manifested only by the terms. For this reason, Mahimabhatta thinks it better and proper to regard an upasarga as a real vacaka unit, and not a dyotaka one.27 It is called a dyotaka figuratively and the purpose for taking recourse to a figurative expression is to bring home the idea that the expressed meaning is cognised clearly; the reason lying behind this figurative use of words is a false notion that the meanings of the prefixes and roots are comprehended simultaneously.28 Really however a sequence exists between the apprehension of the meaning of the prefix and comprehension of the sense of the root, but as this sequence is negligible, one regards the two comprehensions as appearing simultaneously, and this wrong notion prompts him to regard both the meanings as being conveyed by the root,-the prefix only indicating it. In this connection, Mahimabhatta introduces the topic of Visesana which, he says, is two-fold in nature, one being intimate and the other remote. An intimate Viśesana imparts qualities or a thing or an action, only when it is placed by the side of the Viśesya, not intervened by any other thing: a remote Viśesana, on the other hand, imparts qualities on the Viśesya, though remaining intervened by others. A lac-stick imparting redness

to a piece of crystal, lying by its side illustrates an Antaranga Viś sana, while a piece of magnet imparting power to an iron-bar even from a great distance illustrates a Bahiranga Viśes na. As an upasarga is an Antaranja Viśesana, the meaning conveyed by it remains, as if, embeded in the connotation of the root and consequently, the comprehensions of the ideas conveyed by the Viśesana and Viśesya occur in quick succession. The erroneous knowledge of simultaneity springing from imperceptibility of this sequence is responsible for attributing dyotakatva to upasargas. The indeclinables such as Ca and the like also illustrate intimate attributes: as they ascribe speciality to contiguous nouns only, special care is to be taken to insert them in proper place in proper order. Violation to this rule is likely to hamper cognition of the intended idea and the enjoyment of aesthetic relish, consequential upon it.

According to the Dhyanivadin Poetry admits of classification into three types: Dhvani, Gunībhūtavyangya and Citra; in a Dhvanikāvya the suggested content is of paramount importance, in a poetry of Gunībhūtavyangya type, this is rendered subservient to the explicit idea and in a Citrakavya the implicit idea is unable to manifest itself clearly, being smothered beneath a huge mass of figures of sound and sense. Mahimabhatta finds fault with this system of classification, made according to the prominence or subservience of the suggested sense, and remarks that this classification does not conform to facts. converts an ordinary expression into a poetic expression is the charm, springing from touch of inferred meaning and as this charm is equally present in Kavya of Dhvani and Gunībhūtavyangya types, it is proper to group them under one head. The proposition that suggested meanings are capable of rendering themselves subordinate to the expressed idea is unacceptable in the view of Mahimabhatta, because the expressed being a means to comprehension of the unexpressed is bound to render itself subordinate to the suggested sense, which is always prominent. Mahimabhatta does not find any appreciable difference in charm between a specimen of poetry, presenting prominent implicit idea and that, depicting a subservient suggested sense, and asserts, quoting illustrations, that this is true in cases of *Vastu*, *Alamkāra* and *Rasadhvani*. Thus the verse:

Vacca maha bbia ekkāe hontu nīsāsaroiabbāim /

Mā tujjha vi tīe viņa dakkhinnahaassa jāandu //, quoted as an illustration of *Vastudhvani* meets on a common platform in point of charm with the verse:

Anuragavatī sandhyā divasastatpurassarah /

Aho daivagatiscitrā tathāpi na samāgamah //, quoted as an illustration of Samāsokti of the Neo-alamkarikas and Ākṣepa of Bhāmaha in which the suggested idea of the behaviour of hero and heroine embellishes the expressed meaning, and consequently, becomes subservient to it. In a similar manner, the yerse:

Candamaūehi ņisā ņaliņī kamalehi kusumagucchehi laā /

Haṃsehi saraasohā kavvakahā sajjaṇehi karai gur $\overline{u}$ ī//, which is an example of  $D\bar{\imath}paka$  and as such, Poetry of  $Gun\bar{\imath}bh\bar{u}tavyangya$  type is as much charming as the verse:

Vīrāņa ramai ghusrņāruņammi na tahā piāthanucchange /

Ditthī riugaakumbhatthalammi jaha bahalasindūre //, quoted as an illustration of Alamkāradhvani by the learned Dhvanikāra. There is no difference in beauty between Rasadhvani and Rasavadalamkāra, also, which are so carefully distinguished by the Dhvanivādin. Thus the verse:

Kim hāsyena na me prayāsyasi punah prāptaścirāddarśanam Keyam niṣkaruṇa! prayāsarucitā kenāsi dūrīkṛtah / Syapnāntesviti te vadan priyatamavyāsaktakanthagraho

Buddhvā roditi riktabāhuvalayastāram ripustrījanah //, in which the tragic emotion puts into bolder relief the glory of the king and as such renders itself subordinate to that—is as much attractive as any illustration of Rasadhvani. And the reason, Mahimabhaṭṭa observes, is quite clear; the manifestation of the implicit idea is there in both the verses. In support of his proposition, Mahimabhaṭṭa quotes the observation of the learned Dhvanikāra, according to which no poetry worth the name can afford to do without beauty, imparted by an implicit idea, the charm of which is as essential in it as is shyness in a girl.

Thus, Mahimabhatta concludes, as equal beauty is noticed in the Gunībhūtavuanyva type of poetry, as described by the Dhyanivadin, it is improper to regard it as a separate category. The argument that whereas a Dhvanikavya is marked by presence of Dhvani, this is characterised by its absence is misleading, because admission of a type of composition, marked by absence of Dhvani as a specimen of poetry results virtually in granting recognition to the proposition of the Abhavavadin. who declares Dhvani as non-existent. Equally misleading is the attempt to support that argument by pointing out that what is actually meant by absence of Dhvani is non-presentation of emotion only, because an expression that does not present emotion is incapable of being regarded as poetic expression at all. What imparts beauty to an expressed meaning is the touch of the unexpressed content brought into comprehension through the process of Anumana.29

Mahimabhatta regards the classification of Dhvani into two types: Avivaksitava ya and Vivaks tanyaparavacya, improper and maintains, that the very designations applied to the two types go to show its untenability. The term Avivaksitavācya does not certainly convey this sense that, in this type of Dhvani the expressed meaning is totally rejected, because such explanation is likely to jeopardize its capacity to suggest itself. The exposition that by Avivaksitatva partial rejection is meant, and in this type of Dhvanikāvya the Vācyārtha is partially rejected in the sense that, though expressed it is kept subservient to the implicit idea solves the difficulty, but makes the definition of this type of Dhvani exactly identical with that of Dhvani in general. The point that the term Avivaksita conveys the sense of subservience to another equally renders the two definitions identical. The Dhvanivadin subdivides an Avivaksitavacya type of Dhvani into two sub-types, according to the difference in the nature of Laksana that forms its basis. In the first subtype, known as Atyantyatiraskrtavācya Dhvani, the primary meaning is completely rejected and in its place an altogether new meaning appears, while in the second sub-type known as Arthantarasambramitavacya, the primary meaning is trans-

formed into a new meaning, characterised by a number of attributes. Of these two sub-types, the second one is capable of being comprehended under inference, because its illustrations are the same as those of Gunavrtti, and the element of Upacara is present in them. Upacara consists in the superimposition of identity of one on another, made in order to bring home the idea of similarity existing between the two. The expression 'The boy is fire (Agnirmanavakah)' is marked by existence of Upacara, inasmuch as, the identity of fire is superimposed on the boy; but whereas in this expression, the thing superimposed and the object of superimposition both are clearly stated by two different words, in illustrations of Arthantarasamkramitava:ya Dhvani, the same word presents both the thing superimposed and the substratum of superimposition, - the idea of generality conveyed by the term forming the substratum of superimposition of identity of the idea of particularity. A particular, marked by an excellence is often superimposed on a universal, as in the expression: 'Tadamrtamamrtam sa indurinduh', meaning, 'that nectar is nectar indeed and that moon is real moon': here the first term 'amrta' conveys the sense of nectar in general, and the second 'amrta' brings out the idea of nectar, endowed with an ability to bring the dead back to life. The merit or demerit of this particular placed on the universal is comprehended with the help of knowledge, relating to purpose and such other factors as context and the like. 30 Mahimabhatta asserts that the purpose, context and such other factors bear the relation of universal concomitance to the quality of the particular and as such the quality is capable of being known through the process of Anumana. An illustration is necessary to make the point clear. The Dhyanivadin says that in the expression: 'Kamam santu drdham kathorahrdayo Rāmo'smi sarvam sahe', the term 'Rāma' signifies through Luksuna, the sense of 'Dasaratha's son, as characterised by a number of attributes', and the charm of these attributes. brought into light through the function of suggestion renders the verse an example of Dhvani. Mahimabhatta says that in the expression quoted above, the identity of Rama, as charac-

terised by a number of attributes is superimposed on general Rama, and the cognition of the attributes is produced through Anumana. The very fact that one having a knowledge of purpose, context, speciality of the speaker and such other factors comprehends the merits or demerits of the particular superimposed—goes to show that the factors—purpose, context etc. are definite pointers to these attributes, as is smoke to fire. The second sub-type, namely Dhvani of Atyantatiruskrtavācya type, also is capable of being comprehended under the process of inference. And this is so, because the nature of this subtype of Davani is exactly identical with Padarthopcara, consisting in establishment of identity between two distinct objects, resulting in cognition of a relation existing between them. That this relation is capable of being known through Anumana as in the expression: 'This carrier is a bull (Gourvahīkah)' and accordingly, Anumana comprehends cases of Bhakti or Luksana is an established fact. 31

Like the designation 'Avivaksitavācya', applied to a species of Dhvani the name 'Vivaksitanyaparavacya' given to its another species is equally untenable and unable to stand the test of criticism. The explanation that the term Vivaksita means prominence is likely to jumble up the entire thing, because 'anyapara' conveys the sense of subservience and two contradictory attributes, such as prominence and subservience are incapable of inhering in the same substratum, namely vacyartha. The qualities of prominence and subservience, mutually opposed to each other are found to reside in the same adjective sometimes, as in the expression: 'Ramasya panirasi nirbharagarbhakhinnasītāvivāsanapatoh karuna kutaste', meaning: 'Thou art the hand of Rama, expert in sending Sītā in exile even when she was in her advanced stage of pregnancy: compassion is unknown to thee', in which the qualification of the hand, namely Ramasya is prominent, as it imparts cruelty and harshness to the arm, but nevertheless, being a qualification, it is subservient. The argument that in a similar manner prominence and subservience are capable of inhering in the same vācyārtha does not hold good, because those two opposite

attributes co-inhere in an adjective only, and in no other substratum. Moreover, the subservience of vacyartha to vyangyartha in this type of Dhvanikavya is an established fact, because the prominence of the unexpressed content forms the essence of Dhvani. Consequently, the subservience of the explicit idea, being gathered from the very fact that it is a type of Dhvani does not stand in need of further assertion. The point that this characteristic precludes the possibility of including Gunībhūtavyan ya Kāvya, in which the expressed meaning is more prominent than the suggested sense under the scope of Dhvani renders mention of the same characteristic in the designation of Avivakṣitavāvya type of Dhvani, also, an imperative necessity, because both being types of Dhvani meet on a common platform in respect of prominence of the suggested content. The Dhvanivadin classifies Vivaksitanyaparavacya type of Dhvani into two sub-types: Asamlaksyakramavyanijya and Samlaksyakramavyonjya; this second sub-type is further classified into two branches: Śabdaśaktimūla and Arthaśaktimūla. Mahimabhatta asserts that in Asamlaksyakramavyangya type of Dhvani the ensuents, excitants and accessories do not bring Rasa into comprehension through the function of suggestion: but they do so through the process of Anumana. And in a similar manner in Arthaśaktimūla type of Dhvani, the a yartha leads to inferential knowledge of the vyangyartha. The existence of Śabdaśaktimula type of Dhvani, Mahimabhatta maintains, is an absurd proposition, because words are endowed with no function other than that of  $Abhidh\bar{a}$ . Thus, he concludes, that not only the definition of Dhvani, adumbrated by the learned Dhvanikāra is defective, his scheme of classification, also, is faulty and untenable. 82

#### III

# Mahimabhatta's explanation of the illustrations of Dhvani:

In conformity to his doctrine that Anumana comprehends Dhvani, Mahimabhaṭṭa shows that the suggested meanings, pointed out in the illustrations of Dhvanikāvya by Ānandavardhana are capable of being known through inference. First of all he takes up the verse:

Bhama Dhammia Vīsaddho so suņao ajja mārio deņa/

Golānaikacchakuḍangavāsiņā dariasīheṇa//, quoted as an example of Vastudhvani by Dhvanikara, and says that the so-called implicit idea of negation of free movement is made known through inference. The Dhvanivadin, in explaining this verse says that, the expressed meaning is affirmation, inasmuch as, the religious-minded person is asked to move about freely, but the suggested sense is negation, because what the speaker really means is that he should not roam about. The expressed meaning in the form of affirmation, Mahimabhatta remarks, as established by the reason, namely death of the dog is comprehended first, and then is revealed the sense of negation to an appreciator, who knows fully well the antecedents of the speaker, as also understands the implication of the expression, presenting death of the dog at the hands of a more terrible animal; and this is so, because presence of mighty lion is a definite pointer to absence of free movement of a man, afraid of a dog even in a place, haunted by it. Thus in the view of Mahimabhatta, the form of syllogism in the present case is: Idam Godavarinikunjam śvabarrubhramanayogyam sim larupabhayakaran sattvat, meaning: the grove situated on the bank of the river Godavari is not a place proper for free movement of a man, afraid of a dog, infested as it is with & cause of fear in the shape of a mighty lion. Though the expressed and inferred meanings are both contextual here, yet the mind of the knower rests only after apprehending the inferred sense. It is not possible to know the two meanings jointly, because affirmation and negation do not co-inhere in the same substratum. Nor are they apprehended optionally.

because such proposition renders futile the mention of both the alternatives in such cases. Nor are the two comprehended as standing in the relation of part and whole, because such relation does not exist between things, opposed to one another. The relation that actually exists between the expressed and inferred meanings in the verse, Mahimabhatta says, is that as exists between a suppressor and a suppressed,—the inferred meaning suppressing the expressed one, cognised first. The expressed meaning is put to an end, because no sane man, afraid of a dog moves about freely in a place, knowing fully well that a lion has made its permanent habitat there. The postulation of a relation linking the suppressor and the suppressed is an imperative necessity, as without this a case of a knowledge of silver, being obliterated by a knowledge of a real mother-o'pearl is incapable of being explained logically.33 Thus in the verse under consideration, the expressed meaning in the form of a permission granted to the religious-minded person to move about freely, which is itself established by the anouncement of the death of the dog terminates ultimately in the presentation of the sense of prohibition through inference, because no place, that is infested with a cause of fear in the shape of a mighty lion is a proper place for free movement of a coward, afraid of a dog even: and when the inferred negation is comprehended, the expressed sense of affirmation effaces itself completely. Though a Dhyanivadin regards the verse as the best type of poetic creation, Mahimabhatta thinks that it is vitiated by the defect of impropriety, inasmuch as, it is not proper for a lion, eager to cleave the temples of mighty tuskers to select a dog as its prey: accordingly, he suggests that in place of the lion mention is to be made of a bear in the verse. 34

The second verse quoted by the learned Dhvanikāra in order to establish the separate existence of a vyangyartha from a  $v\bar{a}cy\bar{a}rtha$  is:

Atta ettha nimajjai ettha aham diasaam paloehi/

Mā pahia! rattiandhaa sejjāe mahāņa mājjahisi//, in which the expressed meaning is a prohibition, but the suggested meaning is an affirmation, because through it the lady, eager

for union with the traveller really gives him a covert hint to steal into her bed at night. Mahimabhatta denies the emergence of any such hint in the verse, as according to him, the reason that is competent to lead to knowledge of any such hint is conspicuous by its absence here. Scholars who believe that a disguised invitation is extended to the traveller to steal into the bed of the speaker at night in the verse hold that, the reasons that lead to this inevitable conclusion are sudden attribution of the quality of blindness at night to the visitor and the pointing out of the bed of the lady: the resting-place of the mother-in-law, also, is shown, they say in order to remove all possible apprehensions of the old beldame. Mahimabhatta thinks that, these reasons are not conclusive pointers to the sense of disguised invitation extended to the visitor to enjoy the speaker at nightfall. In such a circumstance, a probans, that does not produce any doubt whatsoever in the mind of old woman, but at the same time urges the traveller to approach the visitor at night is to be inserted. The sudden attribution of the quality of blindness at night. that is known on. through constant association is not such a probans, because it tead of removing apprehensions, it is likely to redouble thee in the mind of the old lady, and moreover, it has no bearing on the act of prompting the visitor to enjoy. The exhibition of the resting-place also is neither a definite pointer to this sense of invitation nor to the fact that the speaker is a lady of easy virtues, because even chaste ladies are seen to show respective chambers of the members of the family to visitors coming to the house for the first time. For the same reason, the pointing out of the distance between the bed of the speaker and that of the mother-in-law, leading in the first instalment to inferential knowledge of the fact that, no one of the two is in a position to see each other's bed is incapable of being regarded as a conclusive Probans. Nor are the gestures of the speaker capable of being regarded as reasons, because, according to a Dhvanivadin only a vacyartha is recognised as a vyanjaka. To those scholars who regard the verse as being characterised

by emergence of a covert hint, Mahimabhatta puts a simple question: is the probans favourable to inference of expressed negation or to that of implicit affirmation or to that of both? The acceptance of the first alternative renders the probans a contradicted one, like 'Kṛtakatva' in the syllogism Sabdo nityah krtakatvat, because, as Krtakatva instead of being a pointer to eternity becomes a conclusive pointer to transitoriness, similarly, blindness at night instead of establishing the fact that the visitor will not approach the bed of the speaker at night proves beyond doubt the opposite fact, because, a man blind-at-night is more likely to recline on other man's bed, unable as he is to see his own. The acceptance of the second alternative renders the probans an unestablished one, like 'cākṣuṣatva' in the syllogism: Śabdo gunah cākṣuṣatvāt, and as the attribute of blindness, as superimposed on the traveller is not an established entity, it is likely to cause misgivings in the mind of the old mother-in-law. The acceptance of the third alternative renders the probans an inconclusive one, as is Prameyatva in the syllogism: 'Parvato vahniman Prameyatvat,' where the attribute of Prameyatva is found to co-exist with fire, as also with its absence. A syllogism in which the probans is contradicted or unestablished or inconclusive is not regarded as a valid syllogism, and so, Mahimabhatta asserts, the sense of a disguised invitation extended to the traveller is incapable of being known through inference either from attribution of the quality of blindness to the visitor or from pointing out of the reclining-places of the respective persons. The case of this verse is not the same with that of the first one, because while in the first verse, the reason, introduced to establish the idea of affirmation (Bhramanwidhi) subsequently goes to prove beyond dispute the sense of negation (Bhramana-nisedha), in this stanza, the reason, introduced to establish the sense of negation (Śayananisedha) does not, in the least, help the cognition of the implicit idea of affirmation (Sayana-vidhi). 35

In order to show that the suggested meaning differs from the expressed one in point of substratum of cognition, the learned Dhyanikara quotes the stanza:

Kassa vā na hoi roso datthuņa piāe sabvaņam aharam/ Sabbhamarapadumāghāiņi vāriabāme sahasu ehnim//.

Mahimabhatta says that, the expressed meaning, namely the fact that, the heroine will have to stand the admonition of the infuriated husband is established by a strong reason in the shape of sight of her lips, bearing scar-marks thereon by the hero, the form of the syllogism being 'Nayakah prakopah savranavallabhadharadarśanat, and the suggested meaning, namely the fact that the girl has not been enjoyed by her paramour, in its turn, is established by the conclusive probans in the form of taking of smell of a lotus with bees hovering about it by the lady, the form of syllogism in the present case being: 'Iyam parapribhogavatī na, Sabhramarapadmāghrānaśīla $tv\overline{a}t$ .' The relation of universal concomitance, existing between the probans and the probandum in the present case is revealed, Mahimabhatta maintains, to the minds of persons, given to enjoyment. Though both the expressed and inferred meanings are cognised here, yet the mind of the appreciator sets at rest only after comprehending the inferred meaning, to which the former, being a means to its apprehension, keeps its own self subservient.

The learned Dhvanikara quotes the stanza:

Suvarņapuspām prithivīm cinvanti purusāstrayah/

Sūraśca kṛtavidyaśca yaśca jānāti sevitum// in order to illustrate Dhvani of Avivakṣitavācya type. With reference to this stanza, Mahimabhaṭṭa maintains that the so-called implicit idea, namely the sense that riches are at the disposal of brave, learned and servant is capable of being known through Anumāna, the probans in the present case being the statement that those three are competent to pluck the golden flowers of the earth. As it is not possible to pluck golden flowers, the primary meaning is inapplicable, and what is really comprehended is a sense similar to that meaning, namely the fact that riches are enjoyed in profusion by those three types of persons. Mahimabhaṭṭa regards it as a case of vākyārthopacāra and remarks that just as in the expression: Gaṅgyāyaṃ Ghoṣaḥ—padārthopacāra leads to knowledge of the bank through inference,

similarly in the present case also superimposition of identity between imports of two propositions, that are totally distinct leads to inferential knowledge of the implicit idea, referred to above, the form of the syllogism being: Śūrakṛtavidyasevakāh sarvatra svādhīnasampadah, suvarņapuṣpapṛithivīcayanakāritvāt.

According to the learned Dhvanikara the verse:

Śikhariṇi kva nu nāma kiyacciṛaṃ kimabhidhānamasāvakarottapaḥ/

Taruņi! yena tavādharapāṭalam dasati bimbaphalam

śukaśavakah/

furnishes an illustration of *Dhvani* of *Vivakṣitānyaparavācya* type Mahimabhaṭṭa says that, the so-called suggested meaning in this verse, also, is nothing but an anumeyārtha; here the probandum is the idea that it is not possible for a man, having little stock of religious merits to have a taste of the lips of the girl, and this is made known through the process of inference by the description that, in order to have a taste of Bimba fruit even, that resembles only these lips, a parrot has to practise penance for a long time and thereby acquire religious merit, and the form of syllogism is: 'Tvadadharacumbanāmṛtam nālpapuṇy-avatpuruṣaprāpyaṃ tvadadharasadṛśabimbaphaladaśanavidhau śukaśābakasya asādhāranatapahsampajjanyatvakalpanāt'.

As an illustration of *Dhvani* of *Arthanturasamkramitavācya* type, the learned Dhvanikāra quotes the verse:

Snigdhaśyāmalakāntiliptaviyato velladvalākā ghanā Vātāḥ śīkariṇaḥ payodasuhridāmānandakekāḥ kalāḥ/ Kāmaṃ santu dṛḍraṃ kaṭhorahṛdayo Rāmo' smi sarvaṃ sahe

Vaidehi tu katham bhavişyati hahā hā Devi!

Dhirā bhava//

in which it is pointed out that, the term 'Rāma' refers not only to Daśaratha's son, but to his son, as characterised by a number of attributes, such as banishment from the Kingdom, ability to stand a number of misfortunes and so on, and these attributes are comprehended through the function of suggestion. Mahimabhatta thinks that, these attributes are capable of being known through  $Anum\bar{a}na$  as the probans, the state of Rāma itself bears the relation of universal concomitance to these

attributes, in the same way as the state of a particular tree bears to the generality 'treeness'; as soon as the state of a particular tree is asserted of a thing, it is known automatically that it is a tree: similarly as soon as Ramatva is asserted of a man, it is at once comprehended that he is a victim to misfortunes and sorrows. The form of syllogism, in the present case, he contends, is: 'Aham kleśasahisnuh Rāmatvāt'. In a similar manner, the implicit idea in the expression: 'Raikiranānuggahiāi honti kamalāi kamalāi', quoted as another example of this type of Dhvani is capable of being arrived at through Anumana. According to the Dhyanivadin, the first word 'Kamala' used in the expression signifies the sense of lotus in general, and the same word repeated again conveys the idea of lotus, having real beauty and fragrance, -attributes that are presented through vyanjana. Mahimabhatta thinks that the superimposition of identity of a particular lotus, favoured by the rays of the Sun, and as such endowed with beauty and fragrance on lotus in general points unfailingly to beauty and fragrance of the lotus on which such superimposition is made: he says that the form of syllogism in the present case is: 'Kamalam niratiśayaśobhāsaurabhābhirāmatāviśistam Ravikiranānugrhītakamalatvāt'.

According to the learned Dhvanikāra, an illustration to Dhvani of Atyantatiraṣkṛtavācya sub-type is furnished by the sloka:

Ravisamkrāntasaubhāgyastuṣārāvṛtamaṇḍalah/ Niḥśvāsāndha ivādarśaścandramā na prakāśate//.

Here the term 'andha' signifies through secondary function the sense of mirror unable to hold reflections, and the function of suggestion brings into light the extreme ugliness of the mirror. Mahimabhaṭṭa thinks that, tho very attribution of the quality of blindness to the mirror, which is an inanimate being makes known through inference the unpleasing nature of the mirror, darkened by sighs,—mirror that resembles a blind in point of repulsiveness to the sight: the form of syllogism here is:  $\bar{A}dar\acute{s}o\ vicch\bar{a}yah\ nihi\acute{s}v\bar{a}s\bar{a}ndhatvakalpan\bar{a}t$ . In a similar manner, the inferred meaning in the expression:

'Gaganam ca mattamegham' is the idea that clouds do not behave judiciously, inasmuch as, they put an end to the lives of men, separated from their consorts, and the probans that leads to knowledge of this idea is attribution of madness, a quality, belonging to a living being to the inanimate cloud, and the form of syllogism is: Meghah virahimāranādyanarthakāritvā-samīkṣyakāritvadurnivāryatvādidharmavān tasya mattatvakalpanāt.

Mahimabhatta thinks that Rasa is capable of being known through Aunmana because the excitants, ensuents and accessories are definite pointers to mental conditions of the characters, introduced in the piece. In this connection he quotes the proposition of the learned Dhvanikara that a sequence exists between apprehension of Vibhavas and the like, on one hand, and comprehension of Rasa on the other, and asserts that this statement relegates the position of Sadhana to Vibhavas and the status of Sadhya to Rasa. The stanzas, beginning from the arrival of Parvati, ornamented with vernal flowers to the description of throwing of an arrow by cupid and the consequential loss of fortitude in Lord Siva furnish illustration, he says, to Rasananumana: the Dhvanivadin regards these verses as example of Asamlaksyakramavyanjya type of Dhvani, in which the sequence between the cognition of vacyartha and that of vyan /yartha is not clearly traced.

In the view of the learned Dhvanikāra the word-unit mainly brings into light the vyanyyārtha in Śabdaśaktimūla type of Dhvani, which is illustrated by the expression:

Atrantare kusumasamayayugamupasamharannajrmbhata

Grīṣmābhidhānah phullamallikādhavalāṭṭahāso mahākālaḥ, in which the function of denotation of such multi-meaninged words as  $Mah\bar{a}k\bar{a}la$  and the like being restricted to the contextual sense of unbearable summer season, the non-contextual idea of Lord Śiva is brought into comprehension only through the function of suggestion. As Mahimabhaṭṭa holds that words are endowed only with the function of  $Abhidh\bar{a}$ , he cannot regard the realisation of non-contextual meanings, presented through Vyanjana in such cases a reality. As

regards the expression: 'Atrantare' etc. he however, maintains that the idea of Lord Siva, laughing violently and putting an end to cupid is cognised; but this cognition is effected through inference by the Sadhana-the mention of laughter and the act of putting an end to the cycles, the from of the syllogism being: Mahākālaḥ mahākālākhyadevatāviśczah aţţahāsayuktatve sati yugasaṃhārakartṛtvāt. This process of comprehension of a non-contextual meaning through Anumana is found in the figure of speech Samasokti, which consists in superimposition of the behaviour of a non-contextual on a contextual due to sameness of action, sameness of gender or sameness of adjective. Mahimabhatta cautions against the possibility of production of a wrong notion that, in the expression referred to above, the multi-meaninged term : Mahākāla presents two ideas,—one through Abhidhā and another through Vyanjana. The learned Dhvanikara quotes the verse:

Unnatah prollasaddhārah kālāgurumalīmasah/

Payodharabharastanyāh kam na cakre' bhilāṣiṇam// as a second example of this type of Dhvani: he says that here Abhidhā conveys the idea of the breasts of the lady exciting persons given to enjoyment and Vyanjanā signifies the sense of the mass of clouds, augmenting longing as also the idea of similarity existing between the two meanings. Mabimabhaṭṭa completely denies the emergence of any non-contextual meaning in it, because, as he says, the figure of speech Samāsokti is absent here. Another illustration of this type of Dhvani that receives greater attention from Mahimabhaṭṭa is the stanza:

Dattānandāh prajānām samucitasamayākṛṣṭasṛṣṭaih payobhih Pūrvānhe viprakīrṇā diśi diśi viramatyahni saṃhārabhājah / Dīptāṃśordīrghaduḥkhaprabhavabhvabhayodanvaduttā-

ranavo

Gavo vah pāvanānām paramaparimitām prītimutpādayantu//, where the Dhvanivādin points out that, the sense of rays of the Sun is cognised through  $Ab^{\prime}idh\bar{a}$ , and the idea of multitude of cows as also the relation of similarity existing between the two

are comprehended through Vyanjana. Mahimabhatta is of opinion that the cognition of the non-contextual idea of multitude of cows does not arise at all; and this is so, because there is no reason that can give rise to apprehension of such meaning. The point that the very term 'Go' which is a multi-meaninged one gives rise to apprehension of this meaning is without any value, because it keeps open the question of cognition of other meanings also, such as thunderbolt, earth and the like, which, too, form the connotation of the term 'Go'. It is futile to argue that, the understanding of the sense of cows alone occurs, because the restrictive factors restrict the power of signification of the word to that sense only, since no such restrictive factor is traceable in the verse. The plethora of adjectives does not constitute this factor, because an adjective signifies only that sense, as is applicable to the thing qualified by it, and it is not possible for it to convey an idea, applicable to the sense of multitude of cows, without any reason, in the present verse. The argument that the use of the multi-meaninged word 'Go' itself, which presents the noun supplies this reason vitiates the entire proposition by the fallacy of mutual dependence, as the position comes to this that, cognition of a particular meaning of the noun is dependent on comprehension of such meanings of adjectives, as are applicable to it, and the understanding of specific meanings of adjectives depends on apprehension of such a sense of the noun, as is compatible with those of the adjectives. The point that though individually the noun and the adjective are unable to bring the non-contextual idea of cows into light, jointly they are in a position to do so is unsound, as the sumtotal of two inefficients does not make an efficient entity: this is amply illustrated in the case of two blind persons, who are unable to see individually as well as jointly. The analogy of earth, air and water combining to generate a sprout, -each helping the other two to produce the desired effect—is inapplicable in the present case, because the application of that rule is restricted to things, related to each other, through the natural relation of cause and effect only. Though the noun and the adjective are said to combine to produce apprehension of the

implicit idea, and as such, a relation of cause and effect is said to exist between them, yet this relation is not natural, inasmuch as, the comprehension of the implicit is dependent on existence of appreciative genius in the minds of refined readers; if this genius is not there, the noun and the adjective fail to produce apprehension of the intended idea. 36 Thus it it clear. Mahimabhatta argues, there is no such reason as can give rise to understanding of the non-contextual. It is not possible to regard the same word-unit as responsible for cognition of both the meanings, because, had it been so, the two meanings would have been cognised simultaneously. But a Dhyanivadin holds that the understanding of the non-contextual is preceded by apprehension of the contextual. Moreover, such an assumption entails a violation to the mexim: Arthabhedena śabdabhedah, which demands use of one word to denote one concept only. Thus as the realisation of the non-contextual is a myth, the question of apprehension of a relation existing between the contextual and the noncontextual, also, is false. In this connection, Mahimabhatta introduces the question of distinction amongst Sadhusabda, Asadhusabda and Apasabda, and asserts that words convey meanings only with the help of certatin factors, and never independently of these: accordingly, that idea to which such factors are favourable is signified by a word, and a sense to which such factors are not favourable is not conveyed by a word, even though it is primarily denotative of that sense. 37 For this reason, Mahimabhatta is of opinion, even Asadhusabdas are endowed with the capacity to signify meanings. This view, he says, is in conformity to the doctrine of Bhartrhari, according to which, though ideas are capable of being conveyed by both Sadhu and Asadhu śabdas, yet the former group alone, is to be used, because it results in acquisition of religious merit. An Asadhuśchda is to be carefully distinguished from a Sādhuśabda on the one hand, and an Apaśabda, on the other. A Sadhuśabda is formed according to the rules of Grammar, that are completely thrown into winds by an Asadhuśabda, and an Apaśabda differs from both in this respect that, while these two are competent to express meanings, this, being

bereft of conveying agents is unable to do so. Thus, Mahimabhatta thinks, a Sādhuśabda, also, is treated as an Apaśabda, when it loses its power of signification, being unaided by conveying factors. In Sabdaśaktimūla type of Dhyani, the words are incapable of giving rise to apprehension of the noncontextual meaning, because the factors, favourable to its signification, as has been pointed out, are conspicuously absent. So there is no reason behind the assumption that comprehension of the non-contextual meaning occurs in Sabdasktimula type of Dhvani, and the considered opinion of Mahimabhatta on this point is this that, the explanations, furnished and the illustrations put forward of this type of Dhvani by commentators are based more on respect for age-old tradition than on logic; he says that, these explanations not only speak of total neglect of fact on the part of the commentators concerned, but also fail to bring out the real intention of the poet, and thereby, as if, put him to shame. 38

The Dhvanivadin is of opinion that, in Arthsaktimula type of Dhvani the vyanjaka artha is in some cases objectively possible, being a reality in the outside world even, and in others it owes its existence either to the imagination of the poet or to the imagination of a character created by the poet's muse. This classification of a suggestive meaning, Mahimabhatta says, has no bearing on the nature of an implicit idea, that is said to form the essence of Poetry. The learned Dhyanikara quotes the verse: 'Evam vadini' etc. as an illustration of vastu-dhvani of Arthéaktimula type, and points out that the counting of petals on the part of Parvati, with her face bent down brings into light the idea of her bashfulness through suggestion. Mahimabhatta, however, thinks that the counting of petals is a definite pointer to shyness, and as such the idea of bashfulness is not comprehended through suggestion but through the process of Anumana. As an illustration of Alamkara-dhvani of this type, in which the suggestive meaning owes its existence to the imagination of the poet, the learned Dhyanikara quotes the verse:

Prāptaśrīreva kasmāt punarapi mayi tanmanthakhedam vidadhyān

Nidrāmapyasya pūrvāmanalasamanaso naiva sambhāvayāmi/ Setum badhnāti bhūyah kimiti ca sakaladvīpanāthānuyāta/

Stvayyāyāte vitarkāniti dadhata ivābhāti kampah payodheh//
in which the expressed figure, which is an admixture of Sandeha
and Utprekṣā is said to suggest the figure of Rūpaka, consisting
in superimposition of identity of Lord Vāsudeva on the poet's
patron. Mahimabhaṭṭa argues that the concepts of transfusion
of pain of churning to the Ocean out of a desire to attain riches
on the part of the king, the enjoyment of rest, through love for
pleasures and the construction of a bridge by him prompted by
a desire to vanquish the rulers of other islands—all these combine to produce inferential knowledge of the idea that the king
is identical with Lord Vāsudeva, with which they bear the
relation of universal concomitance, the form of syllogism being:
'Rājā Vāsudevarūpah, slokoktatādṛśapraśnasya āśrayatvāt,
mukhyavāsudevavat'.

Another illustration of Alamkāra-dhvani of this type is furnished by the verse:

Lāvaṇyakāntiparipūritadinmukhe'smin Smere'dhunā tava mukhe taralāyatākṣi / Kṣobhaṃ yadeti na manāgapi tena manye Suvyaktameva jalarāsirayaṃ payodhiḥ//

in which as the Dhvanivādin points out, the figure  $R\overline{u}paka$ , consisting in superimposition of identity of moon on the face is brought into light through suggestion by the expressed meaning. Mahimabhaṭṭa thinks that, the description that, agitation of Ocean is absent even though its causes are fully present points out unmistakably to the idea that, the face is not presented as such, but with the nature of moon superimposed on it. In the view of Mahimabhaṭṭa, this sense of superimposition of identity of moon on face is comprehended through the process of inference, the form of syllogism being: Mukhaṃ pūrnacandrarūpaṃ Samudrasaṃ tṣɔbhāvirhhāvasya kāranatvakalpanāt. In this connection, Mahimabhaṭṭa points out that the epithet 'jalarāśi', applied to the Ocean in the stanza is inappropriate; if the term

is taken to refer to mass of water alone, then its use becomes insignificant, because an ocean remains a huge mass of water, even when its waters grow agitated: if, on the other hand, it is taken to convey the idea of stupendous stupidity, then the meaning that is likely to be brought into comprehension through the function of suggestion is the extreme beauty of the face, and not the superimposition of identity of moon on it. The sense of this superimposition is capable of being cognised only when possible agitation of waters is described as being obstructed by some factor; as the ocean is imagined as a bundle of stupidity, and not as a mass of water, the possibility of agitation, appearing in the Sea is ruled out from the very beginning and so the expressed meaning in the verse under consideration cannot be a definite pointer to the idea that the face is identical with the moon. For this reason, Mahimabhatta suggests a different reading in the second half of the verse, which, according to him should read as:

Kṣobham yadeti na manāgapi tena manye
Rūpāntaram patirapām kimapi prapannah//.

This reading, he says, not only leads to inferential knowledge of the sense that, the face is identical with the moon, but also brings into comprehension the idea that, the Ocean is given to all sorts of enjoyments, and so is much more appealing than the original one. As an example of Vastu-dhvani of this type, in which the suggestive meaning owes its existence to the poetic faculty of the creator, the learned Dhvanikāra quotes the stanza:

Sajjei surahimāso na ā paņāvei juvaijanalakkhhasahe/

Abhinavasahaārmuhe navapallavapattale anangassa sare//, in which the expressed meaning, according to him, suggests the implicit idea that, with the appearance of spring in its full splendour love-sickness will grow violently in ladies. Mahimabhaṭṭa says that, the description of visibility of fresh twigs and buds that are excitants in different trees points out unfailingly to the idea that love-sickness is bound to grow in ladies: he thinks that the form of syllogism, in the present case, is: Surābhimāsataravo juvatijanamadanonmāthadāyinah madanod-

dipanasamarthasvabhāvasampādakatvāt candravat. Thus, Mahimabhaṭṭa explains away all the illustrations of Dhvani, put forward by the learned Dhvanikāra and emphatically asserts that Dhvani, with all its types and sub-types is comprehended under anumāna. This is so because, Abhivyakti does not occur of the implied meaning to which neither the expressed meaning renders its own self subservient nor does the expressive word make its primary sense subordinate; the requisites that are necessary in order to effect revelation of the implicit idea constitute really the probans leading to inferential knowledge of the probandum. <sup>89</sup>

#### IV

### Dhvanivadin's reply to Mahimabhatta:

In Ruyyaka, the commentator on Vyaktiviveka, who has to his credit a number of original treatises also, the school of Dhyani finds a staunch defender: Ruyyaka not only replies to all the charges levelled against the Doctrine of Dhyani by Mahimabhatta, but at the same time, points out the flaws and discrepancies in the observations of the great Anumanavadin himself. In criticising the definition of Dhyani, adumbrated by the learned Dhvanikara, Mahimabhatta first of all remarks that, as an expressed meaning, introduced to effect manifestation of a suggested sense is always bound to render its own self subordinate to the latter, the mention of the adjunct Upasarjanīkrtasva, in relation to artha is redundant. Ruyyaka in reply to this says that, by subservience of the expressed meaning, any one of these three factors is meant: (a) subordination of the expressed to the unexpressed in the same way as a means is to the end, (b) its deficiency in charm in comparison to the implied meaning and (c) the fact that it is competent to rest on its own self and consequently does not stand in need of obtaining help from other ideas. Mahimabhatta's objection is sound in so far as it relates to the first two cases of subservience of the expressed meaning, but it does not hold good in case

of the third alternative, namely in those cases, in which the expressed meaning rests on its own self, and naturally, does not stand in need of being benefited by others. It is wrong to argue that in such cases, the expressed automatically renders its own self subservient to the unexpressed, because examples of such poetic creations are numerous, in which the suggested goes to embellish the expressed, that forms the chief import of the sentence. The figure of speech  $Sam\bar{a}sokti$  furnishes an illustration to the point: in it, the expressed, as ornamented by the behaviour of the suggested Aprakrta forms the main import of the proposition and as such, it constitutes Poetry of  $Gun\bar{b}h\bar{u}tavyanjya$  type. In order to preclude the possibility of inclusion of this type of Poetry within  $Dhvanik\bar{a}vya$ , Ruyyaka says, the adjunct  $Upasarjan\bar{v}krtasva$  is used in relation to artha. Thus in reply to Mahimabhatta's Samgrahaśloka, running as;

Uktam Gunikṛtātmatvam yadarthasya viśeṣanam/

Gamakatvanna tat tasya yuktamavyabhicaratah//, Ruyyaka has his own verse, that runs as follows:

Guņīkṛtātmatārthasya na pratītāvupāyatā/

Na carutvamapi tvarthairbauddhairanupakaryata//.

Mahimabhatta takes exception to the use of the word śabda, along with its adjunct 'Upasarjanīkrtartha', and says that, as a word is endowed with no function other than that of Abhidha, it is not possible for it to discharge any other duty and render the expressed meaning subservient to the suggested one. Moreover, this qualification is known automatically from the mention of the adjunct 'Upasarjanīkrtasva' in relation to artha. Thirdly, a word inserted in order to convey a particular meaning cannot render that meaning subordinate to its own self. In reply to this objection, Ruyyaka points out that, in the view of the learned Dhvanikara, a word is endowed with more than one functions, of which the function of suggestion is one, and so it is possible for it to bring into light both conventional and unconventional meanings,—the first through Abhidha and the second through Vyanjana. The adjunct 'Upasarjanīkrtārtha', he says, is necessary in order to exclude these verses, in which comprehension of two ideas occur from

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the same word-unit, but the implicit, instead of attaining prominence goes to embellish the explicit—from the category of *Dhvani*. The verse:

Dṛṣṭyā keśava goparāgahṛtayā kiṃcinna dṛṣṭaṃ mayā tenaiva skhalitāsmi nātha patitāṃ kiṃ nāma nālambase/ Ekastvaṃ viṣameṣu khinnamanasāṃ sarvāvalānām gatirgopyaivaṃ gaditaḥ saleśamavatād goṣṭhe harirvaściram//.

serves as an illustration to the point.41 Here the use of the word 'salesam', meaning 'deceitfully' shows that the request meted out to Kṛṣṇa by the milk-maid to support her as she stumbles in uneven land is not to be taken in its face value, but what she actually wants is that Kṛṣṇa should be her husband, dubbed as a fallen woman as she has now been through her attachment for him: thus the implicit idea instead of acquiring prominence renders itself subordinate to the explicit one, inasmuch as, it becomes the cause of establishment of the primary meaning of the term 'saleśam' which is incapable of being justified otherwise. The learned Dhvanikara does not recognise the verse as a case of Dhvani, because according to him, in order to constitute Dhvani, it is necessary for the function of suggestion to convey an implicit idea of paramount importance,—an idea, that is not touched slightly even by the function of denotation.42 The criticism that a word is unable to keep its meaning, for the signification of which it is introduced subordinate to its own self, as a leathern vessel is unable to keep water, for the drawing of which it is made subservient to its own self is based on a misconception of the stand-point of the Dhyanivadin. The Dhyanivadin does not demand subservience of a primary meaning to a word denotative of it, because this subordination is an absurd proposition: what he means is that in a Dhvanikavya a word renders its expressed meaning subservient to the suggested idea. Thus in reply to Mahimabhatta's Samksepaśloka:

'vāco guņīkṛtārthatvam na sambhati jātucit /

Tadartham tadupādānādudakārtham dṛteriva //, Ruyyaka sums up his arguments in the following verse:

Vāco guņīkṛtārthatvam vyangyamartham prati sthitam / Tadartham tadupādānādudakārtham dṛteriva //

Mahimabhatta maintains that non-mention of Abhidha in the definition of Dhvani makes it vitiated by the fallacy of too narrow definition, inasmuch as, such poetic creation in which an expressed figure brings into comprehension a suggested figure is left out of the purview of Dhvanikavya: this happens in case of an illustration of the expressed figure Dipaka, that is characterised by cognition of a suggested simile. In reply to this criticism Ruyyaka points out that the charge brought by the learned Anumanavadin is based on a notion that figures are expressions of peculiar types. This concept of Alamkara is a later development and earlier writers on the subject, such as Bhamaha, Udbhata and the like do not regard Alamkaras as expressions to which peculiar turns are given by the imaginative faculty of the poet: they say that Alamkaras belong to words and meanings, and not to the function, known as Abhidhā. Abhidha, these thinkers maintain, is a power belonging to a word, that is inferred from the very fact that the particular word brings a particular meaning into consciousness or it is the very function of pronunciation of a word. Now charm, that is said to constitute the life of an Alamkara does not belong to the act of pronouncing of a word or to that of revelation of its meaning: on the other hand, it resides in a pronounced word and a revealed meaning. For this reason, following the authority of earlier rhetoricians like Bhanaha, Udbhata etc. Anandavardhana, also, regards poetic figures as attributes, belonging to Śabda and Artha, and not to Abhidhā. Ruyyaka thinks that, as in the definition of Dhvani, adumbrated by Anandavardhana, both Sabda and Artha are clearly mentioned as bringing an implicit idea into light, the sense that in this type of poetry an Alamkara, also, is capable of suggesting another Alamkara is known through implication, and consequently, does not stand in need of further statement.43 The point, he continues, that in the poetic figure Dīpaka, the suggested Upamā being more prominent than the expressed Alamkāra, its examples are to be recognised as specimens of Dhvanikavyo

bespeaks total misunderstanding of the stand-point of the Dhvanivādin on the part of the learned Anumānavādin. It is said by a Dhvanivādin that subservience of an expressed meaning refers not only to its subordination, being a means to revelation of the suggested sense or to its deficiency in point of beauty, but also to the fact that as it is competent to rest on its own self, it does not stand in need of being helped or embellished by others. This characteristic feature of an expressed meaning, that is an essential requisite of Dhvani is conspicuous by its absence in an illustration of the figure of speech  $D\bar{\imath}paka$ , in which the suggested simile goes to augment the beauty of the conventional meaning, which presents the poetic figure  $D\bar{\imath}paka$ . In fact, for this reason, the designation  $D\bar{\imath}paka$  is attached to it to the exclusion of the name  $Upam\bar{a}$ -dhvani, in accordance with the dictum:  $Pr\bar{a}dh\bar{a}nyena\ vyapada \bar{\imath}$  bhavanti.

Mahimabhatta finds fault with the use of the terms 'tamartham' in masculine gender, because, as he says, in conformity to such uses as: 'pratīyamānam punaranyadeva' etc. the word denotative of suggested meaning is to be put in the neuter gender in the definition of Dhvani also. As a rejoinder to this charge, it is postible for a Dhvanivādin to point out that as in the Kārikā, immediately preceding the one, in which the theory of Dhvani is enunciated, the word, expressive of implicit idea is put in masculine gender, it is used in that gender in the definition of Dhvani, also, in the quite fitness of things. The Kārikā referred to in this connection is:

Tadvat sacetasām so'rtho vācyārthavimukhātmanām/ Buddhau tatvārthadarśinyām jhatityevāvabhāsate//

Mahimabhaṭṭa holds that the use of the indeclinable  $v\bar{a}$ , as well as of the dual number in the verb  $vyan^i ttah$  is defective, and this is so, because the particle under consideration does neither convey the sense of option nor that of joint action. The proposition of the Dhvanivādin that a word is endowed with the function of suggestion makes this animadversion unreal, because it is possible for him to argue that the indeclinable really conveys the sense of option. In fact, Abhinavagupta puts forward this view and maintains that, while the dual number in

'vyanktah' conveys the idea that both sabda and artha have their roles to play in the matter of bringing an implicit idea into comprehension, the particle  $v\bar{a}$  indicates option between prominence of either of these elements. According to a Dhvanivadin in those cases in which words primarily suggest ideas, the expressed meanings also play their own parts, because a word, whose conventional meaning is not known does not bring any implicit idea whatsover into consciousness: in a similar manner, in those cases in which explicit meanings primarily suggest ideas, the words also contribute their own shares, because a meaning brings into light a suggested sense. only when it is expressed through words. Thus though śabda and artha both combine to bring an implicit idea into consciousness, there is considerable difference between their contributions in different cases; in some cases, the contribution of the sound-element is greater, and as such, these are regarded as fields of Sabdī Vyanjanā: in others, the contribution of the sense-element is more, and so, these are regarded as fields of Ārthī Vyanjanā. 44 The objection that there being sequence between knowledge of word and cognition of its meaning, it is not possible for the sound and the sense-elements to contribute jointly in the matter of bringing the implicit idea into light is without any value, because a sound-unit, also, is endowed with the function of suggestion, and after the primary meaning of a word is cognised nothing stands in the way of the word and meaning acting jointly and bringing out knowledge of the suggested idea.

The point that as the knowledge of the word ceases to exist at the time when its primary meaning is cognised, the function of suggestion, belonging to the word-element is unable to operate and produce comprehension of the implicit idea is answered by the Dhvanivādin in this way. He says that connotation of a term is comprised of two factors: the primary meaning and the self of the word. In some cases, as in ordinary and poetic expressions, the first factor is prominent, the second going to qualify it, and in other cases, as in the rules of Grammar, the second factor is of more importance, the first

serving only as a Visesana to it. Thus just as the universal element of cowness is connoted by the term 'Cow', similarly the word itself is connoted by it, because there cannot be even an elementary experience, that is not associated with a linguistic expression. Bhartrhari, the great philosopher-grammarien maintains that, every possible cognition is determinate, the determinate factor being an articulate verbal form, and asserts that like knowledge revealing the nature of other knowables. and at the same time its own self, word, also is a self-luminous principle, revealing the world of objects along with its own self. 45 For this reason, a Dhyanivadin observes, the knowledge of the word lingers, when its connotation is ascertained, the self of the word forming a part of that connotation, and accordingly the cognition of the implicit idea is produced through the function of suggestion by both word and meaning acting jointly. The fact that a word reveals its own self along with others is further corroborated by use of such verses as:

Udeti savitā tāmrastrāma evāstameti ca/

Sampattau ca vipattau ca mahatāmekarūpatā//,

in which the substitution of the word 'Raktah' for 'Tamrah' fails to give rise to knowledge of the intended idea as also to the figure Arthantarany asa.

Mahimabhaṭṭa argues that there can be no such thing as a 'type of poetry', and consequently, the use of the term  $K\bar{a}vyavisesah$  is defective. The point on which Mahimabhaṭṭa bases his conclusion is that Rasa being a blissful state of ego, in which knowledge of all other knowables is completely obliterated, the concept of excellence is incapable of being asserted of Rasa, and so it is wrong to argue that excellence of Rasa depicted makes a poetry one of excellent type: nor is it possible to say that depiction of a particular mood makes poetry one of best type, because such proposition narrows down the scope of  $Dhvanik\bar{a}vya$ . In reply to this criticism, Ruyyaka says, that the use of the term ' $K\bar{a}vyavisesah$ ', intended to differentiate a  $Dhvanik\bar{a}vya$  from poetic creations of  $Gun\bar{b}h\bar{u}tavyanya$  and Citra types, is an imperative necessity. Definitions, he says, are propounded in such a way that they

bring out the characteristic features of the things defined and at the same time differentiates them from others. From time immemorial two varieties of poetry are in vogue: one, the primary variety, in which the suggested sense is more prominent, and the second, the secondary type, in which the implied meaning is subordinate. As the Dhyanivadin wants to apply the designation Dhvani to the first variety of Poetry only. he formulates its definition in such a way that, the type defined is differentiated from the other type. The observation of the Anumanavadin that in accordance with the dictum: Gaunamukhyayormukhye eva karyasampratyayah na gaunz, the appellation Dhvani applies automatically to the best type of Poetry. even though the term Kavyaviśesah is left unmentioned is not correct, because the dictum operates in the field of Grammar only, and not in the field of Poetics. Equally incorrect is the notion that Rasa always attains prominence, and the question of its subordination to another Rasa or vacyartha is a myth, because a good number of such poetic creations are found in which one Rasa is presented as an aiga to another Rasa. In order to explain the seeming incongruity between the concepts of the same Rasa becoming an angin in some case, and an anga in another, Ruyyaka quotes the analogy of a Vicorabhandarika, and states that the same man when committing theft is chastised and when recognised as owner of fabulous wealth is honoured; in a similar manner the same emotional mood attains prominence in some cases and subservience in others. The idea of the Anumanavadin that existence of Rasa being essential in Poetry, the excellence or speciality of Rasa alone is able to render Poetry one of special type is not correct in the eye of a Dhvanivadin, because, at least, from the point of theory, he regards Vastu-dhvani, Alamkara-dhvani and Rasa-dhvani, all these three types of implied meaning as constituting the essence of Poetry. 46

Mahimabhaṭṭa thinks that by formulating the definition of *Dhvani*, the learned Dhvanikāra gives only a new name to Poetry, and does nothing more. In reply to this charge, it is possible for a Dhvanivādin to point out that the whole theory of

Dhvani is based on an analogy of the theory of Sphota, propounded by the Grammarians, who use the term 'Dhvani' to signify the momentary sounds, pronounced by our speechorgans, -sounds, that go to reveal the eternal sound-essence called Sphota: and the Alamkarikas, also, use the term Dhvani to refer to a whole piece of poetic creation, competent to bring an implicit idea of supreme charm into light. The very fact that the term 'Dhvani' is taken by the Alamkarikas from use of the same term, made by the Vaiyakaranas, though on a different context goes to establish the proposition of the Dhvanivadin that the doctrine of Dhvani is based on the authority of the Vaivakaranas,—the foremost of the scholars, and as such, is incapable of being explained away as a mere brain-wave of the Dhyani Theorists. On the use of this term, Abhinavagupta remarks that, it conveys the idea of a suggestive unit, a suggested meaning, and the function of suggestion also: in the Kārikā, under consideration, it refers to a whole piece of poetic creation. that is comprised of suggestive word and meaning, suggested sense and the function of suggestion. 47 As Dhvani is the designation attached to a particular piece of poetic creation the Dhyanivadin says, it is not possible to comprehend Dhyani under the figures of speech, that are but angas to the angin Dhvani. The concept of Dhvani is old, no doubt, and the Dhyanivadin does not deserve the credit of introducing an altogether new idea of the process of revelation, inasmuch as, this process is known to Vaiyakaranas, also; but, what he deserves is signal honour, for smuggling the concept of revelation of meaning in the field of Poetry and at the same time declaring it as its very life. The Dhvanivadin, for the first time, shows also that Rasa is brought into comprehension through suggestion which is a power, belonging not only to meaning, but also to word: these are novel propositions and the criticism of Mahimabhatta that by propounding the definition of Dhvani, no new principle of literary criticism has been formulated by Anandavardhana does not stand. It is said that the doctrine of Dhvani is based on the theory of Sphota, and in explaining this Kārikā, Ānandavardhana himself points out that the use of the expression:  $S\overline{u}ribhih$  kathitah in it is highly significant, because it makes a clear confession of the indebtedness of the Ālamkārikas to Vaiyākaraṇas, and thereby points out the authority on which the Doctrine of Dhvani is based. Thus, the objection of Mahimabhatta that the insertion of the the expression  $S\overline{u}ribhih$  kathitah vitiates the definition by the fallacy of mention of the unspeakable, technically known as  $av\overline{a}cyavacana$  has no legs to stand upon.

The learned Dhyanikara maintains that, the relation of cause and effect exists between cognition of the expressed and realisation of the suggested,—the former leading to the latter: accordingly, he continues, a sequence exists between apprehension of the explicit and comprehension of the implicit, though of course, it is clearly perceptible in case of Vastu-dhvani and Alamkara-dhvani and imperceptible in case of Rasa-dhvani. Mahimabhatta uses this observation as an argument against the proposition of the Dhyanivadin that the implicit idea is revealed by the explicit one and the Doctrine of Dhvani is based on the analogy of Ghata-Pradipa-Nyāya. In case of a lamp revealing an already existent jar, the knowledge of the manifestor and the manifested occurs simultaneonsly: as in case of the explicit revealing the implicit, the knowledge of two appears in succession, the analogy of Ghata-Pradīpa-Nyāyais not applicable. In this connection he explains six types of possible Abhivyakti, and shows that none of them happens with regard to the suggested sense. In reply to this, Ruyyaka points out that, the definition of Abhivyakti as forming the object of perception, for the first time by the sense-organs in case of an effect that lies within its cause in a latent form is unauthorised. Its other definition also that renders it identical with Anumana is not acceptable. The question of revelation of a suggested sense being of the same nature as that of a rainbow does not arise, because, while the latter is non-existent, the former is an existent entity. What the Dhvanivadin means by Abhivuakti of a suggested sense and abhivyanjakatva of a suggestive unit is that, knowledge of the latter brings the former within the range of one's intellect, in the same way as a lamp makes known the

Ruyyaka asserts that the Dhvanivadin recognises only one type of Abhivyakti, that is based on the analogy of a lamp and a jar. As regards the objection that, cognition of the unexpressed does not appear simultaneously with that of the expressed, Ruyyaka says, a parallelism is introduced only to bring home a particular point of similarity: what the Dhvanivadin wants to clarify by introducing this parallelism is that, at the time of comprehension of the suggested the cognition of the expressed also lingers in the mind of an appreciator, in the same way as a lamp continues to exist even when the jar is known; he never says that the knowledge of the suggested appears simultaneously with that of the expressed. Thus, there is no real conflict of the concept of relation of cause and effect, existing between the expressed and the unexpressed with that of vyanjya-vyanjakı-bhava, linking the two. 48 The Dhvaniyadin certainly regards the expressed as a cause of the suggested: but he things that this relation is something other than that existing between a probans and a probandum, in which the former does not tinge the latter with its own colour: this relation, he says, is vyanjya-vuanjaka-bhava, characterised by presentation of the suggested with colour of the suggestive reflected on it. This type of presentation of the implicit is found in case of suggestion of Rasa, that is relished along with Vibhavas, Anubhavas and Vyabhicaribhavas, and without which Rasa has no existence, whatsoever. The experience of refined appreciators shows that at the time of enjoyment of aesthetic pleasure, the knowledge of excitants, ensuents and accessories persists in the mind of the perceiver. Thus it is clear that Rasa is capable of being brought into comprehension through suggestion and as such it is possible to assert its Abhivyakti. Mahimabhatta maintains that, as knowledge of suggested fact and imaginative mood appears definitely after the cognition of the expressed meaning, it is proper to explain their comprehension as being caused by inference. In reply to this, Ruyyaka says that, when it is an imperative necessity to postulate a separate function, known as Vyanjana in order to account for revelation of Rasa, it is better to explain suitably the

manifestation of Vastu and Alamkara, also, as being caused by that function. The Dhvanivadin believes that the implicit fact and figure are incapable of being brought into light through the functions of Abhidha and Laksana, -by Abhidha, because those do not constitute the conventional meanings and by Laks na, because the conditions necessary for its operation are absent. Moreover, the conditions of valid inference are conspicuous by their absence in the case of suggestion of a fact or a figure by another fact or figure. The point that knowledge of suggested Vastu or Alamkara does not appear simultaneously with that of the expressed meaning is without any value, because the Dhvanivadin himself recognises the existence of a sequence between cognition of the expressed and understanding of the unexpressed fact or figure: by positing the relation of vyangya-vyanjaka-bhava, as remaining between the two units, the Dhvanivadin only means this that at the time of understanding of the suggested fact or figure, the knowledge of the expressed fact or figure lingers in the mind of the appreciator. To this an objection might be raised by an Anumanavadin who might point out that, persistence of the knowledge of the expressed is possible at the time of cognition of the suggested fact, that is not contrary to the former, but such persistence is absurd at the time of understanding of a suggested fact, that is completely opposed to it, as in the verse: 'Bhama Dhammia Visattho' etc. in which the expressed meaning is affirmation, but the suggested one is negation. In reply to this Ruyyaka states that in case of this verse also, the knowledge of the expressed injunction lingers in the mind of the refined reader at the time when suggested prohibition is cognised, inasmuch as, he realises fully that the expressed meaning is merely a cloak, introduced by the speaker to cover up her real intention, and thus nothing stands in the way of existence at the same time, of both the ideas, though they are mutually opposed to each other in the mental plane of the appreciator. 49

According to Mahimabhatta, Rasa is an inferred entity and the probans that leads to its inferential knowledge is comprised of three constituents—Vibhāvas, Anubhāvas and

Vuabhicaribhavas. He thinks that Vibhavas, Anubhavas and Vuobhicaribhavas, presented on stage are artificial, because they are in no way related to the original personage, whose character is imitated only by an actor: in a similar way the feelings, in their turn, are unreal, because the actor exhibits only artificial moods, belonging actually to the original character. This inference of a semblance of mental condition, Mahimabhatta thinks, invariably causes pleasure. The inference of real mental conditions caused by real causes, effects and accessories does not always produce pleasure; and for this reason, it is possible to draw a line of demarcation between inference of ordinary world and inference in the realm of Poetry: the former produces pleasure, pain, hatred, anger and numerous other feelings, as the case may be: the latter produces supreme bliss without fail. In order to bring home this characteristic feature of an inferred semblance of mental condition. Mahimabhatta points out, the figurative expression 'Vyanjua' is used in connection with it, which is actually anumeya. Thus it is clear that the view of Mahimabhatta on the problem of aesthetic realisation is very much similar to that of Sankuka on the same issue. Like Sankuka he thinks that Rasa belonging to the original personage is superimposed on the actor, and this artificial mood is known through inference from unreal Vibhavas. Anubhavas and Vyabhicaribhavas, and this inference invariably causes delight. As against this view, Ruyyaka asserts that. according to the Dhvani Theorists, Rasa does not belong to the principal character; it, on the other hand, is a peculiar blissful state of ego, produced in the mind of a refined appreciator, who with his sense of narrow personality put into sleep realises the excitants, ensuents and accessories, presented in their generalised forms. The theory of Mahimabhatta, he says, fails to explain the fact that Rasāsvāda is a state of pure joy. Mental conditions are always inferred, but evidently, they are not always the cause of pleasure. The explanation that inference of artificial mental conditions, caused by unreal causes and effects produces nothing but pleasure does not seem to be convincing. In fact, while criticising the view of Sankuka, Abbinavagupta raises this relevant objection, and points out that, if there is pleasure in the inference of a mental condition, not actually existing in the actor, it is not clear as to how and why it should not be in the inference of a real mental condition. The Dhvanivādin regards Rasa as manifestation of bliss-portion of one's own consciousness: this pure consciousness, that remains covered by veil of ignorance in ordinary life, he says, is manifested by the transcendental function of Vyanjana at the time of perception of poetry, and as the veil of ignorance is removed, Atmananda shines in its undimmed glory, and consequently, nothing but pleasure is derived from appreciation of Poetry. Thus as Vyanjana is competent to raise Rasa into consciousness, the expression 'Vyanjya' can rightly be used in relation to it and there is no necessity of explaining the use of the term as a figurative one. <sup>50</sup>

It is curious to note that though a Naivavika, an ardent advocate of Anumana gives separate recognition to Laksana, Mahimabhatta comprehends it along with Vyanjana under the process of inference. According to him superimposition of identity between a cow and a man in the expression 'Govervā'ikah' leads to knowledge of similarity existing between the two, and in a similar manner, the use of such terms, between the primary meanings of which no logical connection can be established as in the expression 'Ganjayam Ghosah' leads to this knowledge that one thing is superimposed on another thing and in this way, ultimately the sense of the bank is inferred: the sense of extreme dullness and laziness of the carrier in the first expression as also the idea of excess of coolness and purity, he thinks, are known through Anumana. It is possible for a Dhvanivadin to refute this contention in the following way. In the view of the Alamkarikas, the indicated meaning in the expression 'Gourvahikah' is not the relation of similarity existing between the cow and the carrier, but the sense of the individual carrier itself. Then again, the inability of the primary meanings of the two terms used in the expression: Gangayam Ghosah to establish logical connection between themselves may, as well, lead to this knowledge that, by the

term Ghost the speaker actually means fish: there is no definite reason as to why the bank of the Ganges, alone, should be referred to by the term 'Gania'. Thirdly, the proposition that, proximity of one thing to another leads to inferential knowledge of an attribute, really inherent in the second as belonging to the first is unacceptable, because the probans, put forward is an inconclusive one. A human skull, rolling on the bank of the Ganges lies very near the flowing mass of water, but for that reason, it does not possess the qualities of coolness and purity, that are related strictly to the flowing stream. The relation of universal concomitance, as is supposed to exist between use of a particular word to signify a thing, that does not constitute its conventional meaning and signification of an attribute that does not originally belong to it does not really connect the two, and as such, no valid inference is possible in the present case. Moreover, all the systems of Philosophy irrespective of their difference in other points agree in this that, the secondary sense is brought into light through the function of Laksanā by a word; even Kumārilabhatta, who regards Lakṣaṇā as a function actually belonging to the sense-element does not consider that a word-element has nothing to do in the matter of signification of the secondary sense. Then again, the assumption that the secondary sense is an inferred one makes the connection of such a sense impossible with ideas, presented by words actually used in the proposition, because the dictums concerning verbal knowledge state that an expectancy raised by a word is to be filled up by a word only and no meaning, known through a source of knowledge other than verbal testimony is competent to enter into concord with other meanings, presented by śabla. These considerations go to establish the point of the Dhvanivadin that the separate existence of Laksana is to be posited, and it is not possible for Anumana to comprehend it. As regards the point of Mahimabhatta that the meaning, said to be brought into light by Tatparyaśakti is capable of being known through inference, the Dhvanivadin indicates that the observation of Mahimabhatta in this respect itself goes to falsify his stand. According to the learned Anumanavadin, the idea that, taking of meal at the residence of this particular man is more dangerous than swallowing of poison is gathered through inference by a man, conversant with the nature of the speaker, speciality of context and such other factors from the proposition: 'Swallow poison, but do not eat in this man's house'. The presence of a definite knowledge concerning speciality of the speaker, person spoken to and context in the mind of the man who comprehends tatparyartha is considered an essential factor; these conditions, however, are not required, in the least, to arrive at an idea through inference, in which simply a probans leads to knowledge of the probandum.

Mahimabhatta finds fault with the classification of Dhvani into two main types: Avivaksitavācya and Vivaksitānyaparavacya, and opines that the two designations themselves are inappropriate and inaccurate. The Dhvanivadin, however, finds no inaccuracy in these two names: he says that, in the first type, the primary meaning, being incompatible with the rest of the sentence is not accepted as such, and in the second type, the expressed idea is intended to be accepted, but, nevertheless the ultimate object of our cognition is the implicit idea, to which the former is rendered subordinate. Anandavardhana thinks that this classification of an expressed meaning, that suggests goes to classify ultimately the implicit idea itself, whose charm is so essential for the existence of Dhvanikāvya. 51 Thus, according to the learned Dhyanikara, the Avivaksitavacya type of Dhvani is based on Indication and the Vivaksitanyaparavicya type on Denotation, and in order to bring out their characteristic features it is necessary to give them these designations.

The point that as in Avivak,  $itav\bar{a}cya$  Dhvani, the  $v\bar{a}cy\bar{a}rtha$  is rejected, it is not possible for it to bring a suggested sense into light is without any value, because the  $v\bar{a}cya$  aspect of a meaning is entirely different from its  $vya\tilde{n}jaka$  aspect, and the very fact that a  $v\bar{a}cy\bar{a}rtha$  is rejected does not go to prove that its  $vya\tilde{n}jakatva$  also, is repudiated. Similarly meaningless is the argument that vivak, itatva of a primary meaning is irreconcil-

able with anyaparatva, as the opposite qualities of prominence and subservience are incapable of co-inhering in the same substratum, which, in the present case, is the expressed meaning. And this is so, because by vivaksitatva of the primary meaning, the Dhyanivadin does not mean its prominence; what he means is that, it is accepted in its original form, and by anyoparatva of this sense he wants to bring home the idea that the ultimate object of our cognition is the suggested sense. The objection raised by the Anumanavadin that, both Avivaksitavacya and Vivaksitānuaparavācua being varieties of Dhvani, mention of the term 'anyapara' in the designation of one of them is needless or if use of this term is felt necessary, it is to be used in the designations of both the varieties is baseless. As in Avivaksitavācya type of Dhvani, the expressed meaning is not accepted in its original form, the probability of its prominence does not arise, and so the learned Dhvanikara does not feel it necessary to rule out the question of its predominance; in Vivaksitanyaparavacya type of Dhvani, however, the expressed meaning is not repudiated, and so the question of its prominence is likely to make itself felt: in order to remove all doubts about this and to show that though the primary meaning is not rejected, yet it does not constitute the main object of relish, which is the suggested sense only, the Dhvanikara inserts the term 'anyapara' in the designation of Dhvani of second variety.

Mahimabhatta regards Śabdaśaktimūla type of Dhvani as a figment of imagination, because as he says, words are endowed with no function other than that of  $Abhidh\bar{a}$ . In explaining the stanza quoted by Ānandavardhana as an illustration of this variety of Dhvani,—the stanza, that runs as: ' $Datt\bar{a}nand\bar{a}h$   $praj\bar{a}n\bar{a}m$ ' etc. he points out that the non-contextual sense of cows is neither presented by the noun nor by the adjective nor by the noun and the adjective acting jointly, and as the non-contextual idea of cows is not cognised, the question of apprehension of a relation of similarity existing between the contextual and the non-contextual meanings does not arise. In reply to this animadversion, a Dhvanivādin, argues that the particular

non-contextual meaning is conveyed by the noun and the adjective acting jointly, inasmuch as, the noun presents such meaning as is compatible with the sense of the adjective and the adjective, in its turn, presents such idea as is capable of being brought into relation with the sense of the noun. A number of things, helping one another and ultimately combining to produce the desired effect is found in the case of earth, water and seed jointly producing the sprout. The objection of the Anumanavadin that this mutual co-operation of causes is found in case of those things only, between which the relation of cause and effect is natural, and the comprehension of vyan yartha being dependent on presence of appreciative genius in the mind of the refined reader, the relation of causality, supposed to exist between nouns and adjectives on the one hand and cognition of the implicit idea on the other is not natural has no legs to stand upon. According to the Dhvanivadin appreciative genius is not an accident, influencing the realisation of the implicit; it is a matter and an attendant or efficient cause, leading to knowledge of that idea. Thus the proposition of Mahimabhatta that the tradition of Sablasaktimula dhvani is established only by pedantic demagogues, who are clever in making use of ambiguous words is unsound and untenable. His point that words are incompetent to convey ideas, other than the primary ones renders the beautiful works of such writers as Bana and Subandhu nothing more than meaningless jargons. Moreover, the experience of refined readers shows that a second sense is clearly apprehended from poetical words, containing homonymous words. To an Anumanavadin who denies comprehension of such meaning, a Dhvanivadin answers by merely quoting the observation of Yaska:

Naisa sthāṇoraparā lho yadenamandho na paśyati; puruṣāparādhah sa bhavati.

which means: 'it is not the fault of the post that the blind man does not see it: it is the fault of the man concerned.'

Mammata and Viśvanatha consider a few illustrations, in which the suggested meaning is said to be known through the process of inference, and show that in none of these cases, the

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syllogisms, put forward by Mahimabhatta are valid ones. Mahimabhatta thinks that, in the Prakrta Gatha: 'Bhama dhammia' etc., the sense of absence of free movement is capable of being arrived at through anumana, the form of the syllogism being: 'Idam Godavarīnikunjam śvabhīrubhramanayogyam simharupabhayakaranasya sattvat. When arranged in the form of an Aristotellian syllogism, it takes the following shape:

No place that is inhabited by a lion is a proper place for free movement of a man afraid of a dog.

The grove situated on the bank of the river Godavari is inhabited by a lion.

.. The grove is not a proper place for free movement of a man, afraid of a dog.

As regards this syllogism, Mammata, and following him Viśvanatha point out that, it is vitiated by the fallacies of inconclusive, contradicted and unestablished Probans, and as such, is not valid. First of all, he says, even a coward may go to a place, knowing fully well that it is infested with a cause of fear being ordered by his preceptor or being prompted by considerations of love. So the proposition that the free movement of a coward is always preceded by a definite knowledge regarding total absence of cause of fear is not true, and consequently, the Probans is an inconclusive one. Secondly, a man, who is afraid of a dog in his eagerness to avoid its impure touch may be brave enough to face a lion, and thus, the knowledge of the lion's presence on the banks of the river Godavarī exist, as it does, with the free movement of a man, afraid of a dog, the Probans is a contradicted one. Thirdly, the presence of the lion in the grove is not known either through perception or through inference: it is known only from words, and those, too, of a lady of easy virtues,—a person, whose words are incapable of being relied upon; consequently, the Probans is unestablished, also. For these reasons, Mammata concludes, inference, applied by Mahimabhatta in place of Vyanjanā is fallacious. 52 Analysis of other illustrations, put forward by the Anumanavadin goes to establish this proposition. In the view of Mahimabhatta, in the verse: 'Suvarnapuṣpām' etc. the description of agency of

brave, learned and servant in the act of plucking the golden flowers of the earth goes to convey through inference the fact that riches are easily obtained by these three categories of persons. The Probans, introduced by him in this syllogism. however, is inconclusive and unestablished, because, firstly, the description of this agency is comptent to point out to insanity, as well, of three categories of persons, and secondly, the expressed meaning, residing only in the realm of the poet's imagination, is non-existent in the outside world. Moreover, according to the Dhvanivadin, the suggested sense in the verse under consideration is the excellence of the brave, learned and servant, and not the idea, supposed to be brought into light through inference by Mahimabhatta. Similarly, in the verse: 'Sikharini' etc. the implicit idea, whose charm invests the poetry with the status of Dhvanikavya is the intention of the passionate lover to kiss the lips of the lady, as also, to please her, and not merely the sense that, a taste of her lips is capable of being enjoyed only by persons, rich in religious merits, as explained by Mahimabhatta. In this connection, Mammata quotes the famous stanza: 'Nihśesacyutacandanam' etc., cited by a number of Alamkarikas and contends that, the implicit meaning, namely the fact that, the messenger approached the wretched lover. and that, too, for enjoyment is incapable of being arrived at through the process of inference: and this is so, because the Probans is an inconclusive one, inasmuch as, complete removal of sandal-paste from slopes of the breasts and total absence of redness of lower lip are effects of a dip in the lake, as well. The Dhvanivadin says, that the word 'adhama', implying infidelity, used in the verse helps the expressed meaning to suggest the new sense of affirmation; on the basis of this word, also, it is improper to regard the cognition of the implicit idea of affirmation as an inferential knowledge, because the wretchedness of the lover, which is deemed as one of the constituent factors of the Probans is unestablished and is known solely from the words of an infuriated heroine. Though Anumana fails to bring the idea, under consideration into comprehension, Vyanjana is able to do so, as it does not depend for its operation on the existence of the relation of universal concomitance, linking the expressed and the unexpressed. Jagannatha remarks that, this relation, though favourable to inference is definitely detrimental to suggestion, as in those cases in which it exists. Anumana steps in to replace Vyanjana. 58 The magic wand of suggestion, the Dhvanivadin says, does not require the valid conditions of inference in order to bring an implicit idea into light, and this, he argues, goes to establish the superiority of Vyaniana over other functions and processes. 54 The Anumanavadin thinks that in the stanza: 'atta ettha' etc there is no such valid reason as is competent to convey the implied meaning of affirmation, but the Dhvanivadin in reply to the criticism argues that, as the operation of suggestion does not stand in need of valid reasons, the idea of affirmation, conveyed through this function is comprehended clearly by a true connoisseur of poetic art. With regard to the Prākṛta Gāthā: 'Kassa va na hoi' etc. Mahimabhatta opines that, the idea that the lady has not onjoyed the company of her paramour as presented through inference is cognised by her husband: but, it is to note that, at ording to a Dhvanivadin, a number of suggested meanings, -all presented through suggestion are comprehended by different persons. Moreover, the reason, introduced in the so-called syllogism is inconclusive, contrary and unestablished.

The fallacies discussed before go to vitiate those syllogisms, also, in which reasons lead to inferential knowledge of imaginative moods. Thus in the verse: 'Lāvaṇyakāntiparipūritadiimukhe'smin etc., the agitation of the Ocean, put forward as a Probans is an inconclusive one, inasmuch as, this agitation is capable of being caused by movement of sea-vessels, earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, and thus is not a definite pointer to the idea that, the face is being presented with the form of the moon superimposed on it. Moreover, this reason is unestablished, because the whole description owes its existence to the imagination of the Poet, and as such, is objectively unreal. Viśvanātha observes that, this fallacy invariably vitiates syllogisms in all cases, in which one figure brings a fact or another

figure into comprehension: and this is so, because a figure resides only in the realm of a poet's imagination. It is this fallacy, which vitiates the so called syllogism in the stanza: 'Prāptaśrīreṣa kasmāt' etc. in which the figure Rāpaka, consisting in superimposition of identity of Lord Vāsudeva on the king is said to be presented through Anumāna, because, firstly, the Probans, but forward by the Anumānavādin here is identical with the Probandum, and secondly, the generation of doubts in the mind of the Ocean is an unreality.

The arguments, advanced above, in order to refute the contentions of the Anumanavadin go to repudiate the proposition of those scholars, as well, who like to comprehend Dhvani under Arthapatti. 56 This Arthapatti, through which from a known effect an unknown cause is apprehended is recognised as a separate instrument of cognition by the Vedantin; the Naiyayika, however, is of opinion that, this source of knowledge, being based on a type of universal concomitance, known as Vyatireka-vyāpti is mothing other than Anumana. The Dhvanivadin asserts that, for reasons discussed before, it is not possible to arrive at the cause, namely dalliance from the described effects, namely the changes, appearing in the limbs of the messenger in the verse: 'Nihśesacyutcandanam stanatatam' etc., and thus, Arthapatti is not competent to bring the suggested sense into light. The considered opinion of a Dhyanivadin on this issue is this that, the function of Vyanjana is incapable of being comprehended under the processes of Anumana and Arthapatti.

#### CHAPTER VII

# RELEVANCE OF SANSKRIT LITERARY THEORIES TO MODERN LITERATURE

T

## General Observation

Sanskrit literary theory gives a special status to 'Rasa' and declares with all emphasis at its command that this 'Rasa' constitutes the centre of gravity of Poetic Art. The semantic spectrum of the expression 'Rasa' is extremely wide, and an analysis of this extensive semantic spectrum shows that the concept of 'Rasa' is not merely subjective in character nor objective in nature; but rather it is a combination of subjective and objective components and is capable of being employed to signify the sense of 'Beauty'.

Literary theoreticians describe 'Rasa' as subjective in character; and say that by 'Rasa' is referred that mental state which is derived from experience of Poetry. This mental state, it is asserted, is comprised of Bliss and Bliss alone. The experience of the common appreciator indicates that even tasting of the Tragic and Disgustful leads to transcendental joy. This is so, possibly, because the Bliss which is derived from experience of Poetry does not depend on the character of the emotion presented or the nature of the subject-matter introduced, but on the self of the appreciator himself. Indian tradition believes in the principle that the Finite is the shadow of the Infinite,—the truncated is the reflection of the Great and the Sublime. The joy that is derived at the time of appreciation of poetry, therefore, is the joy associated with the Infinite,—the Grand and the Sublime.

Though Sanskrit literary theory pronounced this truth long back, it is only recently that the Western Aesthetics has

started a movement claiming that, the pleasure derived from appreciation of Poetry does not come from without, but from within the self of the experiencer. This is the common experience of the common man that, on witnessing a beautiful scene and on listening to a splendid melody, he enjoys himself more than the scenic beauty or the melody of the music. This justifies such questions as, 'how do you enjoy yourself?' rather than 'how have you enjoyed the scene or the melody?' The new school emerging in the area of Western Aesthetics, thus, has just started asserting that the joy derived from experience of Poetry is intrinsic to the nature of the experiencer and not external to him. This assertion had been made long back by Indian Aesthetics, which proclaimed times without number the identity of 'Rasa' with the Infinite,—the Grand and the Sublime.

Though the modern trends in Western Aesthetics have just started projecting the basic truth behind the experience of supra-mundane delight at the time of appreciation of Poetry, it has not been able to reach that height which had been arrived at by Indian Aesthetics. Indian Aesthetics which derives its inspiration from the Vedanta and the Saiva systems of Philosophy as also the system of Grammar, naturally, accepts the Absolute as unitary in character, and says that the entire creation is nothing but projection of this Absolute. The Vedanta system of Philosophy considers the world as transformation of the Absolute: the Saiva system regards the Paramasiva as the only real entity, others being merely reflections of this Reality; and the system of Grammar considers the Eternal Verbum as the only truth expressing itself in both the directions of the word and the meaning. The contention of the Vedanta and the Saiva systems, as also the School of Grammar that the Absolute manifests itself in diverse names and forms, and projects itself through different creations casts a deep impression on the thinkers belonging to the system of Indian Aesthetics, and they also declare the Infinite as the only real entity projecting itself through different expressions in the empirical plane. This Philosophy of Indian Aesthetics, which considers the Infinite as the only Reality prompts it to arrive at the Infinite in its search after the genesis of experience of delight.

When this Infinite is arrived at, the riddle is solved, because the Infinite always shines in its undimmed splendour and profoundity of joy. As a matter of fact, Existence, Consciousness and Bliss constitute part and parcel of the Infinite, and the Sublime cannot exist without Bliss and Consciousness. This linkage which Indian Aesthetics establishes between transcendental Bliss derived from experience of Poetry and the Infinite gives a new colour to its theories, and lifts it to a height that is incapable of being attained by any other literary theory of the World,—the English theory, the Greek theory, the French theory and the theories of other traditions.

It may not be out of place here to present the thoughts of Tagore on the concept of Beauty. In his endeavour to find out the linkage between the Good and the Beautiful, Tagore refers to the statement of Keats that, Truth is Beauty and Beauty is Truth, and says that the Indian concept of the Goddess Sarasyatī also envisages this combination of Truth and Beauty. The Upanishad proclaims with all emphasis that the entire creation is manifestation of the Sublime and consequently, is full of joy and truth. The entire creation is nothing but manifestation of joy associated with the Infinite: beginning from the dust under foot to the Sun blazing in the firmament there emerge joy and glory, constituting the part and parcel of the Infinite,—combination of Truth and Beauty. When the man tries to give expression to this joy through employment of language, the field for genesis of Poetry is created. When truth is arrived at through our sense-organs or through intellect, Poetry does not emerge: but when we arrive at the grand truth through our emotions and feelings, then certainly the path for emergence of Poetry is created. This, however, does not mean that there is no scope for employment of intellect in Poetry. Poetry is emotion no doubt, but still there is some place of creative intellect in it. When the human heart discovers Truth with its feeling and emotions, it tries to give eternity to that moment of surpriseful delight and delightful surprise through language, music and colour. In this process Poetry, Music and Painting are brought into being. Poetry, Music and Painting, therefore, belong to the same category of Art,—the art of giving expression to the surpriseful delight,— the joy of discovery of the sublime truth constituting a partt and parcel of the Infinite.

Sanskrit reflects the vigour, broadness and the desire to discover unity, lying latent in Indian mind and consequently, it is not possible to have an idea of Indian mind or Indian culture without a deep penetration into Sanskrit. Long back in the early dawn of human civilisation the Vedas proclaimed—the one Absolute stands still in the firmament like a huge tree: by this Absolute the entire universe is comprehended. With this proclamation, the search carried out by Science, Devotion and Affection, all could find their unified goal. So long Science had been conducting search in matters and movements out of curiosity,—timid devotion had been trying to locate a Supreme God,—and affection had been searching after its locus. With the issue of this proclamation in regard to existence of One in all entities, the search carried by Science, Devotion and Love, all came to an end. The Science realised the truth that in the world the one Absolute was to be traced; tired Devotion could locate its real object, and Affection proclaimed, the Absolute was dearer than children,—dearer than wealth, dearer than all mundane possessions. At that material moment the truth of the One, the fearlessness granted by One and Bliss constituting part and parcel of that One unified the universe and clothed it in profound beauty.2

Indian culture has been able to trace this One as the common bond in the midst of diversity,—as profound peace in the midst of all strifes and conflicts. When the universe is seen in fragments, it appears as ugly: when it is seen in totality, it appears an One steeped in fathomless beauty. The One Absolute.—the One above all beings keeps the entire matters and situations tied to a common string. It is for this reason that even the severest of sorrow gets itself merged in the concert of auspicious music emanating from the universe: it proclaims—the One Absolute stands firm in the firmament. Indian tradition believes that as long as realisation of this Absolute does not dawn in human mind, it does not experience joy or peace: it has to move about aimlessly in search after an anchorage. When, however, the experience of Bliss associated with this One is obtained, the mind experiences surpriseful delight and ex-

claims: 'I have been able to know that Great and the Sublime, living behind darkness': 'I have known that One experiencing whom One attains immortality'. The Poetry identified by a mind desirous of discovering this One is grand,—the poetical paintings carved out by this mind are great: they constitute the natural repository of profound enchantment. Thus the power of Sanskrit is limitless: its enchantment is everlasting.<sup>3</sup>

An analysis of the literary creations beginning from the Vedic period down to the modern times shows that in all these creations the artists have tried to discover this One. Even those literary artists who have selected modern Indian languages as their media of expression, have carved out poetical structures drawing idea from Sanskrit literature and have been able to project this desire to know the One have achieved lasting fame: their creations have acquired tremendous charm and natural enchantment.

The complete surrender of the dedicated thinker is evident in the first specimen of literature—'Lead us from non-existence to existence,-from darkness to light and from death to immortality. Oh. Self-luminous one; kindly extend protection with thy benign looks.' This tendency to trace the unified thread of goodness makes itself felt in the prayer of the Atharvaveda also: 'Let Firmament grant us fearlessness, let the Sky and Heaven grant it, let fearlessness be at our back and in front, down and above: may fearlessness come from friends and enemies alike, from known and unknown alike and from all directions'. This common bond of goodness has been referred to by the expression 'Brahma' in the Upanishads and 'ISVARA' in the Gitā. The observation of the Upanishads that the 'Universe is pervaded by the Absolute' and of the Gita that the 'God resides in the heart of hearts of all beings', thus, has been able to retain its enchantment for all time to come.

The great poet Kalidasa has been able to demonstrate this search after One in all his poetic and dramatic creations and consequently, his literary creations also have proved themselves to be repositories of eternal enchantment. It is because of this that the distinction between the lady and the river has vanished before his eyes; and the qualities of the lotus and the moon have found a happy habitat in the face of Pārvatī. The truth

is that those poets who have been able to realise this truth that all beings are created out of Bliss,—are sustained by Bliss and come back to Bliss—have been able to create literary compositions that are marked by profound beauty and endless charm.

In his attempt to trace the fibre of Indian culture, Tagore has pointed out to this special trait of Indian mind in one of his famous songs contained in Gitañjali<sup>4</sup>:

It is here that the ceaseless reverberation of the Grand 'om' Did arise in the hearts of all unifying them:

It is here that the diverse was consumed in the fire of unity. All distinctions lost and one total mind produced. Unlock the gate of this sacrificial sanctuary.

Of that grand worship and contemplation.

Here everybody is to come with heads subdued. At this sea-shore of sublime Indian Humanity.

The whole of Sanskrit literature reveals the attitude of the mind to trace the 'One',—the propensity of the heart to discover the Absolute and to search after the common bond of Goodness and Greatness. Sanskrit literary artists believe in the principle that Bliss resides in the Great and the Sublime and consequently, their modality has been to dedicate themselves to the Infinite and the Great.

Summing up this attitude of the Indian mind Tagore says:

Unite with all and untie this Knot (of small ego)! Intersperse all acts with thy tranquil music! Keep my mind unflickerning in thy lotus-feet!!<sup>5</sup>

II

# Poet & Poetic Process

Indian Aesthetics conceives of the Poet as a person in whom the faculty of realising the truth and the faculty of giving expression to the truth realised combine. In the literary artist,

it asserts, the capacity of seeing the poetic truth and the capacity of constructing the poetic image find a happy home, as a result of which it becomes possible for him to carve out the poetical painting competent to give expression to the cherished emotive content. This description of the literary artist, as given by Indian Aesthetics puts great emphasis on the Faculty of Imagination, since Imagination plays a significant role not only in the matter of identifying the 'Poetic truth', but in the sphere of finding out the 'poetical painting' also. Imagination, as a matter of fact, presents ever-new corruscations of ideas before the poet and enables him to see all things, as steeped in profound beauty: it is for this reason that the literary artist becomes able to present even ordinary things as resplendent in a new light,—as a splendidly charming category, endowed with the power of generating supra-normal delight.6

It is significant that Indian Aesthetics extends recognition to two types of Imagination: one belonging to the literary artist and the other belonging to the appreciative reader,—the ideal reader, to whom alone the specimen of literary art is addressed. In describing the role of Imagination in the process of creation of Poetry, Mammata states that this constitutes the germ of Poetry; without it Poetry is not produced; and if at all it is produced, it makes the Poetry ludicrous and instead of causing an enchantment for the document produced creates a definite dis-enchantment for it. In giving a detailed analysis of the part played by Imagination, Rajasekhara states that this faculty enables the creative artist to locate the emotion intended to be expressed, and at the same time presents words and meanings, metres and figures, styles and dictions suitable for giving expression to the emotion identified. This means that the Faculty of Imagination identifies emotions and at the same time carves out the image competent to give expression to the particular emotion.

Imagination, therefore, is of supreme importance in the process of creation of Poetry, which, according to the Indian Aesthetics, is capable of being analysed into three or four distinct stages. In his attempt to draw the line of demarcation between such poetic categories as the Guṇa, the Alaṃkāra and the Laksana, Abhinavagupta speaks of three different activi-

ties on the part of the Poet's faculty of Imagination. He proceeds to say that, the Poetic Imagination takes recourse to three activities or vibrations at three different stages and when poetic process passes through all these three stages, then and then alone finished Literary Art is carved out. In the very first phase of poetic process, Imagination identifies the emotion intended to be presented in the document of literary art and its corresponding quality, which is technically known as Guna in the terminology of Indian Aesthetics. In the second stage, this faculty introduces poetic figures, technically known as Alamkāras, as a result of which these poetic figures become organically related to the Art of Poetry itself. These poetic figures that are improvised at the second stage of poetic process bring themselves into organic relation with the Poetic Art, as a result of which, they become part and parcel of the poetic tissue. It is with reference to these poetic figures that Anandavardhana declares that these alone are intrinsic to the Poetic Art, being spontaneous in character. At the third stage of poetic process, Abhinavagupta asserts, the actual body of Poetry, consisting of the expression and the content is created. The charmingness of the body of poetry, which is the effect of the third vibration of Imagination is implanted by the factor, known as the Laksana. The Guna, therefore, originates at the first stage of poetic process; -Alamkara at the second stage and the Laksana at the third and final stage.7

All these show the fundamental role of Imagination in genesis of Poetry. Imagination enables the literary artist to locate the emotive content: it enables him further to identify the quality, the poetic figure, the characteristics, and above all the poetic texture itself,—the appropriate texture, which alone is in a position to give expression to the particular emotive content.

It is to be understood in this connection that when Indian Aesthetics speaks of Imagination as the factor responsible for locating the emotive content, it does not refer to the 'brute emotion' of the literary artist, but rather to the 'impersonal emotion' expressed by him at the time of creation of Poetry. Sanskrit Poetics is very particular in drawing the line of demarcation between 'brute emotion' expressed by the poet in his

capacity as an ordinary man and 'idealised emotion' as expressed by the literary artist throughout the operation of the creative process. When Valmiki, the first creative artist experienced grief on hearing the pitiful lamentations of the she-quail, he experienced ordinary grief; but when he contemplated on this grief, it was transmuted to tragic emotion and while coming out in the external world of existence assumed the shape of the great Epic,—the Rāmāyana. The sage Vālmīki approaching the river for a bath, thus, experienced ordinary grief; the literary artist Vālmīki experienced the grand and sublime tragic. It is not without reason, therefore, that the tragic emotion manifests itself in different forms in the entire movement of the plot of the Epic,-sometimes through the lamentations of the blind sage,—sometimes through the bewailings of the old king Daśaratha,-sometimes through the tears of Sītā, as she is carried out forcibly by Rāvana,—sometimes through the cries of Rāma and Laksmana,—sometimes through the lamentations of the spouses of Ravana and so on and so on. The tragic, as a matter of fact, pervades the entire atmosphere of the Rāmāyana. In drawing this line of demarcation between the feeling of the mind, which experiences and the feeling of the mind which creates, Anandavardhana says that, had Valmiki experienced only ordinary grief, it would not have been possible for him to carve out such magnificient poetical paintings, as are contained in the Rāmāyana. When a man is over-powered with grief, he certainly is not in a position to construct a composition worth the name, what to speak of a shining poetical painting. It is not without reason, therefore, that the eminent literary citic, T. S. Eliot says: "It it not in his personal emotion, the emotion provoked by particular event in his life, that the poet is in any way remarkable or interesting....the business of the poet is not to find new emotions; but to use the ordinary ones, and in working them up into Poetry, to express feelings which are not in actual fact emotions at all. ..... Poetry is not a turning loose of emotion, but an escape from emotion". And this 'escape' to which T. S. Eliot refers cannot come about except through poetic process and the creative emotion and in the very act of creating. The faculty of Imagination thus, enables the creative artist to escape from his personal emotion and

experience a transmuted elevated feeling, as a result of which it becomes possible for him to construct poetical paintings resplendent in their own light.

It may not be out of place to mention here that Modern Psychology draws the line of distinction between the drive or the 'crude emotion' on the one hand and 'transformed emotion' on the other. The drive, it is asserted, is the tendency to action, which is aroused by a need as its complementary art expression. Woodworth points out that habits may become drives and the quality of the habit will depend upon the culture of the individual and the society in which he lives. The permanent feeling, as contemplated in Sanskrit Aesthetics, therefore, is capable of being equated with the stable feeling,—the profound transformation of the crude primitive equipment through a marvellous socio-economic process: this is to be distinguished definitely from the 'brute emotion,'-the 'crude primitive quipment' in the terminology of Modern Psychology. The Sthayibhava is not activated emotion, but the abiding sentiment which can develop into emotion when confronted by appropriate stimuli.8

In explaining the concept of 'Beauty' and the role of Imagination in inducting beauty to the document of literary art, Sanskrit Poetics with all emphasis at its command, asserts that, charmingness is inducted by the action of the artist, the mind of the creator,—or to say more precisely, by poetic process itself. This poetic process is technically known as "Kavi-vyāpāra' in the language of Indian Aesthetics. It is curious to note that the Indian mind does not admit the distinction between 'beautiful' and 'ugly'; and proclaims that there cannot be any such thing as ugly in life. The latent idea is that when an art-form is given to the ugly, it becomes transformed into the most beautiful. When Sanskrit Poetics refers to this power of the poet and Poetry to unite under its light voke the irreconciliable,—to transform the deformed into the most beautiful, it certainly refers to the supreme power of the literary artist and the Art itself. This theory in regard to Kavi-vyāpāra of Sanskrit Poetics is exactly equivalent to the theory of Action of Mind of Modern Aesthetics, as is evident from the proposition of Addison, who writes: 'Anything that is disagreeable when

looked upon pleases us in an apt description. Here, therefore, we must enquire a new principle of pleasure which is nothing else but the Action of the Mind, which compares the ideas that arise from words with the ideas that arise from the objects themselves. For this reason, therefore, the description of a dunghill is pleasing to the Imagination if the image is represented to our mind by suitable expressions".

In his attempt to draw the line of demarcation between the ugly and the beautiful, Tagore formulates a new principle. resting his findings on the speculations of the Upanishads. Tagore says that, when the help of the external sense-organs is taken to distinguish the beautiful from the ugly, the gap between the two categories seems to be too vast: when assistance of the mind and the intellect is sought in addition to that of the sense-organ, the gap remains, but it becomes shortened to a great extent. Finally, when the assistance of the sense of goodness is taken, and the sense of goodness is commissioned to help the external sense-organ and the internal intellect, the distinction between the beautiful and the ugly vanishes and the whole universe appears as steeped in beauty. By 'sense of goodness' Tagore certainly refers to the concept that the world is sustained by a single string of the good and the beautiful,—the Infinite. It is because of this that though surrounded by streams of grief and trials and tribulations, sorrows and strifes, the mind becomes able to appreciate the charmingness of the shining sun, the round ocean, the blue sky and the gliding moon.

It is this eternal chord of the Infinite because of which even the severest of sorrow gets itself merged in the splendid concert emanating from the sights and sounds of nature,—the passions and actions of humanity. Resting his thesis on the Upanisadic Theories, Tagore indentifies this eternal craving of the mind for the Infinite, and says that when this Infinite is taken into account, and the whole universe is seen as the seat of the Infinite and the Grand—the 'Beautiful' and the 'Blissful', the distinction between the beautiful and the ugly vanishes. This approach of Tagore is definitely a confident approach, backed by the authority of the Upanishad, and confirmed times without number by the Gitā and subsequent

systems of Philosophy propounded by great thinkers of this great land. In the Gitā the Supreme Being in his attempt to inspire Arjuna proclaims: "Whatever is Sublime, Good, Auspicious, Mighty in the universe, understand that it exists as great and grand due to my splendour". It is evident that the Infinite affirms with all emphasis at its command that whatever is sublime and great is a manifestation of His power,—a fraction of His splendour. The Gitā thus describes Beauty as an objective property of the work of Art,—of the thing that is accepted as the beautiful.9

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## Beauty and Imagination

This takes the reader to a vexed question which repeatedly crops up in Aesthetic Theory,—the question as to whether or not Beauty is an objective quality. Since the concept of Beauty is to be equated with the quality of mental transfer, the issue naturally is whether the capacity to cause this mental transfer exists in the work of Art around. In its attempt to furnish a solution to this problem, Sanskrit Poetics says that Beauty is an objective property of the work of Art, but at the same time certain subjective instruments are necessary in order to appreciate it and to share the experience of the artist, who keeps himself cognisable in the object of Art. The object of Art is a beautiful and permanent record of an experience, because it could yield back the corresponding experience, which is an emotional one to another man of sensibility, remaining more or less constant to all sensitive appreciators, just as the scientific datum remains constant for all observers. But in order to enable the specimen of Art to create aesthetic experience in the mind of the reader, what is necessary is high sensitivity, which is the only instrument with the help of which an object of Art is to be approached. This sensitivity varies from individual to individual; but there is basic identity of the man's nature between individuals: it

is always possible for all readers possessed of this sensitivity to experience as objective truth the emotion of the artist inducted in a specimen of Art. Sanskrit Poetics, thus, expounds the proposition that, Beauty is an objective property of Poetry and that, this property is donated in the document of Literary Art by Kavivyāpāra or action of the mind of the poet. It, at the same time, says that Beauty is a subjective concept, inasmuch as, transplantation of emotion in the mind of the experiencer depends on a high-level sensitivity lying latent in him. The proof of the enchantment of the objective truth of Rasa lies in its fascinating experience by the reader; but the reader should be one of like heart with the poet. The objective truth of Beauty is witnessed by the identity of the reaction and experience of all sensitive minds.

Indian attitude is marked by a tendency to effect harmony between conflicting views and theories. Betraying the profound influence exhibited by this peculiar Indian attitude, Sanskrit Poetics tries to reconcile the concepts of 'objective science' and 'subjective art' also in the realm of Art, and declares that all distinctions between 'objective science' and 'subjective art' is practically invalid. It, is, therefore, useless to raise the vexed question as to whether Beauty is subjective or objective in the realm of Art.

All these take the critic to the doorway of the fundamental doctrine that, Poetry is the art of employment of expression for the purpose of transplanting the unique experience of the artist into the mind of the refined reader. The objective property of Poetry is donated by 'Kavivyāpāra': the subjective part is taken care of by the sensitivity of the refined reader. It is not without reason, therefore, that Sanskrit literary theories refer to both the poet and the critic as constituting the essence of Poetry jointly. It is said that the circuit of Poetry cannot complete itself without either,—the artist and the appreciator. Modern literary theory, also, defines Poetry in a similar manner, and expounds the Theory in regard to Poetic Circuit for proper understanding of the process of yielding back of the Poet's experience to another similarly delightful experience in the mind of the appreciator.

Once Poetry is conceived of as a process of employ-

ment of expression for the purpose of transplantation of experience from one mind to another, the question of admitting the two parties, necessary for this transplantation,—the Literary Artist, who transfers his experience and the refined reader, in whose mind the Art Symbol is transferred back into another experience naturally raises its head. Sanskrit literary theory employs the term 'Kavi' to signify the Literary Artist, who is described by Abhinavagupta as an Artist competent to create Poetry, full of charmingness and clarity through exuberance of emotion generated in his mind. Mammata, of later date maintains that the creative genius constitutes the causal factor of Literary Art, and in defining creative genius or Imagination says that, it constitutes the germ of Poetry; -without it Poetry is not produced, and if produced by force, makes the creation an object of ridicule. Bhattatauta speaks of the greatness of the Literary Artist, who is called a poet and a seer: a Kavi, he says, is one who combines in him the power of realising the truth and the power of describing the truth visualised. Poetry, thus, is not merely a literary composition: it is truth objectified through poetic tissue. The Doctrine of Sanskrit Literary Theoretician, thus, considers the poet as one possessed of genuine Rasa, seen through a rare capacity of having the most sensitive experience as also of the power of making an objective representation,—creating an Art-Symbol, which typifies the central feeling,-the centre of gravity of the Poetic Art.

While Imagination is an essential requirement for the Literary Artist, it is equally an essential requirement for the refined reader, to signify whom the technical term 'Sahrdaya' is employed in Sanskrit Poetics. While creative genius of Imagination belonging to the Poet presents words and meanings, metres and figures suitable for production of Art-Symbol before the Poet, Imagination, belonging to the refined appreciator enables him to identify himself easily with the characters and situations presented in Poetry and share the feelings of the Poet. The Aesthetic emotion gets transplanted into the refined reader only when the Art-Symbol of this emotion effects an ideal rewakening of it in him. The Sahrdaya of Indian Aesthetics is one who gets himself acquainted with

the literary creations of all master minds, as a result of which, whose mind becomes full of responsiveness to the events and characters presented in Poetry, consequential upon which there occurs an identification of his experience of Aesthetic emotion with that of the artist himself. In describing the different stages in the process of this unique transplantation, Abhinavagupta says that, the sensibility of the responsive reader first becomes attend to the emotional situation portryed: it then identifies itself with the portrayal. It is only when this identification is there that, the experience of the Aesthetic Emotion becomes a reality. Identification, it is asserted, is necessary for attainment of Aesthetic experience. The reader or the spectator has to observe the feeling as being inducted into his own self in order to enjoy it.

It is interesting to note that Sanskrit literary theory is not the only Theory to emphasise the part played by the refined appreciator in completion of 'Poetic Circuit'. Butcher, the famous commentator of Aristotle envisages the existence of an ideal reader or spectator to whom all specimen of Literary Art appeals; without this ideal connoisseur, he says, Poetry does not achieve its fulfilment, because the poetic circuit is left incomplete. The noted critic, C. Day Lewis, agrees with the views that the sensitive reader is of like heart with the Poet, so much so that the feeling experienced by the Poet are experienced in the same manner by the connoisseur. Virginia Wolf similarly advises: "Do not dictate the Poet. Try to be one with him. Be a fellow-worker and acomplice." It is not without reason, therefore, that Abercrombie, while describing Poetry says that, along with the experience transplanted into the mind of the refined appreciator, the moment also in which the unique experience had been derived by the Literary Artist is re-created in his mind, as a result of which there happens complete identification of the connoisseur with the artist. The objective of Poetry, which is nothing but an Art-Symbol, thus, is not to communicate the stuff of experience, but to re-create the moment in which the unique experience is derived and finally to effect transportation of the splendid experience itself into the mind of connoisseur. Imagination, belonging to the refined reader, thus, plays a vital

role in the process of completion of 'Poetic Circuit': it enables the appreciator to transfer back the Art-Symbol into a corresponding experience in his mind. There is sufficient justification, therefore, in the assertion of Baudelaire that in all the Arts there is a lacuna, which is completed by the Imagination of the reader.

Imagination consequently plays a vital role both in the process of creation of Poetry, as also in that of its appreciation; without it the Art-Symbol is not produced nor is it transformed into corresponding experience in the mind of the receptive reader. When Sanskrit literary theory defines the Poet as one endowed with the power of realising the Truth and the power of making objective presentation of the Truth realised, it takes note of the capacity of the Artist to locate the poetic truth,—the truth which is in a position to conduct humanity to the gateway of the Good through the shady avenue of the beautiful: when it describes the Poet as one competent to make objective presentation, it certainly tries to pin-point the power of the Artist to create an Art-Symbol. The clarification given by Susanne Langer, one of the most noted critics of the present century of the Art-Symbol deserves mention in this connection. This noted critic maintains that, the Art-Symbol is a virtual and not an actual object, and in its capacity as a virtual object this symbol establishes its habitat at a distance from nature. But this does not mean that the Art-Symbol is an unreal entity and is a sheer figment of imagination. The fact that works of Art float in a space-timecause world of their creation does not necessarily signify that they have no connection with life and reality. Aesthetic creativity is a part of life and reality, and this new order is its creation. There is sufficient substance, therefore, in the claim laid by Tagore that, 'Valmīki' composed the Ramāyaṇa before Rama was actually born and that Rama's birth in the imagination of Vālmīki was more profound and true than that of this monarch in the city of Ayodhya. There is equal sustance in the claim that the grand world-view flashed before the inward eye of Vyāsa and Sañjaya, when they were contemplating in silence far away from the actual spot of the bloody fight between the Kauravas and the Pandavas.10

The assertion of Susanne Langer that the Art-Symbol is a virtual and not an actual object reminds the curious reader of the statement made by the Philosophy of Grammar that word-meanings have fictive rather than factive existence: but that these fictions do have connections with life and reality, and consequently, they cannot be ruled out as purely intellectual abstractions. Resting his Theory possibly on this speculation of the Philosophy of Grammar, Anandavardhana states that, the Poet excels the supreme creator in all respects, inasmuch, as, while the creation of the supreme creator is regulated by laws of nature, these laws do not control the realm of Art, envisaged by the creative genius of the Literary Artist. The realm of Art is removed from ordinary world of experience, but, nevertheless, it is more significant and profound than the world which is experienced daily by man. And this is so, because aesthetic creativity is very much an expression of life and reality like any other act leading to evolution of human mind.

Sanskrit literary theory, thus, presents certain significant truths in regard to the Poet and Poetic Process, Imagination and Poetic Circuit, and these truths have found expression in new forms and have been emphasised in Western Literary Theory also. The reason is that the truths presented by Indian Aesthetics are eternal in character: they are applicable to all forms and expressions of literature, ancient and modern, old and new. The relevance of Sanskrit literary theories to modern literature, therefore, is astounding.

### IV

## **Doctrine of Suggestion**

Though the germs of the doctrine of Dhvani manifest themselves in the speculations of earlier theoreticians, Ānandavardhana is the first literary critic to give a full-bodied from to the concept and to enunciate a new principle of literary evaluation absorbing the concepts propounded by earlier theo-

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reticians. Ānandavardhana declares Dhvani or the symbolic content as the essence of Poetic Creation and hastens to observe that the best specimen of Poetic Art does not keep itself confined within the narrow limits imposed by the expression and the expressed; it transcends this limit and hints towards the symbolic content, which proves itself as one of inexplicable charm.

In his endeavour to establish the doctrine of Suggestion on a solid foundation, Anandavardhana refers to the viewpoints of the opponents, some of whom try to comprehend Suggestion under Denotation,-some of whom like to equate Suggestion with Indication and Inference,—and some of whom describe it as lying beyond the comprehension of words. After demolishing the animadversions of these opponents, Anandavardhana establishes his contention that Suggestion as a concept is a profound verity,—that it raises into comprehension the inexplicably charming Implicit, which constitutes the centre of gravity of all Poetic Art. The term 'Dhvani' employed by Ānandavardhana and other theoreticians signify a number of meanings: it refers to the suggestive unit: it signifies the sense of the symbolic content: it presents the meaning of the function of Suggestion, and at the same time, it refers to the whole specimen of Poetic Art, comprised of the suggested meaning, the suggestive unit and the function of Suggestion. Abhinavagupta, a brilliant exponent of Anandavardhana makes this point clear, and in his eagerness to show that the Doctrine of Suggestion is backed by the authority of the Science of Language demonstrates the fact that in arriving at the four concepts of Dhvani, Sanskrit literary theory has taken cue from the Science of Language itself.

Sanskrit literary theory attaches profound importance to the Function of Suggestion, because though this function initially starts from facts and figures, at the ultimate level it reaches the stage of 'Rasa', when the self gets itself merged in the profound Bliss of the Infinite. And Sanskrit theory believes that no Poetry worth the name can develop and place itself on solid foundation unless it gives a hint at the Infinite, and serves as the bridge between the Small and the Sublime, the Finite and the Infinite.

It is not without reason, therefore, that, Anandavardhana speaks of three types of suggested content: the suggested fact, the suggested figure and the suggested emotional mood. In his attempt to show that the suggested differs from the expressed in all its varieties, Anandavardhana cites a number of illustrations to demonstrate the distinction of the suggested fact from the expressed fact, and that of the suggested figure from the expressed one. The Function of Suggestion, Anandavardhana states, has got an effulgence of its own, and the moment a concept is touched by it, it aquires tremendous charm and surpasses all other poetical elements in point of strikingness. It is because of this magic which the Function of Suggestion possesses that the most deformed is transformed into the most beautiful in Poetry,—the fathomless grief is transformed into supra-mundane delight and moments of horror are converted into moments of sane and wholesome pleasure. When Shelley exclaims about Poetry and says: "Poetry turns all things to loveliness; it exults the beauty of that which is most beautiful, and it adds beauty to that which is most deformed; it marries exultation and horror, grief and pleasure, eternity and change: it subdues to union under its light voke all irreconcilable things",—he possibly refers to this great power of the Function of Suggestion.

Continuing his argument, Anandavardhana states that though the symbolic content expresses itself in three forms, it is the suggested emotional mood which is of real significance: it constitutes the centre of gravity of Poetic Art,—the be-all and end-all of poetic process; it is, at this 'Rasa' that the endeavour of poet and the appreciator culminates. The suggested fact and figure, therefore, are not ends in themselves: they provide means only to the ultimate end which is furnished by 'Rasa' of paramount significance. It has already been pointed out that 'Rasa' refers to a state of beatitude, which is experienced at the time of carving out of poetical paintings by the literary artist and appreciation of Poetry by the connoisseur of aesthetic sensibility. As a matter of fact, the whole basis of the Art of Literature is that the emotions and feelings directly excited by words and meanings should aptly intensify our emotions and feelings arising from contemplation

of the meaning. When emotions and feelings lying latent in the mind of the appreciator are called into play, as a result. of which he experiences his oneness with the literary artist and humanity at large, it is said that 'Rasa' has blossomed itself in its full splendour, enchanting the minds of all appreciators. Sanskrit Poetics, thus, expounds the principle of evocation of emotions and feelings by words and meanings acting conjointly, and not by words alone nor by meanings of themselves. There is profound justification, therefore, for the affirmation made by Sanskrit Poetics that while feeling is the soul of Poetry, sound and sense together form its body: the concept of this parity of the two implies that sound and sense both arouse nuances of feeling. It is this emphasis on sound made by Sanskrit literary theory that makes the Art of Poetry a close associate of the Art of Music. It is for this reason that Sanskrit Theory declares Poetry and Music as constituting the two essential limbs of the Goddess of Learning.

In elaborating the definition and classification of Dhyani, Anandavardhana has referred to two categories,—the category in which the suggested content manifests itself perceptively, and that in which this content reveals itself imperceptively. Accordingly, the former is called 'Dhvani' of perceptible process' and the latter 'of imperceptible one'. Anandavardhana connects this two-fold classification of Dhyani with three-fold classification of suggested content into the suggested fact, the suggested figure and the suggested emotional mood, and says that, while the case of suggested fact and figure comeunder the category of 'Dhvani of perceptible process', the case of suggested emotional mood, which is declared as constituting Dhvani par excellence is comprehended under the category of 'Dhvani of imperceptible process'. This linking of the three-fold classification of the symbolic content with the two-fold classification of 'Dhvani' comes to show the excellenceof the suggested emotional mood, that is 'Rasa' over the other two-categories of symbolic content,—namely, the suggested fact and suggested figure.

Anandavardhana expounds the proposition that the expressed content is cognised first and the suggested is comprehended next, and consequently there exists a sequence between

the understanding of the literal and the understanding of the symbolic. It is only that this sequence is perceptible in Dhvani of perceptible process, while it is not traceable in Dhvani of imperceptible variety. Anandavardhana further declares that in the intellect of the connoisseur the literal remains mixed up with the symbolic, as a result of which, the two conjointly constitute the content of a unified comtemplation leading to disinterested bliss. It is only the man initiated into the hieroglyphics of Poetry, who is in a position to catch the distinction between the literal and the symbolic, and to know that a particular literal content appears as profoundly charming, because it is in a position to reveal the symbolic content of paramount beauty. The charmingness of the literal content thus lies in its capacity to raise into comprehension the symbolic content of profound beauty.

Mahimabhatta takes cue from these observations, particularly the one relating to the sequence between the literal and the symbolic, and hastens to present a number of arguments in order to demolish the Doctrine of Suggestion and to show that Inference comprehends the concept of 'Dhvani'. Later Dhvani Theoreticians present a number of counter-arguments to show that the process of Inference-Cum-Reasoning is not in a position to comprehend the concept of 'Dhvani', which is regulated only by the logic of emotion. The controversy between Inference and Suggestion, as introduced in the works of 'Dhvani' theorists is capable of being explained in terms of the controversy between Intellect and Emotion, as projected by Croche in his magnum opus 'Aesthetics'. In projecting this eternal controversy Croche affairms that in the realm of Art, the main objective of which is to create and project Beauty and present it in its innumerable varieties, intellect has little role to play, and that it becomes necessary to take the help of emotion to appreciate Beauty in its myriad categories. It is not the intention of Croche to deny that inferential process ever takes place in comprehension of Beauty: it is only to establish that intuition has a significant role in the process of appreciation of Beauty. Similarly the Dhvani Theorist proclaims that inferential process does operate to some extent in the area of appreciation of Poetry, but it

is the emotion or intuitive process which plays a vital role in the area of poetic experience.

The major argument employed by the Dhvani Theorists to controvert the argument of the champions of Inference is that the understanding of the symbolic content does not follow the understanding of the literal alone, but that the function of suggestion is triggered into action by the sound, the literal, the letter, the compound, the metre, as also the musical power of the expression employed. The Dhvani Theorists thus do not rely solely on the literal sense for suggestive evocation, nor do they rely solely on the word as a phoneticentity possessed of musical sound for manifestation of the symbolic content. Anandavardhana does not deny the normal powers of language, and their utility in Poetry. Language, he asserts, signifies its normal content, at the initial stage, but soon this power is transcended, and words start signifying meanings other than the normal ones allotted to them. The Dhvani theorists, thus, approve the normal use of language, and this, as a matter of fact proves to be one of the strongest points in favour of the Dhvani Theory in contra-distinction to Symbolists' Movement in the area of Western Aesthetics. Paul Valery notices the great demand made by the poet on language, and suggests that the poet should employ a special type of language in his attempt to carve out poetical paintings, because the ordinary language is not suited to evocation of emotion. Stephen Mallarme, the father of French Symbolism, who had been trying hard to maintain the integrity of his Art by keeping faith with his intuition declared that, in order to remain faithful to the inner language of form, the poet must invent words and create images; he must mishandle and stretch the meaning of words. The strange words employed by the Poet are to be accepted without questioning, but always with fresh recognition.

In sharp contra-distinction to the French Symbolists, the Dhvani Theorists understand the danger of employment of private language and realise the fact that with employment of private language, Poetry is sure to loose its power of communication. The merit of the Dhvani Theorists lies in the fact that though they invested Poetry with incantational power,

they strongly resisted a regression to magical concept. The expressions employed in Poetry signify their normal meanings, but due to action of the mind of the poet they soon acquire the evocative power, as a result of which the ordinary limits of language are transcended and a new meaning is hinted at. In the matter of this evocation of the new meaning, the words and meanings, the metres and figures, the sound and musical power, all have their role to play. It is also asserted that the symbolic is incapable of being comprehended by those who know Grammar and Lexicon, but is located only by men of taste and literary understanding, who know the Science of Poetry. It is the province of the appreciative connoisseur, who is expert in discerning through the intrinsic texture of veiled words and sounds and capable of locating and identifying himself with the aesthetic emotion that stays behind the poetic tissue.

Mahimabhatta thinks that, only the meaning of the word is relevant in the process of evocation of emotion, and the word as a separate entity has no role to play in this process. This is the safest position for him, for if a direct power is conceded to the word as a distinct entity, the case for Inference becomes weakened. It is here that the Dhvani Theorist takes the wind out of the sail of Inference, and says that emotions and feelings are directly excited by words also,by the musical power lying latent in them, apart from the expressed meaning. Anandavardhana, as a matter of fact, refers not only to this intrinsic suggestive quality of words, but also to their capacity to raise into comprehension different types of implicit due to their position. He further proclaims that, while certain categories of sounds are favourable to revelation of certain sentiments, others are detrimental to the evocation of these emotions.

The stand taken by Sanskrit Poetics on the issue of musical power and evocative power of language is thus clear. It proclaims that poetical paintings are to be carved out through employment of ordinary language which are to be employed in their ordinary meanings; but language is to be surcharged with suggestive power in such a way that, it can soon transcend its ordinary limits and cause evocation of emotion of

not have the aura alone. (Ezra Pound: His Metric and Poetry).

V

# The Doctrine of Aesthetic Experience

Though Anandavardhana declares the suggested content as constituting the soul of Poetic Creation, he hastens at the same time to say that, the centre of gravity of Poetic Art is represented by suggested emotion alone, and neither by the suggested fact nor by the suggested figure. Abhinavagupta, the learned commentator of Anandavardhana clarifies this position of his great master, and categorically affirms that, the soul of Poetry is represented by suggested emotion and that, as the suggested facts and figures excel the expressed facts and figures in point of strikingness, they are referred to as the soul of Poetry. Continuing this argument, Abhinavagupta says that, the suggested facts and figures are not ends in themselves: but rather they constitute means to the ultimate goal, which is represented by attainment of Aesthetic Experience. This Aesthetic Experience is technically signified by the term 'Rasa' which has got an extensive semantic spectrum in Sanskrit literature and literary theory. Sanskrit Theory asserts that 'Rasa' belongs to the creative artist,—the refind reader, as also to the specimen of literary art.

The small aphorism of Bharata constitutes the starting point of multi-structured discussions on the theory of Aesthetic Experience: the different interpretations furnished by commentators of different periods of this aphorism give rise to different theories, which emphasise the one or the other element in Poetry. The small aphorism of Bharata states that, 'Rasa' is brought into being through combination of the excitant, the ensuent, the permanent and the transient moods. To signify the excitant, the ensuent, the permanent and the transitory feelings, Bharata employs a few technical terms, which need introduction at the present moment. The term 'Vibhāva',

profound intensity. In causing this evocation of emotion the help of expressed meaning alone is not to be taken: the musical power of words is to be utilised to a great extent. Sanskrit Poetics thus betrays its fascination for music, but, at the same time, it says that the poet cannot ignore the denotational meaning of words: he is required to work with the help of the explicit sense, as also the sensuous quality of sounds. The suggested meaning is the third dimensional meaning, which is an overtone of the expressed and not a total cancellation of it. It is interesting to note that though the French theory of Symbolism has close affinities with the Doctrine of Suggestion of the Dhvani Theorists on a number of issues, it differs from the latter on two major issues,—on the nature of the language to be employed in Poetry, and on the effect of music associated with language. Stephen firmly believes in the suggestive power of Poetry, and declares that, higher realities can be expressed only through the medium of musical verse. He envisages a new category of language for Poetry. With this language, he sets out to translate his inner visions that have nothing to do with logic, but constitute an action of superior reality. Anandavardhana does not envisage creation of a new category of language: he says that, the best specimen of Poetic Art can be created through employment of the ordinary language: the only thing is that it is to be handled with great care by the poet gifted with the power to realise the truth and give an objective description of the truth realised. The familiar functions of language like Denotation, Indication etc. are to be utilised; but they have to be handled properly in order to enable the reader to have a glimpse of the Infinite. Nevertheless, the poet's instrument for such evocation is still the word. The word and the meaning thus conjointly raise into comprehension the symbolic content of profound beauty. This is why T. S. Eliot also does not accept Mallarme's claim of the identity of Poetry and Music. He realises the basic principle that sense cannot be sacrified to sound nor can sound to sense. While recognising the importance of Suggestion, he exclaims that suggestiveness of Poetry is the aura around a bright clear centre; but one can-

employed by Bharata refers to the characters and situations introduced by the literary artist for depiction of the particular emotion intended to be delineated by him. The 'Vibhāva', thus, is the literary symbol of the ordinary characters and situations, with which one comes across in the ordinary world of experience. This means that the actual character, which forms the locus of the 'Rasa', is not the 'Vibhāva', but an ordinary individual exciting pain or pleasure, hatred or horror in the mind of the experiencer. When the literary artist carves out a literary symbol to signify this ordinary character, he assumes a magnified role, and consequently, the exalted term 'Vibhava' is employed to signify him. The ordinary cause leads to pain or pleasure, as the case may be; it is the ordinary cause of ordinary feeling. The extra-normal 'Vibhava' is the cause of the significant emotion, which has its life in the poem, and not in the poet himself. This significant emotion always leads to unalloyed joy or unmixed bliss.

In explaining the term 'Anubhāva', Sanskrit literary theory applies the same principle, and asserts that when the ordinary fact is presented in Poetry through literary symbols it acquires a new dimension, and consequently the term 'Anubhāva' is employed to signify it. The Vibhāva, thus is the literary symbol of the cause of the significant emotion: it is the literary symbol of the characters and situations carved out by the literary artist, who does not experience ordinary feeling, but rather a transcendental one at the time of creation of Poetry. Anubhāva similarly refers to the literary symbol of effects of certain emotions, which are not ordinary, but creative and significant.

In his attempt to explain the concept of 'Rasa', Bharata employs two other technical terms,—Sthāyibhāva and Vyabhicāribhāva, which also need explanation. The Sthāyibhāva is the permanent mood that lies latent in the form of emotion in the minds of all persons irrespective of their place of residence or time. This permanent mood is incapable of being dissociated from the mental plane: it is not possible to locate a single person who does not have the play of this feeling. In sharp contradistinction to the Sthāyibhāva, Vyabhicāribhāva is a transient feeling, which appears and disappears and does not reside in

the mind in the form of latent impression for all time to come. Thus, Sthāyibhāva is permanent, while Vyabhicāribhāva is transient. It is to be understood, however, that the Sthavibhava is not the crude primitive equipment of modern Western Psychology, but its transformation through socio-cultural process. The Sthāyibhāva, thus, is not simply the 'drive' of modern psychology, but an abiding transformed sentiment, which can be developed into emotion, when confronted by appropriate stimuli. This is evident from the fact that while Sanskrit literary theory speaks of inborn disposition belonging to the refined reader, it, at the same time, affairms that, the competence to enter into mystery of Poetry can be acquired through experience and study. In Art the crude emotion, as a matter of fact, has no place, because as Sanskrit literary theory declares, the delectability of an emotion depends on the fineness and complexity which it attains in the course of evolution. The Vyabhicāribhāva, similarly, is not a crude or raw feeling but its transformation through socio-cultural process. This transformation of the crude emotion is effected through the action of mind of the literary artist, which is technically known as 'Kavivyāpara'. The literary artist takes help of expressions in his endeavour to carve out poetical paintings: these expressions are endowed with tremendous power to transform the ordinary into the extra-ordinary,—the normal into the extra-normal. The significant emotion, therefore, may not be identical with those of real life, but it is more idealised, and more sensitively organised. According to Bharata, this sensitive organisation is effected through building up of an integral pattern of stimuli corresponding to the cause and effects of feelings, ordinarily found in the ordinary world of experience. The literary artist creates literary symbols of these stimuli and other accessories, and when combination of these symbols takes place, the integral pattern of Poetry is created: this integral pattern effects transformation of the ordinary feeling into idealised one, as a result of which, the experiencer derives supramundane delight.

It is interesting to note that the identification of the 'objective correlative' is regarded as one of fundamental importance in the scheme of Western Aesthetics. In one of his famous Essays T. S. Eliot observes that, since the emotion constitutes

the centre of gravity of all Poetic Art, the prime purpose of the poet is to create appropriate 'Objective Correlatives', that are related to the feeling-element intended to be depicted in the specimen of Poetry. By the expression 'Objective Correlative' T. S. Eliot refers to those characters, situations and moods, that are related to the pre-dominant feeling and consequently, are in a position to evoke emotive experience in the mind of the connoissure. This analysis of the concept of 'Objective Correlative' shows that the 'Objective Correlatives' are identical with the Vibhava, Anubhava, etc. of Indian Aesthetics. Indian Aesthetics observes that the Poet presents generalised characters, universalised stimuli, generalised responses and universalised moods and feelings, and when the reader gets himself acquainted with these universalised concepts, he necessarily derives supramundane delight. Eliot's concept of 'Objective Correlative', thus, corresponds to the concept of the universalised Vibhava, Anubhāva, Vyabhicāribhāva and Sthāyibhāva of Indian Aesthetics.

It is necessary at this point of time to have an idea of the concept of 'universalisation' as projected by Sanskrit Poetics. Among Sanskrit literary theoreticians, Bhattanāyaka is the first to expound this concept of universalisation, technically known as 'Sādhāranīkarana' in the terminology of Sanskrit Poetics. What is meant by this is the process through which the poet and the experiencer both become free from the limitations of the individual or personal ego, as a result of which, what is experienced is the universal feeling of the universal man. Sanskrit literary theory takes care to draw the line of demarcation between the mind which experiences the 'brute emotion' and the mind which creates Poetry, and says that, it is the action of the mind of the creative artist that, transforms the ordinary 'brute feeling' into 'generalised emotion', which produces transcendental Bliss and Bliss alone. Bhattanāyaka thinks that, at the time of enjoyment of Poetry, the feeling is experienced neither as mine nor as another's; but as one of infinite extension: he is of opinion that, this is the unique nature of aesthetic appreciation or enjoyment and the artistic media contribute to genesis of this fantastic experience. While in the specimen of Poetic Art this commonness of emotional experience is effected by language and meaning, aided by metres and figures of speech, in a specimen of Dramatic Art this is produced by different types of acting, stage make-up, and diverse other theatrical devices.

Western Literary Theory recognises this distinction between the mind which experiences and the mind which creates, and admits further that it is the action of the mind of the creator which gives a transformation to the ordinary feeling and converts it into a universal one. In elaborating this process T. S. Eliot says: "the analogy is that of the catalist. When the two gases are mixed in the presence of a filament of a platinum they form sulphurous acid. This combination takes place only if the platinum is present: nevertheless, the newly formed acid contains no trace of platinum, and the platinum itself is unaffected; has remained inert, neutral and unchanged. The mind of the Poet is the shred of the platinum". What Eliot means is this that, the mind of the individual poet first derives experience of a thought,—a feeling; then it locates the objective co-relatives; and after this he carves out poetical paintings appropriate to expression of the experienced feeling, now transformed into a blissful universal experience. It is the action of the literary artist, that serves as the shred of platinum because it is due to this action that the ordinary stimuli are converted into universal stimuli, common ensuents are converted into generalised ensuents and personal feelings are transformed into universalised emotions.

It is necessary at this point of time to have a detailed discussion on the experience of the individual poet and the experience of the universalised poet. When the literary artist is guided by mundane thoughts and derives an individual experience, his mind acts no doubt, but it acts at a lower level. When he starts creating Poetry; his mind acts at a high level, as a result of which his narrow individuality is rendered docile and an expansion of personality takes place. When this happens, what the Poet creates is delectably experienced by the universe.

Interestingly enough, Tagore draws a line of demarcation between the two stages in which the mind of the individual poet works. The first stage is referred to by him as the 'workshop of the individual mind; the second stage is referred to as the 'workshop of the universal mind'. By referring to the first as 'workshop of the individual mind', and to the second as the

'workshop of the mind of the universe', Tagore draws the line of demarcation between the individual poet and the impersonal poet, and admits the principle of universalisation, which transforms the ordinary into the extra-ordinary. It is because the process of universalisation operates in two tiers, both at the tier of creation of Poetry and its appreciation, that the ordinary experience of the individual poet blossoms forth as extraemotive experience and the feelings strictly belonging to the characters appear as universal feelings. As the poet is universalised, the stimuli, as well as the situation are universalised and the experiencer also is generalised. So it becomes possible for him to share the feelings of the artist and it becomes possible for Poetry also to effect connection between the mind of the poet and the mind of the experiencer,—the mind of one with that of another,—the past with the present, and so on. It is not without reason, therefore, that while defining Poetry, Tagore dwells upon the etymological meaning of the expression 'Sāhitya' and says that Poetry not only effects union between thoughts and expressions, but also between man and man, poet and reader, past and present, and so on. This observation of Tagore is almost similar to the observation of Tolstoy who says that Art has the characteristics of uniting the man with all members of humanity, nay with the bigger association of universe.

The Poetry, therefore, is not an expression of Poet's individuality: it is the expression of a universal mind, so much so that, the feelings of the literary artist are shared by the refined reader. It is this sharability of experience, that constitutes the criterion of Asthetic Experience. When the literary artist carves out poetical painting, the 'workshop of the universal mind' starts operating, as a result of which, what comes into being proves itself to be an entirely new creation, different from the ordinary world of experience. As the land created by the Imagination of the poet is not regulated by the ordinary laws of nature, there is perfect autonomy in the realm of Poetry. It is not without reason, therefore, that Anandavardhana, the brilliant exponent of the doctrine of Dhyani refers to the Poet as the supreme creator of the land of Poetry, and emphatically asserts that, the world takes different shapes and forms according to the mental inclination of the artist. Continuing his argument,

Ānandavardhana says that, if the Poet is competent enough to locate 'objective correlative's suitable for manifestation of sweet sentiments, the whole world is sure to appear as full of beauty and joy: if, on the other hand, he is of a different mental attitude and inclination, then the world is likely to appear as insipid and dry, and full of despair and strife. In elaborating this assertion of Anandavardhana, Abhinavagupta says that, what is meant is that, the literary artist should be taken to be suffused with the delectation of the various ingredients of a love-situation or a tragic-episode, as found in literature. This assertion of Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta shows that, Sanskrit Poetics does not consider 'brute emotion', belonging to the individual poet as the central feature in Poetry. At the time of creation of Poetry, 'brute emotions' are converted into 'significant emotions' which generally lie not in the life of the Poet, but in Poetry itself.11 It is interesting to note that, T. S. Eliot introduces the concept of 'creaive emotion', as distinct from the 'brute emotion', : this 'creative emotion' is sometimes referred to as 'significant emotion' also. Brute emotions are experienced in the ordinary life of the artist: these emotions are transformed into 'significant emotions' when the 'workshop of universal mind of the artist' starts operating.

It may not be out of place to discuss here Tagore's concept of 'Rasa', and make an analysis of the relation existing between the creative artist and the receptive reader. Tagore allows an extended scope to the concept of 'Rasa', and asserts that it is virtually indentical with the Infinite, and hence belongs both to the Poet and the Connoissuer,-both of whom derive supramundane delight, springing from experience of Beauty, because Bliss and Beauty constitute part and parcel of the Absolute. In his attempt to explain Poetic Process, Tagore says that, the man is inhabited by One, who gloriously resides in his own self and he is extremely eager to find the unity of this One with the One residing in the external world. When the mind realises the identity of the One existing in the external world of appearance with the One residing in his own self, he has this feeling that, he is a great member of the grand Association of Universe, and consequently he derives unmixed Bliss. When this process takes place, 'Rasa' is described as being

experienced, because according to Indian Theory, it consists in enjoyment of the self by the self. Since human mind is eager to trace his own self in the universe and the universe in his own self, appreciation of Poetry or of any specimen of Art removes all impediment that stands in the way of realisation of this experience; the same experience is shared by the literary artist, locus of the original 'brute emotion' and the appreciative reader. For this reason, Sanskrit Poetics refers to the connoisseur, the literary artist and the original character as experiencing the same feeling. Tagore refers to this complete unity of heart between the literary artist and the connoisseur and says that, at the time of appreciation of Poetry, as also its creation, the narrow individualities of the reader and the artist are put into sleep, as a result of which the ego-boundaries of both expand. In this connection, Tagore tries to draw a line of demarcation between the 'truth of fact' and 'truth of Poetry'. Truth of fact or factual truth, he says, is capable of being communicated by ordinary function of Denotation: it has a limited scope, and it can easily be deciphered by the common mind: the Truth of Poetry or the Poetic Truth is raised into comprehension by the function of Suggestion, which knows no limit, being infinite in dimension. It is necessary for the creative artist to begin functioning of his 'Workshop of the universal mind' from the starting point of ordinary fact, but it takes only that much of help from the ordinary fact, which is just necessary to project the infinite truth in its brightest splendour. Kālidāsa, therefore, does not take the help of ordinary measure or yardstick to project the height of the Himalayas, but simply says that, the lotuses shining in the lakes situated on the top of the Himalayas are made to blossom by the upward rays of the Sun, which revolves below the great mountain. The Poetic Truth does not follow the path of reason, but it creates a deep impression on the mind, and presents to the reader the Bliss associated with his own self. Naturally, the function of the 'Workshop of the universal mind' of the poet can carve out such poetical paintings. Bhattanāyaka and Abhinavagupta both, therefore, hold that the direct perception of 'brute emotion' in nature cannot yield that kind of aesthetic delight, which only the representation of it by a con-

summate poet can give. And this is given rise to by the Poet with the help of his artistic power.<sup>12</sup>

In this connection it may be profitable to close this observation by referring to the concept of 'Sādhāraṇīkaraṇa' as projected by Sanskrit Poetics. In his endeavour to explain the process of Sādhāranīkarana, Bhaṭṭanāyaka admits a new function known as Bhābhakatva, which belongs to the poetic structure as a whole and which enables the appreciator to understand the personal excitants and ensuents as impersonal ones. Abhinavagupta, however, feels that though Sādharaṇi-karaṇa is an essentiality for Aesthetic Realisation, it is evoked naturally by the Function of Suggestion, which is in a position to create wonders,-to communicate all types of meanings,-and to transform the ordinary into the extra-ordinary. In explaining the concept of Sādhāranī-karana, Sanskrit Poetics says that, such characters as Sītā and Sakuntalā do not appear as particular ladies standing in particular relationship with particular persons, but as lovable and cultured ladies on the threshold of their youth. It is not that Sītā or Sakuntalā appears as the lady in general, because this presentation is in a position to jeopardise Aesthetic Realisation. In explaining this process of Sādhāraṇīkarana, Abhinavagupta shows how a glutton's tasting of food differs from that of a real taster. The glutton is attentive to the food: but the real taster is inattentive to it; he is most attentive to its taste and the relish of enjoyment. In the case of the glutton's taste of food, the food itself serves as an impediment; in the case of the taster's taste this impediment is off. In case of appreciation of Poetry, thus, the object,—the characters and situations and 'brute emotions'-ultimately disappear, and self experiences repose in itself. It is this joy which is described as Aesthetic Delight. The appreciator, who is in a position to experience this joy,—to ignore the objective entity remaining outside is known as 'Sahrdaya'. As at the time of appreciation of Art of Poetry, characters and situations lose their individualities, and the reader also enjoys his own self, all obstacles disappear and nothing stands in the way of the father and the son, the mother-in-law and the daughter-in-law enjoying the same scene sitting together. Abhinavagupta makes this point clear, and concludes by saying that the vital essence of 'Rasa' depends on

common sharability of experience. It is because of this that the feeling of 'involvement-cum-detachment' is tracable in Aesthetic Experience. This is so, because the narrow individuality of the appreciator is put into slumber, as a result of which he is 'detached': since, however, he experiences the Poem as a member of the universe, he is 'involved' to some extent. In his individual capacity the appreciator is detached, but in his universal capacity he is involved. It is this combination of contradictions that has prompted Sanskrit Literary Theory to describe 'Rasa' as inexplicable,—'Anirvacanīya'. All this makes the position clear that Sanskrit Literary Theories have not lost their relevance in contemporary society: it is possible to adjudicate the beauty and excellence of contemporary writings by applying concepts and principles introduced in Sanskrit Theory. Indian mind which has a special fondness for universal, thus, could project long back certain theories, applicable to all types of literature of all ages,—theories, that have been able to maintain their relevance and enchantment for all time to come.13

### REFERENCES

#### CHAPTER I

- 1. Yadetat vānmayam viśvamarthamūrttyā vivarttate/ So'smi Kāvyapumānamba pādau vandeya tāvakau// —KM, I., p. 6.
- Sabdarthau te śarīram samskṛtam mukham, prākṛtam bāhuh jaghanamapabhramśah, paiśācam pādau, uro miśram...ukticanam ca te vācah, rasa ātmā, romāni chandāmsi, prasnottarāpravahlikādikam ca vākkelih, anuprāsopamādayaśca tvāmalamkurvanti.
- —KM. I, p. 6. 3. Yā dugdhāpi na dugdheva Kavidogdhṛbhiranvaham/ Hṛdi naḥ sannidhattāṃ sā sūktidhenuḥ Sarasvatī// —KM. I, p. 6.
- 4. Mā niṣāda pratiṣṭhām tvamagamaḥ śāśvatīḥ samāḥ/
  Yatkrauncamithunādekamavadhīḥ Kāmamohitam//
- —KM. I, p. 6.

  5. Ānvīkṣikī trayī vārtā daṇḍanītiśceti vidyāḥ. Trayī vārtā daṇḍanītiśceti mānavāḥ. Trayīviśeṣo hyānvīkṣikīti. Vārtā daṇḍanītiśceti bārhaspatyāḥ. Saṃvaraṇamātraṃ hi trayī lokayātrāvid iti. Daṇḍanītirekā vidyetyauśanasāḥ. Tasyāṃ hi sarvavidyāraṃbhāḥ pratibaddhā iti. Catasra eva vidyā iti Kautilyaḥ.

  —AS. 1, 2, 1-8.
- Pañcamī sāhityavidyā iti yāyāvarīyah. Sā hi catasṛṇāmapi vidyānām niṣyandah. . . . śabdārthayoryathāvatsahabhāvena vidyā sāhityavidyā. —KM., pp. 4-5.
- 7. Tatrābhidhāvivakṣā'ātparyapravibhāgavyapekṣāsām arthyānvayaikār-thībhāvadoṣahānaguņopādānālaṃkārayogarasāviyogarūpāḥ śabdār-thayordvādaśa saṃbandhāḥ sāhityamityucyate.
- —SP. (VII), Quoted in KM. edn. p. 133.

  8. Niyatikṛtaniyamarahitām hlādaikamayīmananyaparatantrām/
  Navarasarucirām nirmitimādadhatī bhāratī kaverjayati//
  Niyatiśaktyā niyatarūpā sukhaduhkhamohasvabhāvā paramānvādyupādānakarmādisahakārikāraṇaparatantrā ṣaḍrasā na ca hṛdyaiva taiḥ tādṛśī Brahmano nirmitirnirmāṇam. —KP. I. 1.
- 9. Apūrvam yad vastu prathayati vinā kāraṇakalām
  Jagad grāvaprakhyam nijarasabharāt sārayati ca/
  Kramāt prakhyopākhyaprasarasubhagam bhāsayati tat
  Sarasvatyāstattvam kavisahṛdayākhyam vijayate//
- —LC., I, p. 1.

  10. Catvāri śṛṅgā trayo asya pāda dve śīṛṣe sapta hastāsoasya/
  tridhā baddho vṛṣabho roravīti mahāñ devo marttyān nāviveśa//
  —MB., quotation I, p. 37.

Anādinidhanam brahma śabdatattvam yadakṣaram/ Vivartate'rthabhāvena prakriyā jagato yataḥ// Ekameva yadāmnātam bhinnam śaktivyapāśrayāt/
Apṛthaktve'pi śaktibhyah pṛthaktveneva vartate//
...
Ekasya sarvavījasya yasya ceyamanekadhā/—VP., I, 2, 4.

11. Kāvyālāpānsca varjayet—Quoted by Mallinātha and other commentators in their commentaries on Mahākāvyas.

12. Nānṛṣiḥ kaviḥ 'kavṛ varṇe' iti ca darśanāt varṇanācca kavistasya karma kāvyam. Evaṃ ca darśane satyapi varṇanāyā antarbhāvāditihāsādīnaṃ na kāvyatvamiti tallakṣaṇaṃ na vakṣyate.

-KS., p. 379.

13. Tathā cāha Bhaṭṭatotaḥ—
Nānṛṣiḥ kavirityuktamṛṣiśca kiladarśanāt/
Vicitrabhāvadharmāṃśatattvaprakhyā ca darśanam//
Sa tattvadarśanādeva śāstreṣu prathitaḥ kaviḥ//
Darśanādvarṇanāccātha rūḍhā loke kaviśrutiḥ//
Tathā hi darśane svacche nitye' pyādikavermuneḥ/
Noditā kavitā loke yāvajjātā na varṇanā//

—KS., p. 379.

14. Dharmārthakāmamokṣeṣu vaicakṣaṇyaṃ kalāsu ca/

Karoti kīrttim prītim ca sādhukāvyanibandhanam//—KL. I. 2. 15. Caturvargaphalaprāptih sukhādalpadhiyāmapi/

Kāvyādeva yatastena tatsvarūpam nirūpyate// —SD. I, 2.

16. Caturvargaprāptirhi vedaśāstrebhyo nīrasatayā duḥkhādeva pariņatabuddhīnāmeva jāyate. Paramānandasandohajanakatayā sukhādeva sukumārabuddhīnamapi punah kāvyādeva.

—SD. Vrtti on I. 2.

17. Kāvyam saddrstādrstārtham prītikīrttihetutvāt. —KIS, I, 1. 5.

18. Kīrttim Prītim ca vindati.—Sarasvatīkanthābharana,—I, 2.

19. Ānandaniṣyandiṣu rūpakeṣu vyutpattimātram phalamalpabuddhih/
Yo'pītihāsādivadāha sādhustasmai namaḥ svāduparānmukhāya//
—DR. I. 6.

20. Kāvyam yaśase rthakrte vyavahāravide šivetarakṣataye/Sadyah paranirvṛtaye kāntāsammitatayopadeśayuje//Kālidāsādīnamiva yaśah srīharṣādeh dhāvakādīnāmiva dhanam, Rājādigatocitācāraparijñānam, ādityādermayūrādīnāmivānarthanivāraņam, sakalaprayojanamaulibhūtam samanantarameva rasāsvādanasamudbhūtam vigalitavedyāntaramānandam, prabhusammita-śabdapradhāna-vedādiśāstrebhyah suhṛtsammitārthatātparyavatpurāṇādītihāsebhyaśca śabdārthayorguṇabhāvena rasāṅgabhūtavyāparapravaṇatayā vilakṣaṇam yat kāvyam lokottaravarṇanānipuṇakavikarma tat kānteva sarasatāpādānenābhimukhīkṛtya rāmādivadvartitavyam na rāvaṇādivadityupadeśam ca

-KP, I, 1 and vrtti.

21. Kāvyamānandāya yaśase kāntātulyatayopadeśāya ca ... dhanamanaikāntikam vyavahārakauśalam śāstrebhyo pyanarthanivāranam prakārāntarenāpīti na kāvyaprayojanatayāsmābhiruktam.

—KS, I. p. 3-5

22. Tathā coktam Hṛdayadarpaṇe—
Śabdaprādhānyamāśritya tatra śāstram pṛthagviduh/
Arthe tattvena yukte tu vadantyākhyānametayoh/
Dvayorguṇatve vyāpāraprādhānye kāvyagīrbhavet//

—KS, I. p. 4.

23. Mṛdulalitapadāḍhyam gūḍhaśabdārthahīnam/
Janapadasukhabodhyam yuktimannṛtyayojyam//
Vahukṛtarasamārgam sandhisandhānayuktam//
Sa bhavatī śubhakāvyam nāṭakaprekṣakānām//

-NS, XVI. 118.

-KL. I, 16.

24. Śabdārthau sahitau kāvyam.

25. Rupakādimalamkāram bāhyamācakṣate pare// Supām tingām ca vyutpattim vācām vānchatyalamkṛtim// Tadetadāhuh sausabdyam nārthavyutpattirīdṛsī/ Sabdābhideyālankārabhedādiṣṭam dvyam tu nah//

-KL, I, 14-15.

26. Śarīram tāvadistārthavyavacchinnā padāvalī.—KD, I. 10.

27. Ślesah prasādah samatā mādhuryam sukumāratā/
Arthavyaktirudāratvamojahkāntisamādhayah//
Iti vaidarbhamārgasya prāṇāh daśaguṇāh smṛtāh/
Eṣām viparyah prāyo dṛśyate gaudavartmani//—KD. I.

28. Kāścinmārgavibhāgarthamuktāh prāgapyalamkriyāh/

Sādhāraņamalamkārajātamanyat pradarśyate// —KD. II. 3.

29. Kāvyam grāhyamalamkārāt... kāvyaśabdo'yam guṇālamkārasamskṛtayoḥ śabdārthayorvartate... saundaryamalamkārah....Sa doṣaguṇālaṃkārahānādānābhyām.

—KLS, I. 1, 2, 3.

30. Rītirātmā Kāvyasya. Rītirnāmeyamātmā Kāvyasya. Śarīrasyeveti vākyaśeṣah. Kā punariyam Rītirityāhaviśiṣṭāpadaracanā rītih. Viśeṣavatī padānām racanā rītih. Ko' sau viśeṣa ityāha—viśeṣo guṇātmā. Vakṣyamāṇaguṇarūpo viśeṣah. Sā tridhā-Vaidarbhī, Gau-dīyā, Pāñcālī ca.... Samagraguṇā Vaidarbhī....Ojahkāntimatī Gaudīyā...mādhuryasakumāryopapannā Pāñcālī....Teṣām pūrvā grāhyā, guṇasākalyāt. Na punaritare, stokaguṇatvāt....

—KLS, I. 2. 6-15.

Kāvyaśobhāyāḥ kartāro dharmā guṇāh Tadatiśayahetavastalaṃ-kārāḥ. Purve Nityāḥ.—KLS, III, 1. 1-3.

31. Nanu śabdārthau kāvyam..... — RKL, II. 1.
Pāñcālī Lāṭīyā Gaudīyā ceti nāmato'bhihitāḥ/
Laghumadhyāyataviracanasamāsabhedādimāstatra//

—Do, II. 4. Vrtterasamāsāyā vaidarbhī rītirekaiva. —Do, II. 6. Anyūnādhikavācakasukramapustārthaśabdacārupadam/
Kṣodakṣamamakṣūṇaṃ sumatirvākyaṃ prayuñjīta//
Racayettameva śabdaṃ racanāyā yaḥ karoti cārutvam/
Satyapi sakalayathoditapadagunasāmye'bhidhānesu//

—Do, II. 8-9.

522 LITERARY CRITICISM 32. Kāvvasvātmā dhvanih -DL, I. 1. Sa hvartho vācvasāmarthvāksiptam vastumātramalamkārarasādavaścetvanekaprabhedaprabhinno darśayisyate. —DL, I. p. 50. Rasabhāvatadābhāsatatpraśamalaksanam mukhyamarthamanuvartamānā yatra śabdārthālamkārā guņāśca parasparam dhvanyapekṣayā vibhinnarūpā vyavasthitāstatra kavye dhvaniriti vyapadeśh. —DL, II. p. 190. 33. Tena Rasa eva vastuta ātmā, vastvalamkāradhvanī tu sarvathā Rasam prati parvavasyete iti vācyādutkṛṣṭau tāvityabhiprāyeṇa 'dhvanih kāvyasyātm'eti sāmānyenoktam —LC, p. 85. 34. Bhattanāyakena tu vyangyavyāpārasya praudoktyābhyupagatasya kāvyāmsatvam brūvatā nyagbhāvitaśabdārthasvarūpasya vyāpārasvaiva prādhānyamuktam. On which Jayaratha comments: Na punarlakśanakaranena, Ata evokteh praudatvam yallakşayitumaśakyam tasyāpyabhyupagamah kāvyāmśatvamiti, na punah kāvyātmatvam vadāha—Dhvanirnāmāparo vo'pi vyāpāro vyanjanātmakah/ tasya siddhe'pi bhede syāt kāvyāmśatvam na rūpitā// iti. -AK, p. 10. 35. Yadūce Bhattanāyakena—'Amśatvam na rūpatā' iti, tadvastvalamkāradhvanyoreva vadi nāmopālambhah, Rasadhvanistutenaivātmatayāngikrtah, Rasacarvaņātmanah trtīyāmsasyābhidhābhāvanāmśadvayottīrņatvena nirņayāt. —LC, p. 52. 36. Ramyam jugupsitamudāramathāpi nīcam Ugram prasādi gahanam vikrtam ca vastu/ Yadvāpvavastu kavibhāvakabhāvvamānam Tannāsti yanna rasabhāvamupaiti loke// —DR, IV. 85. Ato na Rasādīnam Kāvvena saha vyangyavyanjakabhāvah. Kim tarhi bhavyabhavakasambandhah. Kavyam hi bhavakam bhāvyā Rasādayah. -AV, p. 96. 37. Gunavadalamkrtañca vākyameva kāvyam. -KM, p. 24. Kah punarayam pākah ityācāryāh ... Supām tingām ca śravah yaisā vyutpattih' iti Mangalah. 'Sausabdyametat. Padanivesaniskampatā pākah' ityācāryāh....'Iyamasaktirna punah pākah' ityavantisundarī....Tasmādrasocitasabdārthasūktinibandhanam Pākah. Yadāha: Gunālamkārarītyuktiśabdārthagrathanakramah/ Svadate sudhiyām yena vākyapākah sa mām prati// -Km, p. 20 38. Nirdoşam gunavatkāvyamalamkārairalamkrtam. Rasānvitam....

-SK. I. 2.

-EV, p. 98.

-AP. CCCXXXVII, 6-7.

Rasajīvitabhūtasya vicāram kurute' dhunā//.... Alamkārāstvalamkārā guņā eva guņāh sadā/ Aucityam Rasasiddhasya sthiram Kāvyasya jīvitam// -AVC, 2, 5. 41. Ucitasthānavinyāsādalamkṛtiralamkṛtiḥ/ Aucityādacyutā nityam bhavantyeva Guņā Guņāh// Kanthe mekhalayā nitambaphalake tāreņa hāreņa vā, Pāṇau nūpurabandhanena carane keyūrapāsena vā/ Sauryena pranate, ripau karunayā—nāyānti ke hāsyatām? Aucityena vinā rucim pratanute nālamkrtirno guņāh// -AVC, 6 & vrtti on it. 42. Anaucityādrte nānyadrasabhangasya kāranam/ Prasiddhaucitya-bandhastu-rasasyopanisat parā//-DL, III. 43. Na hi camatkāravirahitasya kaveh kavitvam kāvyasya vā kāvyatvam. Tatra daśavidhāścamatkārāh—Avicāritaramanīyah, vicāryamāṇaramaṇīyah, samastasūktavyāpī, sūktaikadeśadrśyah, śabdagatah, arthagatah, sabdarthagatah, alamkaragatah, rasagatah, prakhyātavrttigataśca. -KK, III. 1-2. 44. Studies on some concepts of the Alamkāraśāstra: Camatkāra. —р. 269. 45. Śabdārthau sahitau vakrakavivyāpāraśālini/ Bandhe vyavasthitau kāvyam tadvidālhādakārini// Sabdārthau kāvyam vācako vācyam ceti dvau sammilitau kāvyam. Dvāvekamiti vicitraivoktih... Tasmād dvayarapi pratitilamiva tailam tadvidālhādakāritvam vartate, na punarekasmin. -VJ, I. 7 & vrtti. 46. Śabdo vivaksitārthaikavācako' nyeşu satsvapi/ Arthah sahrdayālhādakārisvaspandasundarah// Tadevamvidham viśistameva śabdarthayorlaksanamupadevam. -VJ, I. 9 & vrtti. 47. Ubhāvetāvalamkāryau tayoh punaralamkṛtih/ Vakroktireva vaidagdhyabhangībhanitirucyate// Vaidagdhyam vidagdhabhāvah kavikarmakauśalam tasya bhangī vicchittih, tayā bhanitih, vicitraivābhidhā vakroktirityucyate. -VJ, I. 10 & vrtti. 48. Alamkṛtiralamkāryamapoddhṛtya vivecyate/ Tadupāyatayā tattvam sālamkārasya kāvyatā// Ayamatra paramārthah-sālamkārasyālamkaranasahitasya sakalasya nirastāvayavasya satah samudāyasya kāvyatā kavikarmatvam. -VJ, I. 6 & vrtti. 49. Vargāntayoginah sparśā dviruktāsta-la-nādayah/ Śistāśca rādisamyuktāh prastutaucityaśobhinah// —V. J. II. 2

50. Nātinirbandhavihitā nāpyapeśalabhūsitā/

Aprayatnaviracitā ityarthah.

Pūrvāvrttaparityāganūtanāvartanojjvalā//...

V. J. II 4 & vrtti.

40. Aucityasya camatkārakārinaścārucarvaņe/

Samkşepādvākyamistārthavyavacchinnā Padāvalī/

39. Rajā tu śrngāramekameva śrngāraprakāśe rasamūrīcakāra.

Kāvyam spuradalamkāram guņavaddosavarjitam//

—CL, I. 7 & 8.

51.	bullet of plastin planting participation
	Sa tu śobhāntarābhāvādiha nāti pratanyate// Asya ca varņavinyāsavaicitryavyatirekeņānyat kiñcidapi jīvitānta-
	ram na paridrśyate. —V. J. II. 7 & vrtti.
52.	Etadeva višesaņavakratvan nāma prastutaucitvānusāri sakalasatkā-
	vyajīvitatvena laksyate, yasmādanenaiva rasah param parinosapa-
	davimavatāryate. —V. J. II vrtti on K 15.
53.	Yatra sambriyate vastu vaicitryasya vivaksayā/
	Sarvanāmādibhih kaiścit soktā samyrti-vakratā//
	Tatkāryābhidhāyinā tadatiśayābhidhānaparena vākyāntarena
•	pratītigocaratām nīyate. —V. J. II. 16 & vrtti
54.	Sati lingāntare yatra strīlingam ca prayujyate/
	Śobhāniṣpattaye yasmānnāmaiva strīti peśalam//
	Strītyabhidhānameva hrdayahāri. Vicchityantarena rasādiyojanayo-
FF	gyatvāt. —V. J. II. 22.
55.	Rasādidyotanam yasyāmupasarganipātayoḥ/
	Vākyaikajīvitatvena sāparā padavakratā//
	Yasyām vakratāyāmupasarganipātayorvaiyākaraṇaprasiddhābhi-
	dhānayoh rasādidyotanam śringāraprabrtiprakāśanam.
56.	—V. J. II. 33. Manojñaphalakollekhavarnacchāyāśriyah prthak/
20.	Citrasyeva manohāri kartuḥ kimapi kauśalamtt
	Rasasvabhāvālamkārā āsaṃsāramapi sthitāh/
	Anena navatām yānti tadvidālhādadāyīnīm//
	—V. J. II. 4.
57.	Mukhyamaklistaratyādipariposamonaharam/
1	Svajātyucitahevākasamullekhojjvalam param//
	—V. J. III. 7.
58.	Rasoddīpanasāmarthyavinibandhanabandhuram/
	Cetanānāmamukhyānām jadānām cāpi bhūyasā//
	Rasāh śringārādayasteṣāmuddīpanamullāsanam paripoṣah tasmin
	sāmarthyam śaktistayā vinibandhanam niveśastena bandhuram
	hṛdayahāri. —V. J. III. 8 & vṛtti.
	Jadānāmacetanānām salilatarukusumasamayaprabhṛtīnāmevaṃvi-
	dham svarūpam rasoddīpanasāmarthyavinibandhanabandhuram
59.	varņanīyatāmavagāhate. —V. J. III. 8 & vṛtti. Alamkāro na rasavat parasyāpratibhāsanā//
57.	Svarūpādatiriktasya śabdārthāsaṅgaterapi//
	—V. J. III. 11.
60.	Itivṛttānyathāvṛttarasasampadupekṣayā/
	Rasāntareņa ramyeņa yatra nirvahaņam bhavet//
	—V. J. IV. 16.
	Nirantararasodgāragarbhasandarbhanirbharaḥ/
	Girah kavīnām jīvanti na kathāmātramāśritāh//
	—V. J. IV. 4 (vrtti).
61.	Tathā ca Bhāvasvabhāvasaukumāryavarņane śringārādirasasvarūpa-
	samunmīlane vā vividhavibbūşaņavinyāsavicchittiviracaņe ca parah
	narinosātićavastadvidālhāditāvāh hannan XX I III a

paripoṣātiśayastadvidālhāditāyāḥ kāraṇam. ... V. J. III. 3. vrtti.

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64. Tadasau śabdarthau sagunavanalamkrti punah kvapi... Kvapitya-
     nenaitadāha yat sarvatra sālamkārau kvacit spuţālamkāravirahe'pi
     na kāvvatvahānih.
                                                      -KP, I. 4.
65. Nīrase tu yadi na sphuto' lamkārah syāt tat kimkṛtaścamatkārah
     syāt. Camatkārasāram ca kāvyamityavasyam. Sphutālamkārāpekṣā.
     Analamkrtī punah kvāpītyanenāpyasphuţālamkārasya kvacideva
     kāvyatvam, yatra rasādih sphutah: na tu sarvatretyetadeva prati-
     pādyate. Tasmāt sālamkāratvamātram na višesanam kim tu sphuţā-
     lamkārarasānyataravattvam.
                                                      -PR. p. 9.
66. Ye rasasyāngino dharmāh śauryādaya ivātmanah/
     Utkarsahetavaste syuracalasthitavo gunāh//
                                                      -KP. 8. 1.
     Nanu śauryāderātmavrttitvavanmadhuratvādīnām Rasavrttitvavya-
     vasthitāvevam syāt. Saiva tvasiddhā vinigamakābhāvāditi cet mai-
     vam. Bhavatveva vinigamakābhāvo vadi tvayā varnamātrāśrayā
     gunāh svikartum śakyante. Na tvevam. Aviśesena racanāyāmapi
     tadabhvupagamāt. Tathā ca Rasamātravrttitve lāghavam. Varnara-
     canobhayavrttitve tu gauravam.
                                                    -PR, p. 275.
67. Upakurvanti tam santam ye'ngadvārena jātucid/
         Hārādivadalamkārāste'nuprāsopamādavah / /
                                                     -KP, viii. 2.
68. Mukhyārthahatirdoso rasaśca mukhyastadāśrayādvācyaḥ/
         Ubhayopayoginah syuh śabdādyāstena tesvapi sah//
                                                     -KP, VII. 1.
69. Śabdacitramarthacitramavyangyam tyayaram smrtam.
                                                      -KP. I. 5.
     Etacca citram kavīnām viśrnkhalagirām rasāditātparyamanapekş-
     yaiva kāvyapravrttidarśanādasmābhih parikalpitam. Idānīntanānām
     tu nyāyye kāvyanayavyavasthāpane kriyamāņe nāstyeva dhvani-
     vyatiriktah kāvyaprakārah.
                                              —DL. III. 45. vrtti.
70. Adoşau sagunau sālamkārau ca śabdārthau kāvyam...Gunadoşayo
     rasa evāśrayah.
                                                  -KS. p. 19-20.
71. Tathā ca Lollatah:
         Yastu saridadrisāgaranagaturagapurārivarņane yatnah/
         Kaviśaktikhyātiphalo vitatadhiyām no mato prabandhesu//
         Yamakānulomatadiracakrādibhido"tirasavirodhinyah/
         Abhimānamātrametadgaddarikātipravāho vā//
                                                    -KS, p. 257.
72. Sādhuśabdārthasandarbham gunālamkārabhūsitam/
         Sphutarītirasopetam kāvyam kurvīta kīrttaye//
                                                 -VL, I. 2. p. 5.
73. Śabdārthau nirdosou saguņau prāyah sālamkārau kāvyam.
                                                     -KS, p. 14.
74. Nirdoṣā lakṣaṇavatī sarītirguṇabhūṣitā/
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Sālamkārarasānekavṛttirvāk kāvyanāmabhāk// Angīkaroti yaḥ kāvyam śābdārthāvanalamkṛtī/

Asau na manyate kasmādanusnamanalamkrti//

75. Na hi kīţānuvedhādayo ratnasya ratnatvam vyāhantumīśāḥ kintūpādeyatāratamyameva kartum. Tadvadatra śrutiduṣṭādayo' pi kāvyasya. Uktam ca:

Kīṭānuviddharatnādisādhāranyena kāvyatā/ Duṣṭeṣvapi matā yatra rasādyanugamaḥ sphuṭaḥ// iti.

—SD, I. p. 12.

76. Vākyam Rasātmakam Kāvyam. Rasa eva ātmā sārarūpatayā jīvanādhāyako yasya. Tena vinā tasya kāvyatvānangīkārah 'Rasyate iti rasa' iti vyutpattiyogādbhāvatadābhasādayo' pi grhyante.

—SD, p. 22-23.

77. Rasasyāngitvampāptasya dharmāh śauryādayo yathā/

-SD. VIII. 1.

Śabdārthayorrsthirāḥ ye dharmāḥ śobhatisāyinaḥ/
Rasādīnupakurvanto'laṃkārāste'ṅgadādivat// —Do, X. 1.
Rasāpakarsakā dosāh. —Do. VII. 1.

77(a). Kavivānnirmitih Kāvyam.

Vāgityukte kavivānmātrasyaiva kāvyatvāpattih. Nirmitirityukte kavikṛtaśilpāntarasyapi. 'Vāṇnirmitirityukte vyākhātṛviśeṣasya yasya kasyāpi vyākhyākauśalasyāpi. Asādhāraṇacamatkārakāriṇī racanā hi nirmmitih. Tena Rasāpakarṣakadoṣarahitaṃ yathāsambhavaguṇālaṃkāraṃ rasātmakṃ śabdārthayugalaṃ kāvyamiti lakṣaṇasya svarasah.

—AK, I. 2.

78. Ramaņīyārthapratipādakaḥ śabdaḥ Kāvyam. —RG, I. p. 4.

79. Ittham ca camatkārajanakabhāvanāvişayārthapratipādakaśabdatvam, yatpratipāditārtha-viṣayaka-bhāvanātvam camatkārajanakatāvacchedakam tattvam, svaviśiṣṭajanakatāvacchedākarthapratipādakatāsamsargeņa camatkāratvavattvameva vā kāvyatvamiti phalitam.

RG, I. p. 5.

80. Camatkārastu viduṣāmānandaparivāhakṛt/

Gunam Rītim Rasam Vrttim Pākam Śayyāmalamkrtim/

Saptaitāni Camatkārakāraņam bruvate budhāh//

-Some Concepts of Alamkāraśāstra, p. 270.

81. Athāsya prāgabhihitalakṣaṇasya kāvyātmano vyaṇgasya ramanīyatāprayojakā alaṃkārā nirūpyante. —RG, II. p. 203.

82. Api ca kāvyapadapravṛttinimittam śabdārthayorvyāsaktam, pratye-kaparyāptam vā? Nādyah. Eko na dvāviti vyāvahārasyeva śloka-vākyam na kāvyamiti vyāvahārasyāpatteh. Na dvitīyah. Ekasmin padye kāvyadvayavyāvahārāpatteh. Tasmād vedaśāstrapurāṇalak-ṣaṇasyeva kāvyalakṣaṇasyāpi śabdaniṣṭhataivocitā.

-RG, I. p. 7.

-KD, I. 103-104...

85. Naisargikī ca pratibhā śrutam ca bahu nirmalam/
Amandaścābhiyogo'syāḥ kāraṇaṃ kāvyasampadaḥ//
Na vidyate yadyapi pūrvavāsanā guṇānubandhi pratibhānamadbhutam/Śrutena yatnena ca vāgupāsitā dhruvaṃ karotyeva kamapy-

86. Chandovyākaraņakalālokasthitipadapadārthavijñānāt/ Yuktāyuktaviveko vyutpattiriyam samāsena//

anugraham//

-KL, I. 18.

Vistarastu kimanyattata iha vācyam na vācakam loke
Na bhavati yat kāvyāṅgatvam sarvajñatvam tato nyeṣā//
—Do, I. 19.

Na sa śabdo na tadvācyam na sa nyāyo na sā kalā/ Jāyate yanna kāvyaṅgamaho bhāro mahān kaveh//

-Tīkā on Do, I. 19.

87. Adhigatasakalajñeyah sukaveh sujanasya sannidhau niyatam// Naktamdinamabhyāsyedabhiyuktah śaktimān kāvyam//

—Do, I. 20.

88. Loko vidyā prakīrnam ca kāvyāngāni. Lokavṛttam lokah śabdasmṛtyabhidhānakośacchandovicitikalākāmaśāstradandanītipūrvā vidyā.
Śabdasmṛteh śabdaśuddhih. Abhidhānakośatah padārthaniścayah.
Chandovicitervṛttasamśayacchedah. Kalāśāstrebhyah kalātattvasya
sambit. Kāmaśāstratah kāmopacārasya. Dandanīternayāpanayayoh.
Itivṛttakuṭilatvam ca tatah.—KIS, I. III. I-10.

89. Lakşyajñatvamabhiyogo vrddhasevāvekşaṇam Pratibhānamavadhānam ca prakīrṇam. Tatra kāvyaparicayo lakşyajñatvam. Kāvyabandhodyamo'bhiyogaḥ. Kāvyopadeśaguruśuśruṣaṇam vrddhasevā. Padādhānoddhāraṇamavekṣaṇam. Kavitvabījam pratibhānam. Cittaikāgryamavadhānam. Taddeśakālābhyām. Vivikto deśaḥ. Rātriyāmasturīyaḥ kālaḥ. —KIS, I. III. 12-20.

90. Samādhirāntarah prayatnah bāhyastvabhyāsah Tāvubhāvapi śaktimudbhāsayatah. Sā kevalam kāvye hetuh iti yāyāvarīyah.

-KM, IV. p. 11.

91. Yā śabdagrāmamarthasārthamalamkāratantramuktimārgamanyadapi tathāvidhamadhihṛdayam pratibhāsayati sā pratibhā.

-KM, IV. p. 11.

92. Sā ca dvidhā kārayitrī bhāvayitrī ca. Kaverupakurvāṇā kārayitrī. Sā'pi trividhā sahajā'hāryaupadeśikī ca...Ta ime trayo'pi kavayaḥ sārasvata, ābhyāsika, aupadeśikaśca.

—KM, IV. p. 13.

93. Ekasya tişthati kavergrha eva kāvyamanyasya gacchati

suhrdbhavanāni yāvat/

Nyasyāvidagdhavadaneşu padāni śaśvat kasyāpi sancarati

viśvakutūhalīva//
—Do

94. Seyam kārayitrī. Bhāvakasyopakurvānā bhāvayitri. Sā hi kaveḥ śramamabhiprāyam ca bhāvayati. Tayā khalu phalitaḥ kavervyāpārataruḥ. Anyathā so'vakeśī syāt.

—KM, IV. p. 13.

95. Kastvam bhoh kavirasmi kāpyabhinavā sūktih sakhe pathyatām; tyaktā kāvyakathaiva samprati mayā kasmādidam śrūyatām.
Yah samyagvivinakti doṣaguṇayoh sāram svayam satkavih; so'sminbhāvaka eva nāstyatha bhaveddaivānna nirmatsarah.//
—KM, IV, p. 14.

96. Santi pustakavinyastā kāvyabandhā grhe grhe/ Dvitrāstu bhāvakamanaḥśilāpaṭṭanikuṭṭitāḥ//

—KM, IV, p. 15.

97. Bahujñatā vyutpattirityācāryāh....Ucitānucitaviveko vyutpattih iti yāyāvarīyah. Pratibhāvyutpattyoh pratibhā śreyasī ityānandah

—RG, I. p. 10.

	Vyutpattih śreyasī iti MangalahPratibhavyutpattī mithah
	samavete śreyasyau iti yāyāvarīyaḥ. —KM. V. p. 16.
98.	Svāsthyam pratibhā'bhyāso bhaktirvidvatkathā bahuśrutatā/
	Smṛtidārdhyamanirvedaśca mātaro'ṣṭau kavitvasya// —KM, X. p. 49.
99.	Nāstyacauraḥ kavijanaḥ nāstyacauro vanigjanaḥ/ Sa nandati vinā vācyam yo jānāti nigūhitum//
	Utpādakah kavih kaścit kaścicca parivarttakah/
	Ācchādakastathā cānyastathā saṃvargako'paraḥ//
	Śabdārthoktişu yah paśyediha kiñcana nūtanam/
	Ullikhetkiñcana prācyam manyatām sa mahākaviḥ//
	—KM, XI. pp. 61-62.
100.	Athedānīmakaveh kavitvaśaktirupadiśyate. Prathamam tāvaddi-
	wyah prayatnah, tatah paurusah. —KM, I. p. 149.
101.	Tatra trayah śiṣyāh kāvyakriyāyāmupadeśyāh. Alpaprayatnasādh-
	yāḥ, kṛcchasādhyāḥ, asādhyāśceti. —Do, I. p. 150.
102.	Rase Rase tanmayatām gatasya guņe guņe harṣavaśīkṛtasya/
	Vivekasekasvakapākabhinnam manah prasūte' nkura- vatkavitvam//
	—KK, I. p. 151.
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103.	Abhyāsahetoh padasamniveśairvākyārthaśūnyairvidadhīta vṛttam/
	Ślokam parāvṛttipadaiḥ purāṇam yathāsthitārtham
	paripūrayecca//
	—KK, I. 21.
104.	Yastu prakrtyāśmasamāna eva kasteņa vā vyākaraņena
	naștah/
	Tarkena dagdho'naladhūminā vāpyaviddhakarnah
	sukaviprabandhaih//
	Na tasya vaktṛtvasamudbhavaḥ syācchikṣāviśeṣairapi
	suprayuktaiḥ/ Na gardhavo gāyati śikṣito'pi saṃdarśitaṃ paśyati
	nārkamandhaḥ//
	—KK, I. 22-23.
105	Chāyopajīvī padakopajīvī padopajīvī sakalopajīvī/
100.	Bhavedatha prāptakavitvajīvī svonmeṣato vā bhuvanopajīvyaḥ//
	—КК, П. 1.
106.	Tatra tarka-vyākaraṇa-bharata-cāṇakya-vātsyāyana-bhāratarāmā-
	yana - moksopāyātmajñānadhātuvādaratnaparīkṣā - vaidyakajyo-
	utisadhanurveda - gaja - turaga - purusa - laksanadyūtendrajāla-
	prakīrņeșu paricayah kavisāmrājya - vyañjanah.
-16-	—KK, V. p. 163.
107.	Na hi paricayahīnah kevale kāvyakaṣṭe kukavirabhiniviṣṭah spaṣṭa-
	śabdapravistah/Vibudhasadasi pṛṣṭaḥ kliṣṭadhīrvetti vaktum nava iva nagarāntargahvaare ko'pyadṛṣṭaḥ
108.	Saktirnipunatā lokasāstrakāvyādyavekṣaṇāt/
auo.	Sakin inpunata Tokasasi akav yadyaveksanat/
	Kāvyajñaśikṣayābhyāsa iti hetustadudbhave// —KP, I. 3.

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109.	Śaktih kavitvavījarūpah saṃskāraviśeṣah, yām vinā kāvyaṃ na prasaret, prasṛtaṃ vā upahasanīyaṃ syāt. —KP, vṛtti.
110.	Lokasya sthāvarajangamātmakalokavṛttasya, śāstrāṇām chandovyā- karaṇābhidhānakośakalācaturvargagajaturagakhaḍgādilakṣaṇagraṇ-
	thānām, kāyānām ca Mahākavinibandhānām, ādigrahanāditihāsādīnām ca vimaršanād vyutpattih. —KP, Vṛtti on I. 3.
111.	Kāvyam kartum vicārayitum ca ye jānanti tadupadešena karaņe yojane ca pounahpunyena pravṛttiriti trayah samuditāh na tu vyastāh tasya kāvyasyodbhave nirmāņe samullāse ca hetuh na tu hetavah.  —Do, Vṛtti.
112.	Pratibhāsya hetuh. Pratibhā navanavollekhaśālinī Prajñā. Asya Kāvyasya. Idam kāranam. Vyutpattyabhyāsau tu Pratibhāyā eva
,	saṃskārakāviti vyakṣyate. Sā ca sahajoupādhikī ceti dvidhā. Tatra sahajāmāha—Sāvaraṇakṣayopaśamamātrāt sahajā Dvitīyā-māha mantrāderaupā dhikī. —KS, p. 5-6.
113.	Vyutpattyabhyāsābhyām samskāryā. —KS, p. 6.
114.	Lokaśāstrakāvyeşu nipuṇatā vyutpattiḥSaṃskṛtapratibhā hi tadanatikrameṇa kāvyamupanibadhnāti. —KS, p. 9.
115.	Kāvyavicchikṣayā punaḥ punaḥ PravṛttirabhyāsaḥAbhyāsasaṃs- kṛtā hi Pratibhā Kāvyāmṛtakāmadhenurbhavati. —KS, p. 9.
116.	Śikṣām lakṣayati—Sato'pyanibandho 'sato'pi nibandho niyamaś- chāyādyupajīvanādayaśca śikṣāḥ. —KS, p. 9.
117.	Pratibhaiva śrutābhyāsasahitā kavitām prati/
	Heturmṛdambusambandhavījavyaktirlatāmiva// —CL, I. 4.
118.	Sabījo hi Kavirjñeyah sa sarvāgamakovidah/
	Sarasah pratibhāśālī yadi syāduttamastadā//
	Sabīja ityeva Kavilakṣaṇam, anyāni tu višeṣaṇāni, sabījah kavirīdṛśah syādityarthah
	Bījam prāktanasamskāravisesah kāvyarohabhūh// Rohasca dvedhā nirmātrmūlah svādakamūlasca, yam vinā nirmā-
	tum svādayitunca na śakyate Prajnā navanavollekhasālinī Pratibhā matā//
	—AK, I. 3-5.
119.	Tasya ca kāraṇaṃ kavigatā kevalā Pratibhā. Sā ca kāvyaghaṭanā-nukūlaśabdārthopasthitiḥ. —RG, I. p. 9.
120.	Tadgatam ca Pratibhātvam kāvyakāranatāvacchedakatayā siddho jātivišeşa upādnirūpam vākhandam. —Do, I. p. 9.
121.	Tasyāśca hetuh kvaciddevatāmahāpuruṣaprasādādijanyamadṛṣṭam. Kvacicca vilakṣaṇavyutpattikāvyakaraṇābhāysau. Na tu trayameva. —RG, I, p. 9.
122.	Na ca tatra tayorjanmāntarīyayoh kalpanam vācyam, gouravānmānābhāvāt kāryasyānyathāpyupapatteśca. —RG, I. p. 10.
123.	Na ca tatra Pratibhāyāh pratibandhakamadṛṣṭāntaram kalpyamiti vācyam. Tādṛśānekasthalagatādṛṣṭadvayakalpanāpekṭayā klptavyutpattyabhyāsayoreva Pratibhāhetutvakalpane lāghavāt.

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124.	şanyam kāryatāvacchedakam ato na vyabhicārah. Pratibhātvam ca kavitāyāh kāranatāvacchedakam, pratibhāgatavailakṣanyameva
125.	vā vilakṣaṇakāvyaṃ prati iti nātrāpi saḥ. —RG, I. p. 10. Pāpaviśeṣasya tatra pratibandhakatvakalpanādvā na doṣaḥ. Pratibandhakābhāvasya ca kāraṇatā samuditaśaktyāditrayahetutāvādinaḥ śaktimātrahetutāvādinaścāviśiṣṭā. —RG, I. p. 10.
126.	Yatrārthaḥ śabdo vā tamarthamupasarjanīkṛtasvārthau/ Vyanktaḥ kāvyaviśeṣaḥ sa dhvaniriti sūribhiḥ kathitaḥ// —DL. I.
127.	Idamuttamamatiśayini vyangye vācyād dhvanirbudhaih kathitah// —KP, I. 4.

128. Budhairvaiyākaraṇaiḥ pradhānabhūtasphoṭarūpavyaṅgyavyaṅjakasya śabdasya dhvaniriti vyavahāraḥ kṛtaḥ. Atastanmatānusāribhiranyairapi nyagbhāvitavācyavyaṅgyavyaṅjanakṣamasya śabdārthayugalasya.

—KP, I. Vṛtti on 4.

129. Prakāro'nyo gunībhūtavyangyah kāvyasya drśyate/ Yatra vyangyānvaye vācyacārutvam syāt prakarṣavat//

DL. III. 34.

130. Tasyaiva svayamuktyā prakāśīkṛtatvena guṇībhāvaḥ, yathodāhṛtam samketakālamanasam ityādi. —DL, Vṛtti.

131. Atādrśi gunībhūtavyangyam vyangye tu madhyamam.

—KP, I. 5.

132. Cārutvotkarşanibandhanā hi vācyavyangyayoh prādhānyavivakṣā.
—DL, I. p. 114.

133. Pradhānaguṇabhāvābhyām vyaṅgyasaivam vyavasthite/
Kāvye ubhe tato' nyadyattaccitrambhidhīyate//
Citram śabdārthabhedena dvividham ca vyavasthitam/
Tatra kiñcicchabdacitram vācyacitramatah param//

—DL. III. 41-42

134. Kintu yadā rasabhāvādivivakṣāśūnyaḥ kaviḥ śabdālamkāramarthālamkāram vopanibadhnāti tadā tadvivakṣāpekṣayā rasādiśūnyatā arthasya parikalpyate. Vivakṣopārūḍhaḥ eva hi kāvye śabdānāmarthaḥ.

—DL, III. 41-42, Vrtti.

135. Sarvametacca mahākavīnām kāvyeşu dṛśyate...Tadevamidānīntanakavikāvyanayopadeśe kriyamāņe prāthamikānāmabhyāsārthinām
yadi param citreņa vyavahāraḥ, prāptaparinatīnām tu dhvanireva
kāvyamiti sthitametat.

—DL, III. 42. Vṛtti.

136. Śabdacitramarthacitramavyangyam tvavaram smrtam

—KP, I. 5.

137. Yadi ca avyangyatvena vyangyābhavaḥ tadā tasya kāvyatvampi nāstīti prāgevoktam. Iṣadvyangyatvamiti cet, kim nāma īṣadvyangyatvam, asvādyavyangyatvam, anāsvādyavyangyatvam vā? Ādye prācīnabhedayoreva antaḥpātaḥ, dvitīye tvakāvyatvam.

-SD, IV. 17 Vrtti

138. Uttamam dhvanivaiśiṣtye madhyame tatra madhyamam Avaram tatra niṣpanda iti trividhamāditaḥ/

Dhvanerdhvanyantarodgāre tadeva hyuttamottamam Śabdārthayośca vaicitrye dve yātaḥ pūrvapūrvatām//

-AK, I. 6-7.

139. Śabdārthau yatra guṇībhāvitātmānau kamapyarthamabhivyanktastādyam.

—RG, I. p. II.

140. Evam ca vyañjakānam sādhāranyam pratipādayatām prāmānikānām granthaih sahāsādhāranyam pratipādayatastava granthasya virodhahsphuṭaḥ...Pratyutāsādhāranyasya vyāptyaparaparyāyasyānumānānukūlatayā vyaktipratikūlatvācca. —RG, I. p. 16.

141. Yatra vyangyamapradhānameva saccamatkārakāraņam taddvitīyam. Vācyāpekṣayā pradhānībhūtam vyangyāntaramādāya guņībhūtam vyangyamādāyātivyāptivāranāyāvadhāranam.

142. Yatra vyangyacamatkārāsamānādhikaraņo vācyacamatkārah tat tṛtīyam.

—RG. I. p. 20.

143. Yatrārthacamatkṛtyupaskṛtā śabdacamatkṛtih pradhānam tadadhamam caturtham...Yadyapi yatrārthacamatkṛtisāmānyaśūnyā śabdacamatkṛtistat pañcamamadhamādhamamapi kāvyavidhāsu gaṇayitumucitam yathaikākṣarapadyārdhavṛttiyamakapadmabandhādi, tathāpi ramaṇīyārthapratipādakaśabdatārūpa-kāvyasāmanyalakṣaṇānākrāntatayā vastutah kāvyatvābhāvena mahākavibhih prācīnaparaṃparāmanurundhānaistatra tatra kāvyeṣu nibaddhamapi nāsmābhirgaṇitam, vastusthiterevānurodhyatvāt.

—RG, I. p. 23.

Tatrārthacitraśabdacitrayoraviśeṣeṇāḍhamatvamayuktam vaktum, tāratamyasya sphuṭamupalabdheḥ. —RG, I. p. 24.

## CHAPTER II

1. Tanna. Ādyeyam pūrvo'yam para ityabhilāpāsambhavena avyavahitottaratvasambandhāyogāt. Naṣṭavidyamānayoravyavahitottaratvasambandhasya vaktumaśakyatvācca. Dvitīye śabdajaśabdanyāyena padapratyakṣopapādane'pi padasyāvidyamānatvena tatra śaktyāśrayatvasya grahānupapatteh. Avidyamāne āśrayatvāngīkāre naṣto ghaṭo jalavānityādyāpatteśca. Trtīye yena krameṇānubhavastenaiva krameṇa saṃskārasthitirityatra vinigamakābhāvāt saro raso nadī dīna ityādau viparītasamskāradbodhena pratyekamanyārthapratyayāpatteḥ. —PLM, p. 25

2. Dvāpupādānaśabdeşu śabdau śabdavido viduh/

Eko nimittam śabdānāmaparo'rthe prajuñjate// —VP, I. 44.

3. Tadāha:

Parā vān mūlacakrasthā Paśyantī nābhisaṃsthitā/ Hṛdisthā madhyamā jñeyā vaikharī kaṇṭhadeśagā//iti Vaikharyā hi kṛto nādah paraśravaṇagocarah/

Madhyamayā krto nādah sphotavyañjaka ucyate//iti ca.

—PLM, p. 27.

-VSM, p. 250.

PLM, p. 12.

4.	Anādinidhanam Brahma śabdatattvam yadakṣaram/ Vivarttate'rthabhāvena prakriyā jagato yatah//
5.	Anuviddhamiva jñānam sarvam śabdena bhāsate//
6.	—VP. I. 123. Vaikharyā madhyamāyāśca paśyantyāś caitadadbhutam/ Anekatīrthabhedāyāstrayyā vācam param padam//
7.	—Do. I. 144. Idamādyam padasthānam siddhisopānaparvaṇām// Iyam sā mokṣamānānāmajihmā rājapaddhatih//
8.	—VP, I. 16. Pratyairanupākhyeairgrahaņānugunaistathā/
9.	Dhvaniprakāsite sabde svarūpamavadhāryate// —VP. I. 85. Yathānuvākaḥ śloko vā soḍatvamupagacchati/Āvṛttyā na tu sa granthaḥ pratyāvṛttyā nirūpyate//
	—VP. I. 84.
10.	Syādvācako lākṣaṇikaḥ śabdo'tra vyañjakastridhā. —KP. II. 1.
11.	Asyāyam vācako vācya iti sasthvaā pratīvate/
	Yogah śabdarthayostattvamapyato vyapdiśyate// —VP. III. 3.
12.	Pratyakṣamekam cārvākāḥ kaṇādasugatau punah/
10/	Anumānam ca taccāpi sāmkhyā śabdam ca te ubhe//
12(	a). Śabdādīnāmapyanumāne'ntarbhāvah samānavidhitvāt.
13.	—Praśastapādabhāṣya, p. 576.
13.	Na hi śabdārthayoḥ kuṇḍavadarayoriva saṃjogasvabhāvaḥ, tantu- paṭayoriva samavāyātmā vā sambandhaḥ pratyakṣamupalabhyate.
	—NM, 4. p. 241.
14.	Tatrānumānamevedam Bauddhair Vaisesikaih smrtam —SV
15.	Aviyuktah śabdarthayorbhavah sambandhah, notpannayoh paścat
	sambandhah sabdasyarthena sambandhah. —Mim. Satra I 1 5
16.	Nanu sati svābhāvike sambandhe vyutpannavad avyutpannyasyāpi
	bodhah syāt. na hi agniraviditaśaktīr na dahati—ityatra pratyak-
	şādeḥ svābhāvike'rthapratyāyakatve satyapi yathā indriyasanni- karṣāpekṣā tathā'trāpi saṃketagraha-sacivasyaiva bodhakatvam
	ityāha. —VB, p. 189.
17.	Prāptilakṣaṇastu śabdārthayoḥ sambandhaḥ pratiṣiddaḥ. Kasmāt?
	Pramāṇato'nupalabdheḥ. —Vātsyāyana on Nvāvasūtra, 2. 1. 52.
8.	Atra tārkikāḥ—'Asmācchabdādayamartho boddhavyaḥ' ityākārā
	'Idam padamimamartham bodhayatu' ityākārā veśvarecchā śaktiḥ
	lāghavāt. Saiva saṃketaḥ sambandhaḥityāhuḥ.
0	—PLM, p. 6.
9.	Vākyabhāvamavāptasya sārthakasyāvabodhataḥ/ Sampadyate śābdabodho na tanmātrasya bodhataḥ// —SSP. 12.
0.	Padajñānam tu karaṇam dvāram tatra padārthadhīḥ/
	Śābdabodhaḥ phalam tatra śaktidhīḥ sahakārinī//

—BP. 81.

REFERENCES 21. Ādhunikasanketite tu na śaktiriti sampradāyah. Navyāstu īśvarecchā na śaktih, kintu icchaiva. Tena ādhunikasanketite'pi śaktirastyevetyāhuh. -SM. 81. 22. Tanna. Icchāyāh sambandhinorāśrayatāniyāmakatvābhāvena sambandhatvāsambhavāt. 'Sambandho hi sambandhidvayabhinnatve sati dvisthatve ca sati āśrayatayā viśistabuddhiniyāmakah' ityabhiyuktavyavahārat. —PLM. P. 7. 23. Indriyāṇām svavisayesvanādiryogyatā yathā/ Anādirarthaih śabdānām sambandho yogyatā tathā// -VP, III. 29. 24. Siddhe śabdarthasambandhe. -MB, I, 1, 1, Tasmāt padapadārthayoh sambandhāntarameva śaktih vācyavācakabhāvāparaparyāyā. Tadgrāhakañca itaretarādhyāsamūlakam tādātmyam, tadeva sambandhah....Śakterapi kāryajanakatve sambandhasyaiva niyāmakatvāt....Tādātmyam ca tadbhinnatve sati tadabhedena pratīyamānatvamiti bhedābhedasamaniyatam. Abhedasyādhyastatvācca na tayorvirodhah. -PLM, p. 8-11. 26. Yadi ca śabdah svarūpeņārtham pratipādayati tadā'ksaśabdasyaikyād devana-vibhītaka-rathākṣeṣu tulyā pratitih syāt....api ca paryāyeşu hastah karah pāņirityādişu śabdarūpabhedādhyāsapakse arthabuddhibhedah prāpnoti. -NM, Vol. II. p. 101. 27. ātmādhyāsaśca sādrśyāduparāgācca jāyate. -SV, V. 209. 27(a). Evam ca kṛtvā sarva-ghaṭa śabda-sādhāraṇam sāmānyarūpam artha-pakṣa-nikṣiptam artha-samānādhikaraṇam svarūpam asya vācyam Arthavat-tat-samānādhikaranyāt tatrāpi tathā pratīteh, sāmānya-rūpe eva sanketopapatteh tenaivārthasya sāmānādhikaranyāt, tatraiva śrotrapratīteh.....Lolibhūtāni śabdārthajñānāni ghata ityavagamyante. -Hetārāja on V. 2. Sambandha-samuddeśa Book III of Vākyapadīya 28. Evam ca padādirūpa āntarah sphota vācaka iti siddham. Evam śakyo'rtho'pi buddhisattāsamāvista eva na tu bāhyasattāvistah. Ghața ityata eva sattāvagamena ghațo' stīti proyoge ghațārthatvādastīti proyogānāpatteh, sattayā virodhāt ghato nāstītyasyānāpatteśca. -VSM, p. 339. 29. Śabdah kāraņamarthasya sa hi tenopajanyate/ Tathā ca buddhivisayādarthācchabdah pratīyate// -VP. III. 32. 31. Iaha tu katham vartamānakālata kamsam ghātayati valim bandhayatīti cirahate ca kamse cirabaddhe ca balau? Atrāpi yuktaiva, katham?....te'pi hi teşāmutpattiprabhrtyāvināśāttadrddhīrvyācaksāṇāḥ sato buddhivisayān prakāśayanti. -MB. 32. Tatha ca smrtih: Vipra pṛthavadi cittastham na bahistham Kadacana/ Svapnabhramamadādyeşu sarvairevānubhūyate//

33. Anyathā arthavattvābhāvena prādipadikatvābhāvāt svādyutpattirna

syāt.

21(4)

34. Pade na varņā vidyante varnesvavayavā iva/ Vākyāt padānāmatyantam praviveko na kaścana//

-VP. I. 73.

Tasmānmanyāmahe padānyasatyāni, Ekamabhinnasvabhāvakam vākyam. Tadavabodhanāya padavibhāgah kalpitah.

-Puņyarāja under VP. II. 57.

35. Brāhmanārtho yathā nāsti kaścidbrāhmanakambale/

Devadattādayo vākye tathaiva syuranarthakāh// VP. II. 14.

36. Ataśca sāvayavau vākya-vākyārthau padopajanāpāyābhyām tadartho'pajanāpāyadarśanāt/ .. yo'rtho yam śabdam anugacchati sa tasyārtha ityavasīyate/tat katham asatyā bhāgaḥ.

-NM. Vol. I. p. 354.

37. Taddharmāvacchinnavişayakaśābdabuddhitvāvacchinnam prati taddharmāvacchinnanirūpitavrttiviśistajñānam hetuh. ....Jñāne vrttivaiśistyam ca svavisayakodbuddhasamskārasāmānādhikaranyasvāśrayapadavisayakatvobhayasambandhena bodhyam.

-PLM. p. 5-6.

38. Sa mukhyo'rthastatra mukhyo vyāpāro'syābhidhocyate.

-KP. II. 3.

Tatra sanketitārthasya bodhanādagrimābhidhā. —SD. II. 7.

- 39. Ānantyāt vyabhicārācca vyaktīnāmabhidheyatāyā akalpanat. Na ca jñātagotvādirūpayā gotvādijñānarūpayā vā pratyāsattyā pratyakseņa parikalitāsu sakalatadīyavyaktisvabhidhāyāḥ kalpane nāsti doşa iti vācyam. Sāmānyapratyāsatternirākaranāt. Gouravadoşasyānuddhārāccā. -RG, II. pp. 181-82.
- 40. Śabdānām vişayavibhāgo na prāpnoti iti ca... -KP, II. 3 (Vrtti). Upādhiśca dvividhah-vastudharma vaktryadrcchāsamniveśitaśca. vastudharmo'pi dvividhah-siddhah sādhyaśca. Siddho'pi dvividhah-

Padārthasya-prāņaprado viśeṣādha.

41. Uktam hi Vākyapadīye na hi Gouh svarūpeņa Gouh, nāpyagauh, Gotvābhisambandhāt tu Gauh iti. -KP, II. 3 (Vrtti).

42. Tathā sati dūrādanabhivyaktasaṃsthānatayā gotvāgrahadaśāyām gavi gouriti gobhinna iti vā vyavahārah syāt. Svarūpasyāviśeṣād ghațe gouriti gavi căgouriti vă vyavahārah syāditi bhāvah. Gotvābhisambandhādgotvavattayā jñānat gourgośabdavyavaḥārya iti.

-RG, II. p. 182.

43. Sattve niviśate'paiti prthagjātişu drśyate/ Ādheyaścākriyājaśca so'sattvaprakrtirguņah//

-MB. 4. 1. 2.

44. Kriyā he nāmeyamatyantāparidṛṣṭā pūrvāparībhūtāvayavā na śakyā pindīkrtya nidarśayitum.

-MB, under Bhubādayo dhātavah. Sādhyah pūrvāparībhūtāvayavah kriyārūpah.

-KP, II. 3 (Vrtti). 45. Ditthādiśabdānāmantyabuddhinirgrāhyam samhṛtakramam svarūpam vaktrā yadrcchayā ditthādisvarthesūpādhitvena samnivesyate iti so'yam sajñārūpo yadrcchātmaka iti. —KP, II. 3 (Vrtti). 46. Yādrcchikastu vaktrā svecchayā ditthādiśabdānām pravrttinimittatve samniveśito dharmah. Sa ca paramparayā vyaktigataścaramavarnābhivyangyo'khandah sphota ityeke. Anupūrvyavacchinno varnasamudāya ityapare. Kevalā vyaktireva itītare. Tatrādyamatadvaye viś şanajñānād viśiştapratyah. Trtīyamate ca nirvikalpakātmakah pratyah. Tadittham catuştayī śabdānām pravrttiriti darśanam vyavasthitam. -RG. II. p. 183.

47. Gunakriyāyadrcchānām vastuta ekarūpāņāmapyāśrayabhedād bheda iva laksyate yathaikasya mukhasya khadgamukuratailādyālambana--KP. II. 3 (Vrtti).

48. Himapayahśankhādyāśrayeşu paramārthato bhinneşu śuklādişu yadvaśena śuklah śukla ityādyabhinnābhidhānapratyotpattistat śuklatvādi sāmānyam. Gudataņdulādipākādisvevameva pākatvādi.

-KP. II. p. 37. 49. Sarveşām śabdānām jātirevārthah. Guņakriyāśabdānām Guņakriyāgatāyāh yadrccāśabdānām ca vālavrddhaśukādyudīritatattacchabdavṛttestattatsamayabhinnārthavṛttervā jāterevābhidheyatāsambhavāt. Iti jātiśaktidarśanam. -RG, II. p. 184.

50. Jāterastitvanāstitve na hi kaścid vivakṣati/ Nityatvāllakṣaṇīyāyā vyaktestehi viśeṣaṇe//

-SV. V. 311.

51. Yugapacca tṛtayam vibhaktyarthah-kārakam, lingam, samkhyā ca. na caitad trtayam prātipadikārthe jātau anveti na jātih kārakam, na ca jāteh strī pum-napumsakavibhāgāh, na cāsya dvitīyādiyoga--NM, Vol. I. p. 294.

52. Sakrt prayuktam padam amsena kamcidarthamabhidadhāti, tato'rthantaram lakşayati, tadgatatvena punarlingasamkhyadyabhidhatte -iti na prātītiko'yam kramah. -NM, Vol. I. p. 294.

53. Pratyaksam na hi niskrsta-jātyamsa-parivestitam/

Tadgocara-pravrtteśca śabdas tam kathayet katham// -tasmāt pratyausavisaye pravartamānam tatsamānavisayameva bhavitum arhati padam na sāmānyamātranistham.

-NM, Vol. I. p. 296.

54. Padam tadvantamevārthamānjasyenābhijalpati/

Na ca vyavahitā buddirna ca bhārasya gauravam//

Sāmānādhikaranyādivyavahāro'pi mukhyā/

Vrttyopapadyamānah san nānyathā yojayişyate//

Tasmād gavādiśabdānām tadvānartha iti sthitam//

-NM. Vol. I. pp. 295-97 55. Sthite'pi tadvato vācyatve kvacit prayoge jāteh prādhānyam, vyakterangabhāvah, yathā 'Gaurna padā spṛṣṭavye'ti sarvagavīşu pratiședho gamyate, kvacit vyakteh prādhānyam jāterangabhāvah, yathā 'Gām muñca', 'Gām badhāne'ti niyatam kāmcit vyaktimuddiśye prayujyate, kvacidākṛteḥ prādhānyam, vyakterangabhāvo jātirnāstyeva, yatha 'pistakamayyo gāvah kriyantām' iti.

-NM, Vol. I. p. 297. 56. Kiñca Gotve yadi śaktistadā Gotvatvam śakyatāvacchedakam

Vācyam. Gotvatvam tu Gavetarāsamavetatve sati sakala-go-samavetatvam. Tathā ca go-vyaktīnām śakyatāvacchede'nupraveśāt tavaiva gauravam. -SM. on Sabdakhanda. 57. Vikalpavişaye vrttiriştā śabdānumānayoh/ Avastuvisayāścaite vikalpā iti varņitam// Yā ca bhūmirvikalpānām sa eva visayo girām/ At eva hi śabda thamanyapoham pracaksate// -NM, Vol. I. p. 276. 58. Tadittham catuştayī śabdānām pravrttiriti darśanam vyavasthitam. -RG. II. p. 184. 59. Sambandhibhedāt sattaiva bhidyamānā gavādisu/ Jātirityucyate tasyām sarve sabda vyavasthitāh// Tām prātipadikārtham ca dhātvartham ca pracaksate/ Sā sattā sā mahānātmā tāmahustvatalādayah// -VP. 3. 33-34. 60. Idam yaugikarūdhamityucyate. —PLM, p. 14. Caturdhā evāyamabhidhāvā bhedā ityapyanye. -RG. II. 61. Asādhuranumānena vācakah kaiścidisyate/ Vācakatvāviśese vā niyamah punyapāpayoh// -VP. 3. 30. 62. Tanna. Sādhusmaraṇam vināpi bodhānubhavāt. Tadvācakasādhuśabdamajānatām bodhānāpatteśca, -PLM, p. 14. 63. Ekatra śaktyapyanyatra tadāropāttadarthapratityupapattāvekatraiva śaktirtāghavāt. —TC. p. 627. 64. Na ca śaktibramād bodho sādhuśabdesviti vācyam. Niḥsandehapratyayasya bādhakam vinā bhramatvājogāt. —PLM, pp. 12-13. 65. Śāstrasthā vā tannimittatvāt...ke śāstrasthāh? śistāh. Teṣāmavicchinnā smrtih śabdesu vedesu ca. Tena śistā nimittam śrutismrtyavadhārane. -Mim. Sūtra 1. 3. 9. 66. Mukhyārthabādhe tadyoge rūdhito'tha prayojanāt/ Anyo'rtha laksyate yat sā Laksanā// -KP. II. 9. 67. Lakṣaṇāropitā. ... Sa āropitah śabdavyāpārah sāntarārthaniṣṭho laksanā. -KP, II. 4. Lansaņā śaktirarpitā Sā śabdasyārpitā svābhāviketarā iśvarānudbhāvitā vā śaktirlakṣaṇā nāma. -SD. II. 9. 68. Upakṛtam bahu tatra kimucyate sujanatā prathitā bhavatā param/ Vidadhadīdrśameva sadā sakhe sukhitamāssva tatah śaradām śatam// Etadapakāriņam prati viparītalaksaņayā kaścidvakti. -KP. IV. 1 (Vrtti). 69. Jāterastitvanāstitve na hi kaścid vivaksati/ Nityatvāllaksyamānāvā vyakteste hi višesaņe// —SV. V. 311. 70. Gouranubandhya ityādau śruticoditamanubandhanam katham me

syāditi jātyā vyaktirāksipvate na tu śabdenocyate, ...ityupādā-

nalakṣaṇā tu nodāhartavyā, śrutārthāpatterarthāpattervā tasya viṣa-

-KP. II. 10 (Vrtti).

yatvāt.

71. Nirūdhā lakṣaṇā kāścit sāmarthyādabhidhānavat/ Kriyante sāmpratam kāścit kāścinnaiva tvaśaktitah// -TV, III. I. p. 700 72. Svabodhyasambandho lakṣaneti kecit, Gabhīrāyām Nadyām Ghoṣa ityādyanurodhāt.....Tasmāt tatsamudāyabodhyagabhiratvaviśiştanadīpadārthah, tatsambandho laksaneti, —PLM, p. 18-19. 73. Sā ca śakyasambandharūpā. Tathāhi-Pravāharāpaśakyārthasambandhasya tīre grhītatvāt tīrasya smaraņam. Tatah śābdabodhah. -SM. on Kārikā. 82. 74. Tātsthyāttathaiva tāddharmyāttatsāmīpyāttathaiva ca/ Tatsāhacaryāttādarthyāj jñeyā vai lakṣaṇā budhaih// —PLM. p. 17. 75. Vastutastu tātparyānupapattipratisandhānameva tadbījam. -PLM, p. 17. 76. Vākye tu śakterabhāvāt śakyasambandharūpa lakṣaṇāpi nāstī. Yatra tu gabhīrāyām nadyām ghoşa ityuktam, tatra nadīpadasya nadītīre lakṣaṇā, gabhīrapadārthasya nadyā sahābhedenānvayah .... Tadā nadīpadasya gabhīranadītīre lakṣaṇā, gabhīrapadam tātparyagrāhakam, -SM. on Śabdakhanda, K. 82. 77. Itthañca samāse na kvāpi saktih, padaśaktyaiva nirvāhāditi. -SM. on Śabdakhanda K 82. 78. Śaktyākhyo'rthasya śabdagataḥ, śabdasyārthagato vā sambandhaviśeșo'bhidā ... Śakyasambandho lakṣaṇā. -RG. II. p. 176 & 181. 79. Pare tu āropitaśakyatāvacchedakarūpeņa śaktyaiva tatpadavācyatvena prasiddhānyavyktibodhe vyaktiviśesabodhe vā laksaneti vyavahārah. Chatriņo yāntityādāvacchatriņu sāhacaryācchatritvāropah. Kākeobhyo dadhī'tyādāvapi dadhyupaghātakamātre kakatvāropah. -VSM, p. 133. 80. Na ca 'Gangāyām Ghoṣa' ityādāvāropitagangātvena bodhe'pi tasya jñānasya bhramatvāt śāstrajñānavatām sarvathā bhramatvena grahācca taduttaram gangāgataśaityapāvanatvādipratītirūpam phalam na siddhyet.....iti vācyam, madhye vyañjanayā mukhyagangāpadārthābhedasyāpi pratīteh. Vyañjanājñāne ca bādhajñānena nāprāmāņyagraha ityadoṣāt. -VSM, p. 134. 81. Goutamo'pyāha — "sahacaranasthānatādarthyavrttamānadhāraņasāmīpyayogasādhanādhipatyebho Brāhmaņa-bālakaţa-rāja-saktucandana-gangā-śakatā'nna-puruṣeṣvatadbhāve'pi tadupacāraḥ" iti. Nyāyavārttikakāro'pi—"...Tatra samjuktasamavetām jātim brāhmane samavāyenādhyāropya Brāhmanam yastiketyāha' ityāha. -VSM, p. 141. 82. Ata eva 'Gangāyām Mīna-Ghoṣau staḥ'ityādyupapādyate...Gangāt-

vena eva tīrabodhāt ekadharmāvacchinne nvayasattvena na kṣatiḥ

Vṛttidvayāvacchedakadvayakalpane gauravāt.

83. Sati tātparye 'sarve sarvārthavācakā' iti bhāsyāllakṣanāyā abhāvāt.

-VSM, p. 138.

... Yugapadeva gangātvenaiva nīratīrayorupasthitih.

Jaghanyavṛttikalpanāyā anyāyatvācca....Tathā hi śaktirdvividhā
—Prasiddhā'prasiddhā ca. Āmandabuddhivedyātvam Prasiddhātvam. Sahṛdayahṛdayamātravedyātvamaprasiddhātvam. Tatra Gaṅgādipadānām pravāhādau prasiddhā śaktiḥ, tīrādau cāprasiddheti
kimanupapannam. —PLM. pp. 20-21.

84. Harirapyāha:

Ekamāhuranekārtham śabdamanye parīkṣakāḥ/

Nimittabhedādekasya sārvārthyam tasya bhidyate//

Sarvaśaktestu tasyaiva śabdasyānekadharmaṇah/

Prasiddhibhedādgauņatvam mukhyatvam copacaryate//
iti. Gauņamukhyārthabodhakah śabda eka eva. Yugapatsarvārthaprakāśanam tu na, prakaraṇādirūpanimittabhedāt. Gośabdo gojātau prasiddha iti tatra mukhyah, vahīke tvaprasiddhya gauṇa iti
tadarthah. Nanvevam śabdārthasambandhasyānityatvam syādate
āha—

Gotvānusango vāhīke nimittāt kaiścidisyate/

Arthamātre viparyastam śabdah svārthe vyavasthitah//
iti....Śabdastu gotvamevābhidhatte gaurityatra mukhyam gotvam,
vāhīke tūpacaritam. Śabda eva pravṛttinimittamiti pakṣe sa kadācit
gojātāvanuṣjyate kadācit vāhīke iti. —VSM, pp. 145-46.

- 85. Atrocyate samāse śaktyasvīkāre višistasyārthavattvābhāvena prātipadikatvam na syāt. Ata evārthavatsūtre bhāsye 'arthavaditi kim, arthavatām samudāyo'narthakah—daśa dādimāni sadapūpāh kundamajājinam' iti pratyudāhrtam. Evam ca Rājapurusapadayostanmate pratyekamarthavattve' pi samudāyasya daśadādimātivadanarthakatvāt prātipadikatvānāpatteh. —PLM, p. 115.
- 86. Kim ca rājapuruṣādau rājapadādeḥ sambandhe sambandhini vā lakṣaṇā, nādyaḥ. Rājñāḥ puruṣa iti vivaraṇavirodhāt. ....nāntyaḥ rājasambandharūpa-puruṣa ityanvaya-prasangāt. —PLM, p. 117.

87. Harirapyāha-

Samāse khalu bhinnaiva śaktiḥ paṅkajaśabdavat/ Bahūnāṃ vṛttidharmāṇāṃ vacanaireva sādhane/ Syañmahat gauravaṃ tasmādekārthībhāva āśritaḥ//....

—PLM, p. 119.

- 88. Svanirūpitasādrśyādhikaranatvasambandhena sakyasambandhyarthapratipādikā gaunī, Tadatiriktasambandhena sakyasambandhyarthapratipādikā śuddhā.

  —PIM, p. 16.
- 89. Mānāntaraviruddhe tu mukhyārthasya parigrahe/
  Abhidheyāvinābhūtapratītirlakṣaṇocyate//
  Lakśyamāṇagunairyogādvṛtteriṣṭā tu gauṇatā//
  ...Vahnitvalakṣitādarthāt yat paiṅgalyādi gamyate/
  Tena mānavake buddhiḥ sādṛśyādupajāyate//
  —TV, 1.4.

90. Mukhyārthasākṣātsambandhamūlāropānmukhyārthavṛttiguṇasa mānaguṇavattvarūpaparamparāsambandhamūlāropo jaghanyā iti gauṇyā atijaghanyatvaṃ bodhyam. —VSM, p. 146.

91. Svasiddhaye parākṣepaḥ parārtham svasamarpaṇam/ Upādānam lakṣaṇam cetyuktā śuddhaiva sā dvidhā//

—KP, II. 10.

92. Śakyārthasambandho yadi tīratvena rūpeņa grhītastadā tīratvena tīrabodhaḥ. Yadi tu gaṅgātīratvena rūpeṇa grhītastadā tenaiva rūpeṇa smaraṇam.
—BP, Vrtti on K. 82.
Tīratvena lakṣaṇāyāmeva jahatsvārthatvasya sarvasammatatvāt.
Gaṇgātīratvena bhāne tvajahatsvārthaiva lakṣaṇeti.

—Dinakarī, p. 287.

93. Vişayasyānigīrnasyānyatādātmapratītikrt/

Sāropā syānnigīrņasya matā sādhyavasānikā// —SD. II. 13. 94. Sādhyavasānāyāñca 'Candrarājī Virājate' ityādau candrādiśabdairlakṣaṇayā mukhatvenopasthitasyāpi mukhādeḥ śābdabodhaścandratvādinā bhavati, lakṣaṇājñānasyaiva māhātmyāt ityeke. Lakṣaṇayā mukhatvena mukhādeḥ śābdabodhe vṛtte vyāñjanaikaśabdopāttatvaprādurbhūtayā candratvena bodhaḥ ityapare... Apare tu nivāryata eva viruddhabhānasāmagryā svadharmasya bhānam. Rajatatvabhānasāmagryā śuktitvasyāhānāt iti vadanti.

—RG, II. pp. 201-202.

Atra kecit—'Rūpakasyopamātah svarūpasamvedanāmsamādāyāvailakṣanye' pi lakṣanāphalībhūtatādrupyasamvedanamādāya vailakṣanyam nirbādham. Tādrupyasamvedanam ca viṣaye mukhādau viṣayitāvacchedakasya candratvādeh sampratyah. . . . Atha candratatsadrsayorevaikapadopāttatvāccandrasadrse candratādrupyasya pratyayo yathākathañcidastu, na tu mukhatvavisiṣte mukhe. . . Svatādrupyavadabhedabuddhyā svatādrupyasya subodhatayā tasminnapi tasya siddheh' ityāhuh. —RG. II. pp. 187-88.

96. Anye tu—'Candrādipadebhyo lakṣaṇyā candrasādṛśatvenāpi rupeṇopasthāpitānām mukhādīnām candratvena rupeṇaiva mukhādipadopasthāpitaih sabābhedānvayabodho jāyate...Prakṛte tu viṣayicandrādiniṣṭhāsādhāraṇaguṇavatvapratyah phalam....Ittham ca
svarūpasamvittikṛtaḥ phalībhūtasamvittikṛtaścopamāto rupakasya
bhedaḥ sphuṭa eva' iti vadanti. —RG. II. pp. 188-89.

97. Apare tu bhedakarambitam sādṛśyamupamājīvātubhūtam, bhedākarambitam ca gauṇasāropalakṣaṇāyā iti sphuṭe bhede kṛtam plalakṛtavailakṣaṇyaparyantānudhāvanena. Pakṣo'smin bhedagarbhasādṛśyapratipattestādrūpyapratītīh katham nāma phalam bhavitumiṣṭe ityanupapattim parihartumāyāso'pi nāpatatītyaparamanukūlamityapyāhuḥ.

—RG. II. p. 190.

98. Navyāstu—'mukham candraḥ' 'vāhīko gauḥ' ityādau candrādīnām mukhādibhiḥ saha sambhavati lakṣaṇām vinaivābhedena saṃsargeṇānvayabodaḥ. Bādhaniścayapratibādhyatāvacchedakakoṭāvanāhāryatvasyeva śābdānyatvasyāpi niveśyatvāt. Ata eva atyantā-satyapi hyarthe jñānam śabdaḥ karoti hi' iti prācām pravādo'pi saṅgacchate ... Mukham Candraḥ, gourvāhīkaḥ ityādau tviṣṭacamatkāraprayojakatājñānādhīnāyāḥ icchāvāh sattvādāhāryayogyatājñānasamrājyam ... Ato nāmārthayorabhedasaraṇireva rūpakasthale ramaṇīyā.

—RG. II. pp. 190-95.

99. Itthameva ca mukham candra ityādiprasiddhodāharaņe'pi iyānstu višeṣaḥ—yadekatra sādhāraņo dharmaḥ prasiddhatayā niyamataḥ svabodhakaśrutim nāpekṣate itaratra tvaprasiddhatayā tathā....

Na cāhāryapadārthadvayābhedabuddhau taccamatkāre vā sādhāraņadharmaviśeṣajñānam prayojakamiti śakyam vaktum. 'Yadyanuṣṇo bhavedvahniryadyaśītam bhavejjalam' ityādau sādhāraṇadharmasyāpratyaye'pi vahnyanuṣṇatvādīnāmabhedapratyayopagateh.

—RG. II. p. 195-96.

- 100. Nanu rūpakapratiterupamānābhedavişayatvavirahe 'Simhena sadṛśo nāyam kintu simho narādhipaḥ' ityādau niṣedhyavidheyayorasangatiriti cet, na. Anupadameva prācīnamatadvaye'pi rūpake tādrūpyapratipatteh svīkārasya pratipādanāt... Yadapyuktam rūpake sadṛśalakṣaṇāyāḥ phalam tādrupyapratyayo na yujyate tatsadṛśa iti śabdajabodhānantaramapi tathā pratyāpatteriti, tanna tatsadṛśa ityatra lakṣaṇāyā abhāvena tādrūpyapratyasyāpādanāyogāt. Tādrupyapratyah lakṣaṇāyāḥ phalamiti prācām samayaḥ. Mahābhāṣyātigranthānāmasminnevānukūlatvācca.
- —RG. II. pp. 197-201.

  Na caivam, tattadarthakaśābdasāmānyam pratyeva tattarthanistātparyaktvadhiyah pratibandhakatvāt, tattadarthānām yathākathañcidupanayavaśena manasaiva viśiṣṭadhīsambhavat, mānorathikasukhaprabhedaparyavasitam camathāram pratyapi śābdasyeva mānasasyāpi bodhasya viśiṣya hetutāyāh suvacatvāt, atiriktasya vyañjanākhyapadārthāntarasya svarūpasattayā anvayabuddhau taddhetutvasya ca pramāṇaviraheṇāsattvācceti saṃkṣepaḥ.
- Mukhyārthabādhagrahanirapekṣabodhajanako mukhyārthasambaddhāsambaddhasādhāraṇaprasiddhāprasiddhārthaviṣayako vaktrādivaiśiṣtyajñānapratibhādyudbuddhasaṃskāraviśeṣo vyañjanā. Ata eva nipātānāṃ dyotakatvaṃ sphoṭasya vyaṅgyatā ca haryādibhiruktā.
- 103. Sarveşām prāyaśo'rthānām vyañjakatvampīşyate. —KP. II. 2. Sabdāśrayatvena śabdatadekadeśatadarthavarnasamghaṭanāśrayatvena ca āśrayasya.... —KP. V. Vrtti.

104. Viratāsvabhidhādyāsu yayārtho bodhyate'paraḥ/ Sā vṛttirvyañjanā nāma śabdasyārthādikasya ca//

105. Yat soʻrthāntarayuk tathā/
Arthoʻpi vyañjakastatra sahakaritayā mataḥ//
Śabdapramāṇavedyoʻrtho vyanaktyarthāntaram yataḥ/
Arthasya vyañjakatve tat śabdasya sahakāritā// —Do. III. 3.

106. Na so'sti pratyayo loke yaḥ śabdānugamādṛte/ Anuviddhamiva jñānaṃ sarvam śabdena bhāsate//

107. Udeti savita tāmrastāmra evāstameti ca/

Sampattau ca vipattau ca mahatāmekarūpatā//
—RG. II. p. 463.

108. Abhidhālakṣaṇāmūlā śabdasya vyañjanā dvidhā//—SD. II. 20.
 109. Lakṣyam na mukhyam nāpyatra bādho yogaḥ phalena no/

Na prayojanametasmin na ca śabdah skhaladgatih//
—KP. II. 16.

110. Evamapyanavasthā syāt yā mūlakṣatikārinī. —KP. II. 17.

Mūlakṣatikarīmāhuranavasthām hi dūṣaṇam. —NM. I. p. 21.

111. Athavā nedṛśī carcā kavibhiḥ saha śobhate/ Vidvāṃso'pi vimuhyanti kāvyārthagahane'dhvani//

113. Anekārthasya śabdasya vācakatve niyantrite/ Samyogādyairavācyārthadhīkṛd vyāpṛtirañjanam/

114. Samyogo viprayogaśca sāhacaryam virodhitā/
Arthah prakaranam lingam śabdasyānyasya sannidih//
Sāmarthyamaucitī deśah kālo vyaktih svarādayah/
Śabdārthasyānavacchede viśeṣasmṛtihetavah//

-VP. II. 317-18 115. Atra kecinmanyante—'Yata eteşām śabdānām pūrvamarthantare' bhidhantaram dṛṣṭam tatastathavidhe rthantare dṛṣṭatadabhidhaśaktereva pratipatturniyantritābhidhāśaktikebhya etebhyah pratipattirdhvananavyāparādeva'....iti. Anye tu—'Sābhidhaiva dvitīyā artha-sāmarthyam....sahakāritvena yato'valambate, tato dhvananvyāpararūpocyate' iti. Eke tu-'Śābhidaślese tāvadbhede sati śabdasya, arthaślese'pi śaktibhedacchabdabheda iti darśane dvitīyah śabdastvānīyate. Sa ca kadācidabhidhavyāparāt....tatra vācyālamkāratā. Yatra tu dhvananavyāpārādeva śabda ānītah tatra śabdāntaravalādapi tadarthāntaram pratīpannam pratīyamānamūlatvāt pratīyamānameva yuktam' iti. Itare tu—'Dvitīyapakṣavyākhyāne yadarthasāmarthyam tena dvitīyābhidhaiva pratiprasūyate, tataśca dvitīyo'rtho bhidhīyate eva na dhvanyate, tadanantaram tu tasya dvitīyārthasyāpi pratipannasya prathamārthena prākaranikena sākam yā rūpanā sā tāvadbhātyeva, na cānyatah śabdāditi sā dhvananavyāpārāt.

Tatra kecidāhuh—Nānārthasya śabdasya sarveşvartheşu samketagrahasya tulyatvācchrutamātra eva tasmin sakalānāmarthānāmupasthitau, śabdasyāsya kasminnarthe tātparyamiti samdehe ca satiprakaranādikam tātparyanirnāyakam paryālocayatah puruşasya satinirnaye, tadātmakapadajñānajāyā ekārthamātravişayāyāh punah padārthopasthiteh prāthamikyā iva na kuto nānārthagocaratetiprakarnādijñānasya tadadhīnatātparyanirnayasya vā padārthopasthitau pratibandhakatvam vāeyam, anyathā śābdabuddherapinānārtha-vişayatvāpattih. Ata evoktam —'Anavacchede viśeşasmṛtihetavah' iti. Anavacchede tātparyasamdehe. Viśeşasmṛtirekārthamātraviṣayā smṛtih.

117. Apare tvāhuḥ—nānārthaśabdajaśābdabuddhau tātparyanirnayahetutāyā avaśyakalpatvāt prathamam nānārthaśabdā danekārthopasthāpane'pi prakaraṇādibhistātparyanirnayahetubhirutpādite tasmin yatra tātparyanirnayastasyaivārthasyānvayabuddhirjāyate, nānyasyeti saraṇāvāśrīyamānāyām naikamātragocarasmṛtyapekṣā, nāpya-

parārthopasthāpanapratibandhakatvakalpanam. Evam ca prāgupadarśitanānārthasthale prakaraṇādijñānādhīnāttātparyanirṇayāt prākaraṇikārthaśābdabuddhau jātāyāmatātparyaviṣayāpi śābdabuddhiḥ tasmādeva śabdājjāyamānā kasya vyāpārasya sādhyatāmavalambatām, rte vyañjanāt. . . . Ittham smrtiśabdasya niścayaparatayā viśeṣasmrtiśabdena viśeṣaviṣayastātparyanirṇayo grhyate. Samyogādyairvācakatāyā niyantraṇam caikamātraviṣayakatātparyanirṇayajananadvārā śābdabuddhāvanukūlatvam.

-RG. II. pp. 136-37.

- 118. Tasmānnānārthasyāprākaraņike'rthe vyañjaneti prācām siddhāntaḥ śithilaḥ eva. Prākaraņikāprākaraņikayorarthayorupamāyām tu sā kadācit syādapītyatrāsmākam pratibhāti. —RG. II. p. 143.
- 119. Śabdaśaktyā prakāśamāne satyaprākaraņike' rthāntare...

—DL. II. p. 244.

120. Uktyantareṇāśakyam yat taccārutvam prakāśayan/
Śabdo vyañjakatām bibhrad dhvanyuktervisavībhavet//

—DL. I. p. 146.

121. Yogarūdasya śabdasya yoge rūdhyā niyantrite/
Dhiyam yogaspṛśo' rthasya yā sūte vyañjanaive sā//
Evam sthite nānārthasthale'pyupamāyāh prākaranikārranikārthagatāyāh pratipattaye'vaśyam vācyayā vyañjanayaivāprākaranikasyāpyarthasya pratipattāvalam kliṣṭakalpanayetyāśayena prācīnairuktam nānārthavañjakatvamapi na duṣyati.

—RG. II. pp. 143-46.

- 122. Samyoga nānārthaśabdaśakyāntaravṛttitayā aprasiddhatve sati tacchakyavṛttitayā prasiddhaḥ sambandhaḥ —RG, II. p. 146.
- 123. Viprayoga viśleşah. . . . Atra hi viśleşaniyatapūrvavartinah samśleşasya prāguktadaladvayākrāntatvampekṣyate.

—RG. II. p. 147.

124. Sāhacaryamekasmin kārye parasparāpekṣitvam.

-RG. II. p. 147.

125. Ucyate-samyogaśabdasya sambandhasāmānyaparatayā yatra śabdopāttam prasiddham sambandhasāmānyam śaktiniyāmākam tadādyasya, yatra, tu dvandādigatah sambandhyeva kevalastadā tatsāhacaryasyodāharaṇamiti prācāmāśayāt. Ittham ca sagāṇdīvo'rjunah iti saṃyogasya. gandīvārjunāviti sāhacaryasyodāharaṇaṃ.

-RG. II. p. 149.

- 126. Rāmalakṣmanāvityādau sāhacaryenobhayoryugapadeva niyamanamiti nānyonyāśrayah. Sāhacaryam sādrśyam sadrśayoreva sahaprayoga iti niyamāt. —VSM. p. 111.
- 127. Virodhitā prasiddham vairam, sahānavasthānañca. Tatrādyasya 'Rāmārjunau' ityudāharaṇam prāñco vadanti...Sahānavasthānalakṣaṇavirodhitā tu chāyātapāvityādau bodhvā.

-RG. II. pp. 149-51.

128. Arthah prayojanam caturthyādyabhidhevam...Nanu arthasya lingātko bhedah?...Atrāhuh-uktasya viśistadharmasya śābdabodhottarabhāvimānasabodhaviṣayatvena prakrtaśābdabodhaviṣayatvāllingato vailakṣanyopapattiriti. Lingam tvekapadārthakopadih,

ananvita eva ya padārthāntarena prakṛtaśakyadharmatām śakyāntaravyāvṛttatām ca bhajate, uktadharmastu na tatheti kecit.

-RG. II. p. 151.

129. Prakaranam vaktrśrotrbuddhisthatā. —RG. II. p. 152.

130. Lingam nānārthapadaśakyāntaravṛttirekaśakyagataḥ sākṣācchabdavedyo dharmaḥ. —RG. II. p. 152.

131. Śabdasyānyasya sannidhirnānārthapadaikārthamātrasamsargyarthāntaravācakapadasamabhivyāhārah. Yathā'karena rājate nāgah'ityatra karapadasya nāgapadamādāya nāgapadasya ca karapadamādāya śundāyām gaje ca.

—RG. II. p. 153.

132. Sāmarthyam kāraṇatā. Yathā madhunā mattah kokilah ityatra

kokilamadajanakatayāmadhuśabdasya vasante...

--RG. II. p. 154.

133. Aucitī yogyatā. —RG. II. p. 154.

134. Deśo nagarādih yathā—'bhātyatra Parameśvarah' ityādau paramesvarādiśabdasya rājādau...Evam vaikunthe harirvasati ityatrāpi bodhyam.

—RG. II. p. 155.

135. Kālo divasādiķ...vyaktiķ strīpumnapumsakalingāni...Svaraķ udāttādiķ. —RG. II. p. 155.

136. Tathāhi svarāh kākvādaya udāttādayo vā vyangyarūpameva višeṣaṃ pratyāyayanti, na khalu prakṛtoktamanekārthaśabdasyaikārthaniyantraṇarūpaṃ višeṣam...ityalamupajīvyānāṃ mānyānāṃ vyākhyāneṣu kaṭākṣanikṣepeṇa. —SD. II. Vṛtti on K. 21.

137. Atha prasiddhatvādinā teṣāmasādhāraṇatābuddhiryathākathañcidu-papādyate, tadā prayāśo lingabhedā evaite, na tu sarvathaiva tataḥ svatantrā iti bodhyam. —RG. II. p. 156.

138. Vaktrboddhavyakākūnām vākyavācyānyasannidheḥ/ Prastāvadeśakālādervaiśiṣṭyāt pratibhājuṣām// Yo'rthasyānyārthadhīheturvyāpāro vyaktireva sā//

—KP. III. 1-2.

139. Mithah sākānkṣaśabdasya vyūho vākyam caturvidham/
Śuptingantacayo naivamativyāptyādidoṣatah//
.....Kriyārahitanna vākyamastītyādikastu pracām pravādo
niryuktikatvādaśraddheyah. —SSP. V. 13 & Vṛtti thereon.

140. Vākyasvarūpamāha—

Vākyam syādyogyatākanksasattiyuktah padoccayah.

—SD, II. K. 1.

Vākyasamayagrāhikā ākankṣā. Sā caikapadārthajnāne tadarthānvayajogyārthasya yajnānam tadviṣayecchā 'asyānvayyarthah kaḥ'
ityevamrūpā puruṣaniṣthaiva, tathāpi tasyāh svaviṣaye'rthe āropaḥ.
Ayamartho'rthāntaramākānkṣatīti vvavahārāt. ... Pade tu nāropaḥ,
arthabodhottaramevākānkṣodayāt. Padam sākānkṣamiti tu sākānkṣ
ṣārthabodhakamityarthakam. —PIM np. 33.34

şarthabodhakamityarthakam. —PLM, pp. 33-34.

142. Yadvā utthāpakatāviṣayātanyatarasambandhena ubhayasambandhena vā arthāntarajijñāsa ākāṅkṣā. Ādyam—Paśya mṛgo dhāvatītyatra darśanārthasya kārakadhāvanākāṅkṣotthāpakatvam dhāvanam tu tadviṣaya eva. Antyantu —'Pacati tandulam devadattaḥ' ityādau, kriyākārakayordvayorapi parasparam tadutthāpakatvāt

tadvişayatvācca. Ata eva ghatah karmatvam ānayanam krtih itvato ghatamānavetivannānvavabodhah ākānksāvirahāt.

—PLM. p. 35.

143. Na ca sarvatra jijnāsā nibandhanam, ajijnāsorapi vākyārthodavāt ākānkṣāpadārthastarhi kaḥ? jijñāsām prati yogyatā. sā ca smārita —tadāksiptayoravinābhāve sati śrotari tadutpādyasamsargāvagamaprāgabhāvah. -NK, p. 122.

144. Atrāhuh—abhidhānāparyavasānam ākānkṣā, yena vinā yasya na svārthānvayānubhāvakatvam tasya tadaparyavasānam, nāma-vibhakti-dhātvākhyāta-kriyā-kāraka-padānām parasparam vinā na svārthanvayanubhavakatvam. -PS. p. 67.

145. Yatpadena vinā yasyā'nanubhāvakatā bhavet/Sākānkṣā..// Yena padena vinā yatpadasyānvayānanubhāvakatvam tena padena saha tasyākānkṣetyarthaḥ. ... Vastutastu kriyākāraka-padānām sannidhānam āsattyā caritārtham. Parantu ghatakarmatābodham prati ghaţapadottaradvitīyārūpākānksājñānam kāranam.

-BP-SM on K. 84.

146. Padārthe tatra tadvattā yogyatā parikīrttita. ... Ekapadārthe aparapadārthasambandho yogyatā ityarthah. Tajjñānābhāvācca vahninā siñcatītyādau na śābdabodhah.

-BP with SM on K. 83.

147. Yogyatā ca bādhakamānābhāvah. -PS. Ch. III. p. 67.

148. Yogyatā ca parasparānvayapravojakadharmavattvam. Tena Pavasā siñcatīti vākyam yogyam. Asti sekānvayaprayojakadravadravvatvam yogyatā jale, karanatvena jalānvavapravojakārdrīkaranatvam yogyatā sekakriyāyām. Ata eva vahninā siñcatīti vākyamajogyam, vahneh sekānvayaprayojakadravadravyatvābhāvāt. Etādrsāsthalesu nānvayabodhah, kintu pratyekam padārthabodhamātramiti Naivā--PLM. p. 36.

149. Tanna—Śabdaprayojye bodhe bādha-jñānasya apratibandhakatvāt. tadabhāvajñānasya akāranatvācca. Satyapi bādhaniścaye.... Esa vandhyāsuto yāti' ityādito bodhadarśanāt. Kiñcaivam 'vahninā siñcati' ityato bodhābhāve tadvākyaprayoktuh 'adraveņa vahninā katham sekam bravīsi' ityupahāsah śrotrbhih kriyamāno'sangatah syāt. Etadarthakadravidabhāṣāśravanottaram pāścāttyasyeva mūkatā tasya syāt. Kiñcaivam sati vāde prativādiśabdasyābodhakatvena tatkhandanakathocchedah. -VSM, pp. 505-07.

150. Na ca 'vahninā siñca' ityāditah pravrttirapi syāt, bādhajñānena jāyamānajñāne aprāmānyaśankāyā jananāt tacchūnyajaānasyaiva pravrttyupayogitvenākseteh. Bauddhasyaiva sarvatra bodhavisayatvena bādhasyaivābhāvācca. Taduktam—'atyantāsatyapi hyarthe jñānam karoti hi śabdah' iti. Vastuto bādhajñānam na kvāpi jñāne pratibandhakam. -VSM. p. 513. Vākyārthabodhe jāte buddhārthavisaye prayrttistu na bhavati, buddhārthe aprāmānyagrahādityanyatra vistarah. —PLM. p. 37.

151. Sannidhānam tu padasyāsattirucyate....Anvayapratiyogyanuyogipadayoravyavadhānam āsattih, tajjñānam śābdabodhe kāraņam ....Vastutastu avyavadhānajñānasya anapeksitatvāt yatpadārthasya

yatpadārthena anvayopeksitastayoravyavadhānena upasthitih śābdabodhe kāranam. Tena 'Girirbhuktam agnimān devadattena' ityādau na śābdabodhah. Nīlo ghaţo dravyam paţa ityādau āsattibhramāt śābdabodhah....Nanu yatra chatrī kundalī vā asvī devadatta ityuktam, tatra uttarapadasmaranena purvapadasmaranasya nāśāt avyavadhānena tattatpadasmaranāsambhava iti cet, na. Pratyekapadānubhavajanyasamskāraiścaramam tāvatpadavişayakasmaranasya avyavadhānena utpatteh. .... Parantu tāvatpadārthānām smaranādekadaiva khale kapotanyāyāt tāvatpadārthānām kriyākarmabhāvena anvyabodharūpah śābdabodho bhavatīti kecit.

-SM. on K. 83. 152. Asattirbudhyaviccedah. —SD II. 1.

153. Atah sannihitatvābhāvāt śabdabodhitvābhāvācca dvedhā sannidhyabhāvo bhavati, tatra bhinnakāloccāritayor gām ānaya ityatra padayoh sannihitatvābhāvāt ananvayah. Gām badhāna ityatra badhānāpekṣasya dṛśyamānasya śabdabodhitatvābhāvād eva ananvayah atah sabdapratipannanameva anvayah iti niyamah siddhah.

-Mānameyodaya

154. Āsattirapi mandabuddher avilambena śābdabodhe kāranam. Amandabuddhestvāsattyabhāve api padārthopasthitau ākānkṣāditaḥ avilambena bodho bhavati iti na bodhe tasya kāraṇatvam. Dhvanitam cedam 'Na Padānta' sūtrabhāsve.

—PLM. pp. 37-38.

155. Atredam vicāryam. Uyutpattir balīyasī—na śabdo'rtham avagamayati vyutpattimantarena. Vyutpattisca kim väkasya, väkyärthe, padasya vā padārthe iti. Yadi vākyasya vākyārthe vyutpattistadānvitābhidhām. Padasya padārthe vyutpattau abhihitānvaya iti. -NM. Vol. I. p. 364.

156. Ata eva vākyārtho lāksaņika iti Mīmāmsakah.

-Nyāyaratnamālā. p. 125.

157. Tasmāt padānām padārthasvarūpamātraparatve vākyaprāmānyānupapattir eva lakṣaṇākṣepike'ti tadeva lakṣaṇam lakṣaṇāyāḥ. .... Bhāttapādaiśca vākyārthasya sarvatra lākṣanikatvasvīkārāt.

—TP. pp. 152-55.

158. Na ca padārthasmṛtīnām smṛtānām vā padārthānām anvayabodhakatve saptamapramāṇābhyupagama-prasangaḥ, linga prakaraṇasthānānāmiva śabdapramānāntarbhāvopapatteh. -TV. p. 149.

159. Naun kim anabhihitena padārthena anvitam svārtham avabodhayati go-padam, uta padantarābhihitena? nādyaḥ, ekasmād eva padāt tattadrthānvitasvārthāvabodhasambhavena padāntarasya vaiyarthyaprasangāt. na dvitīyah, parasparāśrayaprasangāt.

—TP. p. 145. 160. Yathā caksuso nīla-pītādivisaya-sahakāribhedāt eva ekayā' pi rūpaprakāśanaśaktyā nīlapītādivijñānakāryabhedah tarhi śabdesvapi sahakāribhedāt kāryabhedo na daņdavāritah.

-Prakāśānanda's gloss on Śabdanirnaya: K. 31.

161. Arthaprakaranaprāptapadārthāntaravedane/

Padam prayujyate yattadvākyamevoditam bhavet//

3. Rāmapadam ca sarvasahatvāhupayuktaśakyārthatayā sakaladuh-

4. Andhaśabdo'tra padārthasphutīkaranāsaktatvam nastadrstigatam

khabhājanatvam laksayat sītām vināpi jīvisyāmīti vyañjayadeva

nimittikṛtya ādarśam lakṣaṇayā pratipādayati. Asādhāraṇavicchāyat-

2. Arthantare samkramitamatyantam va tiraskrtam/

vipralambham vyanakti.

Avivaksitavācyasya dhvanervācyam dvidhā matam//

-DL. II. I.

-PR. p. 132.

-RG. I. pp. 130-31.

—LC. p. 100.

-DL. II. 5.

Vaktā vākyam prayunkte ca samsrstārthavivaksayā/ Tathaiva buddhyate śrota tathaiva ca tatasthitah// -NM. p. 366. 162. Aśābdatvam ca vākyārthapratīteritthamāpatet/ Vyavadhānamavuktam ca sāksācchabdatvasambhave// -NM. p. 367. 163. Nābhidhātrī śaktiranvitavişayā kim tvanvayavyatirekāvagatanişkrşţā -svārthavisavaiva, tātparvaśaktistu tesāmanvitāvagamaparyantā saha vyāpārāt vyāpārāsya ca tadīyasya nirākānkṣapratyayotpādana--NM. p. 371. parvantatvāt. 164. Matadvayamapīdam tū nāsmabhyam rocatetarām/ Kuto'nvitābhidhānam vā kuto vābhihitānvayah// -NM. p. 370. 165. Ucyate samhatyakāritāpyasti, na cānvitābhānam, anvitam artham padāni samhatya sampādayanti na tvanitamabhidadhāti. -NM. p. 371. 166. Anyameva ca paksah śreyān yatsamhatyakāritvam padānāmasankīrnārthatvam ca-Nirapeksaprayoge'yam śalākākalpanā bhavet/ Tadanvitābhidhānstu padāntaramanarthakam// Samhatvakāripakse tu doso naiko'pi vujvate/ Tenāvamupagantavyo mārgo hi hatakantakah// Abhidhātrī matā śaktih padānām svārthanisthatā/ Tesām tātparvaśaktistu samsargāvagamāva dhih// Tenānvitābhidhānam hi nāsmābhiriha mṛṣvate/ Anvitapratipattistu bādhamabhyupagamyate// -NM. p. 372. 167. Tātpatyārtho'pi keşucit. . . . Ākānkṣā-yogyatā-sannidhivaśād vakṣyamānasvarūpānām padārthānām samanvaye tātparyārtho viśeṣavapurapadartho'pi vakyarthah samullasati itvabhihitanvayavadinam -KP, II. Kārikā I & Vrtti. matam. 168. Kesucinnyāyādinayesu. na tu mīmāmsakādimateşu api. -PR p. 17. Ādinā bhāttāmīmāmsakāh. -KP-uddvota. p. 24. 169. Tātparyākhāym vṛttimāhuh padārthānvayabodhane/ Tātparvārtham tadartham ca vākyam tadhodhakampare// ... Abhidhayah ekaikapadarthabodanaviramat vakyartharupasya

#### CHAPTER III

matam.

1. Tatrāvivakţitavācyo nāma lakṣaṇāmālo dhvanih. Lakṣaṇāmūlatvādevātra vācyamavivaksitam bādhitasvarūpam. Vivaksitūnyaparavācyastvabhidhāmūlah, ata evātra vācyam vivaksitam. -SD. Vrtti on K. 2. Ch. IV.

padarthanvayasya bodhika tatparyam nama vrttih. Tadarthaśca

tātparvārthah. Tadbodhakam ca vākvamityabhihitānvayavādinām

-SD. II. Kārinā 20 & Vrtti thereon.

'samprati' ityetadarthāvagotirvilambena. vyangvatvam.

ņena na taduktīnām virodhah.

bhāva-smṛtyādivadasamvedya iti darśitam.

vānupayogitvādidharmajātamasamkhyam prayojanam vyanakti. -LC. p. 172. 5. Asamlaksyakramoddyotah kramena dyotitah parah/ Vivaksitābhidheyasya dhvanerātmā dvidhā matah// Mukhyatayā prakāśamāno vyangyo'rtho dhvanerātmā. Sa ca vācyārthapeksaya kaścidalaksyakramataya prakaśate, kaścit krameneti dvidhā matah. -DL. II. 2. 6. So'yam nigaditah sarvo'pi rasādilakṣano vyangyaprapañcah sphuţa prakarane shagiti protīteşu vibhnubhāvavyabhicārişu sahrdayatamena pramātrā sūnksmenaiva samayena pratīyat iti hetuhetumatoh paurvāparyakramasyālakṣanādalkṣyakramo vyapadiśyate. -RG. I. p. 129. 7. Yatra tu vicnravedyam prakaranam, unneyā vā vibhādayastatra sāmagrīvilambādhīnam camatkṛtermāntharyamiti samlakṣyakramo' pyeşa bhavati. Yathā 'talpagatāpi ca sutanuḥ' iti prāgudāhrte padye -RG, I. p. 129. 8. Na khalu dharmigrāhakamānasiddham ratyādidhvaneralaksyakrama--RG. I. p. 129. 9. Yo rasādirarthah sa evākramo dhvanerātmā na tu akrama eva saḥ. Sakramatvamapi tasya kadācid bhavati. Tadā cārthaśaktyudbhavānusvānarūpabhedateti vaksyate. -LC. p. 174. 10. Syādetat—Yadyaym rasādih samlaksyakramasya vişayah syāt, anuraņanabhedaprastāve 'arthaśaktimūlasya dvādaśa bhedāḥ' ityabhinvaguptoktih, 'tenāyam dvādaśātmakah' iti mammatoktisca na sangaccheta...vastvalamkārayoriva rasāderapyabhivyañjanādastādaśatvaprasangāt. Atrocyate — Prakatairvibhāvānubhāvavyabhicāribhiralaksyakramatayaiva vyajyamano ratyadih sthayibhavo rasibhavati, na samlaksyakramatayā. Rasībhāvo hi nāma jhagiti jāyamānālauki-

kacamatkāravisayasthāyitvam. Samlaksyakramatayā vyajyamānasya

ratyādestu vastumātrataiva na rasāditvamiti tesāmāśayasya varņa-

tasya padārtha-vākyārtha-kramah. Kāsthāprāptasahrdayabhāvasya tu vākya-vṛtta-kuśalasyeva sannapi kramo'bhyastānumānābhinā-

11. Anena ślokena atyantasahrdayo yo na bhavati tasyaişa spuţasamvedya eva kramah. Yathā atyanta-śabda-vṛttajño yo na bhavati

12. ... Tasmādangatvena ca rasādīnāmalamkāratā. Yah purarangī

raso bhāvo vā sarvākāramalamkāryah sa dhvanerātmeti.

13. Alamkāro na rasavat parasyāpratibhāsanat/

Svarūpādatiriktasya śabdārthāsangaterapi// —VJ. III. II.

14. Tasyāngānam prabhedā ye prabhedāh svagatāśca ye/

Tesāmānantyamanyonyasambandhaparikalpane// —DL. II. 12.

15. Rasādīnāmanantatvāt bheda eko hi ganyate. . . . Tathā hi navarasāh. Tatra śṛṅgārasya dvau bhedau. Sambhogo vipralambhaśca. Sambhogasyāpi parasparāvalokanālinganaparicumbanādikusumocca-yajalakelisūryāstamayacandrodayaṣadṛtuvarṇanādayo bahavo bhedāh. Vipralambhasyābhilāṣādaya uktoh. Tayorapi vibhāvānubhāva-vyabhieārivaicitryam. Tatrāpi nāyakayoruttamamadhyamādhama-prakṛtitvam. Tatrāpi deśakālāvasthādibhedā ityekasyaiva rasasyānantyam. Kā gaṇanā tvanyeṣām. Asamlakṣyakramatvam tu sāmānyamāśritya rasādidhvanibheda eka eva gaṇyate. —KP. IV. 57.

16. Kramena pratibhātyatmā yo'syānusvānasamnibhah/ Śabdārthaśaktimūlatvāt so'pi dvedhā vyavasthitah//

—DL. II. 10.

& Śabdaśaktyā arthaśaktyā śabdārthaśaktyā vākṣipto'pi vyaṅgyo' rthah.... —Vṛtti on II. 23.

17. Parivṛttyasahiṣṇūnām śabdānām prācurye tadprayuktāt prādhānyāt satyā apyarthaśakteraprādhānyācca vyangyasya śabdaśaktimūlakatvenaiva vyapadeśah. Parivṛttisahiṣnūnām tu prācurye arthaśaktereva prādhānyāt satyā api śabdaśakteh pradhānānugunyārthatayā mallagrāmādivat pradhānenaiva vyapadeśah. Yatratu kāvye parivṛttim sahamānāmasahamānām ca śabdānām naikajātīyaprācuryam, api tu sāmyameva, tatra...dvyuttho dhvanih.

-RG. II. p. 173.

-VV. p. 11-16.

18. Ākṣipta evalamkārah śabdaśaktyā prakāśte/

Yasminnanuktah śabdena śabdaśaktyudbhavo hi sah// Yasmādalamkāro na vastumātram yasmin kāvye śabdaśaktyā prakāśate, sa śabdaśaktyudbhavo dhvanirityasmākam vivakṣitam. Vastudvaye ca śabdaśaktyā prakāśamāne śleṣaḥ. —DL. II. 21.

- 19. Atra rtuvarnanaprastāvaniyantritābhidhāśaktayah ate eva—'avayavaprasiddeh samudāya-prasiddhirbalīyasī' iti nyāyam apākurvanto mahākālaprabhrtayah śabdāh etamevārtham abhidhāya kṛtakṛtyā eva. Tadantaram arthāvagatirdhvananavyāpārādeva śabdaśaktimūlāt. —LC. p. 141.
- 20. Tasmāt prastutāprastutobhayapare'pi prastutaprastutobhayavācyārthe'bhidhaiva vṛttih. Tadupasthitesu ca padārthesu ākānkṣādisahakārivasāt ubhayavidhavākyārthapratyayah ityaprastutavisaye na padārthapratītaye nāpi vākyārthapratitaye vyaktirupagantavyā.
- 21. Atha ślistaviśesanāyām samāsoktau vyangyasyāprakṛtavyavahārasya prakṛtadharminyāropyamānasya prakṛtopaskārakatavā yathā gunībhūtavyangyatvam evamihāpi ucitam. —RG. II. p. 157.

22. Na cātra upamādīnāmalamkārānām svabhāvatah sundaratvāt kāvyapravrttyuddeśyatayā ca vastumātre gunībhāvo na sambhavati, yathā vastumātrenābhivyaktānām alamkārānam, tulyanyāyatvāt. Aprakrtavyavahārasya tu samāsoktyavayavasya niralamkāratayā

vastunyupaskārakatvam samāsoktau aviruddham iti vācyam evamapi 'bādhe' dṛḍhe anyasāmyāt kim dṛḍhe anyadapi bādhyatām iti nyāyena uktayukteḥ śithilatvāt, aparāṅgatāyā durapahnavatvāt. —RG. II. pp. 157-58.

23. Atha ucyeta—upamānam upameyam sādhārano dharma iti hyupamāśarīraghaṭakam, na tu tataḥ pṛthagbhūtam, tairvinā tasyā aniṣpatteḥ. Ittham copameyasya sādṛśyāmśena upaskāre api upamāyā nāparāngatvam, upameyasyāparatvābhāvāt. Yathā samāsoktau aprakṛtavyavahāreṇa prakṛtopaskaraṇe api na samāsokteraparāngatvam, prakṛtāprakṛtaghaṭitatvāt, evam ihāpi syāditi. Tathāpi samāsokteriva asyāpi prabhedasya guṇībhūtavyaṅgyatvāpatteḥ, asyeva vā samāsokterapi dhvanivyapadeśyatvāpatteḥ.

-RG. II. p. 158.

24. Na caivam upamākṛtotkarṣamādāya astu dhvanitvam alamkāra-dhvaniriti tu kathamiti vācyam. Alamkārakṛtotkarṣadhvanau eva Alamkāra-dhvaniriti vyavahārāt iti. —Nāgeśa. II. p. 159.

25. Anye'pi cālamkārāh śabdaśaktimūlānusvanarūpavyaugye dhvanau sambhavantyeva. Tathā hi virodho'pi śabdaśaktimūlānusvānarūpo drśyate... Evamvidho vyatreko'pi drśyate. —DL. II. pp. 244-45.

26. Na cātra vyatirekasya gunībhūtasya katham dhvanivyapadeśahetutvam, pradhānasyaiva dhvanivyapadeśahetutvāditi vācyam, udāsīne vaktari tattvarthakathanaparasyāsya padyasya vaktrgatarativyañjakatvāsamgateh, gunībhūtasyāpyarthasya vācyārthāpekṣayā pradhānatayā dhvanivyapadeśahetutāyāh prācīnaih svīkārācca.

-RG. II. p. 161.

27. Alamkāryasyāpi Brāhmaņaśramaņanyāyenālamkāratā.

-KP. IV. Vrtti on K. 38.

Nanu udāhṛteṣu upamādīnām prādhānyam na vā. Ādye kutasteṣāmalamkāratvam, anyānalamkaranāt. Dvitīye kuto'sya kāvyasya dhvanitvam, vyangyasya aprādhānyāt iti cet, na. Purvamayamalamkāra āsīt ityetāvatā alamkāravyapadeśāt. Yathā brāhmaṇapūrvabauddhasannyāsini brāhmaṇavyapadeśah. Nanu evam vyapadeśasamarthane'pi alamkāradhvanitvam na samarthitamiti cet, na. Alamkārapadena tadyogyatāyā vivakṣitatvāt. —PR. p. 100.

28. Eşaiva ca yadā sakalena vākyena prādhānyena dhvanyate, tadā parihṛtālamkārabhāvā dhvanivyapadeśahetuḥ. Asyām ca alamkāravyapadeśah kadāpi alamkārabhāvam aprāpteṣu mañjūṣādigateṣu kaṭakādiṣu iva almkurvāṇagatadharmamātrasaṃsparśanibandhanaḥ.

—RG. II. p. 185.

29. Evam śabdaśaktyā vācyagatena ca sāmarthyaviśeṣena arthāntarapratītau kāryāyām ubhayaśaktimūlatvamevātra paryavasyati, na kevalam śabdaśaktimūlatvam...Kintu 'panthia—' ityādyubhayaśaktimūlasya eva udāharanam vācyam, arthaśakterapi vyāpārāt. Anyathā kevalaśabdaśaktervastumātram dhvanyam na syāt. Anenaiva āśayena śabdaśaktimūlavastudhvanim dhvanikrt na angīkrtavān.
—SA. pp. 29-36.

30. Vastudhvanirapi sambandhāntareņa tatra samīcīnah syāt.

-AK. p. 102.

31. Yattu kāvyaprakāśasamkete grathakṛtā vastudhvaneḥ śabdaśaktimūlatvam cintyamuktam, tadudāharanābhiprāyena eva unneyam. -VS. p. 102.

32. Na catra nrpacandrayorupamanopameyabhavah bhedapoharupam rūpakam vā tathāstu iti vācyam, iha nṛparūpasya arthasya candrarūpārthagopanamātrārtham upāttatvena yugapadullasitopamānopameyakayorupamarupakayoh tatparyavisayataya ayogat. Na ca asamsṛṣṭārthadvayabodhane vākyabheda iti vācyam, tulyakakṣatayā dvayoh asamsṛṣṭayoh arthayoh pratipipādayiṣitatve eva tasya abhyupagamāt. Iha tu ācchādakapratītisamaye ācchādyāpratītih, ācchādyapratītau ca ācchādakanyagbhāva eveti nāsti tulyakaksatā. -RG. II. p. 162.

śabdaśaktimūlānusvānarūpavyangyadhvaniprakārāh 33. Evamanye'pi santi, te sahrdayaih svyamanusarttavyāh. Iha tu granthavistara-—DL. II. Vrtti on K. 21. bhayāt na tatprapañcah kṛtaḥ.

34. Arthaśaktyudbhavo'pyartho vyañjakah sambhavī svatah Praudoktimātrāt siddho vā kaveh tenombhitasya vā Vasturvālamkṛtirve sadbhedo'sau vyanakti yat Vastvalamkāramathavā tenāyam dvādaśātmakah//

-KP. IV. k. 39-40.

35. Anyathā 'vasante sapallavasahakārodgama' iti vastumātram na vyañjakam syāt. Eṣā ca kaverevoktih praudhā.

-LC. p. 255.

36. Atra lohitam Bimbaphalam śuko daśatīti na vyañjakatā kācit. Yadā tu kavinibaddhasya sābhilāsasya taruņasya vaktuh ittham -LC. p. 255. praudhoktih tadā vyañjakatvam.

37. Iha cārthah svatahsambhavī kavipraudhoktimātranispannaśarīrah, kavinivaddhavaktrpraudhoktimātranispannaśarīro vā...iti bhedakathanam na nyayyam praudhoktinirmitatvamatrena eva sadhyasiddheh. Praudhoktim antarena svatah sambhavinah api akiñcitkaratvāt. Kavipraudhoktireva ca kavinivaddhavaktrpraudhoktih iti -KS. pp. 55-56. kim prapañcena.

38. Pratibhānirmitatvāvisesāt ca kavi-tadumbhitavaktr-praudhoktinispannayoh arthayoh na pṛthaggaṇanā ucitā, umbhitombhitādeh api bhedantaraprayojakatapatteh. Na ca tasyapi kavyumbhitatvānapāyāt tatprayojyabhedāntargatatvam eva iti vācyam. Prathamombhitasyāpi lokottaravarnanānipuņatvalakṣaṇakavitvāna--RG. II. p. 134. pāyāt prthagbhedaprayojakatānupapatteh.

39. Vrddhoktivisayāt śiśūktivisaya iva kavyuktivisayāt kavinibaddhoktivişaye camatkaradhikyanubhavikatvat prthaguktih.

-Nages's commentary on RG. II. p. 134.

40. Atandracandrābharaṇā...etc. Atra śyāmārūpakāminīviśeṣarajanyoḥ upamā vyangyā, Sā ca atandracandretyādeh parivṛttyasahatayā, samuddīpitatyādestatsahatayā ubhayasyāpi vyañjakatvena śabdār-—PR. p. 109. thobhayaśaktimūlā.

41. Śabdaśaktimūlo'rthaśaktimūlasceti vyangyo dvidhā. Ubhayaśaktimūlastu śabdaśaktimūlānnatiricyate, śabdasyaiva prādhānyena -KS. p. 46. vvañjakatvāt.

& Yadyapi samuddīpiteti sānandamiti cārtho vyañjakastathāpi na śabdaśaktim vina arthaśaktirunmīlati iti śabdaśaktireva vyañjika. -KS. p. 51.

42. Ubhayaśaktyā yathā—'Drstyā Keśava—'itayādau.

-DL. Vrtti on II. 23.

cf. Atra goparagadiśabdanam gope raga ityadivyangyarthanam 'saleśam' iti padena sphutatayāvabhāsah. 'Saleśam' iti padasya parityāge dhvanireva. -SD. IV. Vrtti on K. 17.

43. Śabdārthobhayabhūrekah. -KP. IV. 55. Ekah śabdarthaśaktyutthah. -SD. IV. 10.

44. Śabdārthaśaktyākṣipto 'pi vyangyo' rthah kavinā punah/ Yatravişkriyate svoktya sa'nyaivalamkrtirdhvaneh//

—DL. II. 23.

45. Agūdhamaparsyāngam vācyasiddhyangamasphuṭam/Sandigdhatulyaprādhānye kākvāksiptamasundaram// Vyangyamevam gunībhūtavyangyasyāstau bhidā matāh// -KP. V. I.

46. Vyajyante vastumātreņa yadālamkrtayastadā/

Dhruvam dhvanyangatā tāsām kāvyavrttistadāśrayā// -DL. II. 47. Nanu yadi alamkārāpekṣayā vastumātrasya nātiśayaniyamah tadā katham alamkārena vastumātravyanjane dhvanitvam iti cet, ucyate-sa evārtho vācyah san na tathā camatkaroti yathā vyangyatvamāpanna ityanubhavasiddham. Ato vācyatā apakarşahetuh, vyangpatā tu utkarṣāya iti sthitam. Yatra ca alamkāreņa vastumātram vyangyam, tatra alamkārasya vācyatvena kiñcit apakarsāt vastu mātrasya ca vyangyatvena kiñcit utkarsāt yujyate eva dhvanitvam. -PR p. 145.

48. Rūpakādiralamkārastasyānaiyrbahudhoditah/ Na kāntamapi nirbhūṣam vibhāti vanitānanam// Rūpakādimalamkāram bāhyamācakṣate pare/ Supām tingām ca vyutpattim vācām vānchantyalamkrtim// Tedetadāhuh sauśabdyam nārthavyutpattiridrśī/ Sabdabhidheyalamkarabhedadistam dvayam tu nah// -KL.

49. Śabdārthacitram yatpūrvam kāvyadvayamudāhrtam/ Gunapradhānatastatra sthitiścitrārthaśabdayoh//

-KP. VI. I.

### CHAPTER IV

1. Tatra vibhāvānubhāvavyabhicārisamyogādraṣanispattiḥ.

-NS. p. 272.

2. Atrānuvamsyau ślokau bhavatah-Yathā bahudravyayutairvyañjanairbahubhiryutam/ Āsvādayanti bhuñjānā bhaktam bhaktavido janāh//

Bhāvābhinayasambaddhān sthāyibhāvamstathā budhāh/ Āsvādayanti manasā tasmānnātyarasāh smrtāh// -NS. pp. 289-90.

3. Nātyāt samudāyarūpāt rasāh. Yadi vā nātyameva rasāh. Rasasamudāyo hi nātyam. Na nātye eva ca rasāh. Kāvye'pi nātyāyamāna eva rasah. Kāvyārthavisaye hi pratyakṣakalpasamvedanodaye rasodaya ityupādhyāyāh. —AB. p. 290.

4. Yadāhuh-

Viruddairaviruddhairvā bhāvairvicchidyate na yah/ Ātmabhāvam nayatyāśu sa sthāyī lavanākarah// Ciram citte'vatisthante, sambadhyante'nubandhibhih/ Rasatvam ye prapadyante prasiddhāh sthāyino'tre te// ... Tathā—Sajātīyavijātīyairtiraskrtamūrtimān/ Yāvadrasam vartāmānah, sthāyibhavā udrāhrtah// -RG. I. p. 37.

5. Yathāha Patañjalih-'na hi caitra ekasyām striyām rakta ityan--AB. p. 293.

yāsu viraktah.

- 6. Tasmāt sthāyirūpacittavrttisūtrasyutā evāmī vyabhicāriņah svātmānam udayāstamayavaicitryasatasahasradharmānam pratilabhamānā raktanīlas ūtras yūtaviralabhā vopalambhanas ambhāvitabhangīsahas ragarbhasphatikakācabhramakapadmarāgamarakatamahānīlādimayagolakavattasmin sūtre svasamskāravaicitryam aniveśayanto'pi tatsūtrakṛtam upakārasandarbham vibhratah svayam ca vicitrārthasthāyisūtram ca vicitrayanto'ntarāntarā śuddham api sthāyisutram pratibhāsāvakāśam upanayanto'pi pūrvāparavyabhicāriratnacchāyāśabalimānam avaśyam ānayantah pratibhāsante iti vyabhicārina-—AB. p. 293. ucvante.
- ca...bāhyajadarūpabhautikanetrajalādivilakṣaṇā...bhavanti. 7. Te Tathā hi-Prthībhāgapradhāne prāne samkrāntacittavrttiganah stambho vistambhacetanatvam. Jalabhāgapradhāne tu vāspah. Taijasastu prāņanaikatyāt ubhayathā tīvrātīvratvena prāņānugraha iti dvidhā svedo vaivarnyam ca... Ākāśānugrahe gatacetanatvam pralayah. Vāyusvātantrye tu tasya mandamadhyotkṛṣṭāveśāt tredhā romāñcavepathu-svarabhedabhāvena sthitiriti bharatavidaḥ. Bāhyāstu stambhādayah śarīradharmā anubhāvāh. -KS. pp. 119-20.

-SD. III. Vrtti on K. 143. 8. Gobalīvarddanyāyena iti śesah.

9. Ratyādyudbodhakā loke vibhāvāh kāvyanāţyayoh/ Ālambanoddīpanākhyau tasya bhedāvubhau smṛtau// Ālambanam nāyakādistamālambya rasodgamāt. Uddīpanavibhāste rasamuddīpayanti ye/ Ālambanasya cestādyāh deśakālādayastathā// —SD. III. 32, 3, 4, 138-39.

10. Udbuddham kāraņaih svaih svairbahirbhāvam prakāsayan/ Loke yah karyarupah so'nubhavah kavyanatyayoh// Uktāh strīņāmalamkārā angajāśca svabhāvajāh/ Tadrūpāh svattvikābhāvāstathā cestā parā api// -SD. III. 140-41: 11. Prāk prītirdarśitā seyam ratih śringāratām gatā/ Rūpavāhulyayogena tadidam rasavat vacah/ ... Ityārabhya parām koţim krodho raudrātmatām gatah/

-KD. II. 281, 83.

12. Vişayī yasya tasyaiva vyāpāro jñānalakṣaṇaḥ Jñānalakṣaṇāpratyāsattistu yadvisayakam jñānam tasyaiva pratyāsattih...Evam jñānalakṣaṇāyā asvīkāre surabhi candanamiti jñāne saurabhābhānam katham svāt. -BP. K. 65.

13. Mate'smin sākṣātkāro 'Dusyanto'yam śakuntalādivisayakaratimān' ityādih prāgvaddharmyamśe laukika āropyāmśe tvalaukikah.

14. 'Vibhāvādīnām sambandhād rasasya ratyādernispattirāropah' iti Pañcame. -RG. I. p. 34.

15. Vibhāvādibhih kritrimairakrtrimatayā grhītaih samyogāt anumānāt rasasya ratyādernispattiranumitih naţādau pakṣe iti śesah.

-RG. I. p. 34.

16. Duşyantādigato ratyādirnate pakķe duşyantatvena grhīte vibhāvādibhih kṛtrimairapyakṛtrimatayā gṛhītairbhinne visave'numitisāmagryā valavattvādanumīvamāno rasah itvapare.

-RG. I. p. 34.

17. Na ca kāntātvam sādhāranavibhāvatāvacchedakamatrāpyasti iti vācyam, aprāmānyaniścayānālingitāgamyātvaprakārakajñānavirahasya viśesyatasambandhavacchinnapratiyogitakasya vibhavatavacchedakakotau avasyam nivesyatvāt. Anyathā svasrāderapi kāntātvādinā tattvapatteh. RG. I. p. 28.

18. Tasmāt kāvye dosābhāvaguņālamkāramayatvalaksanena nāţyā caturvidhābhinayarūpeņa nividanijamohasankatakāriņā vibhāvādisādhāranīkaranātmanā abhidhāto dvitīyenāmsena bhāvakatvayvāpārena bhavyamano rasah anubhavasmrtyadivilaksanena rajastamo'nuvedhavaicitryavalāt drutivistāravikāśalakṣaṇena sattvodrekāprakāśānandamayasamvidviśrantilaksanena parabrahmasvadasavidhena bhogena param bhujyata iti. -Abhinavabharati. p. 277.

19. Vibhāvānubhāvavyabhicārinām samyak sādhāraņātmatayā yogāt bhavakatvavyaparena bhavanat rasasya sthayupahitasattvodrekaprakāśitasvātmānandarūpasya nispattih bhogākhyena sākṣātkāreņa viṣayīkṛtih iti dvitīve. -RG. I. p. 34.

20. Tena pratītistāvad rasasya siddhā, sā ca rasanārūpā pratītirutpadyate. Vācyavācyakayostatrābhidhādivivikto vyanjanātmā dhvananavyāpāra eva. Bhogīkaraņavyāpāraśca kāvyasya rasavisayo dhvananātmaiva, nānvat kiñcit. -LC. p. 188.

21. Uktameva muninā na tvapūrvam kiñcit. Tathāhyāha—'Kāvyārthān bhāvayanti' iti tatkāvyārtho rasah. —AB. p. 278.

22. Sādhāranyena pratītiśca na sarvasambandhitayā pratītih. Kintu sambandhiviśesīyatvenāpratītau pratītih.

-PR. p. 67. 23. Matasya etasya pūrvasmāt matāt bhāvakatvavyāpārāntarasvīkāra eva viśesah. Bhogastu vyaktih. Bhogakrtvam ca vynjanāt aviśistam. Anyā tu saiva saranih. -RG. I. p. 29.

24. Mukutapratisīrsakādinā tāvat natabuddhirāccādvate. Gādhaprāktanasymbitsamskārācca kāyvabalānīvamānāpi na tatra rāmadhīh viśrāmyati. Ata eva ubhyayadeśakālatyāgah. Romāñcādayaśca bhūyasā ratipratītikāritayā dṛṣṭāstatrāpi laukikā deśakālāniyamena tatra ratim gamayanti. Yasyām svātmāpi tadvāsanāvattvādanupravistah. Ata eva na tatasthatayā ratyavagamah na ca niyatakāranatayā. Yenārjanābhisangādisambhāvanā na ca niyataparātmagatatayā. —AB. I. p. 295. vena duhkhadvesādvudayah.

25. Na jāyate tadāsvādo vinā ratyādivāsanām....Uktanca dharmadat-

tena-

Savāsanānām sabhyānām rasasyāsvādanam bhavet/ Nirvāsanāstu rangāntahkāsthakudvāsmasannivāh//

-SD. III. 8 & Vrtti rhereon.

26. Sarvathā rasanātmakavītabighnapratītigrāhyo bhāva eva Rasah. -AP. I. p. 280.

27. Ata eva sarvasāmājikānām ekaghanatayaiva pratipattih sutarām —AB. I. p. 279. rasapariposāva.

28. Vibhavanubhavavvabhicaribhih samvogat vvanjanat rasasya cidanandaviśistasthāyātmanah sthāyupahitacidanandātmano vā nispattih svarāpena prakāśanam itvādve. -RG. I. p. 34.

29. ....Sthāyivilaksana eva Rasah. ... Tena sthāyipratītiranumitirūpā prāpyā. Na Rasah. Ata eva sūtra sthāyigrahaņam na kṛtam. Tat pratyuta śalyabhūtam syāt. Kevalam aucityāt evam ucyate sthāyī rasībhūta iti. Aucitam tu tatsthāyigatatvena kāraņāditayā prasiddhānām adhunā carvaņopayogitayā vibhāvāditvāvalembanāt.

—AB. I. 284.

30. Pānakarasāsvādo'pi kim gudamarīcādişu dṛṣṭa iti samānametat.

—AB. I. p. 285.

- 31. Kva anyatra ittham drstam iti cet bhūsanam etat asmākam alaukikatvasiddhau. —AB. I. p. 285.
- 32. Tathā cāhuh—'vyaktah sa tairvibhāvādyaih sthāyibhāvo rasah smṛtaḥ' iti. Vyakto vyaktivisayīkṛtaḥ. Vyaktiśca bhagnāvaraṇā cit. Yatha hi śaravadina pihito dipastannivrttau sannihitan padarthan prakāśayati, svayam ca prakāśate, evam ātmacaitanyam vibhāvādisambalitān ratyādīn. Antahkaraņadharmānām sāksibhāsyatvābhyupagateh. -RG. I. p. 26.
- 33. Vibhavadīnāmapi svapnaturagadīnāmiva rangarajatādīnāmiva sāksibhāsyatvam aviruddham. Vañjakavibhāvādicarvaņāyā āvaraņabhangasya vā utpattivināśabhyām utpattivināśau rase upacaryete.... -RG. I. p. 26.
- 34. Tatra vighnāpasārakā vibhāvapravrtayah. Tathā hi loke śakalavighnavinirmukta samvittireva camatkaranirvesarasanasvadanabhogasamāpattilayaviśrāntyādiśabdairabhidhīyate. Vighnāścāsyām—Pratipattau ayogyata sambhavanaviraho nama svagatatvaparagatatvaniyamena deśakālaviśeṣāveśah nijasukhādivivaśībhāvah pratīyupāyavaikalyam sphuţatyābhāvo apradhānatā samśayayogaśca.

-AB. I. p. 280.

35. Vibhavanubhavavyabhicarinam samyogat bhavanavisesarupat dosat rasasya anirvacanīyaratyādyātmano nispattirutpattih iti Trtīve.

-RG. I. p. 34. 36. Ayam hi lokottarasya kāvyavyāpārasya mahimā yatprayojyā aramanīyā api śokādayah padārthā āhlādam alaukikam janayanti. Vilakṣaṇo hi kamanīyah kāvyavyāpāraja āsvādah pramaṇāntarajādanubhavāt. Janyatvam ca svajanyabhavanājanyaratyadivisayakatvam. Tena rasāsvādasya kāvyavyāpārājanyatvepi na kṣatih.

-RG. I. p. 31-32. 37. Etaiśca svatmani dusyantatvadharmitavacchedakaśakuntaladivisayakarativaiśistyāvagahī, svātmatvaviśiste śakuntalādivisayakarativisistadusyantatādātmyāvagāhī, svātmatvavisiste dusyantatvasakuntalavişayakaratyorvaiśiştyavagahī va trividho'pi bhdho rasapadārthatayā abhyupeyah. -RG. I. p. 32.

38. Vibhāvādīnām samyogāt jñānāt rasasya jñānaviśesātmano nişpattirutpattih iti caturthe. -RG. I. p. 34.

39. Vikāśah kusumasyeva pādapasyeva vistarah/ Ksobho'bdheriya viksepo marutasyeva cetasah//

-EV. p. 96.

40. Śringārāddhi bhaveddhāsyo raudrācca karuņo rasah/ Vīrāccaivādbhutotpattirbībhatsācca bhayānakah//

-NS. VI. 39.

41. Śāntasya tṛṣṇākṣayasukhasya yaḥ paripoṣastallakṣaṇo rasaḥ pratīvate eva. Tatha coktam-

> Yacca kāmasukham loke yacca divyam mahatsukham/ Tṛṣṇākṣayasukhasyaite nārhatah ṣoḍarśīm salām//

-DL. III. Vrtti on K. 26.

- 42. Śāntah śamasthāyibhāvah uttamaprakrtirmatah/ Kundendusundaracchāyah śrīnarāyanadaivatah// Anityatvādinā' śesavastuniḥsāratā tu yā/ Paramātmasvarūpam vā tasyālambanamisyate// Punyāśramaharikṣetratīrtharamyavanādayaḥ/ Mahāpurusasangādyāstasyoddīpanarūpinah// Romāńcādyāśnubhāvāstathā syurvyabhicāriņah/ Nirvedaharşasmaranamatibhūtadayādayah//
- -SD. III. 210. 43. Yairapi nātye śānto raso nāstītyabhyupagamyate, tairapi bādhakābhāvāt mahābhāratādiprabandhānām śāntarasapradhānatāyā akilalokānubhavasiddhatvācca kāvye sā' vasyam svīkāryah. Ata eva 'astau natye rasah smrtah' ityupakramya 'santo'pi navamo rasah' iti Mammatabhatta apyupasamāhārsuh. -RG. I.

44. Vatsalaśca rasa iti tena sa daśamo rasah/ Sphutam camatkāritayā vatsalaśca rasam viduh//

-SD. III. 231.

45. Premarase sarve rasā antarbhavanti ityatry mahīyāneva prapañcaḥ. Keşāñcinmate śrīrādhākṛṣṇayoh śringāra eva rasah. Śringāro'ngī premāngam, angasyāpi kvacit udriktatā. Vayam tu premāngī.

śrigaro'ngam iti viśesah. Tatha ca-Unmajjanti nimajjanti premnyakhandarasatyatah / Sarve rasāśca bhāvāśca tarangā iva vāridhau// -AK. V. p. 148. 46. Sa navadhā bhaktah. Bhaktirsasyaiva hāsya-śrngārakarunna-raudra-

bhavanaka-bībhatsa-śāntādbhuta-vīrarūpena anubhavāt. Vyāsādibhirvarnitasya visnoh visnubhaktānām vā caritrasya navarasātmakasya śravanādinā janitaścamatkāro bhaktirasah.

-MP. p. 164.

47. Vibhāvairanubhāvaiśca sāttvikairvyabhicāribhih/ Svādyatvam hrdi bhaktānāmānītā śravanādibhih/ Esā krsnaratih sthāvī bhāvo bhaktiraso bhavet//

Bhavedbaktiraso' pyeṣa mukhyagaunatayā dvidhā/

... Evam bhaktiraso bhedāt dvayordvādaśadhocyate// -BHS-Pañcama-laharī, pp. 120 & 293.

48. Esā ca prītirlukikekāvyavidām ratyādivat kāraņakāryyasahāyaīh militvā rasāvasthām āpnuvatī svayam sthāyī bhāva ucyate. ... Tatah kāraņādisphurttivišesavyaktasphurttivišesā tanmilitā bhagavatprītistadīyaprītirasamay ucyate; Bhaktimayo raso Bhaktirasa -PTS. p. 571.

49. Tasmāt laukikasya eva vibhāvādeh rasajanakatvam na śraddheyam, Tajjanakatve ca sarvatra bībhatasajanakatvameva siddhyati.

—PTS. p. 583.

50. Ratirdevādivisayā Vyabhicārī tathorjitah/ Bhāvah prokto Raso neti yaduktam Rasakovidaih// Devāntaresu Jibyatvāt Parānandaprakāśanāt/ Tad yojyam paramānandarūpe na paramātmani// Kāntādivisayā vā ye Rasādyāstra nedrsam/ Rasatvam pusyate purnasukhāsparsitvakāranāt// Paripurnarasā ksudrarasebhyo Bhagavatratih/ Khadyotebhya iyadityaprabheya valayattara//

—BS. 2/75-78.

51. Ātmasthitam gunaviśesamahańkrtasya Śrigāramāhuriha iīvitamātmayoneh/ Tasyatmaśaktirasanīyatayā rasatvam Yuktasya yena rasiko'yamiti pravādaḥ//

> ... Śringāra-vīra-karunādbhuta-hāsya-raudra-Bībhatsa-vatsala-bhayānaka-śāntanāmnaḥ/ Āmnāsisurdasa rasān sudhiyo, vayam tu Śrigārameva rasanād rasamāmanāmaḥ//

SP. I.

52. Āsvādānkurakando'sti dharmah kaścan cetasah/ Rajastamobhyām hīnasya śuddhasattvatayā sataḥ// Āsvādānkurakando'sau Bhāvah Sthāvī Rasāvate //

. . . .

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Rasasyānandadharmatyādaikadhyam Bhāva Eva hi/ Upādhibhedānnānātvam ratyādaya Upādhayaḥ//

-AK. V. 62-63, 71.

53. Ratirdevādivisavā vyabhicārī tathāñjitah Bhāvah proktah.

-KP. IV/35.

54. Bhavasya śantirudayah sandhih śabalata tatha/Sandhirekakalameva tulyakaksayorāsvādah. Śabalatā tu kālabhedena nirantaratayā pūrvapūrvopamardinām. Na ca bhāvasya śabalatāyā śāntyudayābhyāmaviśesah. Śānterudayasya vā ekaikasya asvāde tadbhedad--PR. p. 94. vav opagamāt.

55. Anaucityameka eva Dosah: anye tu tasya prapañcabhūtāh-Vyaktiviveka II, referring to which Śriharsa comments: Dosam Vyaktiviveke'mum Kavilokavilocane/Kāvyamīmām sīşuh prāptamahimā mahimādrtah//

-Khandanakhandakhādva IV. 248.

Upanāyakasamsthāyām munigurupatnīgatāyāñca/ Bahunāyakavisayāyām ratau tathā'nubhayanisthāyām// Pratinavakanisthatve tadvadhamapatratirvagadigate/ Śringāre'naucityam raudre gurvādigatakope// Śānte ca hīnanisthe gurvādyālambane hāsye/ Brahmavadhādyutsāhe' dhamapātragate tathā vīre// Uttamapātragatatve bhayānake jñeyamevamanyatra//

-SD. III. 238. 57. Apare tu rasābhāsam tiryakşu pracakşate, tanna parīkṣākṣamam, tesu api vibhāvādisambhavāt. Vibhāvādijnānasūnyāstirvanco na bhājanam bhavitum arhanti rasasyeti cet na, manusyesu api keşucit tathābhūteşu rasavişayabhāvābhavaprasangāt. Vibhavadisambhayo hi rasam prati prayojako na vibhāyādijñānam. Tataśca -EV. p. 106. tiraścamapyastycya rasah.

58. Rasapadenātra prakaraņe tadupādhih sthāyibhāvo grhyate. Rasasya sāmājikavrttitvena nāyakādyavrttitvāt advitīyānandamayatvena virodhāsambhavācca. -RG. I. p. 57.

59. Virodhastāvaddivividhah, sthitivirodho jñānavirodhaśca.

-RG. I. p. 57.

60. Tatra adhikaraṇantare virodhinah sthapane prathamo nivartate. -RG. I. p. 57.

61. Rasāntarasya avirodhinah sandhikarturiva antarāle avasthāpane -RG. I. p. 57. dvitīvo'pi nivartate.

62. Angānginoh angini anyasmin angayor vā na virodhah, angatvānupapattiprasangāt. -R.G. I. p. 58.

63. Api ca yatra sadharanavisesanamahimna viruddhayon avivyaktistatrāpi virodho nivartate. -RG. I. p. 58.

64. Virodhamavirodham ca sarvatrettham nirūpayet/ Viśesatastu śrigare sukumaratamo hyasau// —DL. III. 28.

65. Kim ca śringārasya sakalajanamanoharābhirāmatvāt tadangasamāveśah kāvye śobhātiśayam puşyati ityanenāpi prakāreņa virodhini rase śrigārāngasamāveśo na virodhī.

-DL. Vrtti on III. 30.

66. ... Vyangyasya vācyīkaraņe sāmānyato vamanākhyadoşasya vakşyamānatvāt. Āsvādyatāvacchedakarūpeņa pratyājanakatayā rasasthale vācyavṛtteḥ kāpeyakalpatvena viśeṣadoṣatvācca.

-RG. I. p. 61.

67. Samavalapravalapratikūlarasāngānām nibandhanam tu prakṛtaraṣaposaprātīpikamiti doṣaḥ. —RG. I. p. 61.

68. Vamśa-vīrya-śrutādīni varņayitvā riporapi/ Tajjayāt nāyakotkarşa ityasmākam dhinoti nah//

—KP. I. 22.

69. Yādṛśasya pratināyakotkarṣavarṇanasya tadabhibhāvakanāyakotkarsāṅgatāsampādakatvam tādṛśasya iṣṭatvāt, tadvirodhinah eva niṣedhyatvāt. Na ca pratipakṣasya prakṛtāpekṣayā varṇyamāno'pyutkarṣah svāśrayahantṛatāmātrādeva prakṛtagatam utkarṣam atiśāyayet, ato na doṣāvaha iti vācyam. Evam hi sati mahārājam kamapi viṣaśarakṣepamātreṇa vyāpāditavato varākasya śavarasyeva prakṛtasya nāyakasya na ko'pi utkaṛsah syāditi.

-RG. I. p. 63.

70. Evam prakṛtarasānupakārakasya vastuno varṇanamapi prakṛtarasavirāmahetutvāt doṣa eva. —RG. I. p. 63.

71. Anaucityam tu rasabhangahetutvāt pariharanīyam. Bhangaśca pānakādirasādau sikatādinipātajanitevāruntudatā.

-RG. I. p. 63.

72. Tadayamatra paramārthaḥ—
Anaucityādṛte nānyat rasabhaṅgasya kāraṇam/
Prasiddhaucityabandhastu rasasyopaniṣat parā//
Ata eva ca Bharate prakhyātavastuviṣayatvaṃ prakhyātodāttanāyakatvaṃ ca nāṭakasya avaśyakartavyatayā upanyastam. Tena hi
nāyakaucityānaucityaviṣaye kavirna vyāmuhyati. Yastūtpādyavastu
nāṭakādi kuryāt tasya aprasiddhānucitanāyakasvabhāvavarṇane
mahān pramādaḥ. —DL. Vṛtti on III. 14.

73. Parikaraślokaścātra—

'Avyutpattikṛto doṣaḥ śaktyā saṃvriyate kaveḥ/
Yastvaśaktikṛtastasya sa jhaṭityavabhāsate//
Tathā hi-Mahākavīnām api uttamadevatāviṣayaprasiddhasambhogaśṛṅgāra-nibandhanādyanaucityaṃ śatktitiraskṛtatvāt grāmyatvena na pratibhāsate. Yathā kumārasambhave Devīsambhoghovarṇanam.

—DL. Vrtti on III. 6.

74. Na ca sādhāranīkaranāt ārādhyatvajñānānutpattiriti vācyam. Yatra sahrdayānām rasodbodhah pramānasiddhah tatraiva sādhāranīkaranasya kalpanāt. Anyathā svamātrvisayakasvapitrrativarnane'pi sahrdayasya rasodbodhāpatteh. Jayadevādibhistu Gītagovindādiprabandhesu śakalasahrdaya'ammato'yam samayo madonmattamatangajairiva bhinnah iti na tannidarśanena idānīntanena tathā varnayitum sāmpratam. —RG. I. p. 64.

75. Kathāśarīramutpādyavastu kāryam tathā tathā/ Yathā rasamayam sarvameva tat pratibhāsate// Santi siddharasaprakyā ye ca rāmāyaṇādayaḥ/
Kathāśrayā na tairyojyā svecchā rasavirodhinī//
—DL. Vrtti on III. 14.

76. Vibhāvabhāvānubhāvasañcāryaucityacāruṇaḥ/
Vidhiḥ kathāśarīrasya vṛttasyotprekṣitasya vā//
Itivṛttavaśāyātāṃ tyaktvānanuguṇāṃ sthitim/

Utprekṣyāpyantarābhīṣṭarasocitakathonnayaḥ//

Sandhisandhyangaghatanam rasābhivyaktyapekṣayā/ Na tu kevalayā śāstrasthitisampādanecchayā//

Uddīpanapraśamane yathāvasaramantarā/

Rasasyārabdhaviśrānteranusandhānamanginaḥ//

Alamkṛtīnām śaktāvapyānurūpyeņa yojanam/

Prabandhasya rasādīnām vyañjakatve nibandhanam//

—DL. III. 10-14.

#### CHAPTER V

1. Tatrābhāvavikalpasya trayah prakārāh—śabdārthagunālamkārānāmeva śabdārthaśobhākaritvāt lokaśāstrātiriktasundaraśabdārthamayasya na śobhāhetuh kaścidanyo'sti sti ye'-smābhirna ganita ityekah prakārah, yo vā na ganitah sa śobhākārī eva na bhavati iti dvitīyah, atha śobhākārī bhavati tarhi asmadukte eva guņe vā alamkāre vā antarbhavati, nāmāntarakaraņe tu kiyadidam pāndityam.

—LC. p. 15.

Tathā canyena kṛta evatra ślokaḥ—
 Yasminnasti na vastu kiñcana manaḥprahladi salamkṛti
 Vyutpannai' racitam ca naiva vacanairvakroktiśunyam

ca vat/

Kāvyam taddhaninā samanvitamiti prītyā praśamsanjado No vidmo' bhidadhāti kim sumatinā pṛṣṭaḥ svarūpam

dhvaneḥ//—DL. I. page 26.

3. Bhajyate sevyate padārthena prasiddhatayā utprekṣyate iti, bhaktirdharmo'bhidheyena sāmīpyādiḥ, tata āgato bhākto lākṣaṇiko'rthaḥ.
...Guṇasamudāyavṛtteḥ śabdasyārthabhāgastaikṣṇādirbhaktiḥ, tata āgato gauṇo'rtho bhāktaḥ. Bhaktiḥ pratipādye sāmīpyataikṣṇyādau śraddhātiśayaḥ, tāṃ prayojanatvenoddiśya tata āgato bhākta iti gauṇo lākṣaṇikaśca.
—LC. p. 30.

4. Etaduktam bhavati—dhvanatīti vā, dhvanyata iti vā, dhvananamiti vā yadi dhvanih, tathāpyupacaritaśabdārthavyapārātirikto nāsau kaścit. Mukhyārthe hyabhidhaiva iti pāriśeṣyādamukhya eva dhvanih, trtīyarāśyabhāvāt.

—LC. p. 31.

5. Amukhyavṛttā kāvyeşu vyavahāram darśayatā,—commenting on which Locana states—Bhaṭṭodbhaṭavāmanādinā. —LC. p. 32. & Iha hi tāvat Bhāmahodbhaṭaprabhṛtayaścirantanālamkārakārāh pratīyamānamartham vācyopaskārakatayā alamkārapakṣanikṣiptam mayante. —ALS. p. 3.

6. Ete ca traya uttarottaram bhavyabuddhyah. Prācyā hi viparyastā eva sarvathā. Madhyamāstu tadrūpam jānānā api sandehenāpahnuvate. Antyāstvanapahnuvānā api lakṣayitum na jānata iti krameṇa viparyāsa-sandehājñānaprādhānyam eteṣām. —LC. pp. 33-34.

7. Sa hi artho vācyasāmarthyākṣiptam vastumātramalamkārarasādayaścetyanekaprabhedaprabhinno darśayiṣyate. Sarveṣu ca teṣu prakāreṣu tasya vācyādanyatvam. —DL. I. p. 50.

8. Śarīrīkaraṇam yeṣām vācyatve na vyavasthitam/
Te'lamkārāh parām chāyām yānti dhvanyaṅgatām gatāḥ//,
Commenting on which Locana remarks:
Etaduktam bhavati—sukavirvidagdhapurandhrīvadbhuṣaṇam yadyapi śliṣṭam yojayati, tathāpi śariratāpattirevāsya kaṣṭasampādyā
kunkumapītikāyā iva, ātmatāyāstu kā sambhāvanāpi. Evambhūtā
ceyam vyaṅgyatā yā apradhānabhūtā'pi vācyamātrālaṃkārebhya
utkarṣamalaṃkārānām vitarati.
—LC. p. 279.

9. KS. pp. 31-40.

10. Śabdārthaśāsanajñānamātreņaiva na vedyate/
Vedyate sa tu kāvyārthatattvajñaireva kevalam//
...Atha ca vācyavācakalakṣaṇamātrakṛtaśramānām kāvyatattvārthabhāvanāvimukhānām svaraśrutyādilakṣaṇamiva apragītānām
gāndharbalakṣaṇavidāmagocara evāsāvarthaḥ.
—DL. I. 7.

- 11. Sa ca tathāvidha aupādhiko dharmah śabdānām autpattikaśabdārthasambandhavādinā vākyatattvavidā pauruṣāpauruṣeyayorviśeṣamabhidadhatā niyamena abhyupagantavyaḥ, tadanabhyupagame hi tasya śabdārthasambandhanityatve satyapyapauruṣeyapauruṣeyayoḥ vākyayorarthapratipādane nirviśeṣatvam syāt. Tadabhyupagame tu pauruṣeyānām vākyānām puruṣecchānuvidūnasamāropitaupādhikavyāpārāntarānām satyapi svābhidheyasambandhaparityāge mithyārthatāpi bhavet.
- —DL. III. pp. 438-39. 12. This represents the doctrines of Abhihitanvayavada and Anivitabhidhānavāda, as understood by Mammata. In the fifth section of Chapter II, these doctrines have been discussed in details, and the great blunder committed by the Alamkarikas, beginning from Ahhinavagupta in citing them has been pointed out. It is possible, however, to establish the absolute distinction of Vyanjana from Abhidhā, even if these doctrines are taken into consideration in their correct perspective. The theory of Abhitanvayavada states that, as the function of Abhidhā ceases after bringing into light the primary meaning, the function of Laksana pertaining to this meaning starts to function and signifies the sense of association amongst different concepts. As the suggested content neither constitutes the conventional meaning nor enters into association with other concepts, it is incapable of being conveyed through Abhidhā or Lakṣaṇā. Moreover, its comprehension occurs at a late stage,—after the cognition of the idea of association effected through Laksanā and this fact, alone, rules out the possibility of Abhidha leading to its apprehension. The theory of Anvitabhi-

dhānavādā, on the other hand, maintains that, the function of Abhidhā itself brings out the idea of correlation amongst concepts endowed with expectancy, compa- and tibility proximity. Though this theory ascribes greater power to Abhidhā, which is supposed to exhaust its potency after signifying the sense of said association, yet the suggested content is incapable of being conveyed through it, since this content does not enter into this association, and in some cases, is completely opposed to the expressed idea.

13. ....Kasmācca lakṣaṇā lakṣaṇīye'pyarthe dīrghadīrghatarābhidhā-vyāpareṇaiva pratītisiddheh kimiti co śruti-lingavākya-prakaraṇa-sthāna-samākhyānām pūrvapūrvabalīyastvam ityanitābhidhānavāde' pi vidherapi siddham vyangyatvam. —KP, V. p. 230.

14. Guņavrttistūpcāreņa lakṣaṇyā ca ubhayāśrayāpi bhavati kintu tato'pi vyañjakatvaṃ svarūpato viṣayataśca bhidyate.

—DL. III. p. 423. ....iti abhidhātācparyalakṣaṇātmakavyāpāratrayātivarttī dhvananādiparyāyo vyāpāra'napahnavanīya eva. —KP. V. p. 249.

16. Bhahtyā bibharti naikatvam rūpabhedādayam dhvanih. Ayamukta-prakāro dhvanirbhaktyā naikatvam bibharti, bhinnarūpatvāt. Vācyavācakavyatiriktasyārthasya vācyavācakābhyām tātparyena prakāśanam yatra vyangyaprādhānye sa dhvanih. Upacāramātram tu Bhaktih. —DL. I. 17.

17. Rūdhā ye vişaye'nyatra śabdāh svavişayādapi/ Lāvanyādyāh prayuktāste na bhavanti padam dhvaneh//

—DL, I. 19.

18. Uktyantarenāśakyam yat taccārutvam prakāśayan/ Śabdo vyañjakatām bibhrat dhvanyukterviṣayībhavet//

—DL. I. 18.

19. Viśiste Laksanā Naivam Viśesāh syustu Laksite.

-KP. II. 18.

20. Tena Rasa eva vastu ātmā, vastvalamkāradhvanī tu sarvathā rasam prati paryavasyete iti vācyāt utkrstau tāvityabhiprāyena 'dhvaniḥ kāvyasyātme'ti sāmānyena uktam. —LC. p. 85.

21. Rasādayo hi dvayorapi tayorjīvabhūtaḥ. Itivṛttādi tu śarīrabhūtameva. —DL. III. p. 401.

22. Na hi kaveritivṛttamātranirvahaṇena kiñcit prayojanam, itihāsāderapi tatsiddeḥ.

—DL. III. p. 336.

- 23. Tatra avivakşitavācyatvāt eva vācyena saha vvangyasya kramapratītivicāro na kṛtaḥ. Tasmādabhidhānābhidheyapratītyoriva vācyavyangyapratītyoḥ nimittanimittibhāvāt niyamabhāvī kramaḥ. Sa tu uktayuktyā kvacillakṣyate kvacinna lakṣyate.
- —DL. III. p. 413.

  24. Na ca padārtha-vākyārthanyāyo vācya-vyangyaoh...yathā hi ghate niṣpanne tadupādanakāraṇānām na pṛthagupalambhah; tathaiva vākye tadarthe vāpratīte padatadarthānām. Teṣāmtathā vibhaktatayopalambhe vākyārthabuddhireva dūrībhavet. Na tveṣa vācya-vyangyornyāyaḥ. Na hi vyangye pratīyamāne vācyabuddhir-

dūrībhavati, vācyāvabhāsāvinābhāvena tasva prakāśanāt. Tasmād ghatapradīpanyāyastayoh. Yathaiva hi pradīpadvāreņa ghatapratitāvutpannāyām na pradīpaprakāso nivartate vyangvapratītaū vācvāvabhāsah. Yattu prathamoddyote—'yathā padārthadvārena' ityādyuktam, tadupāyatvasāmyamātrasva vivaksavā.

—DL. III. pp. 419-21.

25. Yah samyogaviyogābhyām karanairupajanyate/ Sa sphotah śabdajaśśabda dhvanayo'nyairudāhrtāh//

-VP. I. 102.

26. Pratyayairanupākhyeyairgrahanānugunaistathā/ Dhvaniprakāśite śabde svarūpamavadhāryate // —VP. I. 83.

27. Śabdasyordhamabhivyaktervrttibhede tu vaikrtāh/ Dhvanayah samupohante sphotatmā tairna bhidyate //

-VP. I. 77.

28. Yatrārthaḥ śabdo vā tamarthamupasarjanīkrtasvārthau/ Vyanktah kavyavisesah sa dhvaniriti suribhih kathitah//

-DL. I. 13.

29. Anena vācyavācakacārutvahetubhva upamādibhvo'nuprāsādibhyaśca vibhakta eya dhyaneryisaya iti darśitam.

-DL. I. 13.

30. Vyangyaprādhānye hi dhvanih. Na caitat samāsoktyādisvasti.

—DL. I. p. 108.

31. Cārutvotkarsanibandhanā hi vācyavyangyayoh prādhānyavivakṣā. —DL. I. p. 114.

32. Api ca sankarālamkare'pi ca kvacit sankaroktireva dhvanisam-—DL. I. pp. 124-25.

33. Taşmādangatvena ca rasādīnāmalamkāratā. Yah punarangī raso bhāvo vā sarvākāramalamkāryah sa dhvanerātmeti.

—DL. II. p. 204.

### CHAPTER VI

- 1. Dvividho hi vişayah śabdānām—anumeyah pratipādyaśca, Tatrānumeyo vivaksālaksanah. Vivaksā ca śabdasvarūpaprakāśanecchā, śabdenārthaprakāśanecchā ceti dviprakārā. Tatrādyā na śabdavyavahārāngam, sā hi prānitvamātrapratipattiphalā. Dvitīvā tu śabdaviśesāvadhāraņāvasitavyavahitā'pi śabdakaraņavyavahāranibandhanam. Te tu dve apvanumevo visavah sabdānām. Pratipādvastu prayokturarthapratipādanasamīhāvisayīkrto'rthah. Sa ca dvividho vācyo vyangyaśca. —DL. III. p. 449.
- 2. Na ca vyañjakatvam lingatvarūpameva, ālokādisvanyathā drstatvāt. —DL. III. p. 453.
- 3. Kāvyavişaye ca vācyavyangyapratītīnām satyatvāsatyatvanirūpaņasyāprayojaktvameveti tatra pramāņāntaravyāpāraparīkṣā upahāsāyavaiva sampadvate. Tasmāllingipratītireva sarvatra vyangyapratītiriti na śakyate vak-

tum.

bhāvanām nirākaroti.

Yattvanumeyarūpavyangyavişayam śabdanam vyanjakatvam, taddhvanivyavahārasyāprayojakam. —DL. III. pp. 455-56.

4. Anumāne'ntarbhāvam sarvasyaiva dhvaneh prakāśayitum/ Vyaktivivekam kurute pranamya Mahima param vacam// -VV. I. 1.

5. Sambhavavyabhicārābhyām syād visesaņamarthavat/ Na śaityena na causnyena vahnih kvāpi viśisyate//

-TV. I. 3.

6. Uktam gunīkrtātmatvam yadarthasya visesaņam/ Gamakatvānna tat tasya yuktamavyabhicaratah//

-VV. I. 7.

7. Yo hi yadarthamupādīyate, nāsau tamevopasarjanīkarotīti yuktam vaktum yathodakādyupādānārthamupātto ghatādistadevodakādi. Anyathā pradhānetaravyavasthā nirnibandhanaiva syāt.

-VV. I. p. 16. 8. Kiñca yathābhideyo'rthastadviśesanam copāttam tadvadabhidhāpyupādanamarhatyeva. Anyathā yatra Dīpakālamkārādāalamkārāntarasyopamādeh pratītistatra dhvanitvamistam na syāt tallakṣaṇenāvyāpteh. -VV. I. pp. 18-19.

9. Yathā ca vākyārthavişaye sādhya-sādhana-bhāve sādhyasādhanapratītyoh sulaksyah kramabhāvah tathā vastumātrādāvanumeyavisaye'pyavagantavyah kevalam rasādisvanumeyesvayamasamlaksyakramo gamyagamakabhāva iti sahabhāvabhrāntimātrakṛtastatrānyeşām vyangya-vyanjaka-bhavabhyupagamah, tannibandhanaśca dhvanivyapadeśah. Sa tu tatraupacārika eva prayukto na mukhyah tasya vaksyamāņanayena bādhitatvāt. Upacārasya ca prayojanam sacetanacamatkāritvam nāma. -VV. I. p. 53.

10. Ata eva śrūyamāṇānām śabdānām dhvanivyapadeśyānāmantah sanniveśinaśca sphotābhimatasyārthasya vyangyavyañjakabhāvo na sambhavatīti vyañjakatvasāmyāt yah śabdārthātmani kāvye dhvanivyapadeśah so'pyanupapannah, tatrāpi kāryakāraņamūlasya gamya-gamaka-bhāvasy-opagamāt. -VV. I. p. 57.

11. Na hi vibhāvānubhāvavyabhicārinah eva rasā iti kasyacidavagamah. Ata eva vibhāvādipratītyavinābhāvinī rasādīnam pratītiriti tatpratītyoh kārya-kāraņa-bhāvenāvasthānāt kramo'vasyambhāvī. Sa tu lāghavānna laksyate ityalaksyakrama eva santo vyangyā rasādava itvuktam.

Tasmādabhidhānābhidheyapratītyoriva vācya-vyangya-pratītyornimitta-nimittibhāvād nivatabhāvī kramah. —DL. III. p. 404.

- 12. Tadevam vācyapratīyamānayorvaksyamāņakrameņa lingalingibhāvasya samarthanāt sarvasyaiva dhvaneranumānāntarbhāvah samanvito bhavati, tasya ca tadapeksyayā mahāvişayatvāt. Mahāvişayatvam cāsya dhvanivyatirikte'pi vişaye paryāyoktādau guņībhūtavyangyādau ca sarvatra sambhavāt.
- -VV. I. pp. 63-64. 13. Tacca vacanavyāpārapūrvakatvāt parārthamityavagantavyam.... tadbhāvahetubhāvau hi drstānte tadavedinah/Khyāpyete vidusām vācyo hetureva ca kevalah. -VV. I. pp. 64-65.

13 (a). Bhrāntirapi sambandhatah Pramā. Manipradīpaprabhayormanibuddhyābhidhāvatoh/ Mithyājñānāviśese'pi viśeso'arthakriyām prati//

-VV. I. p. 74. 14. Tadevam vibhāvādīnām hetvādīnām ca kṛrtimā-kṛrtimatayā kāvyalokavişayatayā ca svarūpabhede vişayabhede cāvasthite satyekatvāsiddheryadā vibhāvādibhirbhāvesu ratyādisu asatyesu eva pratītirupajanyate tadā tesām tanmātrasāratvāt pratīvamānā iti gamyā

iti ca vyapadeśā mukhyavrttyopapadyante eva. —VV. I. p. 73.

15. VV. I. pp. 76-78.

16. VV. I. p. 80.

17. Athobhayaorapi grahanam na karisyate iti tarhyanumānasyaiva tallaksanam parvavasvati na vyakteh. Taccestameva nah, vācyapratīyamānayoh satoreva ca krameņaiva prakāśopagamāt.

-VV. I. p. 81.

18. Yadyartha iti vācyo'rtho'bhimato'vyāptireva sā/ Yenaivam vādinītyādāvarthasyārthāntarādgatih// Athobhau tarhyativyāptirdvitravastuvyavāyini/ Prahelikādirūpe'pi Kāvye dhvanyātmatā yataḥ//

-VV. I. p. 88.

19. Arthasya viśistatvam śabdah saviśesanastadah pumstam Dvivacanavāśabdau ca vvaktirdhvanirnāma kāvyavaiśistam/ Vacanañca kathanakartuh kathita dhvanilaksmanītidaśa doṣā Ye tvanye tadbhedaprabhedalakşanagatā na te ganitāh// -VV. I. p. 104.

Vācyastadanumito vā yatrārtho'rthāntaram prakāśayati/ Sambandhatah kutuaścit sā Kāvyānumitirityuktā// Etaccānumānasyaiva lakṣaṇam nānyasya. Yaduktam 'Trirūpālingākhyānam parārthānumānamiti. Kevalam samjñābhedah.

-VV. I. p. 105.

21. Yah satatvasamāropastatsambandhanibandanah/ Mukhyārthabādhe so'pyartham sambandhamanumāpayet// Tatsāmyatatsambandhau hi tatvāropaikakāraņam/ Gunavrtterdvirūpāyāstatpratītirato'numā / / —VV. I. p. 116.

22. VV. I. pp. 116-18.

23. Bhaktyā bibharti caikatvam rūpābhedādayam dhvanih/ Na ca nāvyāptyativyāptyorabhāllaksyate tayā//

... ... ... Tasmāt vyutpattiśaktibhyām nibandho vah skhaladateh/ Śabdasya so'pi viiñeyo'numānavisayo'nyayat / /

—VV. I. pp. 119, 121.

24. Tenātrārthāntaragatirārthī tātparyaśaktijā na punah.

-VV. I. p. 122.

25. Tadayuktam. Sākṣācchabdasyārthapratītihetutvāsiddheh. Pāramparyena tu tasya hetutvopagame vastūnām hetuphalabhāvavyavahārāniyamo na vyavatisthate....Kiñcayam vişamah śaradrstantopanyāsah. -VV. I. p. 123.

26. Prasiddham mārgamutsrjya yatra vaicitryasiddhaye/ Anyathaivocyate so'rthah sa vakroktirudāhrtā// ... ... ... Atrocyate'bhidhāsanjñah śabdasyārthaprakāśane/ Vyāpāra eka evesto yastvanyo'rthasya so'khilah// Vācyādarthāntaram bhinnam yadi tallingamasya sah/ Tannantarīyakataya nibandho hyasya laksanam// Abhede bahutā na syāt uktermārgāntarāgrahāt/ Tena dhvanivadesā'pi vakroktiranumā nu kim// -VV. I. pp. 126-27.

27. VV. I. pp. 129-32.

28. Tasmāt bhāktameva dyotakatvamupagantavyam, na mukhyam, bhakteśca prayojanam vācyasyārthasya sputatvapratipattih. Nimittam cā viśeşaṇaviśeşyapratītyorāśubhāvitayā kramānupalakṣaṇāt sahabhāvapratītih. -VV. I. p. 131.

29. Ata'tadātmabhūtasya ye'bhāvam jagadurdhvaneh/ Te mudhaiva pratiksiptāh svoktibhāvamapaśyatā// Athesyate sa tatrāpi rasādivyaktyapakṣayā/ Kāvyamevānyathā na syādrasātmakamidam yatah// Vācyasyetyetaduktam syānmata saivānumā tatah// -VV. I. pp. 142-43.

30. VV. I. pp. 146-47.

31. Atyantatiraşkrtavācyastu padarthopacāra eva yathā Gourvāhīkah iti Tasyāpyanumānāntarbhāvah samarthitah eva. -VV. I. 147.

32. Nāvivaksitavācyasya dhvaneryuktā prakāratā/ Na hi prakārastasyaiva sa evetyupapadyate//

Bhaktih padārthavākyārtharūpatvād dvividhā matā// Tadbuddhiścanumānanta bhūtā yadupapāditā//

Tat tiraskrtavācyasya dhvanerbhakteśca kā bhidā/ Dvitīyo'pi prakāro yah so' pi sangacchate katham//

Parasparaviruddhatvād vivaksātatparatvayoh/

Yah śabdaśaktimulo'nyah prabhedo varnito dhvaneh//

So'yukto'nyato evāsau tatrestārthāntare matih/

Sabde śaktyantarābhāvasyāsakrt pratipādanat//

-VV. I. p. 148. 33. Avasyom caitadabhyupagantavyam. Anathā śūktikārajatapratītyorapi kramabhāvinyoretadparyanuyogoprasangah kena vāryate. Tasmād bādhyabādhakabhāvāvasāyakṛta evātrottarārthviśrāntiniyama iti sthitam. -VV. III. p. 401.

34. VV. III. pp. 401-03.

35. VV. III. pp. 405-07.

36. VV. III. pp. 417-18.

37. Kiñca na svabhāvatah eva śabdānām arthapratītikramah iti niyamasambhavah. Kintarhi? Sāmagrīvaśāt. —VV. III. p. 419.

38. Tasmāt upapattiśūnyah evāyam gatānugatikatayā anekārthaśabdaprayogavipralabdhavyākhyātrparamparāsamayamātraprvarttitah śabdaśaktimalanusvanaruparthantarapratītipakṣaḥ.

-VV. III. p. 423.

Tadevam dhvaneranumānāntarbhāvābhyupagamah śreyāniti. Tadidam vistarasyāsya tātparyamavadharyatām/

Yarthantarabhivyaktau vassamagrīsta nibandhanam//

Saivānumitipakṣe no gamakatvena sammatā/

Anyato'nyasya hi jñānamanumaikasamāśravam//

Vācyavācakayoh śvārthaprādhānyapratisedhatah/

Dhvaneh śaktyantarābhāvād vyakteścānupapattitah//

Prānabhūtā dhvanervyaktiriti saiva vivecitā/

Yattvanyat tatra vimatih prāyo nāstītyupekṣitam//

-VV. III. pp. 454-55.

- 40. Atra vyaktivādino'yamabhiprāyah—Yadetadarthasya gunīkrtātmatvam tadarthantarapratyayakatvenopayatvadapradhanyam, pratiyamānāpeksayā acārutvam, viśrāntatvenārthāntarānupakāryatvam ceti trayāh pakṣāh sambhavanti. Tatrādyam pakṣadvayamanūdya kāmam dūṣitam. ... Tṛtīyastu pakṣa Gunībhūtavyangyanirāsāya siddhāntitah. Tathā hi-Samāsoktyādau pratīyamānārtho vācyārthoupayiko' pi na svātmani viśrāntim bhājate, pratyāvrtya vācyārthopaskārāya pravrttatvāt. ... Tataśca Gunībhūtavyangye vācyasya svaviśrantatvenārthantaropakāryatvam vyāvartyamiti viśesaņamupapannam. -VVV. I. p. 13.
- 41. Vyaktivādinah punarmate śabdasya śaktyantarasamarthanāt svarūpeņa upādānasya sārthakatvam vivaksyate. Tasya copasarjanīkrtārthatvam višesaņam saprayojanameva. Tathā hi 'dṛṣṭyā Kesava goparāgahrtayā' ityādau pratīyamānasya arthasya śabdasprstatvāt vācyam prati upaskārakatvāt vācyārthāpekṣayā śabdasya gunīkṛtārthatvam nāsti. Tadvyavacchedārtham viśesanam upādeyameva. \_\_VVV. I. pp. 17-18.

42. DL. II. Kārikā 23.

- cirantanairalamkāratantraprajā 43. Atra vyaktivādino'yamāśayah-iha patibhirbhattodbhataprabhrtibhih śabdarthadharma evalamkarah, pratipāditāḥ, nābhidhārmāḥ, yato'rthapratipattyunneyah śabdavyāpārah śabdoccāraņavyāpāro vābhidhā. Na ca tatprakāratvamalamkārānām yuktimat. carutvam hi vaicitrāparapāryām prakāśamānamalamkārah. Na ca śabdoccāranasyārthaprakāśanasya vā cārutvam prakāśate, uccāryamāņasya ca pratipādyamānasya ca cārutvapratīteh. Tena cārutvasya sadbhāvācchabdārthadharmā evālamkārā nyāyāhyā, nābhidhādharmāh. —VVV. I. p. 18.
- 44. Vyankta iti dvivacanenedamāha-Yadyapyavivaksitavācye śabda eva vyañjakastathāpyarthasyāpi sahakāritā na truţyati, anyathā ajñātārtho'pi śabdastadvyañjakah syāt. Vivaksitānyaparavācye ca śabdasyāpi sahakāritvam bhavatyeva, viśistaśabdābhidheyatayā vinā tasyārthasyāvyañjakatvāditi sarvatra śabdarthayorubhayorapi dhvananam vyāpārah. Tena yadbhattanāyakena dvivacanam dūṣitam tadgajanimīlikayaiva. Artha śabdo veti tu vikalpābhidhānam -LC. p. 104. prādhānyābhiprāyeņa.

45. Na so'sti pratyayo loke yassabdanugamadrte/

Anubiddham iva jñānam sarvam śabdena bhāsate//

-VP. I. 124.

Ātmarūpam yathā jñāne jñeyarūpam ca dṛśyate/ Artharūpam tathā śabde svarūpam ca prakāśate//

-VP. I. 50.

46. VVV. I. p. 103.

47. Artho vā śabdo vā vyāpāro vā. Artho'pi vācyo vā dhvanatīti, śabo'pyevam vyangyo vā dhvanyate iti vyāpāro vā śabdārthayordhvananamiti. Karikaya tu pradhanyena samudaya eva kavyarupa mukhyatayā dhvaniriti pratipāditam. —LC. pp. 105-06.

Vyañjakapratītikāle hi niyamena vyangyapratītiriti nāsmākam āśayah. Vyangyapratītikāle tu niyamena vyanjakapratītih bhavati

eva ityāśayena akramatvam vyaktiśca samarthitā.

-VVV. I. p. 58.

-KP. V. p. 254.

49. VVV. I. pp. 58-59.

50. Tasmāt vidyamāna eva vāsanātmā ratyādih sthāyibhāvo vibhāvādibhih sambandhasmaraṇādivyavadhānam antareṇa vyakta iti stithau mukhyam eva vyangyatvam rasasya naupacārikam nāpyanumevamiti tāvat. -VVV. I. p. 59.

51. Tathāvidhābhyām ca tābhyām vyangyasaiva viśesah.

—DL. II. p. 167. 52. Atrocyate. Bhīrurapi Guroḥ Prabhorvā nideśena priyānurāgena anyena caivambhūtena hetunā satyapi bhayakāraņe bhramatītyanaikāntiko hetuh śuno bibhyadapi vīratvena simhānna bibhetīti viruddho'pi Godāvarītire simhasadbhāvah pratyakṣādanumānādvā na niścitah api tu vacanāt, na ca vacanasya prāmānyamasti arthenāpratibandhādityasiddhaśca tat kathamevamvidhāddhetoh sādhyasiddhih.

53. RG. I. pp. 18-19.

- 54. Vyaktivādinā cādhamapadasahāyānāmesām vyañjakatvamuktam. Na cātra adhamatvam pramāņapratipannamiti kathamanumānam. Evamvidhādarthādevamvidho'rtha upapattyanapekṣatve'pi prakāśate iti vyaktivādiņah punastat adūsaņam. -KP. V. p. 256.
- 55. Kiñca evamvidhānām kāvyānām kavipratibhāmātrajanmanām prāmanyanavasyakatvena sandigdhasiddhatvam hetoh.
- -SD. V. Vrtti on K 4. 56. Etena arthāpattivedyatvam api vyangyānām apāstam, arthāpatterapi pūrvasiddhavyāpticchāyām upajīvyaiva pravrtteh.

-SD. V. Vrtti on K. 4.

## CHAPTER VII

1. Vastutastu vaksyamānaśrutisvārasyena ratyādyavacchinnā bhagnāvaraņā Citeva rasah. Sarvathaiva Cāsyā viśistātmano viśesaņam viśesyam vā Cidamśamādāya nityatvam svaprakāśa-katvam ca siddham. Ratyādyamśamādāya tvanityatvamitarabhāsyatvam ca. Carvaṇā cāsya cidgatāvaraṇabhanga eva prāguktā, tadākārantaḥkaranavrttirvā. -Rasagangādhara, I, p. 27. 2. Vṛkṣa iva stabdho divi tiṣṭhatyekastenedam purnam puruṣeṇa sarvam.

Ekadhaivānudraṣṭyavyamettadaprameyam dhruvam. Eṣa sarveśvara eṣa bhūtādhipatireṣa bhūtapālaḥ/ Eṣa seturvidharaṇa eṣām lokānāmasambhedāya. Tadetat preyaḥ putrāt preyo vittāt

Preyo'nyasmāt sarvasmādantarataram yadayamātmā.

-Quoted from Upanisads in 'Dharma', pp. 49-50 by Tagore.

3. Vedāhametam puruṣam mahāntamādityavarṇam tamasah

parastāt/

Tameva viditvātimrtyumeti nānyah pahthā vidyate'-yanāya//

4. Atra kadācid virativihīnaḥ Sumahānomiti nādaḥ, Ekakamantrenāntaratantre

Prollasiti nirvādhah.

Tapaisaikāgnau hutvā bahulam Samapākṛtya vibhedam,

Ekamapūrvam hrdayamudāram

Manujo 'janayadakhedam.

Adya tadārādhanatatsādhana—

makhaśālānām vivṛtam dvāram,

Atra sameşām milanam bhāvyam Niyatam vyānatasīrṣamudāram.

-Gītāñjali, Translated by Mm. Kalipada Tarkacarya, p. 114.

Sanyojaya nikhilaih saha vigatam kuru bandham,
 Sancaraya sakalavidhişu śantam tvacchandam!
 Padakamale mama mānasamacalam kuru he! —Do, p. 6.

 Śa tattvadarśanādeva śāstreşu kathitaḥ kaviḥ/ Darśanāt varṇanāccātha ruḍhā loke kaviśrutiḥ//

-Bhattatauta, quoted by Hemacandra in Kāvyānuśāsana.

7. Eteşām tu darśanam—kaveh yah pratibhātmā prathamaparispandatah tadvyāpārabalopanatah guṇāh. Pratibhāvata eva hi rasābhivyañjanasāmarthyamādhuryādih upanibandhanasāmarthyam, na sāmānyakaveh. Anena śabdena idam vastu varṇayāmītyevambhūtavarnanāparaparyāyadvitīyavyāpārasampādyastvalamkārah. Śabdānamībhih śabdairarthānamībhirarthaih samghaṭayāmītye-vamātmakstu yastrtīyah kaveh parispandah tadhanīnātmalābhādih śabdārthātmakakāvyaśarīrasamśritāni vakṣyamāṇaśleṣādigunadaśakasamabhiñjanavyāpārāṇi śabdārthopasaṃskāra-kalpani kriyarūpānīti yatuktam tatraiva—

Kāvyepyasti tathā kaścit snigdhah sparśorthaśabdayah/yah śleṣādiguṇa....

Atra pakṣe kavivyāpārabhedād Guṇālaṃkāralakṣaṇavibhāgaḥ.
—Abhinavabhārati, p. 380.

8. Viruddhairaviruddhairvā bhāvairvicchidyate na yaḥ/Ātmabhāvaṃ nayatyāśu sa sthāyī lavaṇākaraḥ//

Ciram citte'vatisthante sambadhyante'nubandhibhih/ Rasatvam ye prapadyatne prasiddhāh sthāyino'tra te//

-Quoted in Rasagangādhara, p. 37.

9. Yad yad vibhutimat sattvam śrīmadūrjitameva vā/ Tattadevāvagaccha tvam mama tejo'mśasambham//

-Śrīmadbhagavadgītā, X. 41.

10. Šatyam satyamaye! tadeva racayişyasyām bhuvi tvam tu yat/ Śatyo yo ghaţate na sa vyatikarah sarvo'pi he satkave! Sāketādapi sattaram tava manah śrīrāmajanmasthalāt// —Bhāṣā O' Chanda of Tagore, translated by Sri Durgadas Goswami, Majuṣā, Oct, 1958.

11. Apāre kāvyasamsāre kavireva prajāpatih
Yathāsmai rocate viśvam tathedam parivartate/
Śringārī cet kaviḥ, kāvye jātam rasamayam jagat,
Sa eva vītarāgaścet nīrasam sarvameva tat//
—Śringārokta-vibhāvānubhāva-vyabhicāri-carvaṇārūpa-pratitimayo,
na tu strīvyasanīti mantavyam. ...śringāra-padam rasopalakṣaṇam.
—Dhvanyāloka, IV with Locana.

12. Kaviśaktyarpitā bhāvāstanmayībhāvayuktitāḥ/
yathā sphurantyamī kāvyānna tathādhyakṣataḥ kila//

—Abhinavabhāratī

13. Madhurādirasāsvāde tu viṣaya-sparśavyavadhānam; tato'pi kāvya-nātyādau tadvyavadhānaśūnyatā.

—Iśvarapratyabhijñā-vivṛti-vimarśinī, Vol. 2, Page 180.

Pitā-putra-snuṣā-śvaśrū-dṛsyam yasmāttu nāṭakam/ Tasmādetāni sarvāni varianīyāni yatnatah//

-Abhinavabhāratī.

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